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ERRATA IN VOL. III.

P. 115, line 4, *for* "from the inner to the outer"
read "from the outer to the inner."

P. 141. The note at the foot is without a mark
of reference in the text. Insert this mark after
"older" in line 9 from foot.

P. 169, line 15, *for* "alien" *read* "allied."

SECTION II.

(continued.)

THE CONTENTS OF THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS.

CHAPTER IV.

THEODICY.

WHENCE comes the evil of the world ? This question has stirred the interest of men in all ages, and the attempt to solve it everywhere contributes an important element to the formation both of religious and of philosophical theories. The attempts at a solution fall into three great classes, each of these exhibiting a number of subordinate variations. The cause of evil is sought either in a being outside God and independent of him, which forms a dualistic limitation of the divine power, or in a want in the deity himself, or in a defect which lies only in the creature. In the *first* case the principle of evil may either be a supersensuous spiritual being, an anti-god or anti-gods, a whole realm of them—this is the origin of the belief in devils, of which we spoke in our second chapter—or it may be an impersonal being, such as fate, an impersonal power confronting the gods and limiting their power; or it may be an entirely unspiritual substance, like matter, this cosmogonic element of philosophical theories. In the *second* case, the reason of evil in God may be a defect in his thinking: thus, in the legend of the Kamtschatkans evil came from the stupidity of the Creator of the world, who was only prevented by his wife, who is cleverer than himself, from perpetrating still greater follies; and similarly, in the most recent pessimism, it is the irrationality of the blind will of the unconscious

that is accountable for the evil of the world. Or the reason may lie in the evil will of God, his envy, which cannot allow the human race to enjoy unmixed good, his jealousy, which regards man's efforts after higher civilisation as an encroachment on the privileges of deity, and visits them with evils: this we shall find in the Greek legend, and echoes of the same idea occur in the oldest Hebrew legend too. In the *third* case, finally, the reason of evil may either be a natural imperfection necessarily connected with the nature of the creature, or a free moral transgression. The latter may be sought either in a transgression of man against the deity at the beginning—under this head come the efforts of the early age after civilisation which, though in themselves legitimate, were dangerous from their bold disregard of man's natural limitations,—or in the gradual deterioration of the race as the generations sank down into an ever more savage state; or, finally, in the personal transgressions of the separate individuals; and these transgressions of individuals, which bring about individual evils, may be sought either in their present life or in a former life, a state of pre-existence whether extramundane or mundane (the latter in the theories of the fall of souls in heaven, and of metempsychosis). We may expect to find in the legends of different peoples manifold combinations and interweavings of these theories with each other. In the first place, this belongs to the very nature of such attempted explanations; in the second, the union of disparate theories in the same legend reflects the successive stages of religious development in which it was elaborated; and in the third place, even popular legend assumes new forms under the influence of the successive interpretations and developments of speculation. The most perfect examples of all these processes are to be found collected in Greek legend and speculation; and we begin with it in this chapter, especially as what bears on the present question in the lower nature-religions has already been treated of in connection with the belief in demons (vol. iii. p. 307 *sqq.*).

According to the Hesiodic legend of the ages of man, there lived in the golden age, under the rule of Kronos, a happy race of men, free from cares and troubles, in unbroken youth and cheerfulness,

amid a superfluity of the gifts which the earth of itself afforded them,—not immortal indeed, but knowing death only as a gentle slumber. When this race died out, Zeus made them good spirits, which flit about men. Then the gods created the silver age; the men of which were not equal to their predecessors either in strength or in disposition, but luxurious and arrogant and refractory even towards the gods: wherefore Zeus destroyed them and made them demons. Then followed the age of brass, hard and warlike, which destroyed itself in insensate ragings. Finally came the present age, that of iron, which has to win its support laboriously from the soil, and in the constant struggle for existence falls always lower morally, casts off faith and shame, and keeps nothing but evil. No real reason can be seen for this gradual descent of man; it is a natural process, a necessity of fate, which may be regarded as “a parallel and concomitant phenomenon of the theogonic development of the world” (Preller). Of a totally different character is the group of legends about *Prometheus*. He is the Titan in whom the power of human intelligence, of the spirit of invention and the impulse towards civilisation, by which man seeks to equal the gods, is embodied. His strength does not lie in rude physical power; hence in the struggle between the Titans, the rude nature-spirits, and the gods, the representatives and upholders of the reasonable world-order, he stood on the side of the latter. But when the gods had gained the victory and the world was divided, and unfortunate man was deprived by Zeus of his proper share, and even dedicated to destruction, then the clever demigod Prometheus took up the cause of men, and managed to procure for them the weapon by which, though deserted by the gods, they might prevail in the hard struggle for existence; he stole the heavenly fire which Zeus had jealously reserved, and gave it to men as an instrument for all sorts of industrial pursuits and devices, by which they obtained rule over nature. But, for this advance in human civilisation, thus craftily procured in spite of nature and the gods, the bringer of this gift and the whole of humanity had to do bitter penance; the former, the type of the heroic, energetic human spirit, was fixed by Zeus to a rock in the desert, where the eagle of

Zeus daily plucked out his liver (the organ of insatiable desire), which daily grew again, till at last the divine hero Heracles frees the human sufferer Prometheus from the bonds and torments into which he had been cast by the bold striving of a human mind restlessly seeking to be equal to the gods, and yet impotently confined by the limits of its finitude. But the rest of the race too had to suffer for the act by which its leader had made civilisation possible ; the gods sent Pandora to men, a woman adorned with all the charms of the goddesses, and gave her for her dower a box of unknown contents. In spite of the forebodings of Prometheus and his warnings against the Danaan gift of the gods, his brother Epimetheus, the type of weak, unreasonable, sensuous human nature, appropriated the charming present of the treacherous gods, and the sad consequences of his act at once appeared. Out of Pandora's mysterious box there flew abroad into the world all the evils, especially all the sicknesses, which had till then been strange to the natural and healthy life of mankind ; and only hope was left to men to comfort them in their afflictions. The legend of Prometheus, with that of Heracles, is one of the most profound and suggestive in all mythology ; and its meaning is not difficult to read : Evils are a result of civilisation, which, while on one side a beneficent and salutary, indeed an indispensable, achievement of the human mind, yet on the other side involves a breach with the simplicity of the narrow and limited nature-life. By outstepping the natural limits of man's life, and seeking after a wisdom and a power like that of the gods, it ministers both to man's arrogant self-deification and to his sensuous greed and love of pleasure, and in both ways draws down upon him the punishments of the enraged deity.

The Nature-philosophy of Greece was not led to enter into the question of the origin of evil ; but the Socratic thinkers could not avoid it, as they saw the principle of the world in the deity, which Plato regarded as the supreme good, Aristotle as perfect thought. From the nature of such a cause it appears that only a perfectly good world might be expected ; but in both philosophers the deity, the idea, thought, is not the sole cause of the world ; by its side

matter stands ; and though in relation to the idea, or form, which alone is real, it may be a mere not-being, a quite undetermined being, a mere possibility of definite being, yet it has enough reality to oppose such a resistance to the working of reason, that the ideas, the ends, can only be imperfectly realised, because they find in the necessity of material existence a limitation they can never entirely overcome. Hence the world is not perfectly good, but only good so far as the deity was able to make it good according to the nature of matter, which had to be made use of. Especially is the material body, according to Plato, a fetter and a prison for the soul of man, not only foreign to the soul's true supersensuous being, but entirely hindbersome to it ; before its earthly birth the soul existed in a higher life, gazing on the idea in the choir of the gods ; but by allowing that part of itself which was affected by desire—(it had then such a part from the beginning)—to gain the upper hand of its rational part, it sinks down out of the world of the ideas into the world of the senses, and is planted in an earthly body. By this combination so much sensuousness and passion and unreason attaches to the purer nature of the soul, that it is disfigured and becomes scarcely recognisable ; the ideas, in the contemplation of which it lived before, it now forgets, and it can only by degrees raise itself again out of the error of sensuous appearance and the unrest of sensuous desires to the recollection of the eternal true being and of the highest good. “ So long therefore as we have the body with us, and the soul is coupled with this evil, we can never perfectly attain the goal of our (true, higher) desire, viz., truth.” The material body, therefore, which hinders us from the true good, and is the occasion, the stimulus and the instrument of all low desires, is the ground-evil, from which we must wish to be freed as soon as possible ; only with death does the higher life begin, but preparations can be made for it beforehand by philosophic self-liberation from sense. From this view there is manifestly but a short step to the conclusion drawn by Philo that matter is the principle of evil ; but Plato did not take this step ; with him the origin of evil is in the soul itself, it is the soul's own desire that draws it down into

material corporeity ; so that the latter is not the principle, but only the form of manifestation, of the soul's evil, which however helps greatly to confirm and to augment that evil. But though evil is thus unavoidable in the material world, Plato is deeply penetrated with the conviction that the merciful deity has arranged and rules all things for the best ; that goodness and badness surely find, whether inwardly or outwardly, in this world or the next, their just compensation ; that to him especially who loves God all things that come from God work together for good, even evils themselves, in so far as they are not the punishments of former sins ; though apparent evils descend on him, yet "all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death ; for the gods have a care of any one whose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain his likeness ; if he is like God, he will surely not be neglected by him" (*Rep.* x. 613).

The ideas of this Platonic theodicy were further worked out by the later *Stoics*, whose monistic view of the world however caused them to differ from Plato in making that necessity of nature, which gives rise to evils, not a limiting barrier of the purpose and the reason of the world-order, but the means through which it is consummated. *Ætiologically* considered, evils are in the view of the *Stoics* a necessity, being inevitable accessory consequences of the laws by which the world-order is constituted. As all that is good in the world is based on these laws, it is impossible to remove out of the whole those evils which also proceed from the same laws, without destroying the good at the same time ; the two are so inseparably interwoven in the world that each can only exist along with its opposite and through it. This is true of moral evils too ; they are so bound up with the virtues, as the opposite to be overcome, that the virtue could not work itself out without the evil. But just because he knows that all things, evils too, came about according to eternal laws, which the perfect divine reason has ordained, the wise man nowhere sees blind chance or irrational fate, but the salutary government, which aims at the best, of divine providence. The Roman *Stoics* especially, a Seneca, a Marcus Aurelius, an Epictetus,

give beautiful expression to this thought in a great variety of ways. Thus Seneca¹ says: "I do nothing under compulsion, I do not obey God slavishly, I freely consent with him, and that the more readily because I know that all things come about in accordance with fixed and eternal laws." "What folly is it, rather to be dragged than to follow! We are born citizens of the divine kingdom; to obey God is liberty. I follow Him not because I must, but from my heart." Misfortune too is only the occasion of virtue, the means to exercise and strengthen virtue. "Those in whom He is well pleased, whom He loves, God hardens and braces, He visits them; He disciplines them; those to whom He appears indulgent and forbearing, them He is reserving as weaklings for future evils. God is fatherly disposed towards the good, he loves them with a manly love, and says: Let them be disciplined by labour, pain, and loss, that they may acquire true strength! A spectacle worthy of God is the brave man struggling with adversity. In the absence of adversaries courage turns soft." As the brave man therefore knows beforehand that evils too are not meant to be against him but for him, he does not lose his composure when they come to him, but continues faithful to himself and overcomes all outward things, offering to fortune a serene brow. "All that is adverse he regards as means of discipline, and what true man would not rejoice in exertion, or would not be prepared for the dangerous fight? to what man of activity would idleness be anything but a punishment? Thus to the good man evil itself becomes a true and inwardly wholesome good; as, conversely, to the natural man outward goods often prove an inner evil and a curse. Hence to the pious Epictetus the theoretical question of theodicy passes at last into a practical exhortation: "Only dare to look up to God, and to say, 'Make use of me as thou wilt, thy will is also mine, I am thine, I refuse nothing that pleases thee; lead me wherever thou wilt!' For I consider what God wills to be better than what I will. This way leads to freedom, this way alone is redemption from slavery!"²

¹ *De providentia*, v. 4-6; iv. 7; ii. 1-6. *Vita beata*, xv. 6. Epist. xvi. 2.

² Dissert. ii. 16, 42; iv. 7, 20; 1, 131.

In *Indian* speculation, similarly, evils have a necessary basis in the being of the world, but they are not mere accessory consequences of the reasonable constitution of the world, which as such may and should be means towards good; to the pessimistic mood of the Brahman and the Buddhist, evils appear as the true kernel of all existence, only to be removed with the cessation of the finite itself. All life is pain, and the desire to live, the cleaving of desire to existence and to the world of sense, this is the fundamental evil, the original sin, which punishes itself throughout the endless cycle of enforced suffering. Such a non-theological, softly sensitive way of thinking cannot attain to the thought of the conquest of evil and its transmutation into a means of good; all it can think of is the alleviation of evils by mercifulness to individual sufferers; or, even more, flight from the domain of painful phenomena to the mystic beyond of the extinguished will, of ascetic self-mortification and quiet apathy, or of Nirvana. With this esoteric speculation, however, both Brahmanism and Buddhism associated the exoteric dogma, that every suffering is the retributive consequence of a man's own guilt, incurred in this or in a previous existence, a punishment which infallibly follows every act sooner or later, from the inexorable necessity of the causal connection of all that takes place. A mystical distortion, this, of the profound truth of the moral world-order, which, moreover, is not based here on the belief in a real divine power and guiding providence.

The view which regards evil as the retribution following upon human guilt was everywhere a solution of the problem to which the religious consciousness readily turned, based as it is psychologically on the connection of the God-consciousness with the conscience which judges our acts. The particular manner, however, in which evil and guilt were supposed to be connected with each other was capable of very different interpretations, and depended on the general character of a religion. With the Brahmans, whom the Buddhists followed in this point also, retribution was conceived as an individual affair; quite in the spirit of their abstract idealism, the individual life is detached from the concrete conditions of its connection with nature

and with society, and regarded as a whole, shut off by itself, in which what is done and what is suffered are said accurately to correspond. But as daily experience contradicts such a position, the doctrine of transmigration is brought in, and the ground of present evils sought in prior modes of existence, with regard to which, however, there can be no moral accountability. Thus did the dark and unknowable former existence make it impossible to arrive at any clear or sound judgment of the actual world and the actual self. Quite different was the form assumed by the idea of retribution on the soil of a historical and theological view of the world, such as that of the Persian, but more specially of the Jewish and the Christian religion. The position of the *Persian* religion with regard to the question of the origin of evil is quite a peculiar one; in part it explains it mythologically, from the power of the hostile spirit Ahriman (vol. iii. p. 314); in part ethically, from a transgression of the first men, which began with lying and idolatrous thoughts, then grew more pronounced in the selfish efforts of civilisation, and was consummated in the worship of the devil, by which man suffered the power of the spirits hostile to God to prevail over himself and over the earth. In so far, therefore, as the evils experienced in the world are due not only to the former transcendent cause, but also to a cause which is historical and moral, they may be overcome by moral effort, and to do this is the task of the historical community of Ahuramazda; and thus evils though in themselves of anti-divine, devilish origin, become in their turn the means of the divine world-order; they call forth that exercise of moral activity which is pleasing to God, and that not only in the case of individual wise men, as with the Stoics, but for the whole of the members of the society which is engaged in the service of God.

In the *Biblical* narrative of the "Fall" (Gen. iii.), the prophetic narrator works up old legendary materials¹ in the ethical spirit of prophetism. Even the scene of the action, the "garden of Eden," with its four streams, points to the Babylonian home of the legend. In the

¹ Schrader: *Cuneiform Inscriptions, etc.*, i. p. 37 sqq. Delitzsch: *Wo lag das Paradies?* 1882. Dillmann: *Commentar zur Genesis*, 1885.

two trees, the "tree of life," and the "tree of knowledge," we have to recognise a Hebrew doubling of the sacred tree of the Assyrian monuments. The apple plays a considerable part in Greek and German mythology, now as a love-token, now as an object of strife (Eris-apple); a bite of an apple was fatal to Persephone, and bound her to the under-world; and it is by eating the Idun-apples that the German gods renew their youth. The serpent on the tree, which in the Hebrew narrative plays the part of the tempter, frequently occurs in Greek and German legend, as the dragon who watches over the golden apples (of the Hesperides, for example), or who robs them. That it had a part in the Babylonian legend too, appears from several representations on the monuments, one particularly deserving attention, in which a man and a woman are stretching out their hands towards fruit hanging on the tree (there a bunch of dates), while a serpent is creeping upwards behind the woman. The similarity of this situation with that of the Bible narrative is very obvious, and we must allow it to be at least very probable that this representation refers to the fall, though no positive certainty is attainable on the subject, because we are not yet acquainted with the Babylonian form of the legend of the fall. It was, no doubt, myths of this kind (we are not here concerned with their original meaning), which were worked up into an ethical form in Hebrew literature; the inaccessible and dangerous character of the fruit being traced to a divine prohibition to eat of it. The motive of this prohibition was not merely, in the original meaning of the legend, to provide a trial of the virtue of the first parents, but the fear that by eating of the fruit they might come to possess a knowledge too high for mortals. The word of the serpent when trying to persuade Eve—"God knows, that on the day on which ye eat thereof, your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil"—cannot be regarded as a mere deceitful pretence, since God himself confirms the statement after the act has been done: "See, man is become like one of us, so that he knows good and evil," words which the context does not allow us to interpret as mere irony. The original meaning of the narrative is therefore simply this: The

origin of the evils of human life to be found in the transgression by the first men of the divine prohibition which had denied to them the higher knowledge, like that of the Gods, the knowledge, namely, of good and evil. The knowledge of good and evil is the knowledge of what is becoming and unbecoming to man; the first result of his eating the forbidden fruit was that man found it unbecoming for him to be naked. But this knowledge is nothing but the most elementary elevation of man above mere nature, the first dawning of the consciousness of supersensuous destiny which makes him higher than the beasts,—in fact, the first stirring of the impulse towards civilisation. In so far, then, this knowledge was a progress beyond the naïve innocence of the state of nature; but it was at the same time a breach with the unity of nature, a loss of its happy simplicity and of undisturbed converse with the deity. With the beginning of self-knowledge and of civilisation, the first step of which is the covering of his nakedness, man sacrificed the happiness and innocence of the state of nature, and as with every further advance of civilisation, as described in Genesis iv.-xi., he increases his emancipation, he also increases his alienation from the highest good, from the peace of simplicity and of the fear of God. "It is the yearning cry that goes through all the peoples; as they advance to civilisation they feel the value of the goods they have sacrificed for it" (Wellhausen). We have here, in fact, what finds expression everywhere, with the Persians and the Greeks too (the Prometheus-legend), namely, the view that the entrance on the path of civilisation could not take place without violating the divine will, was a self-willed overstepping of the God-imposed limits of human life, not without an arrogant, Titanic attempt to assume the likeness of God. And however certain it is that man is made for civilisation, who will deny that it has that dark side? Thus the narrative of the fall, if we take it in its original sense, and not in that which dogma has imposed on it, contains the profound thought of which the modern philosophy of history has seen in it the symbol, that the civilisation of mankind has a two-fold aspect, both with respect to immediate happiness, and

with respect to the moral and religious judgment to be passed on it.¹ It must be conceded, that the unanimous voice of the legends of the peoples does not, as we are accustomed to do, give precedence to the optimist, but to the pessimist side. Yet the former is not entirely wanting; in the Greek legend, for example, of the fatal gift of Pandora, hope was left to comfort the human race; and in the Bible narrative, when the first pair are expelled from Paradise, the hope is given to cheer them on their toilsome and painful way, that the head of the serpent will one day be crushed.

The narrative of Genesis iii. explains the origin, not of the sin, but of the evils, of mankind, as a punishment of the disobedience of their first parents. In the rest of the Old Testament, there is no mention of this explanation, except in the late Book of Wisdom. The general ills of the human lot, as well as the transitoriness of man's life on the earth, and even his moral weakness and impurity, are often traced to the fleshly nature of the human race,² and thus regarded as having a natural and necessary basis in human nature (this is not inconsistent with Genesis iii. 19 *seqq.*, as immortality is not there assumed to be a natural attribute of man, but a later consequence of partaking of the tree of life, which he is driven out of Eden to prevent him from doing). Special and conspicuous evils on the contrary are regarded both in the exhortations of the prophets and in the theory underlying their histories, as an expression of the divine wrath, God visiting with definite penalties those who transgress his ordinances. According to the old view, it is not only those immediately guilty who are visited; the guilt of the fathers is punished in their children and their grandchildren. Only Jeremiah and Ezekiel, speaking in view of the ruin of the theocratic popular life, rejected the earlier view of the solidarity and community of guilt, and set up the principle of personal responsibility and of re-

¹ Compare Schiller: *Ueber die erste Menschengesellschaft nach dem Leitfaden der mosaïschen Urkunde*; similar views in Hegel's *Religionsphilosophie*, i. 192. Of theologians Wellhausen may be named as one of the few who understand, clearly and naturally, the original meaning of the narrative.

² Genesis vi. 3; Job xiv. 1-4; iv. 17 *seqq.*; Psalm ciii. 14.

pentance as a task to be engaged in by individuals, each for himself.¹ But this brought new difficulties into view for the doctrine of retribution. So long as this idea was only applied to the people as a whole, it was not difficult to work it out; for experience also showed the fortunes of the people to be directly connected for the most part with its moral and religious behaviour. But when the doctrine of retribution came to be applied personally, and to teach that outward fortune accurately corresponds to moral desert in the life of each individual, it was impossible to overlook the fact that experience contradicts in many ways such an assumption, and then the problem presented itself of reconciling the contradiction between the sufferings of good men, which experience reports, and the assumed retributive justice of God,—the problem of Theodicy which forms the subject of the didactic poem of *Job*.

The first way which presented itself of escaping from the difficulty was to deny that any such contradiction really existed; either it could be asserted that the sufferer was not innocent, except in appearance, and that he had committed secret sins which were the reason of the penal sufferings he endured; or it could be said that his sufferings were merely apparent; they could be represented as a mere passing trial sent to prove him, and certain to lead to his greater happiness in the sequel, as conversely the apparent happiness of the ungodly only prepared for them a deeper fall. Both these positions are taken up by *Job's* friends; first, they cast doubt upon his righteousness, and urge him to bethink himself of his secret sin; and then again they comfort the sufferer by assuming that he is innocent, and bidding him look forward to a speedy end of his trial, and a glorious restoration of his fortune; and this actually takes place at the conclusion of the story of the book. But both these explanations are rejected as inadequate. Against the first the moral self-consciousness of the righteous man protests: he denies that he is guilty of any special sins for which he should deserve such exceptional sufferings. The latter is disproved by the fact of common experience that the misfortunes of the good man, the prosperity of

¹ Jer. xxxi. 29 *seq.*; Ezek. xviii. xxxiii. 12 *seqq.*

the ungodly, by no means always change before their death (xxi. 23). In view of this fact the religion of the Old Testament, which hoped for earthly good from the recompensing righteousness and faithfulness of God, had no resource but dumb resignation, which makes up its mind that it cannot understand the hidden counsels of God, and must not strive to do so. "Shall he that cavilleth contend with the Almighty? Behold, I am of small account, what shall I answer thee? I lay my hand upon my mouth, I will not answer. I have uttered that which I understood not, things too wonderful for me, which I knew not!" (xl. 2-5; xlii. 3.)

None but the very deepest piety, however, can support this position of dumb resignation. Doubts which have merely been beaten down generally raise up their heads again, and if they are not solved, lead to general scepticism. The latter is the case in the "*Preacher*," who despairs of a solution of the hard contradictions of life, and falls back on the practical wisdom of a moderate enjoyment of life, restrained by the fear of God. At a later time, from *Daniel* onwards, the belief in the resurrection made it possible to hope that the retribution and compensation which this life had not afforded would take place in the next. Here, it is true, the spirit of service for reward, of which there is always a danger in connection with any doctrine of retribution, was not got rid of; indeed, it was rather intensified by the attention directed to the miraculous world of the resurrection, as we see from Pharisaism, which kept account and reckoning of all the sufferings of the just as so many receipts or notes of exchange to be honoured in heaven. Much higher than such a calculating piety is that *ethical and teleological* mode of view, which, regardless of all outward retribution or compensation, sees the value of sufferings in the salutary moral influence they exert immediately on the sufferer and the society about him. This deeper turn of theodicy, too, is by no means unknown to the Old Testament; it was based, in fact, in the whole historical and teleological character of the religion, which represents even the punishments of God's judicial righteousness as by no means inconsistent with his faithfulness to his covenant, but as meant to be the means of chastening

and sifting the impure covenant people in order to restore the true and God-pleasing covenant community. Through the whole of prophetism, therefore, there is combined with the idea of primitive retributive evil, that of salutary and chastening suffering, though the idea applies, it is true, to the people as a whole ; and the expectation is thus held fast of the outward restoration of the people after its discipline has been accomplished. But afterwards, when religious reflection came to concern itself more with the life of the individual, the afflictions of individuals too could be placed under this idea of salutary discipline, and the meaning and purpose of them be seen just in their moral effects as means towards virtue, quite irrespective of outward retribution or reward. This is exemplified in a number of fine expressions in the Books of Wisdom.¹ In times again, like those of the exile or the period of the Maccabees, it was seen how the best had to endure the sorest personal trials, and to suffer for the guilt of all, to which they had contributed least, and how yet this fortune did not shake their faith ; but their faithful perseverance amidst all that was laid upon them was a blessing for those around them, a rock of strength for those who were cast down, an earnest of healing and restoration for the whole people of God ; and this experience led to the great thought that the sufferings of the innocent had a wider than merely individual meaning, that all were interested in them, and that they pointed forward to a benefit for all, that they possessed a healing power for the moral life and history of the whole community. The great Unknown of the exile first gave classical expression to this thought (chap. liii.). In Christianity this teleological view of suffering was the prevailing one ; in view of the typical sufferings of Christ it could not but be so : in the *cross of Christ* the Christian sees the curse which in the world's judgment rests on those who are unhappy, for ever lifted off them, and even the hardest lot sanctified as a means of grace in the execution of God's loving purpose : knowing himself to be a child of God, he knows that "to them that love God all things work together for good" (Rom. viii. 28 ; v. 4).

¹ Prov. iii. 2 ; xv. 33. Sirach ii. 1 *seqq.* Compare also Job v. 17.

Yet it was only for the practical religion of the Christian that death had thus lost its sting, and suffering its penal character. As for the theoretical question of the origin of evil, the theory maintained itself which had been worked out in Jewish dogmatics, on the assumptions of legal retribution. In the Old Testament writings the story of the fall is never used for doctrinal purposes; but rabbinical theology could not fail to make use of such an interpretation of the evils of the world, accurately as it fitted the assumption of that theology that all evil is the consequence of sin. The first trace of this is met in the Book of Wisdom, which (ii. 23) represents death, which, according to the old Hebrew view, was based in the nature of man as a fleshly being, as having come into the world from the envy of the devil, which means that the devil (who is now seen behind the serpent) out of envy seduced the first men to sin, and that death became the doom of humanity as a punishment for sin. And not only death, but also the "impulse to evil" though present from the first in the nature of man as a creature of sense, came, the Rabbinical theology teaches, to the universal prevalence experience shows it to have among men, only in consequence of the sin of the first parents; so that the whole present state of mankind, as it is subject to the power of sin and death, is on the one side the natural consequence of man's fleshly nature, but, on the other side, the positive penal consequence of a historical first transgression. It is certainly difficult to hold both these views at once without contradiction; but it is characteristic both of the theology of Palestine and of the Alexandrian speculation of Judaism, that they are always found in combination.

Essentially the same doctrine was taught by the apostle *Paul*, who naturally could not deny his Jewish theological training, and determined the Christian theory upon the subject. With him also there are two views standing side by side without any attempt to harmonise them.¹ First, it is the transgression of Adam, by which sin came into the world, and death by sin, and the two came to be a dominating power over mankind, in virtue of a divine penal sentence,

¹ Rom. v. 12-21, with vii.-viii. 13; 1 Cor. xv. 45-50, and frequently.

which, to punish the guilt of its head, condemned the whole race of man to the strict ward of sin and death. Secondly, however, sin and death are based on the fleshly nature of man, because it belongs to the nature of flesh, the sensuous, selfish nature-life, both to resist the spiritual law of reason and of God, or to be sinful, and also to be subject to the natural law of the finite, of the world, or to be mortal. The two theories agree, however, in this: that subjection to sin and death is a universal and, now at least, an involuntary condition of man's life. But this necessity of sin and death is only one side with Paul; the other side has to be taken along with it, that both alike are ordained by God with a view to the redemption he intends, that therefore they only constitute that condition of need of redemption, which is to be terminated in the actual redemption by Christ (Gal. iii. and iv.; Romans ix.-xi.). Here lies the theodicy of this apostle, in which the Isaianic anticipations of the theology of the divine world-government find a majestic fulfilment in the universalism of the all-embracing wisdom and love of God, which make even the disobedience and errors of man subserve their saving purposes. But that profoundly earnest view of the world, which with Paul clothed itself in the doctrine borrowed from Jewish dogmatics, of the universal rule of sin and death inherited by man from Adam, pervades the whole of the New Testament. The apostle's cry of pain, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" finds an echo in the whole contemporary literature of his time, even in that of the Greek and Roman world, as a glance into the writings of the Platonists, the Neo-Pythagoreans, and the Stoics of the empire, may show us. It was natural that minds which were inclined to theosophy should seek to trace the wretched state of the world, of which they were so keenly aware, to deeper, transcendental roots. This effort produced the notion-mythologies of the Gnosticism of the second century. But the Johannine theology too of the fourth Gospel and the cognate epistles of the New Testament was not content to find the origin of the world's evil in a historical human occurrence such as the act of Adam, but saw in it a manifestation of the mysterious discord which had run through the spiritual world from the begin-

ning; the historical antithesis between the community of the faithful and a hostile world was a mere sign of the metaphysical conflict of essences between light and darkness, the Son of God and Satan, the children of God and the children of the devil. But, as with Paul, the historical antithesis of the elect and the reprobate finally disappears in the universalism of grace, which has concluded all in unbelief, that it might have mercy upon all, so with John too we see above the conflict of a divided world the reconciling unity of God, who loved the world, and gave his Son for it, and the world-conquering power of the Logos, the one mediator and ultimate end of the whole creation. Thus there rose above the *Pessimism* which formed the prevailing mood of the period the glad and believing *Optimism* of the Christian tidings of redemption, the victorious watchword of the future.

Each of these two tendencies forms an essential element of the Christian consciousness; and the problem of finding a dogmatic method of reconciling them engaged the attention of Christian theology from the fifth century onwards. In Manichæan dualism the early Church encountered the heretical extreme of the pessimistic view of the world; that system declared human nature to be so devilish and bad that the very possibility of redemption seemed to be taken away as well as all moral accountability. The Fathers of the Church clung the more firmly to that antique optimism, according to which human nature is essentially good, and evil is only a defect, a weakness which by no means does away with the freedom of the will for goodness, but, on the contrary, can be overcome by the efforts of the will when assisted by proper instruction. Death, too, appeared to some of the Fathers, especially the Alexandrians, to be a natural and salutary lot for earthly human nature, with its sensual inclinations. This teaching was not at first impugned; but when it was advanced by *Pelagius* with such distinctness as to appear to cast doubt on the necessity of the church provision for salvation, a reaction was called forth in the African church, of which the acute theologian *Augustine* made himself the spokesman. In his earlier contests with the Manichæans, whose dark and fantastic mythology

at the same time had not been without attraction for him, he had been the champion of freewill and of the imputation of evil; and to refute dualism he had also maintained the Greek theory of the mere negativity and relativity of all evil, evil being merely the shadow which necessarily accompanies the light to make up the world-whole. But if he had not approved of that pessimism, neither could he now approve of the Pelagian optimism. It appeared to him to be in conflict with all the assumptions of faith: redemption by Christ, the sole saving efficacy of the Church's means of grace, the necessity of infant baptism for salvation; in conflict too with the facts of our moral consciousness. For evil is, according to Augustine, not mere weakness or sensual inclination; it is the fundamentally perverted direction of our will, which, instead of finding its centre in the love of God, rather in its self-love and its love of the world deifies the creature, and withdraws from the Creator the honour which is due to Him; but a will thus poisoned to the very root by pride and selfishness, whose love is turned away from God to the transitory, can bring forth nothing truly good in detail; it is free to evil only, and destitute of all power for good; even its apparent virtues are in reality only splendid sins; any good it has can only come to it through God's redeeming grace, as it is conveyed by the means of grace in the hands of the Church. The latter are the more necessary, as the state of perfect wretchedness and weakness now described is not only, as it were, an evil, a sickness, a defect calling for pity, but involves guilt, and is worthy of damnation. For though to the individual an involuntary inheritance, it yet originally proceeds from guilt freely incurred, namely, from the sin of Adam, who, while he was created in perfect wisdom, holiness, and blessedness, and lived in Paradise a life of bliss, free from all the defects and needs of the earth, yet, with an arrogance deserving to be punished, fell away from God, and by this abuse of his freedom committed, as it were, moral suicide, completely lost his better nature, and was delivered over to the dominion of evil desires, to the conflict between flesh and spirit, to the influences of demons, to the evils of natural life, to the necessity of death, and finally to the judgment of eternal damnation

in hell. Thus, according to Augustine, mankind since the fall of Adam forms a universal "mass of corruption," in which there are no differences between good and bad which need to be considered, on which there rests the infinite responsibility for a damnable first transgression, and from which, therefore, those only can be saved whom God in his decree before the beginning of time has of his uncaused grace predestined to salvation. Thus absolute predestination or election of grace forms the crown of this doctrine, as the free transgression of Adam is the basis on which it is built. That the former position is inconsistent with the latter no one can fail to see; nor that the assertion of an inherited original sin is inconsistent with the moral consciousness which makes every individual feel himself to be responsible for his own free action. What Augustine puts forward by way of reconciling these positions with each other, namely, that we all (virtually) took part in Adam's sin is, of course, empty dialectic and no more. That this doctrine yet received the approval of the Church, and became, and continued to be, a prevailing dogma of the Church, may be ascribed to two reasons. The first is that of its ecclesiastical usefulness: it seconded the efforts being made at the time to extend the power of the Church, and to develop the organisation of the hierarchy, and offered the necessary dogmatic substructure for these processes. But it also contained a relative truth of permanent value; it embodied what we may call the Pauline depth of the moral consciousness, the insistence on what is deepest in man; it understood the cardinal Christian truth, that it is the heart and its loving that determine man's value or want of value, and at the same time his weal or woe. The former was the Catholic side of Augustinian doctrine, which made it of such fundamental importance for the Mediæval church; the latter is the evangelical side of it, and was brought prominently forward by the Reformation. To free the pearl entirely from its hard shell is the task, not yet fulfilled, of Protestant theology.

Modern philosophy can do much to help her in this task. In philosophy, too, we meet, only in another form, the antithesis found in the history of dogma, the Pelagian underestimate, the Manichæan

exaggeration, of evil, and the two tendencies which seek to mediate between these. On the former side are the theories of Spinoza, Leibniz, Shaftesbury, etc. The thinker who went furthest in this onesidedness was *Spinoza*, who declared the notions "good and evil" to be mere subjective notions of reflection, which we form by arbitrary comparison of things with each other; nothing, he taught, is evil in itself, there is merely an accidental want of something that exists elsewhere: blindness, for example, is merely a want,—we compare it with the seeing of others. According to him evil is merely a want of power or of reality, since good or virtue consists in the power to maintain one's own being. Thus stated, the assertion is purely naturalistic; it is qualified by the further assertion that the true being of man is being reasonable, or knowledge, and evil thus comes to consist in a defect of reason or of insight, as with *Schleiermacher* it consists in a want or a weak state of God-consciousness. These statements are manifestly inadequate; they arise from the fundamental error of Spinozism, its a-teleological causalism, or its refusal to recognise the inner end as the law of the formation and the life of all beings. The problem of theodicy was dealt with more thoroughly and more cautiously, if not altogether satisfactorily, by *Leibniz*, in the book bearing that name. He also sees in limitation or privation the metaphysical origin of evil, the root both of physical pains and of moral wickedness: the latter consists in the want of the higher effort which is directed to true good, and that want is connected with want of insight. Evil, including moral evil, is not itself willed by God, but as it is an unavoidable accessory consequence of the production of good, it is permitted by God as a feature of the best world, and as a means to the attainment of greater goods. It is one of those discords which, introduced at the right place, make the harmony more impressive; it is also in many instances a mere appearance, due to our human shortsightedness. He, at least, is not to be praised, who, like discontented citizens, utters nothing but complaints about the divine government of the world. *Schelling* remarks on this Leibnizian explanation of evil from finiteness or limitation, that it is insufficient, and arises from an unliving notion of the positive:

the positive is rather the whole, or unity; its real contrary is not mere negation, but division, disharmony, ataxy of forces. Even a century before the *Theodicy* of Leibniz, *Jakob Böhme* had found the origin of evil to consist in this, that the one will, in order to become manifest, sensitive, and operative, must carry itself into a number of different *centra*, the self-willing of which gives rise at first to strife, clash of wills, and anxiety, but only to the end that in the overcoming and flooding it in the eternal will from which it sprang, the life of goodness and love should become manifest. With this profound thought, which Schelling took up again in his doctrine of freedom, the question of theodicy had entered on the right path; evil is not to be explained from the empty notion of being and its limits, and as little from the notion of pure thought, as logical idealism fancies: it can only be explained from the nature of will, from the relation of the one whole will to the self-willing of the many will-centres, of the reason-will to the unreasonable self-will. As the Panlogism of *Hegel*, which holds nothing to be real but reason, conducts to a false optimism, so the Panthelism of *Schopenhauer*, which knows nothing but the irrational will, conducts to pessimism. If there is such a thing as goodness, and if goodness is to be regarded as the power which rules the world, then the principle of the world is reason; so far Hegel is right. But if there is really such a thing as evil, not merely in appearance, but as a reality, to be earnestly contended with and overcome, then the subject of this reality must be will,—so far Schopenhauer is right,—will carried out to differentness, will distinguished from reason, and manifesting itself as the self-willing of the individual will-centres. The question is to find the proper connection of these two sides; both the religion and the philosophical history of the problem of theodicy point to this conclusion.

To be faithful to the critico-genetic method we have hitherto followed, we must not set out from the transcendental question how evil is related to God, or how we can explain its presence in the world, and reconcile it with the world-order; we simply ask in the

first place what evil is as we know it in our consciousness, what experiences of our heart those are, which lead us to the problem of theodicy? Now the experiences which give us pain are notoriously many in number, and vary in kind, from the pains accompanying the first sensations of the new-born child, to the pain at parting of the old man who is leaving the world weary of life; were we to consider them all separately there would be no end of it, and for the question we have in hand little would be gained thereby. It will be better if we select out of the legion of evils some special group to represent them all; and for this a pain will be best suited which is known to every individual as an immediate experience of his inner life, and which at the same time represents the nature of all analogous phenomena at the greatest intensity:

“Life is not the first of blessings,
Of all evils guilt is sorest.”

We shall seek for the most intense and the most instructive manifestation of evil, not in the events of outward life, but in those experiences of the ego, which, because we are accustomed to connect them with the painful sense of moral indebtedness, we call “*badness*,” or *moral evil*. That every one is acquainted with such evils from his own personal experience is an assumption which, it may be supposed, will be generally allowed.

What then is “moral evil”? It might be supposed that all would have the same notion of an experience so universal and felt so immediately. It is far from being so: opinions vary widely on the subject. The oldest and most inadequate explanation is that moral evil is merely a *limitation*, a defect of reality; it would amount then to just the same thing as the finiteness, the form of existence, of each individual being. But it expresses a determination which is there and should not be there, an abnormal quality. Not even physical evil is a mere want of reality; no one would think of calling it an evil that we have no wings, but it is an evil to have no hands or no feet, to be without something that should be there, something that belongs to the nature, to the purpose and idea, to the

perfection, of our existence. Sicknesses, too, do not always proceed from a want of vital energy ; they come as often from a superabundance of energy ; the abnormality consists here essentially in disharmony, in the conflict of the various life-functions with each other, and with the purpose of the whole, in an inner self-division and opposition to order. Much more will this be the case with moral evil. Hence another widely current definition of it is beside the mark, viz., that it consists in *sensuousness* ; this combines both the errors of a definition, being both too broad and too narrow. All that is of sense is not evil, and all evil is not of sense. The most extreme ascetic would scarcely venture to assert that all the functions of sense are evil as such ; and we cannot admit of any one of them that it is in itself evil, because such an assertion would amount to an impious reproach against the author of nature (1 Tim. iv. 4). In themselves all the functions are indifferent ; they only become evil according to circumstances, when they come to be at variance with any end which either our own person or society ought to serve. Hence the above definition would at least require to be corrected to the effect that evil consists in the *unregulated movements of sense* ; and as the rule of its order lies in the spirit, and its contrariness to order consists in its disregarding or setting aside the requirements of the spirit, the definition might be put in this way, that moral evil consists in the predominance or rule of sense over spirit. But the responsibility for the evils of sense lies not with the sensuous body but with the personal ego, the spirit ; and so it might be more correct to say that evil consists in the weakness of the spirit as against sense, in its inability to keep sense under curb and spur, and to rule and guide it, in the slackness of the ego in asserting its requirements and opposing the inclinations of sense. Thus put, the definition applies to many forms of moral evil, and possesses at least relative truth. But only relative truth : it is far from accounting for all the forms of moral evil, and least of all the highest forms, in which the nature of moral evil appears most distinctly. The vices, *e.g.*, of avarice, of ambition, of lust of rule, of hypocrisy and falsehood, of fanaticism,—what have these to do with sense ? Can we speak of a

weakness of spirit in connection with such immoralities? do we not see the intellect and the will put forth the most astonishing energy in their service? And the earliest forms in which evil appears in children, their obstinacy and selfwill, cannot very well be traced to sense.

Such considerations make us the more inclined to agree with those who place moral evil not in sense but rather in a spiritual direction of the will, in selfishness. It is certain that in whatever form it may appear, evil always has its seat in the will, and that the full notion of moral evil, which always includes accountability, the incurring of guilt, is only applicable where the will is fully present, the self-conscious and self-determining ego, the will as subject. It is also correct to say that the badness of the will consists essentially in selfishness, in the seeking of the own self alone, of its own personal ends to the neglect of or in spite of the universal ends of the whole. Here, however, we must beware of pessimistic exaggeration. What is evil is not that the will seeks and finds self-satisfaction,—this is and must be an essential feature of the will. It must will something, must seek definite ends for itself, and the more it feels these to be really its own ends, and lives in the realisation of them, the more self-satisfaction must it of necessity feel; and this satisfaction does not become less, but purer, deeper, and therefore greater, the more the will widens out its ends, from its own particular narrow life to the welfare of the community. Self-willing and self-satisfaction are indissolubly connected with each other by an eternal law of nature; and the latter could only appear reprehensible to his eyes, who saw even in self-will an evil to be overcome,—the position, consistently held, of the pessimism of the Indians and of Schopenhauer, in which all danger of quietism and mysticism is set at naught. He, on the contrary, who does not require that the will be mortified and emptied, who holds his own independent activity to be both his right and his duty, is guilty of an extraordinary inconsistency, and offends against a fundamental psychological law, if, allowing to the will its own activity, he refuses to it its own satisfaction. What is illegitimate is that the individual will, instead of

seeking its satisfaction in and with the whole, seeks it outside the whole and against the whole, that it seeks to make itself the whole instead of incorporating itself in the whole, subordinating itself to the whole, as a ministrant member. This subordination is the eternal and fundamental law of reason for all finite beings; and we may therefore say that that will is bad, which wills its own ends against the law of reason, against the reasonable order of the whole. And inasmuch as the law of reason is the purpose of God, we may say that moral evil is *the resistance of the particular will to the divine will*. But here also we have to guard against a misunderstanding which is found, not very rarely, in theological circles, and which makes it much more difficult to understand the genetic appearance of evil, namely, the belief that evil consists from the very first in *conscious* rebellion against God, in the denial of God and the deification of self or of the creature. This view might naturally be suggested by the Old Testament metaphors of infidelity, of the revolt of Israel against his king Jahveh: then it obtained a footing in the dogmatics of the Church through Augustine's theory of the fall of the first parents; and it has lately been championed by the theologian Julius Müller, in his celebrated book on sin, who, however, acknowledges that sin is, as he understands it, the most incomprehensible riddle in the world. On the above assumption, it must certainly be so; but this only proves that the assumption, which does not agree with the facts of experience, is erroneous. Evil is not, from the first, conscious enmity with God; on the contrary, in its earliest stage it is not connected with the God-consciousness at all, as every one knows who has children to educate; but in later life too, he who wills evil is not bent on offending God—he scarcely thinks of God at all—he merely wishes to carry through his own will, to satisfy his inclinations in an irregular way. Objectively considered, there is certainly opposition to God here; but that opposition need not be apparent to him who wills evil, or intentional on his part. Rebellion against God in defiant self-deification may be the extremest demonic pitch of evil, but is not on that account the beginning of evil or its essential nature.

If evil is thus connected with free will, then, when the next question is asked, that, namely, as to the origin of it, the most obvious and natural answer would appear to be that the origin of evil in each individual proceeds from his own free choice,—the capacity, which belongs to every man in an equally original degree, of deciding, from a state of pure indeterminateness, for good or for evil. This theory, however—it is called the indeterminist theory—readily as it recommends itself to the superficial understanding, is essentially untenable because psychologically impossible, and moreover quite in conflict with the fundamental views of every deeper morality, specially the Christian. The will is never in reality the empty possibility indeterminism takes it to be, equally capable of turning to any side and after every action empty again, undetermined without direction. On the contrary, the will has always its own definite character in every actual individual, and in the character it has at each time lies the determining motive of its action at that time. If freedom is self-determination, it is just acting from the character of the particular self, of this being, determined as it is and distinguished from every other being; it is not an acting from the pure undeterminedness of a merely possible or unreal ego; from such an undeterminedness no real action could ever proceed, least of all an action from deliberate choice and with clearly conscious motives. If, moreover, human choice were so undetermined and free, then the moral life could have no connectedness; there could be no continuous development, no regular formation of character; on the indeterminist theory the will must be a mere succession of individual acts ranged one after another like atoms, without any inner connection; the theory entirely fails to recognise that moral life as well as life in general is a steadily advancing development in which the living being and its environment act and react on each other, a process of becoming in which every antecedent is taken up in the consequent as a co-operative factor in the living formation of the moral ego, and every consequent is a fruit which all the former incidents of life have been preparing. It is on such facts as these alone that all moral influence brought to bear on the formation

of the will in education and instruction proceeds; were every act of the will an uncaused decision from a state of pure undeterminedness, it would be of no use to implant in the will the best motives, the purest principles—they could never form a firm and constant direction of the will. No dependence could ever be placed on any man; even if he had hitherto proved himself the best of men, the possibility would always remain that from his total freedom of choice he might determine himself the next moment for the very worst conduct. Indeterminism, however, conflicts specially with two cardinal views of Christian morality: with the doctrine of the universality and the originality of sin as a characteristic of the species which does not depend on the individual will, and with the doctrine of redemption and of moral renewal by the higher power of the divine spirit. Were evil the work of each individual free will, and of its uncaused decision at each time, it could not be proved to be universal without exception, and it would be inconceivable that evil should cleave to all men from their very birth, and to such a degree that we should find it in us from the beginning of our lives as a power with which we have to struggle and which we can never entirely overcome, as Christianity justly asserts. But with the surrender of this assumption we should also have to give up the doctrine taught by Christianity of man's need of salvation. If the free will of the individual were the sole originator of evil, then it also, it logically follows, is the sole originator of the removal of evil or of good, for which accordingly, as it was his own free act, man would himself deserve the credit. Thus indeterminism leads, as the history of Pelagianism, old and new, also teaches, to the destruction of the Christian doctrine of salvation at its inmost centres; it fails to recognise the pregnant truth, that not the fruits make the tree good, but that as is the tree, so are its fruits, as the heart, so its willing and doing (*agere sequitur esse*). "First let me know a man's heart, and then I know also what he wills, what he will do."

The undeniable fact of experience, that from the very dawn of moral life we find evil present in us as a power, the origin of which accordingly must be beyond the conscious exercise of our freedom,—

this fact, on which indeterminism, Pelagian or rationalistic, must ever suffer shipwreck, has led to the *pre-deterministic* theory which seeks the origin of evil in an act of freedom which in one way or another precedes the visible earthly life. This theory is found in a mythical form in the Indian doctrine of metempsychosis, and then again in *Plato*. The statements on the subject in the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic* appear at first to be of so poetical a cast as to make it hard to say how much of it is doctrine which Plato actually held, how much a merely exoteric pictorial vesture for the philosophical thought that the spiritual part of our being is based on our participation in the supersensuous ideal world. It has lately been maintained that the doctrine of the pre-existence and post-existence of the soul is entirely foreign to Platonic idealism and belongs merely to its exoteric statement.¹ However this may be, the doctrine certainly determined the course of thought in the religious speculation of the Jewish and the Christian Alexandrians (*Philo, Origen*), and provided these thinkers with their explanation of the origin of evil; and it has lately been upheld by *Julius Müller*, the theologian. It is found in a more philosophical and sublimated form in *Kant, Schelling, and Schopenhauer*. The first form, which assumes a real individual pre-existence of the personal spirit before its entry into the earthly mode of being, belongs to the problematical ideas of which science can make nothing, because they have no point of attachment in our experience, and only explain one obscurity by another greater obscurity. As regards the more strictly philosophical form of pre-determinism the case is somewhat different, as the determining free act here assumed does not precede the individual's earthly existence in time, but is said to be related to it as the timeless ground, to be assumed only in the notion. But if we take this strictly, according to what the words imply, it appears to me to follow necessarily that what is spoken of cannot be an *act* of the free being already in existence, since the individual character of the individual in question is held to proceed from that free act as its consequence, but only the *becoming* of the free being—*i.e.* of the individual will. In that case, however, we may reason—

¹ Cf. Teichmüller : *Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe*, 1874.

ably prefer to seek the determining cause of evil not in the inaccessible region of a beyond of thought, but in the course of development, traceable by psychology, of the finite will, from its enchainment in nature to its freedom.

It was by a true instinct that the Church declined both theories, the indeterministic and the predeterministic; the former because it makes evil unthinkable as an objective power in the world, and so casts doubt on man's *need of redemption*; the latter because it seeks the origin of evil not in the natural constitution and historical development of mankind, but in the transcendental regions of the world of spirits, and, by thus flying off from the ground of history and morals, casts doubt on man's capability of redemption in the historical way of positive religion. But while it was natural and comprehensible, if redemption or the origin of salvation was a historical fact, that a counterpart should be found for it in a corresponding *historical origin of evil, in the fall of Adam*, no one can fail to see that this theory, as dogmatically fixed since Augustine, is liable, when closely looked into, to the gravest objections. It is indeed impossible for the understanding so far to overcome these objections as to allow the theory to be really true, though a permanent allegorical truth need not of course be denied to it. Not to speak of the difficulties connected with the notion of a primitive perfect state, it is impossible not to see that on the assumption of such a state, a fall could scarcely have taken place. Evil cannot arise out of a will which is purely good; there could be no motive for it, and no free act can be conceived without a motive; but if to explain the fall we assume the presence of pride or unbelief or lust, or any such affections as might provide a motive for evil, then we have admitted the existence of inner evil before the fall took place, and the fall becomes not the first origin of evil but only the first appearance of evil which had its origin elsewhere. Nor does it make the fall, on the assumption of a sinless primitive state, any easier to comprehend, if an external tempter is introduced into the transaction; since the days of Alexandrian Jewish philosophy (p. 16). Satan has had this part to play. Not to mention that this is merely thrust-

ing back the question of the first origin of evil from the world of men into the world of spirits, where all the difficulties reappear with double force, we cannot forget that an external enticement alone, if unresponded to by any latent inclination to evil, would be no temptation, and could not exert the very least influence on action. The outer enticement may awaken the desire within, but the real attraction of the temptation will always lie in the latter, as even James says: "Every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed." Thus temptation by Satan could not explain the fall unless there were present on the part of the first parents some evil lust or inclination to which it could address itself. And thus it remains true that the first sinful act presupposes a sinful state, and would be inexplicable without it.

Equally incomprehensible with the fall itself are the consequences of it as dogmatic describes them, and that whether we regard them as brought about in the course of nature or as supernaturally arranged. In the former case no analogy of experience would be sufficient to explain the radical corruption of the nature of the race in consequence of the single, the first act of the first parents. For while it is true that habits and tendencies may proceed from acts, they never proceed from isolated acts, but only from a series of similar acts stately repeated, and then the habits and tendencies which proceed from them are only one-sided developments or perversions of the forces and impulses implanted in the nature of the race. Again, that by a first act of the use of freedom freedom should itself be lost, that by one particular manifestation of a specifically human faculty that faculty itself should have been destroyed in its essence, in its moral capacity—that is simply inconceivable. The dogmatists of the Church could not help feeling this: they could never decide whether the divine image, said to have been lost in the fall, really formed the race-nature of mankind, or was only an accident of it, and whether an essential or an unessential accident. The doctrines of the various confessions disagree on this point and so reflect the difficulty involved in the supposed fact they are based on. The ruin of the fall is further said to have extended to man's bodily

nature and even to the rest of the creation outside man, humanity having become subject in consequence of the fall to the manifold evils resting upon it and especially to the lot of mortality ; an unnatural view which requires us to conceive of human nature before the sin of Adam or apart from that fortuitous occurrence as entirely free from all those evils. He had a body then, composed of earthly materials, which was not liable to dissolution in death either from causes resident in itself or from outward occurrences of any kind—he might have fallen down from the highest tower and yet have taken no harm—as one of the Fathers assures us he did ; but such an immortal paradisaical body only exists in poetic fancy ; never and nowhere can it exist upon the actual earth. And if, to get rid at one leap of all these incomprehensibilities, we should take refuge in an appeal to the wonder-working omnipotence of God, which produced before the fall a supernatural perfection in man's state, and after it as its punishment an equally supernatural deterioration, all doubts as to the natural possibility of the matter are overborne, but only to awaken in their stead and to a greater degree our doubts as to the moral possibility of such a procedure on the part of God. We could not reconcile it either with the wisdom or with the justice or with the goodness of God, if because of the unfavourable result of the first trial of his quite inexperienced and unpractised pupils, which he had of course himself foreseen, he at once allowed to descend on the whole human race the curse of entire physical and moral ruin. No one who judges this matter honestly and without prejudice can conceal from himself that such a mode of procedure savours more of the harsh theocratic idea of the despot of Augustine and Calvin than of that picture of God which Jesus put before us, the Father in heaven who makes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, the type of unbounded goodness ! But the gloomy picture, finally, which the Augustinian dogma draws of the state of fallen man corresponds neither to actual experience nor to the statements of Holy Scripture, the concordant testimony of which is to the effect that in spite of its sinfulness human nature is by no means so God-forsaken as not to carry in its conscience the law of God, in its understanding the consciousness of

God's revelation, and in its heart the yearning and the search for God—a bond, not to be broken, of kinship with God now, a pledge not to be taken away, of the communion with God promised in the future. The dogmatic view of the “state of corruption,” accordingly, we cannot consider to be anything but a caricature of the reality; and this readily suggests to us, that the corresponding view of man's “first state of perfection” is no more than an ideal picture. There was never any reality corresponding to it; it is an abstraction of actual humanity on its bright side, or according to its God-like constitution and destiny, just as the other picture is an abstraction on the dark side, of that purely natural state of man which is at enmity with God.

We are led to the same point by a consideration of the difficulties which are involved in the idea of an original state of man which was intellectually and morally perfect. To poetry the idea may have its charms, that heaven poured all truth and goodness on our first parents as their dower; sober reason, however, is unable to forget the cardinal truth of which every day afresh reminds us, that man has to fight for whatever is true and good, and to purchase it in a perpetual struggle against obstacles from within and from without. We can form no idea either of a human wisdom that was not acquired by the trouble of learning, seeking, investigating, and thinking, or of a human holiness not reached through the discipline of education and the conflict of virtue with inclination. These difficulties *a priori* have been confirmed of late by the positive knowledge resulting from the scientific study of antiquity, which, the further back we press towards the beginning of human life, shows us the more unmistakably the picture of a hard struggle for existence, of difficult and slow labour in overcoming nature, of a gradual and toilsome rise from the rudest life-surroundings by the acquirement and improvement of the tools of civilisation and the elementary establishment of social customs and laws. In the presence of such facts, what becomes of the poetical picture of a holy and happy primitive state? The dogmatic of the church may cling to the representation for the sake of its practical contents, when it is regarded as an allegory; purely

theoretical religious science must once for all abandon it. And it should also be remembered that the biblical legend of the primitive state is incomparably more sober than the Augustinian dogma; it knows nothing of the perfect wisdom possessed at first by our first parents, but seems rather to assume the contrary; if our first parents acquired their knowledge of good and evil by eating the forbidden fruit, then it did not belong to them before. But where the elementary knowledge of moral distinctions is not yet present, it stands to reason that there can be no such thing as holiness; the latter is the state of perfect virtue which is raised above the conflict and the strife of good and evil, while the former is the state of indifference, of childish innocence which is not yet acquainted with the difference between good and evil, has no consciousness of evil, but as little of good, and has the conflict still before it in which man forms a practical experience of that difference, and enters on the gradual effort to get beyond it in a morally virtuous character. This child-like "innocence," as it meets us in the biblical narrative, obviously is not a state of superior moral excellence, in which everything is good and nothing bad; it is, as we may observe in any child, a state of morally unconscious naturalness, in which the germs of good and evil still lie together undeveloped and unseparated from each other, and the necessary way to goodness lies through the development of these, *i.e.* first of all, the distinction of them in consciousness. Then in the first appearance of the bad germs in sinful desire and act we have to see not the first origin of evil but its first appearance, which is by no means indicative of a change for the worse in human nature, but only a development of it, a development not essentially different from that which perpetually recurs in the microcosm of every individual life. We may thus regard the narrative of the "Fall" as a typical example of the natural process, always essentially the same, of the manner in which man comes to be sinful. Even the Apostle Paul regarded it in this way in his typical description of this process of consciousness, Rom. vii. 7 *seqq.*

The psychological genesis of evil is not difficult to understand, if we set out from the fact that the tendency towards the satisfaction

of his natural impulses is as necessary to man as it is to every other living being. This tendency, which lies in the essence of the will, or indeed is that essence, is not in itself evil ; but that evil comes out of it, and how evil comes out of it may be very easily seen, as soon as we look at the facts of man's general psychological life, without prejudice or dogmatic prepossessions. The impulse towards the satisfaction of the natural impulses is at first purely natural, unaccompanied, that is to say, by any moral judgment as to the "should" or "should-not;" it is not checked by any consciousness of a law, it is directed unconditionally and without any limitation to the satisfaction of every impulse, however and whenever it may arise ; the natural desire is thus at first the sole-ruling, unbroken, power of the man's life. Now, however, comes the law, first of all in the form of the requirements coming from without, of guardians, of society, of the ruling authorities, and imposes a limit on naïve desire, by the prohibition, "Thou shalt not covet." Thus to desire, which has hitherto been quite unrestricted, there is now added an obstructing check, represented as an opposing will ; but is the effect of this new element of consciousness immediately to do away with desire as a fact, to break and overcome it ? Every one knows that this is not the case, and it is easy to see how such a thing is not possible. Natural self-will has on its side the real power of the impulse to live, and to natural feeling this appears to be the sole and only right in life : and how then should self-will at once come to an end at the mere idea of the opposing (forbidding) foreign will ? That the foreign will which forbids has a higher right to be obeyed than man's own desire, which till now has been unlimited and has thus appeared to be alone entitled to regard, is a perception which cannot by any means be assumed to have been present from the first, and which is not given implicitly along with the prohibition, but can only be the result of a series of real experiences, in which the awakening moral consciousness makes the practical discovery, that the foreign will which forbids is really as against man's own desire a higher power, and one which is able to lend force to its prohibition, to break the resistance of man's self-will by its result-

lessness or by the disagreeable consequences connected with it. The idea of repeated real experiences of this kind supplies the first effectual motive for subordinating self-will to the prohibiting other will; and to this there further come the feelings of sympathy, regard and piety, which suggest a new and more ideal motive in the fear of offending the higher will which lays its commands upon us. Last of all comes the perception of rightness, of the inner foundation in the nature of the case, or the reasonable necessity, of the command or prohibition. This perception is the highest motive, and confirms the others, though naturally itself varying from the dimmest suspicion of the rightness of the other will to full (autonomous) recognition of its reasonableness. Only from the summation of all these various motives does there gradually arise as the total result of them the recognition of the moral right of the will which gives the law, and of the obligation resting on man to subordinate his self-will to its prohibition and command; in short, the moral consciousness of the *shall*, which is thus seen to be a complex result arrived at by various processes of consciousness and various moral experiences before morality, by no means a thing immediately given in the mind and developed from the first. The theologians who assume that it is the latter, cannot possibly understand the genesis of evil; and we may be allowed to remark that a little more psychological and pædagogical insight would do no harm to theological dogmatics and ethics, and would at least secure those who seek to understand these things in sober psychological fashion, from the absurd reproach of an "unethical way of thinking"!

If, then, it cannot be disputed that the moral recognition of the law which forbids cannot be present from the first, but is a result arrived at by many different processes of consciousness, it follows of itself that the warning prohibition "Thou shalt not covet!" can at first do nothing but call forth the opposition of natural desire; far from adapting itself willingly to the limit which thus meets it, self-will is only stimulated by this opposition to an obstinate insistence on its own purpose (hence "self-will" appears as the earliest form of evil in children). With this the feeling of self becomes

intensified, and also the strength of the will, that precious and indispensable foundation of independence of character; but there arises at the same time a habitual inclination to struggle against every limit, a contrariety to the law which, as the higher power, and more and more also as the higher right, asserts itself against self-will. Thus, as man's moral consciousness gradually awakens, he finds himself at once in the midst of the conflict between "would" and "should"; for he feels a rooted antipathy to the law, which yet he is obliged to recognise as the good which has authority, and this antipathy makes obedience to the law partly impossible to him, inasmuch as moral motives do not powerfully enough oppose his natural tendencies, and partly at least painful and oppressive; in any case the Ego finds in itself, when its moral consciousness awakens, a *powerful inclination of self-will to lawlessness—i.e. an evil inclination*, which, because originated before moral consciousness, and therefore before all free moral self-determination, appears as a natural, innate, radical defect of the will. To this extent, a certain basis of fact and truth undoubtedly underlies the assertion of the presence in man of a natural evil or of "original sin." On the other hand, however, it must be admitted, that this notion is not strictly accurate; the element which is natural in man—viz., self-willing, and the effort after self-satisfaction, cannot properly be called evil; and that which is evil in man, the tendency of will which asserts itself against law, cannot properly be called natural, as it does not belong to the naïve stage antecedent to morality, but to the morally conscious Ego.

But the transition from the former to the latter is a gradual one, and consists in a process of consciousness passing through experiences, acts, and states, which to some extent have not ceased to be natural, but are already moral; and this fact gives support to the peculiar dialectic of the relation between the natural and evil, which is packed into a paradox in the doctrine of "original sin." In this dialectical relation, or in the relativity of the whole moral process of development, lies the reason why we cannot properly speak of a first sin, cannot fix a definite point as the boundary between action

which is natural and indifferent ("innocent"), and action which is moral and involves responsibility, and therefore can draw no abstract distinction between the mere possibility and the actuality of evil, the first of which might be asserted to be universal, but not the latter. No one can arrive at the actual consciousness of good and evil, these inner determinations of the will, without having in some way or other, to a greater or less degree, made experience in himself of the antithesis, without having learned to know in movements of his own will, more or less protracted and intense, that divergence of "would" from "should," which itself amounts to some degree of the presence of evil. Imputation and guilt are similarly to some extent relative; in the fullest sense they belong only to the personal moral act—*i.e.* to a conscious self-determination against the moral norm; before there is any consciousness of a "should" there is no imputation of guilt for natural action which is morally indifferent, innocent. Nor can the act of another or its effects ever be imputed to any one as guilt; the notion of an original sin which is deserving of condemnation must be entirely rejected. But from the point when moral consciousness awakes, there is imputation, in exact proportion to the possibility which exists at each particular stage of the development of conscience, of overcoming lawless inclinations, by summoning as motives to contend with them the moral insight and impulses existing at the time. Every step in the development of conscience, every widening of the moral view, every increase in refinement of judgment or in instinctive feeling of right and wrong, augments the possibility of reaction against abnormal impulses, of overcoming the bad motives by good ones, and thus increases with man's moral freedom his responsibility also for what he does and leaves undone.

If accordingly evil only becomes actual in the lawless self-determination of the finite will, then evil has its origin in the latter, in the creature, not in God. Evil is neither willed by God as an end,—on the contrary, it contradicts the end willed by the holy will of God, or the law of goodness—nor wrought by him as his act; on the contrary, man is most distinctly conscious of evil as his own act,

and the divine working with respect to evil presents itself to him only as a negative reaction against it, in his conscience which judges him, and in the world-order. As creator of man, a spiritual being born for free self-determination, God founded the possibility only of evil, but inasmuch as he created man with this possibility, which is inseparable from his nature as a being made for freedom, and of which God knew from eternity that its realisation too was a consequence not to be avoided, and a necessary stage on the road to the realisation of the positive moral end, the real freedom of the good will,—it may be said that God permitted evil for the sake of the good which was not to be attained without this condition; and inasmuch as the world-order is arranged with a view to the conquest of evil, the presence of which in the world-plan has thus been calculated on, we shall have to say, that evil was foreseen by God and ordained along with good, not as a thing that ought to be, but as a thing which could not not-be, and so as an accident destined to be overcome. And as we conceive evil to be an element of the divine world-order along with good, though an element accidental merely and to be got rid of, we know it to be dependent on God, and his unconditioned rule over the world to be secure.

Here, however, the question may be raised whether the God-contrariness of evil is not in contradiction with the relation of God to the finite as traced above, where it was said that God as the all-embracing whole has the finite not outside him but in him? First of all we have to remember that we conceived that relation from the first in such a way as not to destroy but to maintain the relative independence of the individual beings; but where will-centres exist which will themselves, a possibility is at once present that their will and activity may be abnormal and collide with the order of the whole. To the abstract intellect the thought may present some difficulties, that the particular should be in conflict with the whole which yet embraces and subsumes it; but that such a relation is possible is placed beyond doubt by analogies of our immediate experience. How many tendencies of will, how many feelings and ideas has the Ego in its consciousness, which it sees to be opposed to

the purpose of its own being, and therefore denies and seeks to conquer! It knows these affections, feelings, and fancies as its own, present only in itself and through itself, and yet rejects them, abhors them, hates them, as repugnant, hostile, foreign to itself, and therefore to be overcome. When we hate our own evil tendencies we show that they are alien, that they are opposed, to our own self; and yet we could not regard them as objects of hatred, we could not fight against them, if they had nothing to do with our Ego, if they lay outside it, if we did not find them to be moments of our own life as a whole. It is just because the antithesis of good and evil is *within* the embracing unity of the Ego, that it gives rise to the torture of inner division, to the painful sense of guilt, the agony of moral struggle; but it is for that reason too that there is a possibility of cure, of the conquest of the repugnant element, of the restoration of inner concord and harmony. In pain we witness everywhere, both in physical and in moral life, the reaction of the whole against the abnormal part; pain is the symptom of evil, of sickness, of division, and yet at the same time the sign that the living energy is still there which can conquer the evil and restore harmony. In the life of the microcosm accordingly the possibility of the overcoming of evil (both moral and physical, the case is the same with both) rests on the circumstance that on the one side it is *different* from the Ego, *opposed* to the reasonable purpose of the Ego as a whole, while, on the other side, it is *not separated* from the Ego, but forms a part of its joint life. This must also be true of the evil of the macrocosm in relation to God; it is certainly opposed to the one will or reasonable purpose of God, it is certainly denied by his Ego, yet it must certainly fall within the sphere of that organic interaction in which the whole life of God unfolds itself, because otherwise there would be no possibility of its being overcome by the reaction of the divine organism of the world-order. It is far, then, from being the case that the fact of evil militates against the theory of concrete monotheism which we uphold; that theory here acquires fresh and most important confirmation. The evil of the world could not exist as evil, as disharmony, as division, unless *the individual beings of the*

world were real independent separate wills, different from the one will of reason, or the self-conscious Ego, of God. And again, the evil of the world could not be a moment which is destined to be removed and to be actually overcome in the harmony of the whole, were not all the separate wills and individual powers *embraced by the unity of the whole life of God as subordinate moments of it*, supported by his omnipotence, arranged by his perfect wisdom in an organic and purposeful system. And if, finally, it be objected to this, that if evil falls within the life of God as a moment of it, then it must be felt by him,—I am not afraid of this consequence of my position, and can only rejoice in a train of thought which has led to an idea, which to the deeper religious mind has always seemed to be a jewel of faith, though theology, wrapped up in her aristotelian-platonic abstractions has always contemned it:—I mean the conviction that every pain that passes through our hearts is also really and truly felt as “sympathy” by the great heart of God, which feels all. Far from abiding in the monotony of a selfish blessedness, in the fancied other world of unchangeable singleness and pure thought, untouched by pains which he leaves to us mortals as our privilege, he shares with a compassionate heart all our sorrows, and helps to bear our weakness; our errors and failures, more especially, grieve his Holy Spirit (Eph. iv. 30), and so call forth the judging and healing reaction of his just and gracious will. As he is always certain of overcoming by his divine power all the evil with which he sympathises, his compassion always passes into the blessedness of saving, healing, and comforting love. And so while he takes a sympathetic part in our pains, he causes us to rejoice with him as we take part in his blessedness.

That the divine reaction against evil accomplishes itself in the form of the moral world-order, we saw above when speaking of the divine righteousness and holiness. The first manifestation of it is the judging conscience, in which that objective reason which binds the individual to the whole, pronounces its judgment on our will and on our acts in the form of spontaneous feeling. That this function, by whatever human means worked out and matured, yet rests on a

trans-subjective divine foundation, the unconditional nature of its judgments clearly declares. Now, as man is wont to read into the world what he finds in himself, it is psychologically very intelligible, how, proceeding from that inner judgment of which he is aware in the judging voice of conscience, he sees in the outer evils too which the course of the world brings upon him, the punishments of his transgressions. Thus the doctrine of retribution proceeds from and is partly justified by the projection of man's moral self-consciousness into the outer world; but there is a double error in that doctrine, which makes it misleading and confusing, both for religion and for a rational view of the world. First, it sees in each particular evil a special divine appointment to repay some particular transgression; and secondly, it fails to recognise the theological significance of evil as a salutary means of education. Those who look at the world from an objective and rational point of view, cannot by any means discern that there is always a causal connection between moral desert and outward fortune, still less that the one always balances the other, as the theory of retribution requires that it should. It is frequently seen that the good man suffers undeserved calamities, while the bad man rejoices in undeserved prosperity; and from the time of Job this circumstance has been a stumbling-block to the doctrine of retribution. The difficulty disappears however before a purer view of the divine government ("providence"), such as suggested itself to us above in our discussion of the divine omnipotence, wisdom, and righteousness. We must not consider every particular fortunate or unfortunate event as being by itself, apart from the natural causal connection of events, a special manifestation of the divine omnipotence or righteousness; rather does the omnipotence of God manifest itself as a regular and orderly omnipotence in the whole of the action and reaction of the world; particular things are only brought about by it mediately, by the intervention of all the natural causes at work in connection with them. Similarly, the scope of divine justice amounts to no more than this, that in the whole moral world-order good is to prevail and evil to come to naught; and this purpose it attains on the whole and without fail through the fact that the abnormal willing

and doing of individuals ultimately suffers shipwreck on the order of the whole, that it checks and neutralises itself, and in the dialectic of events turns into its opposite and involuntarily helps in the promotion of goodness. But this by no means prevents it from happening, that, in this interaction of the free forces which results in the maintenance of the system of moral goods, in particular instances the good may often have to suffer and the wicked may often prosper. The conditions on which the one or the other of these results is brought about are by no means coincident with the moral worth or badness of the persons in question ; in fact, though the natural and the moral world-order are arranged each with a view to the other, yet they are not identical, but represent different stages of the system according to which the world pursues its goal : different laws rule in these two stages, independently of each other. Hence the evils which, according to the natural course of events, light upon individuals, do not for the most part stand in any causal connection with the moral conduct of those they light on. They are not to be regarded in the light of retribution for transgression, but must be understood as the natural effects of natural causes, according to the causal law of the course of nature.

But while this natural explanation of evil, from the nexus of finite causes, satisfies a reasonable view of the world, it is far from contenting the religious consciousness. To religion it is an axiom that everything that happens, no matter what its natural cause may be, is an instrument in the hand of God, and serves the purposes of his wisdom and love. Religion therefore cannot contemplate evils on their natural and ætiological side alone ; it must also regard them on their moral and teleological side, and see in them *salutary instruments of education with a view to good*. That they really can be this, and are meant by the divine ordinance to be this, is attested by the experience of all good men, who under the pressure of the evils of the world did not obstinately harden themselves nor timidly despair, but allowed themselves to be taught in the school of affliction, that the worst evils do not lie outside us but in ourselves, in the selfish separate will of our foolish heart, which makes its own petty ends

into idols, which it not only serves itself but would fain make the whole world serve too. To cure us of such unblessed delusion, from which the human heart, just because it is personal will, always suffers more or less, to free us from the self which is opposed to God, so that we may find in the love of God our true, God-like, reasonable and free self, this first of all is the end which the evils of the world are meant to serve. Thus what certainly appears in the first instance as an obstruction, never to be overcome, of our separate finite ends, proves itself to be a furtherance of our infinite end and of our highest good. In the manifold experiences of pain self-will is made practically acquainted with the nothingness of its selfish endeavours and ends; but this unwelcome obstruction leads to a voluntary bowing down and yielding to the higher will of the government of the world; and out of this surrender, the painful death of the selfish Ego, there then arises the new life of happy and trustful obedience, of the loving self-devotion of the free individual will to the will of God and to the ends of his rule, the true good of mankind. Then the evils of society in particular, from being hindrances to freedom, become stimuli of moral energy, and standards of the moral tasks requiring from time to time to be taken in hand. The brave man who has adopted, as the aim of his own life, that which is the aim of God himself, viz., to advance goodness and to overcome evil in the world, will not let himself be frightened by the magnitude of the obstacles to be overcome, nor by the dangers and sufferings which throng about his path: the more dangerous his enemies, the more will his energy increase for the good fight. But as the bravest soldier is most exposed to wounds, so in the moral world too he has always to suffer most severely from the evils of society, the folly and the malice of the world, who fights most bravely and effectively against them. Thus the misproportion between merit and reward, which forms such a stumbling-block to the belief in retribution, explains itself quite naturally from the higher moral point of view, and not only explains itself but altogether ceases to offend, as the practical thought is suggested to us, that to the brave fighter for God the scars he has gained in the good fight are changed into insignia of honour, of which he is proud

rather than ashamed. Even should he be altogether vanquished to outward appearance, his forward-looking faith regards this as a sacrifice which he makes the more readily for the good cause, because he knows that the future will abundantly make up for it, and that from one man's seed of tears there will spring for many a harvest of joy, the anticipation of which makes even his sacrifice easy for him. Thus the evil of the individual, piously regarded and endured, becomes not only a means to the accomplishment of his own highest end, his own personal salvation, but to the salvation of others too. This is the truth, the ethical, teleological truth of the idea of the substitutionary sufferings of the righteous on behalf of a world of sinners. Hence too the apostle Paul knows that God's grace is sufficient for him, that God's strength is perfected in his weakness; hence he will glory most of all in his afflictions, because in them the life of Christ is most gloriously manifested for the church too; and so he sums up the fundamental Christian view of the divine government of the world in the simple but exalted phrase: "We know that all things work together for good to them that love God."

CHAPTER V.

REVELATION AND MIRACLE.

WITH the belief in God and the worship of God the belief in revelation was everywhere implied, for how could the belief in God arise and maintain itself without the conviction that he had revealed himself, and what could be the object of worship, if not to experience the helpful revelation of the deity? But two things were sought from the very first in the revelation of God, two things were found in it by men. They sought and found in it the *knowledge* of the world and of their place in it, and secondly, *victory* over the world; the former, as defective human knowledge was thought to be supplemented by divine instructions (oracles, prophecy); the latter, as the deficiencies of human power were held to be made good by acts of divine power (miracles, acts of healing). That these two sides of divine revelation are generally connected with each other even externally, in one way or another, belongs to the very nature of the case, since accurate knowledge as to the lie of the world is half the victory over it, and foreknowledge of coming events facilitates the proper attitude of mind and the suitable mode of action regarding them. Besides, the divine communications take place to a large extent by means of outward signs, which excite the attention of men as being acts of more than earthly power.

The revelation of the deity by the communication of knowledge has been found from of old in two forms of *mantic*: a mediate form, by outward signs, which require to be interpreted,¹ and an immediate,

¹ Inasmuch as this interpretation depends on art, Cicero calls this *mantic* (de divin., I. xviii. 34) "artificial," and contrasts with it the immediate as "the natural." This distinction, however, is accidental, and not so suitable as that given above.

brought about by inner inspiration. Such *signs*, which were interpreted as divine communications with regard to the hidden things of the present or still more of the future, were found in the most various occurrences, not only of an extraordinary but also of quite an ordinary character; both in the rare event which called forth astonishment and in that which was perfectly familiar. In Chaldæa a learned priesthood might watch the course of the stars and think it possible to read in their mutual approximations and divergences the course of earthly fortunes; but the Greeks and Germans managed more easily, hearing in the rustling of sacred trees the whispers of the gods, and seeing in sacred birds, as they flew past on the right hand or on the left, heaven-sent messengers of momentous tidings. The Etruscans and the Romans sought the indications of the gods in the bloody entrails of sacrificial victims; other peoples again, as the Arabs, the Hebrews, the Chinese, used as their oracles the casting of lots with sacred stones or rods. A later form of the oracle by signs was the opening of a sacred book; such were the so-called Sibylline books to the Romans, to the Greeks their poets, to the Christians afterwards their Bible or the legends of the saints (*sortes Sanctorum*). The possibility of such sign-reading was not a question which entered into the mind of remote antiquity; divine communications being in request about hidden things, they were naturally found in any accidents men pleased, to which some association or other of ideas attached itself suggestive of this or that interpretation. It was only the philosophers in Greece who cast doubt on the legitimacy of this mantic from considerations drawn from scientific thought; as in Israel the prophets did the same from motives suggested by a more refined religion. Following Xenophanes, the school of Epicurus rejected the whole system of signs as an absurdity; it contradicted both the physics of that school, which saw in all events the orderly consequence of the mechanism of the atoms, and their theology, which represented the gods as leading a blessed existence in heavenly regions without troubling themselves in the least about earthly and human affairs. This deistic irreligiousness, however, which co-operated with their rational view of the world in leading the Epicureans to reject the

system of signs, deterred philosophers like the Stoics, who had a strong interest in religion, from such an Illumination, and drove them to the misleading paths of that semi-mystical semi-sophistical justification of superstition, which both in ancient and in modern times has too readily attached itself to conservative speculation.

Of more importance for the history of religion, because more capable of development, is the other form of mantic, the immediate, which rests on inner inspiration. Widely diffused is the belief in the divinatory significance of *dreams*. All nature-peoples hold dreams to be the highest form of the revelation of the gods. The Indians in America, *e.g.*, enter on no undertaking of importance without being assured by means of a dream of its fortunate issue, and they willingly make the greatest sacrifices if a dream has summoned them to do so, as they believe that disobedience to such a divine voice will infallibly have death for its consequence. Dreams which cannot be fulfilled literally they interpret allegorically, so as to act up to them in some way. It may happen, moreover, when an order given in in a dream is extremely disagreeable, that a contrary order is found in another dream. In Greece, too, it was one of the ordinary methods of procuring the advice of the gods, to sleep in the temples and regard the dream which was dreamed there as divinely inspired. How universally this belief was shared by the Hebrews also, we see from a number of well-known stories of revelations in dreams, both in the Old and the New Testament. The form of revelation most nearly akin to the dream is *ecstatic vision*. The state of convulsion, ecstasy, was regarded by the ancients, and is still regarded by savages, as the work of a god or a superior spirit, temporarily resident in the man ("enthusiasm") and making use of him as an instrument of revelation, the man's own mind being all the time quite passive. From the similarity of the phenomena, the madman was also regarded as divinely inspired, and the poet and the seer were held to be a kind of madmen. For practice the great point was, of course, to insert into the fantastic sense-form of ecstatic vision a rational meaning, morally valuable and substantial; either the visionaries themselves gave expression to their ideal inspiration in such a form, in which

case the form too was gradually purified and fitted to be a noble and poetical vessel of religious and moral ideas ; or the oracles spoken in ecstasy received afterwards a rational interpretation, as was the case, *e.g.* with the public oracles of the Pythian Apollo at Delphi, where the utterances of the somnambulous priestess, the Pythia, were clothed by the hands of the priestly brotherhood with the suggestive wording on which their great, and for a long time salutary influence on the public life of the Greeks was based (vol. iii. pp. 94, 95). As the independent political life of the ancient peoples decayed, and public interests were thrust into the background, the public oracles also sank to the level of divination from which they had formerly risen. Instead, however, of the naïve belief of the earlier ages, there now ruled a languid superstition out of which cheater and deceit made their profit. From the century before Christ a flood of professional diviners overspread the Roman world, who pretended to be in the service of Isis and Osiris, Mithra and *Dea Mater*, and other Oriental deities, and traded with the arts of the juggler and the charlatan on the need of revelation felt alike by people and by sages.

Of the philosophers the *Stoics* were the first who attempted a scientific justification of revelation by dream and ecstasy, tracing these in part to the general likeness to God of the human soul, which they regarded as an emanation of the divine world-spirit, partly to appearances of the gods, who speak to man in his dreams. The former explanation was based on the Stoic doctrine of the Logos, but would have led to the assumption of a universal revelation of the divine Logos in all human truth and goodness, such as we find in later Stoics (Seneca, Marcus Aurelius) ; this doctrine, however, was insufficient to vouch for individual prophetic dreams and anticipations ; for this purpose a supernatural explanation was required, and the well-known Stoic accommodation to the popular faith made it an easy matter to provide it. Equally conservative towards the popular faith, especially in the question now before us, was the Platonising *Plutarch*, in whom we find the first regular theory of revelation. That there is such a thing as revelation is certain with him, for the simple reason that without it we could have no know-

ledge of the Deity ; such knowledge can only be communicated by Deity itself. He considers revelation to consist in a state of "enthusiasm,"—*i.e.* "a kind of madness which arises in man not without divine influence nor of itself. It is an inspired state brought about by an outward cause, a total change of the intellect and reason, both the origin and the energy of which are due to a higher power." The human soul appears to be open to the divine influence, not in entire passivity, but in accordance with her own particular character, and thus there appears to be a combination of two movements, one wrought in the soul from without, the other lying in the nature of the soul itself. Hence the outcome cannot be quite perfect ; as each thing is capable of being the expression and instrument of an idea only so far as its own peculiar nature admits, and the idea must always receive alloy and defect from the medium expressing it, so the soul of the Pythia cannot remain entirely unmoved and quiet at the stirrings of the God, but is driven about like a ship on the sea by the passions which are natural to the human soul. From the imperfect human share of this "mixed motion," Plutarch acutely accounts for the occasional imperfection and the changeableness of the Pythian revelation. He also remarks very justly that we must not fix our regards so much on the mediate causes of revelation as to overlook the Deity, the ultimate and operative cause of it, while on the other hand we must not think of inspiration as immediate, as if the Deity were sitting in the person of the soothsayers, and speaking through their mouth and voice like instruments, which would not befit their dignity and greatness. Thus even the old Platonist rejected the two opposite errors which constantly recur in the problem before us—the naturalistic denial of any divine element, and the supernaturalist denial of any human element in the process of revelation.

While Plutarch assumes an independent co-operation on man's part before revelation can take place, *Philo*, on the contrary, ever disposed to exaggerate the dualistic transcendence of the divine, represents the organ of revelation, or the prophet, as being in a state of ecstasy, in which the human entirely disappears before the divine

subject, which alone is active. He regards the prophet as a musical instrument, invisibly touched and played by the hand of God ; it is only in appearance that the prophet himself speaks ; the truth is that another makes use of his mouth and his tongue to communicate what he wishes. The human spirit goes out when the divine spirit comes in (to the body), for it is not fitting that mortal and immortal should dwell together ; only when the daylight of human consciousness (Nous) has gone out and darkness taken its place in man does the divine light rise in him and engender ecstasy and God-filled inspiration ; the soul must give itself up to await the visit of the Logos. Not only must it remove everything evil from itself to make itself a pure temple of God, though this is also requisite ; even our reason and our senses must dive down to oblivion, so that the true Logos may replace them in the soul. Moral purification and exercise is only one, though a necessary, preparation for the way, the real end of which is the complete absorption of the conscious mind in the night of ecstatic unconsciousness. The very same theory was afterwards further developed and made the salient point of the system of *Neo-Platonism*. The gulf which yawns, according to this philosophy, between the primal being and the finite, can only be transcended by the soul's freeing herself from all finality, to become immediately one with the infinite. This is done by means of complete retirement from everything external, by self-absorption and finally forgetfulness even of one's self, the disappearance of all thought, will, and consciousness, the flowing away of the whole self in intoxicated surrender to the Deity, whose blessed light then rises in the soul, when the latter has by complete "simplification"—i.e. emptying of self, quenched in itself every natural light. In this convulsed state, entirely destitute of contents, consciousness has disappeared, and with it also the very possibility of the religious relation, and the possibility of revelation, in favour of an orgiastic tumult of feeling. Thus this abstract idealism ended at the very point at which the primitive belief in revelation had begun in natural religion ; in mindless enthusiasm and orgiastic !

The Philonian doctrine of inspiration exercised a determining influence in Jewish, and to some extent also in Christian theology, as bearing on the view taken of the nature of the inspiration of the prophets; yet a glimpse into the writings of the *Hebrew Prophets* shows how far their religious consciousness was removed from those unnatural and ecstatic states, and the more it was developed the more decidedly did it transcend them. The nature of this prophecy is entirely peculiar to itself, yet it also had its roots in the popular soothsaying of the Hebrews, which originally did not differ in any essential respect from that of other peoples. The oldest Hebrew seers too were called "convulsed ones, madmen" from the ecstatic form of their seeing. In their communities ("schools of the prophets") this state was induced by sensuous means, such as music and dancing, as is still the custom among fakirs and dervishes in the East, and the contagiousness which always belonged to this state of religious possession belonged to it among the Hebrews too, as we see from the example of Saul when he found himself among the prophets. The contents of this primitive Hebrew prophecy, too, did not differ from those of ordinary mantic; a Saul goes to the famous man of God, Samuel, to ask where he will find his father's asses; a David, setting out on an expedition against the Philistines, inquires if he will be successful, and receives an encouraging answer; of the seer Elisha in especial, a great number of divinations and miracles are reported, which are quite of the same class as those of heathen soothsayers and magicians. From these beginnings, which differed little from the soothsaying of nature-religion, there afterwards proceeded in Israel something essentially different, and the principal reason of this was that in Israel the prophets from Samuel onwards were the principal representatives of the national religious idea, the belief in Jahveh. In the unions founded by Samuel prophetic enthusiasm was placed under the service of Jahvism, and thus elevated to a peculiarly active factor of the political and religious history of Israel. These unions of the prophets were the citadels of the belief in Jahveh at times of persecution by kings of heathen sympathies. Naturally it could not fail to follow that their struggle

for the national religion carried them sometimes into the political sphere; the position and work of the prophets at the head of the popular opposition bore some analogy to that of the tribunes of the people. In course of time this too close connection with politics might come to impair the moral and religious influence of the prophets of Israel as a professional body, and might lead to their being surpassed by individual non-professional men of God, as the priesthood of Delphi lost its authority from similar causes, and had to yield the spiritual leadership of Greece to independent thinkers and poets. Not as a "prophet or pupil of a prophet," *i.e.* a regular member of the prophetic order, but as one immediately called by God, did the shepherd of Tekoa, *Amos*, appear before his people; but he aimed at no direct political results, he gave his attention solely to the healing of the moral evils of his time, and not of his time only, but of the coming time as well; and he therefore gives his exhortation the fixity of the written word, thus making it a monument for all the future. From this time forward the activity of the prophets is not devoted to the political interests of the day, but to the eternal ideals of religion and morality. Thus in the first prophets whose written works are in our hands, with *Amos* and *Hosea*, the prophecy of Israel rose to its third and highest stage of development. Having set out from ordinary soothsaying, and then become in the schools of the prophets of the early centuries of the kings an influential politico-religious national oracle, it now (from the eighth century onwards) became finally the organ of the revelation of moral religious truth, the representative of the exalted God-consciousness, the incorruptible conscience, and the unshakable future hope of Israel. For the third and highest stage of Hebrew prophecy history nowhere presents any direct analogy, though an indirect one may be found in the ideal forms of the God-inspired poets and thinkers of Greece (from the sixth century onwards). "Israelite prophetism in fact is a thing quite by itself, as much so as, *e.g.* Greek philosophy: as the origin of the latter can only be explained from the character and the history of the Hellenes, so for the rise and specially for the later development of Israelite prophecy the peculiar genius of Israel had

to co-operate with the certainly by no means ordinary course of Israel's history " (Kuenen).

Of what nature was the prophetic consciousness at this stage? This is an important question; here if anywhere we may expect to find an authentic explanation of the notion of revelation, for it is beyond question that these men felt themselves to be the representatives, the instruments, the speakers, of divine revelation. "They come before their people with the clear, firm, and living consciousness of a higher commission; they feel that the spirit which impels them is not the common spirit; and if they begin their discourse with the words, 'Thus saith the Lord!' that is neither an empty phrase nor a vain self-delusion; it is the effect of the irresistible pressure of the soul which seeks the warrant for its endeavours, not in itself, nor in its own neighbourhood, but in immediate contact with the source of truth and right. And this the more as they feel themselves to be in conflict with a hostile, or, what is still worse, with an indifferent world" (Reuss). The prophets know themselves to be the representatives of God; they do not announce their own opinions, but the truths of which they become aware in themselves as the "oracle of God;" not their own arbitrary reflection is the source of their announcement, but they feel themselves seized, overmastered by a higher power, from which they distinguish their own power quite clearly; the sense of the contrast between the inadequacy of their own power and the fearful magnitude and weight of the task imposed on them makes them tremble and quake. Thus, for example, Jeremiah seeks to withdraw himself from the divine commission, but he cannot do so; it is like a burning fire in his heart, he must own himself persuaded whether he will or no. But while he feels himself overwhelmed by the irresistible pressure of the divine spirit, he is at the same time lifted above himself, filled with a more than human power which gives him courage to stand alone against the whole land as an iron pillar and a brazen wall (Jer. i. 6, *seq.*, 18, *seq.*, xx. 7, *seq.*). In such experiences of severe conflicts and wonderful uplifting in their mind did the prophets find the legitimization of their work, the sole but at the same time the infallible proof of their

divine mission, to which they appeal as against false seers ; it is a subjective certainty, but one which rests on the most solid objective basis, on the moral judgment of conscience. For this is what constitutes the essential and decisive mark of the true prophet as against the multitude of the people, the priests and the false prophets—that the former stand up for the inviolable, if not pleasant, truth of conscience, while the latter allow for and flatter the wishes and inclinations of the natural heart (Jer. viii. 11) ; the former announce the day of Jahveh as a day of judgment, while the latter preach “Peace, peace !” the former require the circumcision of the heart, and repentance and amendment of life, while the latter are inclined to see in the full performance of the temple-worship and the sacrifices a complete guarantee of the divine favour.

This implies, of course, that the burden of the prophetic revelation did not consist in what used generally to be thought of, and to some extent is thought of still, in connection with the terms “prophecy” and “revelation.” It was not on the one hand the prediction of definite events—true prophecy had pretty well transcended the stage of heathen soothsaying—nor, on the other hand, was it the unfolding of dogmatic mysteries, or instruction regarding theological propositions and notions. True, the prophets possessed and announced a new and deeper knowledge of the nature of God in his relation to Israel, of the aims and methods of his government of the world, of Israel’s task and hope. But they themselves acquired this higher knowledge, not by means of theoretical reflection, least of all by means of metaphysical speculation ; it came to them as the effect of practical intuition, as the result of the impression made on their pure-toned personal feeling by the actual experiences of history, and the existing condition of their people ; it was the reaction thus produced on their own mind which led them to new insight. The divine truth accordingly, which they had to announce to the people, and to put upon record for posterity, was by no means an abstract doctrine, or general theory, or even a dogmatic statement on religious questions generally ; they dealt with truths of an immediate practical nature, with the concrete consequences of the idea of God, with the

applications and expositions of the holy will of God in its concrete bearing on the circumstances of a particular time ; they illustrated and explained the history of their own day with exhortation, rebuke, and comfort, and they forecast the future in the light of the pure and unchangeable will of God. "The prophetic discourses never present even the most universal truths otherwise than in their living connection with the history of the day. And the circumstances of the time are not merely used externally, as the garment clothing a subject matter of the prophetic teaching which, in all circumstances, remained unchanged ; they are, in the truest sense, co-operating factors of the preaching of the prophets, steps, as it were, by which divine truth is introduced more deeply into the human circumstances of Israel" (Schultz). This feature of Hebrew prophecy, its being bound to the actual history of the people, is what gave it its popular power, and made it a history-forming agent of the first rank ; but here lies at the same time its temporal limit. The view of the prophets was limited to the relation of God to their people, the other peoples scarcely entered into their consideration at all as an object of positive divine ends ; hence the hopes of the future which arose in their teaching out of such a soil, have but a narrow outlook, and are far from amounting to a correct foreknowledge of the actual future of the people of Israel, far less of mankind as a whole. The permanent truth in these cases is merely the eternal idea itself, which is contained in the history, and brought forward by history into the light of consciousness ; and only in so far as the eternal laws will always assert themselves, the circumstances being analogous, in analogous forms, do the biblical prophecies possess a *typical truth* for all times. In scarcely any case can we speak of a *literal* fulfilment of them.

If the contents of the prophetic consciousness are weighty, they are presented in a form which is worthy of them, in a style rational and clear. Dreams and ecstatic visions retire to the background and become exceptional, the rule is an elevated but clear state of inspiration, in which, while the prophet feels himself passively carried away by the power of the higher divine spirit which has laid hold of him,

he yet retains the command of his senses and his thoughts; he recognises quite clearly the contrast between the greatness of the divine burden of his prophecy and its inadequate human form; he struggles with his task, and quakes himself under the weight of the divine oracles he hears, but he also seeks the most suitable form of expression in word and symbol to convey the greatness of the new ideas. The truth of the prophetic ideas was born at first from deep and passionate excitement and heart-struggles, and in the process of shaping them reason and sense were by no means, as Philo conceived, plunged in the night of unconsciousness; on the contrary, they were operative at their highest power and intensity—a process not analogous certainly to the cool reflection of the inquirer, but certainly to the intuition and production by genius of the poet and the artist. The specific form of the prophetic productions must accordingly be admitted to be fantasy, not fantasy dreaming, however, but awake; not flitting about apart from reason and sense, but in the guise of reason at the pitch of genius, contemplating and creating with full understanding and purpose. Such states may easily pass, as is psychologically quite intelligible, and especially in the excitable nature of Orientals, into properly ecstatic convulsions and visions; and so we cannot wonder if we occasionally meet, even in the true prophets, with experiences of a visionary nature, the natural and psychological conditions of which they themselves overlooked, naturally enough, and which they regarded as direct apprehensions of divine appearances and communications, to be regarded as evidence of their divine call (*e.g.* Isaiah vi.). This explains also how at a later time the prophetic word was frequently clothed in the form of visions, which were not actually experienced as such, but freely invented as poetic symbol to give the thought an appearance of reality. This is frequently the case in *Ezekiel*, whose marked inclination for artificial forms betrays, when we compare him with Isaiah and Jeremiah, a certain falling-off in original prophetic force. These two prophets, especially *Jeremiah*, were too closely engaged in the earnest battles of life to have leisure for the artificial form of symbolical visions; and Jeremiah, besides, thought very little of dreams, and poured out

fierce satire on those prophets who could speak at length about their dreams, while bringing forth the deceit of their own heart, and causing God's word to be forgotten (xxiii. 25). What would this hero of religious subjectivity, of conviction held with so clear a head, so warm a heart, have had to say of the doctrine that the prophet is merely the impersonal instrument, the flute or pen of the Holy Spirit, who blows into him, or dictates the words he is to write down?

This curious way of speaking of inspiration is, wherever it appears, a product of the mental poverty of an age of Epigoni, which no longer finds in itself any of that creative power of which it venerates the monument in the written records of former spiritual heroes. The sources of that mechanical notion of inspiration which from this period weighed like a mountain on Jewish and Christian dogmatic, lie in the lawyer-like pedantic school-theology of the synagogue, to which was added in Egypt the analogy of the heathen oracle system, and the influence of the dualistic Platonic and Philonic psychology. But when once the notion of verbal inspiration had come into vogue with regard to the Old Testament writings, and had grown into a fixed assumption, in which the Christian Church also shared, it followed by inevitable consequence that the same view came in time to be applied to the New Testament writings also, though it finds as little support in the utterances of the apostles—in fact, is as repugnant to the views of the apostles as to those of the prophets. The New Testament writers nowhere lay claim to any exceptional origin for their epistles or their histories; they never pretend that they have enjoyed any unique or miraculous inspiration; they never invite the credence of their readers on the basis of any such claim. Paul, it is true, feels that through the spirit of Christ with which he is filled he teaches divine truth, and therefore also writes it, and accordingly he asks that the word of his preaching be accepted as a true word of God; but that this spirit of Christ by which he is enlightened differs either in kind, or in point of its effects, from the spirit which is given to the rest of the Christian Church, he nowhere indicates. The contrary, indeed, appears to be assumed when Paul says of Christians generally: "We have not received the spirit of

the world, but the spirit which is of God, that we should know those things which are given to us of God." Again, he speaks of his non-apostolic fellow-worker apostles as quite on a level with himself, while he opposes himself to his brother-apostle Peter, and convicts him of error. He calls all our knowledge, and therefore his own knowledge too, a "knowing in part;" he strives to prove the truth of his Christian convictions to his readers by long and most elaborate argumentation, and exhorts them to prove his doctrines as well as those of all other spirits. The evangelist Luke again appeals to human reports, and speaks of the pains he has taken to collect and sift them, just as any other historian would. A James finally attacks most vehemently Paul's doctrine and school, while the catholic author of the second Petrine epistle thinks it right to rehabilitate the apostle of the Gentiles, and does so by giving him a somewhat coldly-expressed certificate of orthodoxy. In the face of such facts it is scarcely possible to base the dogmatic theory of the inspiration of Scripture on the views and expressions of the New Testament writers about their own work. And they certainly lose nothing, but rather appear greater in our eyes, if we leave them their human self-consciousness, filled and illumined as it is by the Christian spirit, and refuse to regard them as mere organ-pipes, through which a spirit blows which is not theirs.

Paul is certainly right when he asserts that he did not receive his Gospel of men, or through men, but "through revelation of Jesus Christ;" but this revelation was by no means a communication, coming to him from without, of ready-made propositions; it was an overwhelming experience of his own soul which, led up to by severe struggles of conscience, was brought about by the act of his own will when he obediently surrendered himself to Jesus, the crucified Messiah. It was the task of the apostle's life from that time forward to work out all the consequences of this experience in thought and act; and to bring this task to a consummation he had incessantly to labour, to strive, to bear anxiety and sorrow, both outwardly and inwardly. It requires no extraordinary degree of attention to find everywhere in his epistles the traces of his meditative seeking,

indeed even the scars of his struggle between the old man and the new, the disciple of the Pharisees and the disciple of Christ, the believing Jew and the apostle to the Gentiles. This, indeed, is most distinctly to be seen at the very central points of his doctrine, and of the church dogmatic which sprang out of it. The apostle's consciousness of revelation therefore is no more than that of the prophets free from the conditions belonging to the person and the time ; but for all this Paul knows his gospel to be a power of God unto salvation to every one who believes, and appeals, instead of every other legitimization, to the " demonstration of the Spirit and of power," by which the truth of his word attests itself to the hearts and consciences of men. He is conscious that in his belief in Christ he possesses the spirit of sonship, which searches the deep places of the Godhead, and reveals to us also the secrets of divine love, giving us the witness that we are the children of God. In this notion of the " Holy Spirit " which has become our own, which continuously moves our hearts and places us in the most intimate communion with God and Christ, Paul gives the Christian consciousness of revelation a peculiar and singularly profound character. In this " witness of the Holy Spirit in our hearts " lies the archimedean point of his Gospel certainty, which cannot be replaced by any outward support, by any positive authority or attestation of whatever kind ; and here also lies the germ of a speculative theory of revelation, which unites in a higher synthesis the historical antithesis. In the *Johannine* theology the Holy Spirit is in the same way an immanent principle of revelation. Here the Spirit takes the place of the exalted Christ, and is indeed nothing but the permanent revealing presence, brought about by the historical appearance of Jesus, of that same Logos who was the principle of the creation, and as such the light of men from the beginning, who in the period of history before Christ was the principle of all religious knowledge, but arrived in Christ at a full and concentrated revelation. But this Spirit, far from being exhausted and ended in the single person of Jesus, and in the doctrines personally given by him to his immediate disciples, is always advancing, and leads the Church, in a constant progress which is never interrupted and never stands

still, into all truth—a notable idea of the spiritual Gospel, almost suggestive of the notion of “development.” Thus in this Gospel Christianity is viewed ideally, and justice is done to the freedom of man’s religious self-consciousness without at the same time compromising the historical nature of revelation.

In the early church, too, while the truth revealed to the church was undoubtedly regarded as new and unique, the feeling yet asserted itself that the Christian and the general human knowledge of truth were intimately connected with each other. Even the Johannine Gospel speaks of the children of God scattered abroad in the Gentile world (xi. 52. x. 16), and the apologist Justin taught that the whole human race had part in the Logos, and that all who had lived with reason had been Christians, even if they had been regarded, like Socrates, as godless persons. The Alexandrian Father *Clement* saw in Greek philosophy a parallel education of the human race by the pre-Christian revelation of the Logos, to that of Hebrew prophecy ; so that Christianity fulfilled at once the germs of truth of Hebrew prophecy and of Greek philosophy. Even *Augustine*, in spite of the Church feeling which his ecclesiastical battles tended always to make narrower and more exclusive in him, did not altogether abandon the great and wide views of the Greek Fathers ; in fact he is the author of the profound and beautiful saying that *that* religion which is now called the Christian was in existence with the ancients too, and never was wanting from the very beginning of the human race. And as the early church believed in the connection between the Christian and the pre-Christian and general human revelation, it was self-evident that the Christian revelation had not exhausted itself in the apostolic age, but goes on progressively in each generation. *Tertullian* in particular regarded revelation quite, like Lessing, in the light of a divine education of humanity developing itself through various ages of life, in which nature-religion represented the elementary stage, the law and the prophets childhood, the gospel the period of youth, while the maturity of manhood was only introduced by the Paraclete (the Holy Spirit), who directs the course of discipline, unfolds the Scripture, reforms knowledge, and generally

brings about an advance to better things. This advance of faith by means of the growth of the understanding both of individuals and of the church as a whole, is according to *Vincentius* the notion of Catholic tradition, which seems in so far to have the advantage over rigid adherence to Scripture of being moveable and living. This progress, it is true, is far from being a true "development," as it consists only in the extension of what is already given by new doctrines, not in a change of it; that feature is wanting which is essential to a true development, that the thing becomes other than it was, that the old is replaced by the new. Hence Catholic tradition is far from being identical with the living and developing Christian consciousness, as *Möhl* idealises it; on the contrary, it is merely a convenient covering for all the rubbish of Church traditions and decrees, under the weight of which pure evangelical truth was always in danger of smothering. Justly, therefore, did the Reformers discard tradition and go back to Scripture as the genuine source of Christian truth. But while a *Luther* exercised the freedom of religious genius which is self-inspired, and judged the letter of Scripture by the spirit, Protestant theology, feeling the need, in the double struggle against Rome and the fanatics, of some firm outward support, applied to Scripture the most extreme and mechanical notion of inspiration (which, indeed, was a heritage received by the church from Jewish dogmatic, and had always been of some weight), and carried the deification of the letter of Scripture to the utmost extent possible. Certain isolated voices were raised from the first objecting to this exaggeration; but this was only on the part of the mystics who opposed the inner light to the outer word. Rationalism, however, began in the eighteenth century, guided by a true instinct, to direct its columns of attack against this the weakest point of orthodoxy; though it too was certainly under the error that the defeat of the dogma of the inspiration of Scripture would involve the destruction of religious faith in revelation altogether.

Here we may remember that the doctrine of inspiration as found in Jewish and Christian dogmatic has a number of analogies in other quarters. The *Indians* believed with regard to their Veda that

it had fallen down straight from heaven or had been "breathed out" by Brahma, in whose spirit it had pre-existed from eternity and been seen by the holy singers (Rishis); at any rate it is, according to Brahmanic orthodoxy, of superhuman origin, and quite infallible. This naturally was rejected by the heretics, and especially by the Buddhists. According to *Persian* dogmatic the contents of the sacred Scripture *Avesta* was received by Zarathustra in a personal conversation with Ahuramazda; but this word of revelation is the same as that by which the world was made, and which was living before the Creation as the pure, holy, quickly moving *Honover*. The latter is a Persian Logos, a personification of the divine will, who revealed himself both in the creation and in the legislation of Zarathustra; hence there dwells in the "word" of the Zarathustrian revelation a wonderful power to sustain and promote life; as a word of prayer it becomes a magic power and a principal weapon against evil spirits. In *Islam* the *Koran* is held to be the earthly copy of an original heavenly text which was revealed to Mohammed during his ecstasies by the angel of revelation. As to the relation of this earthly copy to the original heavenly text (*i.e.* of the "Scripture" to the "word of God") there was much controversy in Islam too; the legend declared the two to be in perfect agreement, saying that Mohammed and the angel Gabriel collated the copy with the original every year. Even this, however, did not satisfy the need for a direct divine document; the tendency to deify Scripture only reached satisfaction in the dogma that the Koran, just as it is written, its very letters and breathings, was "uncreated," and had an eternal and independent existence as God's own word, having no part in the conditions and the imperfection of all created things. The rationalism of the Mutazilites cast doubt on this postulate of orthodoxy, and pointed to the real state of the facts which, when reasonably regarded, exhibited something very different from an absolutely perfect heavenly text. Nor was a mediating theology wanting to Islam, which, drawing an ingenious distinction between the original heavenly text and the earthly Koran, leaves to the former all the predicates of the orthodox doctrine

of Scripture, but refuses to apply them without qualification to the latter.

Belief in an inspired Scripture is, as we saw, only one particular mode and form of expression of the more general belief in divine revelation as the foundation of religion. This latter we find everywhere, when once religion has arrived at such a stage of development as to seek to account for its own existence ; and this belief therefore must have some connection with the essential nature of religion, and find its true explanation there. If we can arrive at an understanding of the real truth present in this belief, the psychological explanation of the various forms in which it appears will be accompanied with little difficulty.

In the question as to the nature and the truth of revelation, two tendencies of thought have always, both in ancient and in modern times, confronted each other with that rigid and unbending opposition which generally indicates that each of the two sides has *one* side of the truth, but is insisting on it to the neglect or exclusion of the other. The two tendencies we may here call *a parte potiori*, that of faith and that of reason, or, to use modern party names, the supernaturalistic and the rationalistic. The former is generally the older, for the simple reason that it only expresses in the form of a dogma, as the definite outcome of reflection, what the simple believing consciousness counts to be a self-evident and immediately certain truth, namely, that in religion man stands in relation, nay rather in communion, in immediate intercourse with the Deity, that he influences the Deity by his worship, and experiences in turn the effects of the blessed nearness in which the Deity makes itself known to him. This continuous experience of the blessed and elevating effects of his religious communion with God the believer traces, and very justly, to a real divine revelation. That is to him the cause of these effects ; but the assumption, in itself a true one, that an objective revelation is the cause of his religious experience, clothes itself to his mind in the form of special revealing acts of the Deity which happened in space and time, and were cognisable by him. In these acts the Deity manifested itself externally in such and such a

manner, instituted perhaps such and such religious usages or this particular *cultus*, or revealed such and such sacred truths, perhaps even committed to the church by the hand of its ambassadors a whole collection of rules of faith and life for permanent observance. All these sacred things, these sacred histories of former acts of revelation, these sacred usages and signs, doctrines and writings, are to the faithful the modes in which, by means of which, his inner religious life acquires form and reality, in which he is certified of the fact of the revealing nearness of God. Hence it comes about quite naturally, that he transfers the truth of the revelation of God of which he is immediately aware in his *inner* life, to these *external* matters too, and asserts of them also, that they proceed from direct divine communications of an extraordinary, quite unique, supernatural, miraculous nature. The intellect, however, is not long in discovering that in all such traditions, whether oral or written, of divine revelations, there is much to which objection may be taken, many things absurd, or unworthy of the Deity, or contradictory of each other. It is also seen that every religious community is equally entitled to advance the claim of a divine origin and absolute truth for its own traditions, while the traditions of one religion conflict with those of another, so that the claims of both cannot possibly be well founded. Finally, there are found in the sacred traditions evident and demonstrable traces of a human origin, the historical occasions which led to the formation of such and such a legend, the influences of the surroundings, of the opinions of the times in which the books arose, of the individuality and of the situation of the various poets and seers, prophets and apostles. Closer investigation reveals so plainly on every side the human and historical conditions of the sacred traditions, that in that which the believing supernaturalist regards as a direct divine revelation the intellect can recognise at first no more than a quite indirect natural revelation, and then no revelation at all, no higher truth, but simply the product of human forthsetting, poetry, fable, invention, etc. This antithesis of a *rationalistic intellectual illumination* on the one side, and supra-naturalistic adherence to old beliefs on the other, is not

confined by any means to the ground of the Christian church, nor is it merely a product of modern times; it is to be found everywhere, when a new stage of culture in the life of a community comes in conflict with the assumptions of the old faith. A very instructive example of this may be seen in the rationalism of the Greek sophists, who traced the whole doctrine of the gods of the popular religion to natural causes, whether to human history misinterpreted (Euhemerism), or to the deliberate inventions of priests and rulers. For this they appealed just to the multiplicity and the accidental character of the religious usages and opinions prevailing in this and that district, which they held showed them to have been products of deliberate human invention. In the same way there sprang from the culture of the age of the Hohenstaufens with its religious syncretism, that rationalism of the later Middle Ages which found its popular expression in the legend of "the three impostors," and culminated in the radical heathenism of the Renaissance. In later times the same phenomenon repeats itself in three homes of civilisation successively in different and yet allied forms: in England as deism, as naturalism in France, and finally, as rationalism in Germany. In short, "Rationalism" is not an isolated historical phenomenon; it is a general principle, which, as it recurs with regularity at certain stages of civilisation, cannot be held to be quite devoid of justification.

Rationalism is right in asserting that the religious process is rational and rationally knowable, in respect both of form and of contents. In point of form, it insists on the subjective human side of the consciousness of revelation, and protests against the supernaturalist belief that any religious phenomenon can be, as it appears in space and time, an entirely divine operation not indebted to the assistance, nor subject to the conditions of the human mind. It insists, on the contrary, that everything that occurs in the human mind, as an element of its consciousness, depends on the human mind's own activity, and hence must both be in harmony with the nature of mind in general, with the psychological laws of mind, and take form in accordance with the particular character of each indi-

vidual mind, the contents of its consciousness at the time, its position in time and space. To accept this view is to discard every mechanical theory of inspiration and revelation, such as would regard the human mind as the mere lifeless vessel, into which the revelation was poured *ab extra*, or the instrumental mouth from which a foreign speaker makes himself heard. Revelation being regarded as entirely subject to human conditions, it follows at once that no particular product of revelation can, as such, lay claim to absolute perfection or infallible truth. If it could do so it would be entirely and exclusively divine; if it depends on human agency, and is subject to human conditions, it must inevitably partake in some degree of human imperfection and limitation. But that this actually is the case history tells us at all hands; for at no point does history show us any absolute product of revelation, any knowledge of truth in every respect and absolutely infallible, beyond which no historical progress was possible or has been made. And supranaturalism concedes this to be the fact, and explains it by speaking of an accommodation of the revealing God to human comprehension,—a view which clearly only conducts us roundabout, by a somewhat gross anthropomorphism, to the proposition we reached before, that in revelation the human mind is a co-operative and conditioning factor. Nor is rationalism less in the right when it refuses to recognise as the matter of a revelation anything contrary to reason, anything which appears unthinkable according to the laws of thought, whether of theoretical or of moral judgment (conscience). In our reason and conscience we cannot but see a divine revelation implanted originally in our nature, and a contradiction of their laws would amount to the contradiction of one divine revelation by another, which, however, is quite unthinkable, as God cannot contradict himself. To this we must add that what is completely unthinkable can never become part of our mental property. Formulas with which we can connect no clear meaning, or no meaning at all, we may receive on authority, *i.e.* leave them undisputed, raise no objection against them, but we can make nothing of them, they give us no help, and least of all do they minister to our salvation, to our improvement or edification. We must therefore say that a

"revelation of salvation," the contents of which consist of incomprehensible and mysterious doctrines, is an extraordinary *contradictio in adjecto*; it "reveals" nothing, but leaves everything covered with impenetrable darkness; and this is far from "saving;" either it blunts and kills all interest in religion, or it calls forth doubt and objections of the most desperate character. It appears at first sight an insoluble riddle what positive interest the guardians of tradition can possibly have in getting men to believe propositions which, as they themselves allow, contain incomprehensible mysteries. The solution of the riddle is to be found partly at least in the fact that these extraordinary propositions generally conceal real interests of the religious life, namely experiences of religious feeling, which have received in these forms an awkward and foreign expression. It should be regarded as the positive task of theology to trace the reasonable meaning concealed under the doctrine—a task, however, which the guardians of the letter will not allow to be incumbent on them, far less set themselves to accomplish.

But neither is what is ordinarily called rationalism competent to solve this problem; it has never learned yet to apply its principle of rationality in a really rational way; in other words, its thought is too superficial, too narrowly subjective. It conceives reason to consist in one or two notions, as generally stated, and as vague as possible, which it has deduced from religion and morality as they now exist, notions as generally known to man from the beginning and as unchangeable, as the elementary truths of mathematics. Rationalism fails to see that religion is not occupied with intellectual notions so much as with experiences of the heart, efforts of the will, states of feeling to which the religious ideas correspond. These are facts of inner human experience which only attain to reality in connection with the whole complicated development of society, and so cannot possibly have been present from the beginning, and without change in the consciousness of the race. Rationalism justly wishes to find reason in religion, as in other departments of human activity; but, in the first place, it overlooks the fact, that the reason to be found in religion is not primarily theoretical, but practical or emotional

reason, not that of thought, but that of the heart; in the second place, it fails to see that reason is not innate in man as a certain fixed magnitude, as a possession he knows himself to have, but only as a function, as an impulse of rationality, which can only take shape in the actual contents of his consciousness by means of that interaction of the individual co-ordinate functions which constitutes the *development* of the mental life of man in history; and, in the third place, it does not sufficiently consider that the development of the religious disposition which is the central one of the reasonable dispositions, and that in which the complicated threads of all the life-experiences not only of individual history, but of the history of the race, converge, would be quite incomprehensible if we were to think of the human subjects only, and to look no further than to their fortuitous individual experiences for the ultimate ground of the whole process. Religious development more than any other has its ultimate ground in the *eternal reason of God*, by which our growing reason is sustained and led—in the wisdom and the love of God. In these three respects, then, psychological, historical, and metaphysical, the thinking of ordinary rationalism is inadequate, abstract, one-sided, and limited, and has still, in fact, to make itself rational in deed as well as in name.

Looking again at the prophetic consciousness of revelation, which we discussed above, the points which appear to be specially characteristic of it are the following. What appears in the consciousness of the prophets is a new thing, a thing not learned from others, but rather in contradiction to the prevailing opinions of the prophets' environment, and partly also¹ to the views and prejudices formerly entertained by the prophet or the apostle himself. This new thing again has not been reached in the way of arbitrary reflection, of discursive thought and investigation, but enters the consciousness in the guise of an immediate intuition; it is received, found there as a thing given, the origin of which therefore is outside of conscious reflection; emerging out of the mysterious depths of the soul, it necessarily creates the impression of a work, a word of God. The

¹ Comp. e.g. 1 Sam. viii. 6-22; 2 Sam. vii. 2-6. Specially also the struggles of Paul before and after his conversion.

content of it is not a fortuitous isolated object of knowledge, nor is it a dogmatic theory about God and the world; it is a thing which has to do with the central interest of life, with the question what God is to us, and what he desires that we should be to him; it is a new view of the religious and moral ideal of life. For this reason it is not a matter concerning the cognitive faculty only, it sets the whole soul, the emotions and the will, mightily in motion; before the greatness of the new idea the soul quakes and trembles; painful conflicts arise whether between the old prejudices and the new truth (Paul), or at least between the natural feeling of the man's own weakness and shrinking from action and from pain, and the weight of the task laid on his soul (Jeremiah). The sense of truth and the sense of duty determine the issue of the struggle, and while the will yields itself captive to the higher idea, all its energy, formerly divided and drawn hither and thither, now concentrates itself on the one tendency of the newly found ideal of life. With this there arises in the soul an un hoped-for sense of peace, and not only of peace, but of power raised almost to a more than human pitch; and this feeling being also set down to God's agency is regarded as the divine seal authenticating the truth the prophet has learned, and his view of his mission; it is the witness of the divine Spirit in the human heart.

But certain as it is that this whole condition of life, these views, these feelings, these movements of the will, announce themselves in consciousness as a new thing, a thing given from a source not in man, it must not be overlooked on the other side that this new thing is, in another aspect, a thing in many ways led up to by the old—a link indissolubly connected with what went before in the historical development. The appearance of a revelation is never and nowhere a fortuitous, unsuggested, uncaused event. It is in every case occasioned by definite historical occurrences and experiences, the impression produced by which on a susceptible and pure-toned soul excites and stimulates the religious impulse in that soul to independent and powerful activity and to original production. These historical occasions may be of various kinds; yet it may be possible to trace, in the salient examples of them with which we are

acquainted, certain common features. Dark fortunes have broken upon the people of God or are rising threateningly on the horizon; the contradiction they offer to the feelings of the people of God, to its faith and hope up to this time, confronts the religious mind like the sphinx's riddle; the contradiction must be solved, or it must rend the soul asunder, and cast her into the abyss of nothingness. Weak souls close their eyes before the riddle; they conceal from themselves the gravity of the situation, call "Peace, peace," and perish in their blindness. The strong soul looks the riddle of the time in the face, truly and faithfully—denies by no means the torturing contradiction the reality presents to the assumptions and claims of the people's faith, but refuses at the same time to give up the conviction on which its own faith is based, that there is reason in history, truth and justice in the divine government of the world; it seeks therefore a solution of the contradiction, and rises to a higher religious insight, to a purer view of the holy nature and will of God and of the ideal mission of the people of God. I need scarcely say that Isaiah and Jeremiah are the classic types of this. The case of the apostle Paul is different, and yet similar enough. Here too the occasion of the new revelation lay in the torturing discrepancy between a historical fact and the views and hopes which Paul the Pharisee shared with those around him. The belief of the Christian community that the crucified Jesus was the Messiah sent by God was a flagrant contradiction of the Messianic ideal of the kingdom cherished by the Pharisees, while at the same time the lives and deaths of these believers powerfully appealed to the conscience of the pious Pharisee, answered to his ideal of righteousness, and promised to his religious hunger after righteousness an unhoped-for satisfaction. In vain did the Pharisee attempt to shake off this riddle which weighed upon his soul, painfully did he wrestle for a solution, and he found it in the revelation of the Son of God in his heart, and in the new view of the God of grace, who in his Son was reconciling the world to himself.

These classic instances plainly show, in the first place, that the revelation is not to be sought in the outward historical events regarded by themselves—to the multitude the events are dumb and

without significance—but that the impulse merely lies in them which awakens in pure souls the reaction of the religious instinct, and calls into action processes of consciousness out of which there proceed new combinations of ideas, new master points of view, and ultimately a new religious world, a new ideal of life. As on the one hand it is certain that these new processes of consciousness would not have taken place but for the outward occasion given by the historical situation, so it is certain, on the other hand, that these outward impulses could never set such inner processes in motion, were not the power and the matter which go to form them already present in the soul, the power, namely, as an innate religious disposition, let it be called conscience, or religious sense or impulse of reason (*Nous*), or by whatever other name; and the substance in the whole contents of consciousness acquired by the whole previous development, composed of the whole sum of religious and moral ideas, feelings and inclinations of will. It is a fundamental error to suppose that ideas or convictions can ever be brought home to man without his own co-operation, whether as an innate endowment or by instantaneous infusion or inflation, or any other such external contrivance, however miraculous. On the contrary, ideas, convictions, tendencies of life, are always the products of manifold and complicated psychical activities, only a small part of which, it is true, appears in the light of consciousness, while the deeper connections of them are too subtle for reflection to trace. Even where ideas and tendencies already present in society are brought home to individuals by means of precept and example, the appropriation of them is in every case the work of independent functions, through which the individual reproduces in his thoughts and feelings what others have thought and felt before him. Hence the difference between the reproduction of given ideas and the original production of them in religious heroes (prophets), is, however wide the difference may be, never more than a relative one. In every reproduction there is, just because it is based on the independent activity of individuals, something original; and the most original production again is never entirely new, but is a new combination of the contents of consciousness which the original

genius has inherited as the accumulation of the mental possessions of his fathers. The independent activity of his genius may extend the inheritance of his predecessors, and elevate him and the society about him to a higher platform of life, but whatever he achieves he achieves only because of, by means of, the capital laid up by former generations, into which he entered as its heir.

The fact that the personality of genius, with all it is and can, is firmly rooted in the soil of its own time and surroundings, is a part, and not a small part, of the secret of its power, of the mighty influence it exercises on the world both in its own time and afterwards, of its effects in history; but this is also the reason of its individual weakness, of its historical limitations. That he is the child of his age the most powerful spirit can never quite deny; in the assumptions from which he sets out, the ideas in which he must perforce express his views and aims, in the limited nature of his immediate aim, in the tendency of the battle he fights and the weapons he employs in it, he betrays how he is bound to his time and situation. It is just this limitation that gives his character those deeply cut features, and with them, of course, the hard lines and sharp corners which we could not imagine any considerable historical character to be without. That the history of religion, of the Christian religion as well as others, forms no exception to the universal law, may be seen from such figures as Paul and Luther. To think away from such figures the limitations of individuality and of historical surroundings, which marked them, would be to exchange their historical reality for fictitious abstractions, destitute of sap or force. But if we admit their limitations, then we admit that the revelation they undoubtedly conveyed to the world was a relative one, and contained the truth, not with absolute purity, but in forms such as the history of their times demanded, forms accordingly which, as history proceeds, must be subject to further development and change.

But that which is the limitation of the bearers of revelation is at the same time the root of their power, the reason of their effectiveness in history. Only because they are themselves the children of

their time does their word find something to lay hold on, and meet with an echo in the reason of the age. Were that which the religious genius brings not founded in its essence on man's mental constitution generally, and more particularly on the historical condition of the epoch in which he appears, then even the profoundest truth could not be understood, nor greeted by any one as a revelation, it would be useless, it would be lost to the world. If the appearance of a revelation in the man of genius would be incomprehensible apart from the natural equipment and the historical conditions of his mental life, equally incomprehensible must be the effect that revelation produces on others to whom he communicates it, if he is not, in spite of his singularity, the true representative at the same time of all the ideal tendencies which slumber in the consciousness of his age and his people. It is always the sufferings of the mass of the people and the riddles of the time that stir the latent energy of genius, and impel it to its extraordinary original production, and so that truth which he has conquered for himself, found in himself, is at the same time won for all; it is the truth which had been dimly present to their minds, what the best, at least those who saw deepest, had at the bottom of their minds anticipated and desired. Hence, in spite of its novelty, the revelation which the one man brings is not entirely unexpected; it contains the word which solves the riddle of the time, the ideal spirit appears in it which had been present before as an under-current in the depths of the consciousness of the age. This relation of the original genius to society has been aptly described by Carlyle, and I may transfer his words to my own pages: "What he (the spiritual hero) says, all men were not far from saying, were longing to say. The Thoughts of all start up as from enchanted sleep, around his thought, answering to it, Yes, even so! Joyful to men as the dawning of the day from night; is it not indeed the awakening for them from no-being into being; from death into life? We still honour such a man; call him Poet, Genius, and so forth; but to these wild men he was a very magician, a worker of miraculous unexpected blessing for them, a Prophet, a God! Thought once awakened does not again slumber; unfolds itself into a System of

Thought; grows, in man after man, generation after generation, till its full stature is reached.”¹

The new thing so described, though it makes its appearance as opposite to what men knew before, is yet merely a new manifestation of one and the same being, and is both called for by the law of life of that being, and prepared by its previous states. It is simply a new “stage of development” of that being on one particular side of its life-process. We are therefore warranted by what has now been said, to state that every true revelation of a new religious and moral ideal of life represents a new stage of the development of mankind in respect of the central sphere of its life, that of moral religion. In the notion of development rightly understood there are always two sides, the becoming other, or the newness of the later state which replaces the earlier one, and at the same time the constancy present in the change, or the connection of every later with every earlier by the law of change, which resides in the persistent unity of the being. This law has for its consequence both that every later stage is causally conditioned by the earlier, and that every earlier has a teleological reference to the later. If the first side is overlooked, then there is no real progress, no living growth; either the later and higher forms of life are pressed down to the elementary stage of the earliest, or they are read into the earliest, so that the beginning is raised to an unnatural height which could not belong to it; in either case the real history is falsified and taken away (in the first instance in a naturalistic, in the latter in an idealistic way). If the second side is overlooked (that the later is pointed to in the earlier) then history resolves itself into a discrete series of unconnected occurrences, each of which is a fact without a cause, and incomprehensible, a miracle; connection may be lent to it by some supposed thread, as, *e.g.*, by the assumption of a designing Providence; but this connection remains purely ideal and assumed, external to the real process of events, and bearing about the same relation to the actual living unity of historical development as the connection of the bones of a

¹ Carlyle: *On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History*. London, 1872, p. 19, *seq.*

skeleton arranged together with wires, to the connection of the living organism. Now if it be the task of all science to understand the orderly connection of becoming, the real development of life—both natural life and spiritual—then both of those errors alike make it impossible for science to fulfil her task. In our sphere those errors encounter us as *Rationalism* and *Positivism*. The former forgets that religion has a historical life, in the course of the development of which that which is actually new appears, namely, where, at particular points in space and time, which we may compare with the ganglia of plant-growth, or the critical turning-points in the life of the individual, a higher form of life, having a new principle, presses itself forward, which can by no means be pressed down to an earlier and lower level, and cannot be regarded as a mere fortuitous morphological variation of structure. And Positivism forgets, that the new, the higher, which comes into existence at definite points of history, yet always fits in to the real genetic connection of the religious development of mankind, and is an orderly member of that connection, since it was regularly prepared for in the course of antecedent history, and develops itself further in a natural way in the history which comes after. Positivism forgets that this whole of earlier and later, lower and higher, represents the total development of the religious impulse implanted in the nature of our race, and that, therefore, every individual phenomenon of that development must be considered, when regarded from the point of view of the whole of the nature of the human race as a thing veritably natural, and at the same time when regarded as related to what immediately preceded it, as a thing positively new and higher.

If the positivist theology (it is to be seen at present in a more uncompromising form in the school of *Ritschl* than in the orthodoxy of the church¹) considers that it is necessary in the interests of the specific truth and value of positive revelation to disconnect that revelation from the real and living chain of that natural and universal revelation which takes place in the religious and moral disposition of mankind, it is in an extraordinary and somewhat

¹ Cf. Lipsius, R. A. *Die Ritschl'sche Theologie*, Leipzig, 1888.—Tr.

dangerous error. It forgets, that is to say, that if the natural revelation of God in that reason which is present in conscience and in religious feeling, that "inner light" of which Jesus speaks, that natural knowledge of God and law of conscience, of which Paul speaks,¹ be denied or ignored as unimportant, then we are deprived of every standard that can enable us to test the truth, or to estimate the value, of a religious or moral ideal. When every bond between Christian truth and human nature is severed, the acceptance of the former in humanity, the rise, the spread, the preservation of the faith of the nations in the Christian revelation, becomes an utterly incomprehensible riddle, a pure miracle. It may be some feeling of this that leads the Göttingen theologians to insist so strongly on the one nature-wonder of the bodily resurrection of Christ. By their Socinian positivism they have deprived themselves of the inner, essential explanation of the rise of the Christian faith from the motives of the human heart; and they seek to make it somewhat more intelligible by this outward event. But are they not hanging hundredweights on a cobweb when they do this? And what becomes of scientific consistency in such a procedure, especially in connection with such a doctrine of God as that of Ritschl, which will hear of no direct metaphysical causal relation of God to the world of nature and of man, and gives us instead a purpose of God which accomplishes itself nowhere but in our ideas? But not only does the origin of belief in the revelation of Christ remain, on the assumptions of Ritschl's theology, an unexplained and inexplicable miracle; the rise of the consciousness of revelation in Jesus, and then, too, in the prophets, is equally inexplicable. For here there is only one alternative, either this consciousness of revelation is the product of an external divine influence brought to bear on man, as in the supranaturalistic theory of revelation and inspiration; or it is the product of a divine power which operates within man, as is assumed since the critical movement by consistent scientific theology of every shade. The theology of Ritschl, however, abjures the former alternative; it has tasted too much of the tree of knowledge to be able

¹ Matt. vi. 23; Rom. i. 19, ii. 14.

to stomach simple, blunt supranaturalism. But it will not accept the other alternative either, because a revelation which was the product of a divine power within man would naturally involve the presence of such a power in human nature generally, and therefore a general metaphysical connection of essence between human nature and the divine, the admission of which would be the uprooting and subversion of positivism altogether. But what is the theology of Ritschl driving at if it refuses to accept a revelation either from without or from within? Under such circumstances a thinker in any degree strict and clear would surely soon arrive at the conclusion that if revelation is not thinkable from without, nor yet from within, then it is not a real thing at all, but only the form of idea under which, as practical men, we have to represent to ourselves the religion which has, as a fact, attained to historical solidity, in order to place it under higher sanction as a thing brought about by divine causality, though, as a fact, there is no such causality. The present generation of Ritschlians will not hear of any such radical consequence being drawn from their position; but it is based too deeply in the nature of the case, and has too many analogies in the history of scepticism, both ancient and modern, which is always most intimately connected with positivism, to let the prophecy of such a negative criticism as a possibility of the near future appear a mere hobgoblin threat. Every positivist system which divorces the individual positive revelation from the general historical development of the race, is irreconcilably at variance with the root principle of all science, and, therefore, such a system takes up a position of harsher exclusiveness and arrogance than any church dogmatic; for the latter always exhibits in its speculative elements some approach to general human truth.

Starting from historical facts, the path of our inquiry has brought us to find in revelation, in the first instance, the history of the development of the religious faculty in man. In order to accomplish the further step into the domain of metaphysics, we have only to remember what was remarked above as to the proofs of the existence of God and as to the attribute of divine love. As we there saw,

it is impossible to understand the development of a number of independent beings, agreeing to a certain end, in any other way than by conceiving them as comprehended in a causal and teleological relation to a reason which sets their ends, the purpose of which manifests itself in the law which guides their correlative development. In particular, it is impossible for us to understand the development of the moral and religious disposition of man from finite causes merely, more impossible the more clearly we recognise in it a product, brought about in the most manifold ways, of the most various factors, of the complicated interaction of the individual with society and of both with nature. The fact that in the beginnings of man's life, the impressions made on him by nature disengaged in him the first manifestations of the impulse of reason in the apprehension of the divine and the commencement of a relation therewith ; this fact was to us a revelation of the creative wisdom which constituted nature and the human soul with such reference to each other that the impressions of the one should awaken the faculties of the other, and create in these faculties the presentiment of and the striving after, the Higher, which is above both nature and man. We found it impossible that every other need placed in our nature should point to a corresponding real object of its satisfaction in the realm of being, but that the deepest and most universal of all, the central need of the religious impulse after communion with God, should be without any object of its satisfaction, an unexplained illusion. In the very existence of this impulse, therefore, we shall see the operation of that force of gravitation of the spiritual world which keeps all finite spirits connected with the Father of spirits, namely, of that will of the divine love which makes for the living communion of all reasonable creatures with the creative reason. And if every normal activity and development of any impulse is to be regarded as an effect of the principle of development which underlies it, then in every stirring, every development of the religious impulse, whether in many or in an individual, we must recognise, so far as it acts normally, a real effect of that reasonable will of God which supports the growing spiritual life of all men. It is an operation of that will specially with regard to the

intention it cherishes of bringing about a living fellowship with us ; it is an operation of the love of God as giving itself to be experienced by man in his own heart, or as revealing itself. Wherever, therefore, any sound religious impulse manifests itself, though in ever so primitive and childlike a fashion, there a revelation of the divine love which aims at living communion takes place. Or are we not to see this love in the beginnings of religion because here the childish mind still takes pleasure in smaller gifts of God ? But how else could divine love educate the children of men in their pupilage to the true love of God as the highest spiritual good, but by first causing them to taste and see in small symbols how gracious the Lord is ? As the religious faculty and religious receptivity develops, the revelation of divine love grows in value and significance, till at the highest stage of life, which itself again admits of manifold development, it culminates in the communication of its holy and blessed living spirit. This could not be otherwise ; the love of the parent discloses itself always more deeply and spiritually to the children as they grow more advanced, although it never denied itself to them when they were smaller, nor even to the very smallest. If the Saviour promised the kingdom of heaven to children, what right have we to deny to the child stage of humanity any share of the revelation of the love of God ? God's heart certainly is greater, and his revelation extends much further, than the narrowness of theological scholasticism can dream.

Here we may remark further, that from this point too the notion of God of concrete monotheism finds a complete confirmation. Were the divine and the human ego not really different from each other, no revelation would be possible, for the removal of one of the two members would destroy the religious relation itself. But if God and man were so separated from each other as abstract (deistic) theism declares, which makes of God a particular extra-mundane being, separated from the beings in the world and co-ordinate with them, then a real revelation of God, a revelation that is which offers itself to man's inner experience, would likewise be impossible. For then God could only manifest himself to us in the same way as any

other being outside us, *i.e.* by external signs, which affect our senses, and are worked up by us by means of independent reflection into idea-pictures and judgments. Now there is certainly such a universal sign-language of God, and the religious impulse in man is powerfully stimulated and called into action by it, especially at the beginning, and always to some extent at later stages too,—*viz.*, nature. It is easy to understand, therefore, and the fact is a characteristic one, that deism, when strictly worked out, limits God to those outward means or signs, but denies any immediate experience of them in our hearts. And nature being always essentially the same from the creation, this revelation is limited to the beginning of the world, since which God “remains in the deepest silence,” as Herbart naïvely expresses it. But the religious man cares little for such an epicurean god; he seeks and finds the true revelation of God just within himself, in the experiences of his heart; in the sum of the ideas, feelings and movements of will in which his religious life moves forward, he is aware of the inworking energy of God, the “witness of the Holy Spirit.” If this is not an illusion but the truth, then it involves a relation of man to God in which he is open to God’s working within him. But that can only be the case if we live and move not outside God but in him, if our life is a part, founded on and embraced in the All-life of God. Then beyond all contradiction, it is not only conceivable, but it is necessary to think, that our impulse towards communion with God is an effect of the divine will which aims at communion with us, that therefore every individual manifestation of that impulse in religious functions is an outcome of that divine will, and in particular that every intensifying of the religious impulse to more than ordinary productivity and higher development of life rests on an intensified communication of force on the part of the divine will, and is therefore to be regarded as a *special manifestation of the love of God in the life of men in time*, whether of peoples or of individuals. To penetrate more deeply into the manner of this manifestation is neither possible nor necessary; yet it may be said that it is no more difficult to conceive of the translation of the divine loving will into the activity and satisfaction

of the religious impulses of human hearts, than to conceive of the translation of the *one* divine will into the many finite activities on which the existence of the world is built. The secret of revelation is just an excerpt, a special form of the primal secret of creation, which though we cannot fathom, we are yet able to think of by approximation and analogy.

This brings us to the belief in *miracles*, which at the beginning of this chapter we spoke of as the other half of the belief in revelation. The belief in miracles is as old as religious faith itself, for "miracle is faith's dearest child," as the poet says, profoundly and aptly. From the beginning the Deity was to the religious consciousness the power which is free and sets free from the limits of the world; and so faith ever expected the Deity to do acts of emancipation, saving miracles, and because and as it expected them, so it found them in one way or another in its experience. True, it sees in the ordinary every-day course of nature too, the continuous personal rule of the gods; but it does not consider the gods to be bound to the course of nature, but represents them as types of the personal will which is free and unbound, and so expects from them extraordinary manifestations of power. These are seen in operations which take place contrary to the general order and rule (*παρὰ μολραν*), in which, therefore, a special divine intention is apparent, an unusual manifestation of the favour or disfavour of the gods to the worshippers or their enemies.

The power of doing miracles is not only ascribed immediately to the Deity, but to those men who are more nearly connected with it. The principal significance of the belief in miracles in the history of religion is derived from this fact. Miracles are always the standing attribute of those persons who appear in one way or another to stand nearer to the realm of the divine, and to occupy a middle position between it and the world of men. This principle appears more persistently than almost any other phenomenon throughout the whole history of religion and at all its stages; only the forms in which it is applied vary with the modifications of the religious con-

sciousness. In the lowest religions, where the priest enjoys intercourse with the world of the gods through worship, he is the regular possessor of divine miraculous powers, so that priest, magician, miracle-doctor, and rain-maker are usually united in one person. In the higher religions the miraculous gift is only ascribed to such persons as have produced a profound influence on their surroundings by the power of their religious inspiration, as prophets, reformers, or religious founders, who have created a belief in their mission and in themselves as divine ambassadors; or to those who, by the extraordinary zeal of their asceticism and contemplation, have obtained the reputation of saints and initiated persons (*mystæ*). In these cases it is always found that it matters little whether such men believed themselves to be in possession of miraculous powers or not, whether they themselves pretended to work miracles or not; the faith of their contemporaries and successors in their extraordinary divine mission, and their position as mediators between humanity and the heavenly world, is sufficient to create the presumption of their miraculous power. And when once a body of disciples expects miracles, the observation or at least the report of actual miraculous occurrences cannot be wanting. This phenomenon meets us with the most striking uniformity in the founders of the three greatest religions of the present day. The Buddhist legends are full of miracles which Buddha and his disciples are reported to have done; some of these are precisely analogous to the miracles of the Gospels, but most of them are more extraordinary; and yet in the canonical writings of the Buddhists the words are preserved in which the founder forbade his disciples to work miracles, even if the people should call out for signs and wonders: the true miracle, he said, was that they should go and hide their good works before men, but confess before them their sins. In the same way the Mohammedan legend narrates a great number of miracles of Mohammed, and yet he himself says in the Koran that he is a man like other men, and he considers it unworthy of himself to work miracles, and appeals to the great miracles of Allah; the rise and the going down of the sun, the rain which fertilises the earth, the plants which grow, and the

souls which enter into human existence, without any one's being able to tell whence they come ; these are the true signs and miracles. And finally we are told about Jesus, that to the demand of the people for a striking miraculous sign he answered : " There shall no sign be given to this perverse generation but the sign of the prophet Jonah,"—*i.e.* the mighty influence of the word of Jesus' preaching, of which Jonah's preaching of repentance at Nineveh had been a type ; and there are a number of indications in the evangelical narratives that he rather sought to check than to encourage the report of his miracles, which spread in spite of all his efforts. He withdrew from the crowds which thronged about him in the expectation of seeing a miracle, and he traced the wonderful cures of believing persons to their simplest cause, the faith of those persons themselves. It agrees perfectly with this, that he saw in this powerful effect of his word, which called forth a faith possessing power even in the sphere of the body, a sign of his higher mission and of the approach of the kingdom. Various causes contributed to the elaboration of the later more highly miraculous narratives of the church, among which may be specified the glorified figure of Christ in Pauline speculation and in apocalyptic prophecy. They also answered to the general expectations present in the thought of the times, without satisfying which a new religion could scarcely have effected an entry into the world. Indeed, if we consider all the senseless superstition which was believed even by persons of cultivation in the Greco-Roman world of that time, and the morbid curiosity with which not only the multitude but specially the upper classes and even philosophers ran after sensational miracles and mysteries,¹ it will appear to us much less a matter of wonder that Christianity too, in spite of its spiritual and moral character, and in spite of the aversion felt by Jesus to such sensuous methods, wound its wreath of legend and of miracle about the person of its Master, than that its miracles are so markedly distinguished from heathen

¹ Every history of civilisation in the times of the Roman Emperors gives abundance of instances of this ; compare, for example, Lecky's *History of European Morals*, from Augustus to Charlemagne, 1869 ; also Hausrath's *History of New Testament Times*, and Zeller's *History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. v.

superstitions by their measured simplicity and their deep childlike and poetic beauty. But the ideal and edifying value of the miraculous narrative is of course far from proving the historical nature of the miraculous events; on the contrary, the more obvious the ideal significance of such a narrative is, the more reason is there to think it probable that it arose from purely ideal and sentimental motives, without any historical background of definite actual occurrences. If we add that the other historical religions have their miraculous legends as well as Christianity, the person of the founder and the early spread of the religion being in every instance adorned with them, it must appear to every one who approaches the subject free from dogmatic prejudice to be at least possible either to concede that all these miraculous legends are alike historically true, or to condemn them all alike as not historically true. For a long time the Christian church did the former; it regarded the miracles and oracles of heathenism as real, though it put them down to demonic agency; and in this it was at least more logical than modern Christianity, which considers its own miracles (ecclesiastical, or at least biblical) to be historically true, but those of the other religions to be mere tales and legends. As soon as the question of the reality of the miraculous legends is put in this, the only logical form, as an alternative between the acceptance or the rejection of all the miraculous narratives of the various religions, it is, for us moderns, as good as answered. We must not, however, decline the task of examining the question as to the objective possibility of miracles from the purely philosophical point of view.

The possibility of miracle was debated even by the philosophers of the ancient world. The Epicureans were led by their deism and their atomistic physics to deny it, and the Academics had doubts on the subject; while the *Stoics*, the *Neo-pythagoreans*, and the *Neoplatonists* thought it possible to find a place for miracle in their philosophical view of the world. The active cause of miracles they sometimes found simply in the demons, which of course was leaving the ground of philosophy for the more popular one of the imaginations of polytheism; sometimes they attempted to explain miracle from

their metaphysic, tracing it like soothsaying to the sympathetic connection of all the forces of the universe, by means of which whatever happened at one spot announced itself in innumerable other places too, so that every influence exerted on one thing propagated itself to other and to distant things through invisible dynamic media. These philosophers accordingly sought to justify miracle, the exception from the natural order, by bringing it into a connection with nature which was only hidden to us, and so making it a natural result of these same universal forces out of which the regular course of nature arises. We meet the same explanation of miracle, only with a theological turn, in the Church Father, *Augustine*. The part played in the system of those Greek philosophers by the sympathetic connection of the order of nature, is played in his system by the will of God. Since nature is nothing but the manifestation of the will of God, and the nature of each thing just that for which God intended it, the author of all their natures can, *Augustine* argues, make of them anything he likes; nothing is against nature, because nothing is against God's will; miracle is contrary only to nature as known to us. In this way the contrariety to nature is very simply got rid of, namely, along with the notion of nature itself, which is exchanged for the free working of the divine will. But does not miracle introduce a contradiction into this divine will? No, *Augustine* answers, there is no contradiction here either; since everything, the extraordinary as well as the ordinary, is foreordained from eternity in the one eternal decree of God. In the same way did the founder of German philosophy, *Leibniz*, seek to reconcile miracle with his determinism and the pre-established harmony of the world: God could not indeed effect any change in the world he had once chosen to be created, without thereby withdrawing as imperfect the resolution once arrived at by his wisdom, which cannot be thought; but the miracles were themselves included in the idea of the world which God chose for realisation, and from the point at which he chose this world from the infinite number of possibilities, God determined to perform them. Thus miracle is to be saved by being embraced in the pre-established world-harmony as one of the real possibilities or

germs, which in and through the development of the whole are to arrive at realisation when their time comes. Looking more closely, however, we see that miracle is saved in a very ambiguous way—that the true notion of miracle is in fact got rid of altogether. Instead of a violation of the order of nature and a breach of law, miracle here becomes an act which is led up to and prepared in accordance with law and through the order of the whole ; only in its appearance is it extraordinary, it is only relatively miraculous ; in its essence it is natural. This defence of miracle accordingly is not so far as at first sight it might appear from the denial of miracle by Spinoza.

The first reasoned philosophical attack on the belief in miracle came from *Spinoza*. He proves the impossibility that anything can take place against the laws of nature from the consideration that these laws are nothing but the determinations of the divine will, which flow from the necessity and the perfection of the divine nature ; the power of nature is therefore the same thing as the power of God, and this again identical with God's own most intimate essence. To say that God does anything against the laws of nature amounts to saying that he acts contrary to his own nature ; which is most absurd. Nor can anything go out beyond nature in such a way as to be independent of the laws of nature, because these extend to everything that is the object of the divine thought. Equally unreasonable would it be to suppose that God made nature so powerless and the laws of nature so barren, that he was compelled more than once to come to their assistance afresh so as to keep them upright, and things progressing in a good course. From all this Spinoza concludes that there cannot really be any supernatural miracles ; when occurrences are called miracles, that is only to say that when certain things took place men did not know the natural causes of them. Schleiermacher proceeded on this thought of Spinoza : he also taught that it was difficult to see how divine omnipotence could show itself greater in the interruptions of the connection of nature than in the unchanging course of things in accordance with their original arrangement, which was itself divine. To be *able* to change would only be an advantage when it was *necessary* to change, and this would involve an original imperfection.

Every absolute miracle, moreover, would completely destroy the whole course of nature both backwards and forwards, the very notion of nature would be destroyed, the divine activity would be a magical one without order, and God himself would be placed in the category of individual free causes, one among others, and so reduced to a finite causality. "Thus," Schleiermacher concludes, "with respect to miracle the general interest of science, especially natural science, and the interest of piety, meet together at the same point, namely, that we must give up the idea of the absolutely supernatural, because in no single case could any such thing be cognisable by us, and it could never be demanded of us by religion that we should recognise it." Similarly, according to *Fichte* and *Hegel*, the belief in miracles is not only not demanded by the interests of piety; to the true interest of piety it is rather hindbersome, and to the pure idea of the religion of the spirit it is quite unsuitable. The spirit itself, its rationality and freedom, is in their eyes the one true supernatural, and if so, it can only be the vehicle of what is truly spiritual; the belief in outward miracles in the world of sense, on the contrary, *Fichte* conceives to be merely the after-working of Jewish and pagan superstition, unworthy of the pure Christian faith in that God "whose great and eternal miracle it is that he creates a new heart in all those who draw near to him."

For the possibility of miracle the apologists appeal in the first place to the livingness and freedom of God, who is not to be tied up by any laws of nature, and again to the elasticity of nature, which both admits and requires higher intervention. As for the first argument, a God whose livingness and freedom were only manifested in miracles would obviously be in general unliving, inactive, and not free. Against this, faith must enter a decided protest, while the intellect must, on behalf of the law and order of the world, object to such isolated exceptions of a lawless divine freedom. As the intellect asserts an inviolable and constant order of the world according to its inner laws, so faith asserts an absolute divine activity which does not show itself alive by way of exception merely, being usually bound by the outer bonds of nature, but now and then show-

ing itself free, but which must be unconditionally and always free and spontaneous activity. With such a separation, which besides takes the lion's share for natural law, and only leaves God a vanishing minimum of rare and isolated acts of power, neither faith nor reason can be satisfied; each of them claims the whole, and cannot but claim it. How then is justice to be done to both demands, which appear to be mutually exclusive of each other? Manifestly in this way, that the divine activity and the world-order do not border on each other outwardly, but the latter is taken to be the rational form of the former. Now we saw above when speaking of the divine omnipotence, wisdom and holiness, that the divine will can have nothing else as the contents of its willing and its activity but the thoughts of the divine reason, the eternal truths which come to manifestation in the laws of the world-order; and if this is the case, it is impossible to see how the divine will could will or work anything contrary to those laws. And these laws of his own reason are as little a constraint to him as it is a constraint to him to will what is good. This is what constitutes the holiness of God, his being not what man is, that the willing of the law of reason is his nature, and that the question of his ability to will otherwise can never arise with him. It is no glorification of God, but a too human, too low idea of him to suppose that he must sometimes feel the need of ridding himself of the burdensome compulsion of the world-order, and suspending the laws which he himself made. Such a suspension would be nothing but the emancipation of his will from his reason, from the eternal necessity of being which dwells in his reason ("the eternal truths"), and so it would be a self-contradiction within God himself, an assumption shocking alike to reason and to piety.

As miracle, viewed as an occurrence contrary to order, does not harmonise with the strict notion of divine omnipotence, so neither does it harmonise with the strict notion of nature. That our knowledge of the details of nature is imperfect is no doubt true, but so much we certainly do know, that nature is an orderly and connected whole of causes and effects, the very notion of which precludes the possibility of phenomena contrary to law. It is not only details of

our knowledge of nature, which are always more or less accidental, that are placed in dispute by the assumption of the possibility of miracles, but our whole notion of nature, which is involved in the necessity of our laws of thought. The phrase, too, of "elastic laws of nature," proves on calm consideration to amount to an inner contradiction; for while it is true that the operation and the coming into view of the different laws is in every occurrence conditioned and modified in various ways by the manner in which the various factors of the occurrence act on each other, this variable element does not apply to the law itself, which, on the contrary, operates with unconditional certainty as soon as, and to the extent that, there occurs in the world of phenomena a possibility of its operation. It is just because of this infallible and inviolable validity of the laws of nature that it is possible for us to infer with certainty from any given effects to their causes, and to predict that from such causes as may be given such and such events will certainly follow in the future; which is the same thing as the possibility of all our rational thought and calculated action. And if it be pointed out that in nature itself there occur analogies of miracles in the entrance of higher forms into lower forms of life, this analogy, when looked at a little more closely, proves nothing for miracle proper, which is the suspension of law. Those so-called "new beginnings" are always based on the law and order of the world as a whole. They were present in germ in the antecedent development, and as soon as the conditions are matured for their appearance they appear infallibly and according to law, and at once fit in to the general order as harmonious members of it. Of a contradiction of the universal law, a breaking through the natural connection of cause and effect, there is nowhere a trace in such cases, and we cannot apply to them the term of "miracle" in the absolute sense; at the most we can speak of the relative *mirabile*, which is all that Leibniz argued for. That which is only a wonderful higher, as compared with the lower, ordinary existence, can very well be a necessary member of the development proceeding in the whole of nature, a member striven after from the first, and brought about in accordance with law; and then it is not really a miracle at all. Thus

the human spirit may be called a miracle in comparison with nature below the level of man, but in this instance it is extremely obvious what a different thing this relative supernaturalness is from the absolute supernatural of miracle proper. For in the whole of the world-order man is, as much as any other being, a part of the whole which is absolutely subject to the laws of the whole; his appearance was the goal towards which the natural and lawful development of life on the earth was striving from the beginning, and his existence is bound at every point by those conditions which are prescribed to him both in his own organisation and by the nature of earthly life in general.

But human freedom, it is objected,—is not human freedom too, lord over nature, and does it not thus afford an actual demonstration of the possibility of miracle? If this lordship over nature is taken to mean that man is free to set himself above the laws of nature, and to exercise influence on nature apart from or against those laws, it is a fanciful idea not borne out by reality, and on which no wise man will proceed to act. But if the lordship of man's freedom over nature means no more than that man is able by the exercise of his will to produce changes in the state of things in nature at a given time, this is no doubt true, but it is a trivial truth which no one would deny; and what does it prove in respect to miracles? Is it to prove that God, like ourselves, produces particular results which, if not contrary to the general laws of nature, yet would not have taken place in that way without his special intervention? This would not suffice to explain the complete supernatural and anti-natural miracle as it appears in most legends, but only the so-called "miracles of Providence." And besides, the assumption of such partial interventions of God in the course of the world, by which the lawful orderly interaction of finite causes was interrupted or suspended at definite points, would involve that deistic relation of God to the world, of which we have several times spoken, which makes God an individual being external and co-ordinated to the beings of the world, and therefore no longer really God, no more that One who comprehends in and under himself all the many. If, after all our discussions, we feel it convincingly necessary to conceive of God's relation to the

world not in that deistic fashion, but in a truly monotheistic way, then we cannot think of the divine will as a single cause working for its own ends beside other causes, we must think of it as the unity, the one ground which comes to manifestation in the orderly operation of all finite causes, and by means of their operation.¹

We cannot therefore find in the appeal to the freedom of our own mind from nature any proof of the possibility or of the reality of the miracle of nature. Yet we do find here an important thought which leads us to an explanation of the belief in miracle from its true motive. Every moral and religious act of self-determination from the thought of goodness or of God, is undoubtedly a free ascent above pure naturalness, and therefore something supernatural when compared with our sensuous and selfish natural disposition, though at the same time, in respect of our reasonable constitution and destiny as men, what is most truly in accordance with nature. This supernaturalness, then, which is a feature of the religious consciousness, and is according to the moral world-order, has clothed itself, in the idea of supernatural-natural occurrences, with a symbolical expression. In the world of the senses there take place no miracles which conflict with the laws of that world; but the moral and religious spirit is itself the great miracle, the divine making itself appear. We cannot bend nor break the laws of the world-order according to our particular ends, according to the wish and the insistence of the human heart as it trembles and quakes in fear and hope; yet for all this, "our faith is the victory which overcomes the world." It is this because it springs from a heart which has let itself be conquered by the love of God, and has bent and broken the pride and obstinacy of self-will under the supreme will which seeks and is working out in the reasonable order of the whole, the true good of every individual too. Is it really any loss to the religious consciousness, if it should come to see that it cannot gain anything *against* the immovable order of the holy and unchangeable will of God, but that in this good and wise will it already possesses at all times that

¹ Compare on the above, the essentially similar discussions in the dogmatic works of Biedermann (p. 584) and Lipsius (p. 404).

which is best, the freedom which nothing can bind and the peace which the world can neither give nor take away? Is anything lost, when it is found that all that is lofty and fair which was thought to be contained in the belief in miracles, is in truth nothing but the reflection of faith's own inner wealth of heavenly goods, thrown out upon the world of sense? As an expression in terms of sense of the eternal spiritual miracle which faith itself is, the miraculous legend will always maintain its place, where the religious spirit unfolds and contemplates its mystery in sensuous representation; in the symbolism of religious art, in the worship of the church which speaks through that symbolism to the heart.

CHAPTER VI.

REDEMPTION AND MEDIATION.

REDEMPTION from the evil of the world, and the attainment of a salvation which satisfies all wants, in communion with the life of God, this is the end which every religion seeks in its own way to attain. But we saw in the foregoing chapter that it is essential to the religious consciousness to refer its desire for saving divine fellowship to a divine will which also seeks for the same thing, and to find the revelation of that will in gracious manifestations and saving acts of the Deity, both of an outward and an inward kind. On this side redemption is expected from a movement of the will of God which has man for its object—from his grace. But on the other side it is held to be no less certain that redemption is only obtained from a movement of the human will directed to God—from faith. These two sides, from their very nature, come together to a unity in the religious process; and the religious idea now embraces them both in one pregnant and typical expression, in the ideal representation of these *mediating figures* of religious history and legend, the importance of which for faith lies in every instance in the fact that they make present and visible to faith, in a personal unity, this bringing together of the divine and the human, which faith itself is: of this they afford to faith the typical representation and the certainty, whether it be that, by their action merely, as ambassadors and representatives of Deity, they convey the revelation of God to man, or whether they stand in virtue of their nature in the middle between the two, partaking in some way of the nature of both, and so representing in a corporeal form in the personal (metaphysical) unity resident in them, the becoming one of God and man.

Of both these kinds of mediators the history of religion in all its stages exhibits manifold examples. Even in the nature-religions intermediate beings play a conspicuous part. Now they are divine beings made men, who live for a time on the earth, and do the works of a Saviour for the benefit of men; again they are deified men who rise upwards from below on the ladder of merit and good fortune; again they are sons of the gods, who, begotten by the heavenly ones, prove the superior force of their origin in an exalted human life, and complete and transfigure their humanity by a final elevation to the world of the gods. Accordingly, we must generally trace the origin of such legends to a double root, an ideal or mythological and a real or historical one. The heroes are on one side ideal, superhuman beings, demigods or sons of gods sprung from true nature-gods; on the other side, however, and at the same time, they are the national heroes of former times, the kings and legislators of an early age, its champions in battle, the quellers of its evils, the founders of civil order as well as of the practice of worship, the ancestors of illustrious (kingly and priestly) races. The transference of such reminiscences of early times to the ideal figures of heroes has a twofold result; on one side national tradition becomes more ideal, and on the other side the heroic legend becomes more human and national, "so that an interaction was set up between two creative factors, legend and poetry, which operated to an immeasurable extent, and in a people endowed with mental ability and engaged in great conflicts and movements, could not fail to produce extraordinary results." This admirable remark of Preller, the great student of Greek mythology, bears the more closely on the inquiry of this chapter, as a similar "interaction of two creative factors, legend and poetry," the historical and the ideal, may be observed in the belief in heroes or mediators of the higher religions too.

Most instructive is the group of Heracles-legends, to which Greek and Oriental mythology, the poetry of nature and epic heroic poetry, Greek family legends and moral and didactic philosophy, all brought their manifold contributions. Heracles is originally a sun-god, who became a sun-hero and a symbol of triumphant light,

both in the physical and in the ethical sense. The much-tried, yet ever victorious son of Zeus and of a human mother, he is the manifestation and the proof of unconquerable divine power, both in the earthly lowliness of human life and in his heavenly exaltation. He is equally the type of human virtue suffering and striving in an infinite succession of battles and labours, and the god-descended hero who, sent by divine command and equipped with superhuman power, becomes the bringer of salvation, a "saviour and emancipator" to vexed humanity. His redeeming activity is at first directed principally to the ridding of the earth from all monsters, from all the savagery and untutored rudeness of the early age; yet profound ethical references are not wanting in him. Such a reference may be found notably in the relation of Heracles to Prometheus; if the latter is (vol. iii. p. 5) the representative of natural humanity, which in its titanic endeavours after freedom and civilisation plunges itself in guilt and misery, Heracles is the ideal man, who by obedience in action and in suffering approves his divine origin, and merits his elevation to the blessed. To him alone, then, is it allowed to bring to that sufferer, forsaken alike of gods and men, the termination of his endless torment. Here we find the idea of the first and the second Adam, the bringer and the conqueror of death, foreshadowed in mythic traits. Heracles also appears in the character of the spoiler of hell, overcoming and leading away the hell-hound Cerberus: in this character he was often celebrated in the representations of the mysteries, being joined with Orpheus as leader of the under-world (mystagogue). And this victory of the divine power of life over the forces of death, which had been the burden of his redeeming activity, reaches its consummation in his end; from the sacred mount Oeta, out of the flames which devour his earthly covering, the transfigured hero rises to heaven in the thunder-cloud of his father Zeus, Athene leads him, Nikê hovers about him, the Olympians receive him in triumph and crown him with the victor's wreath; the anger of fate (Herê) is atoned, and eternal life and joy await him who has conquered and is perfected. Finally, it is extremely interesting to remark how this mythical god-man, in whom both the lowliness and the exaltation of

humanity, both its pains and its joys, are so wonderfully symbolised, became at last, in the fable of Prodicus, the allegorical ideal of purely human virtuous energy, whose heroism consists in moral self-conquest, as he prefers the difficult road of virtue under the guidance of Athenê to the lower life of pleasure in the service of Aphroditê. Here Heracles is the type of Greek *kalokagathia* as contrasted with the oriental view of life, which finds its symbol in the legend of Paris, whose choice was different.

Greek religion stands half-way between nature-religion and moral religion, and what the figure of Heracles, the hero of civilisation, is to Greek religion is found raised to a higher power in those faiths which are moral from their outset, or in the *historical religions*. In these it is a matter of course that the highest revelation of the redeeming deity cannot any longer lie in natural processes, nor yet in the deeds of heroes whose achievements belong to the sphere of general human civilisation. These religions find the highest revelation of God in their own distinctive religious consciousness, and so the true mediators between God and man appear to be those personalities who took a leading part in the genesis and the development of their religion, principally, therefore, the *religious founders* themselves. What was said above of the belief in mediators in general, that it lends objective reality to man's communion with the God who reveals himself to him, is specially true of the founders of the positive religions; for in the view which a religious community forms to itself of the person and the work of its founder there is reflected in every instance its own religious self-consciousness, or its moral and religious ideal of life.

The *Persian* religion, according, at least, to the somewhat late theology of the Bundehish, assigns a central position to its founder, *Zarathustra*, by placing him in the very centre of the history of the world. From the creation of the world to his appearance was a period of 3000 years, the first half of the world-times, during the lapse of which the kingdom of the evil one (Ahriman) kept the upper hand. With him, however, comes the turn, in favour of the rule of the good God; and hence even at his birth the good spirits

rejoice, while Ahriman, foreseeing his approaching defeat, seeks to do away with the champion of the kingdom of light, offering him as the price of his abandonment of the word of Ahura the empire of the earth. Zarathustra, however, withstands the temptation, and becomes the first announcer of the true word of God, by which he smites the demons, and brings in the kingdom and the blessings of Ahura. The time of the victorious warfare and advance of the kingdom of God extends 3000 years from Zarathustra onwards; and then will come the great "Bringer of Salvation," *Saoshyas*, who will be born of a virgin mother, and conceived by the holy spirit of Zarathustra, and will thus be in a sense Zarathustra himself come again; he will accomplish the work which Zarathustra began, redeeming the world from the kingdom of the demons, and crowning it with a final victory.

It is probable that this Persian dogma had some influence on the development in various directions, on Persian ground, of the doctrine of *Islam* regarding the person of the prophet *Mohammed*. The orthodox dogmatic made him a wonder-working saint and world-judge, the rationalists a distinguished teacher of truth, while the Shiites and Sufis made him an incarnation of the pre-existent divine light, or more particularly of the light implanted in mankind from Adam onward. Mohammed had not himself claimed superhuman dignity, not even perfect holiness; all he claimed was the infallibility of his word of revelation, which he said he had received through the disclosures of the angel Gabriel. To the dogmatic of Islam this appeared insufficient for the dignity of the founder, and the position was taken up that from the beginning of his life he had possessed the infallible knowledge of God, a statement more than bold when we remember the notorious fact that at an earlier period he had shared the heathen beliefs of his country. Equally little did the assertion of the sinlessness of Mohammed agree with the history of his life, for the noble early enthusiasm of the reformer was sadly sullied afterwards by the despot and the master of a harem. In view of these notorious facts, the rationalists of Islam urged objections to those predicates, while naturally orthodox theology thought it neces-

sary to uphold the perfection of the founder of the religion, in which it saw the expression and the guarantee of the perfection of the religion itself. Between this ideal postulate and the historical view the theologians of Islam sought out artificial means of harmony, by distinguishing, *e.g.* between the possibility and the actuality of sin; the former, they held, belonged to the human nature of Mohammed, but the possibility never became an actuality, being kept from doing so both by miraculous divine inspiration and by the prophet's own virtue. The multitude, however, led more by the interest of faith than by the reflections of the intellect, gravitated more and more towards the supernatural; the miraculous legends grew and increased, especially did the cardinal miracle of Mohammed's heavenly journey receive more and more fabulous elaboration, in which he was said to have been solemnly installed by God as his prophet. Following up, finally, the roots of his higher nature backwards, theories were reached which suggest, if they do not positively assert, personal pre-existence; according to the doctrine of the Shiites God at the creation introduced into matter a spark of his own light, and this spark was the soul of Mohammed; to it God spoke: Thou art the chosen one, the elect, in thee dwells my light and my guidance, for thy sake do I spread out the earth and make the heavens an arch, do I institute reward and punishment, do I create heaven and hell. Thus the sinless prophet became here also the centre and the end of the creation.

From this mystic tendency of the Persian Shiites arises also their legend of the voluntary death of *Hosein*, a grandson of Mohammed, who fell in the battle against the Omayyads, but was idealised by his adherents, and turned into a saint and martyr, who, according to divine predestination, out of love for the sinful world, gave up his life as a sacrifice for the world's salvation, and for this was exalted by God to be the world's judge, who bears the keys of Paradise. This legend became the subject of a passion-play, which to this day is performed every year with great solemnity in all the cities of Persia. This idea of a Saviour's love sacrificing itself for the good of sinners is quite foreign to Islam generally; it is connected with the mysticism of Persian Sufism, and is a proof, like that school of

thought, that on Indo-Germanic ground Islam was forced to accept changes and additions in order to adapt itself to a deeper range of feeling. We need not seek to determine whether these changes came to Islam from the Buddhist or from the Christian religion of redemption. It deserves to be remarked that in that popular legend and celebration the idea of redemption attached itself to the tragic fate of a historical person, and thus the idealising of this person, from an unfortunate warrior to a martyr taking upon himself voluntary sufferings, came about naturally as a necessary requirement of worship. It was only by means of this historical attachment and investment that the idea of redemption succeeded in establishing itself as to some extent a popular element, a part of the worship, of Persian Islam; where it remained without this historical help, and was taken as a purely inward process of feeling belonging to the ascetic and mystic love of God, it remained restricted to the esoteric scholastic speculation of Sufism (vol. iii. p. 182), and only in the form of an emotional religious poetry did it attain to somewhat greater and more permanent importance. It must certainly be acknowledged that among the poems of a *Saadi* and *Jelaleddin Rumi* (both belonging to the thirteenth century) there are to be found genuine pearls of religious mysticism not unworthy to be placed by the side of the finest Christian poetry, *e.g.* :—

“ My spirit with thy soul divine
Is blent as water mixed with wine,
My greater self is now in Thee,
How then shall I the smaller be ?
My nature thou dost take for thine,
Thine let me therefore have for mine.
In the deep places of my breast
With heaven's reflection thou dost rest.”

“ Say wouldst thou live for ever, abide everlastingly ?
Oh ! haste then thy striving soul from this transient world to free !
Thy heart heed not, nor thy body ; be free from earth's callings and cares !
Let the love of thy Creator now thy true existence be,
And the feeling of self be lost in the sense of eternity !

See how gladly the corn in the earth rejoices when sown to die,
 For the nothingness whither it hastes has the richest gifts in store,
 And when in the dark earth buried, self has to nothing grown,
 Then the flower and the fruit strive upwards, heavenward evermore !”

Outside Christianity the belief in redemption and mediation assumed central importance nowhere but in *India* ; where it first appeared as an esoteric doctrine of salvation in Brahmanic speculation, and then as a popular religion among the disciples of Gautama Buddha. The most remarkable feature of the Brahmanic doctrine of salvation is the antithetical and indeed hostile position it takes up towards the exoteric doctrine of duties of the law of Manu, which prescribes ritual and moral works as the way to happiness both in this world and the next. The position, indeed, can only be regarded as a preparatory stage to the other.¹ All doing of works, of whatever kind, can never, according to the system of the Vedanta, lead to redemption ; it can only lead back to Samsara ; for as works proceed from the Ego which desires, they always demand a *compensation* in pleasure or pain ; but these belong only to the bodily not to the incorporeal existence ; only to the changing, not to the unchanging, which is the state of Brahma and of redemption. Nor is redemption to be attained by moral improvement, for all improvement takes place by the adoption of virtues and the discarding of errors, by an activity therefore which aims at a change in the object ; but the self (Atman) is eternal and unchangeable, so that there can be no activity that is directed to the self as its object, while an activity that is directed to another object cannot affect the self, nor improve it. Man's goal, redemption (Moksha), is only attained by knowledge of the self, a knowledge quite independent of any activity, even of any moral effort after virtue, by knowledge of one's unity with the great self of the world, with Brahma. When the consciousness awakens of the identity of one's own self with Brahma, then the separation from the all-one, a separation based on the illusion of Maya, comes to an end, and with it the cause of all suffering. This identity has always

¹ Compare Deussen, *Das System des Vedanta*, Leipzig, 1883 (especially the 5th section ; *Moksha oder die Lehre v. d. Erlösung*).

subsisted; what takes place in redemption is not a becoming, a change, a renewal of the self; only the barrier is removed which was caused by the false state of mind in the former ignorance. The entry of this knowledge, moreover, in which salvation consists, cannot be brought about by any efforts on our part, as is the case with other knowledge, such as is directed to outward objects. The knowledge here in question is of a peculiar nature; here the ordinary distinction between knower and known disappears in the unity of both; and this is not possible by means of ordinary (reflecting, discursive) thought, but only through a mystical immediate becoming aware, which quite transcends the ordinary antithesis of consciousness; hence it is said: "Who does not know, he alone knows it." This dawn of the higher knowledge, not to be explained from the ordinary causal nexus, is represented by exoteric dogmatic as a gift of *Divine grace*, which effects that which is unattainable to human power, and manifests to the man whom it has chosen the essential nature of the self; the esoteric view, to describe it more precisely, is that it is man's own self in its unity with the absolute, or as subject-object, which enters unveiled into the mind to which it was veiled before. But though the redeeming knowledge cannot be brought about (immediately) by works, nor by virtuous efforts, nor by searching the Scripture, yet the various works of asceticism (outward and inward) are so far of religious value as they at least help to bring about redemption. They are not, as exoteric legal piety considers, meritorious in themselves, so as to call for reward, but they are salutary as *means of grace* which place the soul in a favourable position for receiving the redeeming knowledge. The means of grace in this wider sense, enumerated by Brahmanic dogmatic, are the following: sacrifice, alms, fasting, self-mortification, study of the Veda, meditation. These exercises belong to the stage of preparation, and cease after the attainment of knowledge; the means of grace in the stricter sense, however, which are directly connected with the religious state of feeling; quiet of soul, self-training, renunciation, patience, self-collection, these maintain their place at the stage of redemption, or with him who knows, and form a part of his life even till death,

with which redemption is consummated. As for the stage of redemption, or the blessedness of the wise man, it is described as complete detachment from all particular determinations of consciousness, such as are affected by oppositeness or change, from the antithesis of I and Thou, of activity and passivity, of good and evil. No care for the things of the world any longer vexes him who has known the world to be illusion ; no feeling of pain, not even of his own body, affects him who sees his own body to be an illusion. The incorporeal and unchangeable, which the wise man has recognised himself to be, is no longer touched by pleasure or pain. The fruit of former works, too, good as well as evil, disappears for the consciousness of the wise man ; for him who knows Brahma, who has recognised that the self is not active, former works which he did in the vain dream that he was the doer of them, come to nought when this dream is dispelled by knowledge. " Him who knows this, neither overpowers ; whether when he was in the body he did evil or whether he did good ; he out-comes both ; no longer does it burn him, what he has done and what he has not done. This bridge (of redemption) death does not overstep, nor pain, not good works, and not evil works, all sins turn round before it." A removal of sins like this, through knowledge of the illusion of being an actor, may lead to quietude of soul, but cannot lead to new moral life and energy for goodness ; what does away with sins does away with good works too, both those past and those to come : " He who has found peace in the self is no longer bound by any duty." With the knowledge of the soul as Brahma " the fulfilment of man's destiny has taken place, and all obligation has an end. All laws, those proceeding from Scripture not excepted, are, if brought into connection with the knowledge of Brahma, as blunt as the edge of the knife when pressed against the grindstone." Thus there is quiet in the soul of him who knows and is redeemed, but it is the quiet of death, of the heart dead and emptied, to which, along with evils also goods, along with the false and illusory also the true and permanent ends of existence have disappeared, and become vain and meaningless. To this existence, which is so dead within, outward life still rolls on for a while, to be compared to the potter's

wheel, which continues its revolution for a time after its work is done. And when at last what remains in the outer life of the earlier living impulse is used up, the spirits of the wise man's life do not go forth to a new existence ; his redemption is consummated by his absorption in Brahma :

“ As run the streams, which in the ocean,
Both name and form surrendered, are no more ;
So, freed from name and form, goes forth the sage,
Goes in to the great spirit, the spirit divine.”

This Brahmanic doctrine of redemption was an esoteric ideal of life, which was intimately connected with the esoteric scholastic speculation of the Brahmans, their abstract idealistic and monistic thought, and for that reason could of course never pass beyond the narrow circle of the philosophers ; the multitude had to content itself with the exoteric ideal of ritual piety and civic uprightness as delineated in the law of Manu. Besides, it was impossible to carry out that esoteric ideal without an outward as well as an inward withdrawal from the “ world,” from the life of the family and of society, so that one might devote one's self to quiet contemplation. But even in India, where outward conditions make the life of the “ hermit of the woods ” much more possible than with us, it was not every one who was suited for it ; such total isolation, without support from any intercourse whatever, only a few world-weary exceptions could endure. For these reasons the Brahmanic way of salvation could never become popular. The new turn given to the Indian doctrine of salvation by Gautama *Buddha* consisted firstly in its being severed from Brahmanic scholastic philosophy, and made perfectly practical, so that it was suited to be the common property of the whole people ; secondly, in the type, which every one could understand, of the way of salvation given in the person of the founder ; and lastly, in the fixed organisation of the holy life in the community of his disciples, which could assist individuals as a support and supplement of their own more or less imperfect endeavours.

But however great the difference in form between the popular religion of redemption of Buddha and the esoteric philosophical and

mystical theory of redemption of the Brahmans, the practical tendency of the idea of redemption was essentially the same in both. Both sought the cause of evil in not-knowing, which chained the will to that which was naught, and the ground of redemption in knowing, in an illumination of the consciousness, which caused the illusion to be seen through, and the will entangled in it freed and brought to rest. True, the content of the knowledge which redeems is not with Buddha the metaphysical thought of the unity of the self with Brahma,—this notion he rejected expressly ;—but the practical thought that pain does not cease so long as the will cleaves to existence, because till then it is subject to the law of all existence, to the sentence of the instability of all being, the transitoriness of all happiness. But as the Brahman expects that by the metaphysical knowledge he speaks of, all doing and all suffering being seen to be illusory, will come to an end, just so Buddha holds that when the law of becoming and of the deceitfulness of all efforts after happiness once are known, the will which cleaves to the world will go out and come to rest. The Buddhistic “Nirvana” comes practically to be the same thing as the Brahmanic “Moksha,” only that it wants the metaphysical pantheistic background of the latter ; it is the state of extinguished desire, of passionless quiet, of the dead and withered heart. The way to redemption too is almost the same in both cases. Buddhism, it is true, attaches no value to ritual sacrifice, to the study of the Veda, or to mortification, which are reckoned among the Brahmanic means of grace in the wider sense ; but beneficence in all its forms, quiet and patience, self-conquest and renunciation of the world, absorption or meditation even to the pitch of ecstatic emptying of consciousness, these means of grace in the stricter sense, of the Vedanta, form the Buddhist way of salvation too. The Buddhist ideal of life too culminates in the withdrawal of the wise man from the world, from family and business, house and land, to lead in *perfect renunciation of the world* the life of holiness and of blessed peace. But in the manner in which this principle is carried out there is a difference which has important consequences ; the Brahmanic avoidance of the world led individuals to the retirement of the woods for a

life of inactive contemplation ; the Buddhist avoidance of the world led many into cloisters ; where they organised themselves as monks, and as mission preachers, father confessors, teachers and educators of the people, formed a regular religious calling. In the community of monks and nuns Buddhism possessed the kernel of an ecclesiastical organisation to which the congregation of the laity attached itself ; here it found a standing embodiment of its distinctive religious principle, and an active instrument of its diffusion ; in short, an objective means of grace, in which the subjective religious life and endeavour of individual believers might find, in the form of a fixed institution, both a visible type, and the needed generative power, the help and support and fulfilment it craved.

This community of the saints, again, had its type and bond of unity in the *person of the founder*, in whose doctrine and life that ideal had first been manifested by which his followers were inspired. It was this connection with a historical life with dramatic and attractive human features, that gave the *religion* of redemption its great advantage over the mere *theories* of redemption of the Brahmanic schools. The more simple, practical and popular view of the way of redemption naturally contributed very greatly from the first to the success of Buddha's preaching ; but this of itself would scarcely have sufficed both to found and to hold together a religion which spread beyond the limits of nationality, had not the personal life of the founder afforded to his first disciples, and then, by the accounts they transmitted, to later generations also a popularly intelligible and winning example of the doctrine of the new religion. It was no more than a natural expression of this fact that the church of Buddha exalted its founder, in whom it saw both the embodiment of its ideal of life and the source of its religious satisfaction, to an *object of worship*, and so represented the highest it knew in the world as being also the highest power over the world, thus assuring itself of the eternal continuance of his benefits. He thus came to occupy in the eyes of the church the place of the world-ruling deity, and was invoked in worship as "god of gods, father of the world, redeemer and governor of all creatures." But when once the demands of wor-

ship had lifted up the founder beyond the measure of humanity, the result necessarily followed that pious fancy adorned the memory of his life on earth with legends, in which the pregnant symbolism of religious ideas was blended with purely mystical traits from old heroic and divine legends (*e.g.* sun-myths). It is not necessary for us to enter here on the detail of the legend of Buddha; we need only remark that the unique and dominating importance of his personality for the consciousness of his church finds expression not only in the miracles of his career as a prophet, but also in the legend of the miraculous beginning of his manifestation on earth. It was love to the creation that caused him to descend from his heavenly existence and to be born of a virgin mother, his birth being accompanied by all manner of signs and miracles. For all this, however, the earthly person of the founder was to the Buddhist church no more than one single appearance and revelation in history of universal ideals outside of time; as we may gather from the peculiar expectation, that similar Buddhas will appear in future ages of the world, repeating and continuing in an indefinite number of avatars, as often as the need of the earth requires, the existence of that one who had already come.

Similar to this was the subsequent Brahmanic doctrine of the incarnations of Vishnu, one of which in particular, that of the solar hero *Krishna*, attained to an importance which rivalled that of Buddha. In moral respects he is much inferior to the latter, but he has the advantage of him in being connected with the popular mythology and the epic heroic legend of the Indians. The legends of Krishna's miraculous birth in a shepherd's stall, and of the flight of the child from persecution, form the subject of the celebration of the principal Brahmanic festival, the Indian Christmas, or birth-feast of Krishna, the similarity of which with the Christian Christmas has long been remarked. The question has been much discussed whether we have here a fortuitous coincidence of phenomena arising out of similar motives, but quite unconnected with each other historically, or whether a historical connection exists, and if so, which of the two is the original, and which the derived one? This question, like the similar one of the relation to Christianity of the legend of Buddha,

we may leave to be decided by further historical investigation. I content myself with remarking that the passionate excitement which such inquiries still seem to call forth in the theological world appears to me very extraordinary and unintelligible ; a little reflection ought, I think, to show that in any case, whatever may be the result to which such inquiries lead, there is a similarity in fact between the two groups of legends, the substantial reason of which can only be found in psychological considerations. There must be psychological motives at work, which arise, independently of outward events, out of the religious consciousness generally, and more particularly out of the soil of the religions of redemption. In these religions the need is strongly felt to see in the picture of a personal human life the typical revelation of the divine redeeming power, and therefore to conceive of the ideal person of the Saviour as mysteriously connected from the first with deity. This is a natural need of the brooding and expectant soul ; and we ought not to deny its legitimacy, or to undervalue the truth that is in it, because we see that poetic fancy had a share in forming the miraculous legend.

In *Christianity* the belief in redemption and mediation is traceable in various ways to the religion of Israel, without, however, coinciding exactly with any of the ideas of the older religion. What is generally comprised under the title of "Messianic prophecy" is, as is well known, a mixture of very various ideas, of which it may be said without injustice that those of them which were intended as prophecies do not really apply to the Christian Saviour, and that those in which there really is a prophecy of the new covenant and its founder had at first no real Messianic significance. To the first class belong the prophetic hopes of a Davidic ruler, who is to raise up again in its former glory the national theocracy ; to the latter belongs the deutero-Isaianic picture of the patiently teaching and suffering Servant of God, in whom the prophet himself saw, not the Messiah of the future, but the ideal Israel of the present, as he no doubt saw it personified in pious sufferers of his own time, Jeremiah, or other saints not known to us. The idea here expressed of the

vicarious sufferings of the good man for an atonement for sinners, was afterwards connected in Jewish theology with the external legal doctrine of the merit attaching to works and sufferings, one's own as well as those of others, and so reached an importance more than in proportion to its value. But what in Pharisaic theology led to a morally deadening confidence in the merits of Jewish saints past and present, and so tended to increase the vain self-righteousness of the Jewish joint national consciousness, the apostle Paul placed in connection with the death of Christ on the cross, so making it the foundation of his doctrine of salvation, which casts to the ground all self-righteousness by the announcement of the atoning grace of God, and of righteousness by faith alone.

The riddle of the *Pauline* doctrine of redemption, which to this day is seldom understood correctly, consists in this, that it overcomes the Jewish religion of the law on its own ground, and by means of its own assumptions. That sin is not forgiven without propitiatory penalty, that the penalty demanded by the law for sin is nothing less than death, but that the sufferings of the righteous man are imputed to the community which is bound up with him in solidarity, as a vicarious penalty for them, these were fixed axioms to the Paul of the Pharisaic school. The application, too, of the idea of a vicarious, guilt-atoning suffering of the just man, to the death of Christ, had established itself in the Christian community before Paul. But the inferences Paul made from these given premisses were new and of signal importance. They issued mainly from his higher view of the person of Christ, whom he regarded not merely as a just man of Jewish race, or as a national Messiah, whose sufferings could only have been of force for this one people, but as the second Adam, the prototypal man from heaven, who represents the whole of mankind for good, as the first Adam had represented it for evil. Hence Christ's death possesses such meaning as if all had died in and with him, its atoning power is for the benefit of all, potentially of all men,—for as the first or heavenly man he represents all men before God,—and in fact all those who recognise the representative meaning of his death, and so make it in fact their own, experiencing it over

again in their own consciousness, and so feeling themselves to be ideally dead and risen again in and with Christ. The death of Christ therefore effects abstractly, objectively, the atonement of the whole world; but this comes to be a subjective reality, a state of justification or of freedom from guilt, *only* in those, but again in *all* those who in faith inwardly appropriate to themselves the death of Christ in such a way that it is no longer merely the outward experience of one instead of all, but the common inner experience of *all in and with the one*. Thus there is added to the higher view of Christ, as a further decisive factor with Paul, the deeper apprehension of faith as the central act of obedience in which the heart surrenders itself to the atoner to be one with him in death and in life; by this faith the many grow together into one spirit and members of one body with their one head; they are animated with the one mind of Christ the Son of God, that spirit of self-sacrificing love, which seeks to manifest its dignity of being in the likeness of God not in violent and selfish strivings, but in meek and obedient self-humiliation, service, and suffering. Turned as Paul thus turns it, the Pharisaic idea of a removal of guilt by the merit and the sufferings of another loses the objectionable element which attaches to it not only apparently but really, and the profoundly moral idea now appears that in the trustful surrender of the heart to the type of pure humanity and of saving love, an inner change takes place in man in which the old guilt is done away, along with the old bondage of the law, and a new purity and freedom, and energy for good is gained. The Jewish idea of vicarious propitiation was therefore for Paul merely the lever by means of which he raised himself and his Jewish readers to the level of the Christian idea of a redemption which takes place not outside us but within us, namely, in the turning away of the heart from the old selfishness of sin and the law to the trustful experience and grateful return of the love of God. Seen from this point of view the death of Christ is no longer as at first a means of propitiation provided by God to satisfy the demands of the law by executing the curse of it; it is on one side a proof of the love of God, which gives up for us the best it has, and asks nothing but

our heart in return, while on the other side it is the type of our faithful obedience, which in this central act of the surrender of the heart to God, an act of moral self-sacrifice, is sure that it accomplishes the saving purpose of God, and receives his gift of righteousness and of life. With Paul, as truly as with Jesus, the kernel of the doctrine of salvation was the inner process of ethical redemption in the death of the old selfish man and the coming to life of a new, God-loving man; and with Paul this process drew from the contemplation of the historical death of Christ not only its original impulse, but also its dramatic pattern for all time, and a motive immediately intelligible and of great force for the simplest mind. Such a motive and pattern is of irreplaceable value for the religion of redemption, since in this way alone can the essence of the matter, of this mysterious process of the heart which can never be exhaustively set forth in the language of nature, obtain a generally intelligible form of expression, such as may prove an effective means for the diffusion of the religion of redemption. In this sense the significance Paul attributed to the death of Christ, of a central, all-comprehending means of salvation, is undoubtedly a truth which can never be put aside. But the circumstance that in Paul's form of doctrine this Christian truth is closely inwoven with those assumptions of the Jewish religion of law which formed its starting-point, makes his doctrine hard, and gives it its oscillating, dialectical character. It is as if there were two souls in his breast; the old one of the Pharisee, which still clings to the law, and the new one of the Apostle, which has found in faith the liberty of the children of God; and the struggle of those two souls in Paul's breast is reflected in the oscillation of his doctrine of redemption between the form which is Jewish and the result which is Christian. But this very dialectic, the theoretical comprehension of which is the crux of expositors, has a peculiar value of its own for the practical religious life; we must not forget that the same ascent from the legal to the childlike consciousness, which was first accomplished with such struggles in the Apostle Paul, has been repeated in the experience of multitudes of others, especially in Protestant Christianity. All these

require in turn, just as Paul once did, the lever of legal ideas by which to raise themselves up above the legal standpoint; and how natural is it that the psychological working dialectic of the heart, when making the transition from the slavish fear of the law to the childlike confidence of the gospel, should find in the dialectic of Pauline theology, which stands just between the two positions, and mediates in so original a fashion between them, both the support and the bridge it is in search of! This is the reason why the dogmatic of the church will not give up this form of doctrine, angular as it is, and harsh, and exposed to manifold doctrinal objections. It does right in this, inasmuch as the end and purpose of dogmatic is simply to present the right ideas, *i.e.* the ideas which are practically serviceable, for the production of the normal processes of the religious consciousness.

It has to be said, however, that the Pauline doctrine of redemption, conditioned as it is by individual peculiarities, can only find entrance and understanding where analogous assumptions exist to those of its origin; that it cannot advance the claim to be held solely and exclusively valid follows from the simple fact that other modes of doctrine are present in the New Testament. The theory of propitiation from which Paul set out, finds no place in the *Johannine* theology, since the law with which Paul had still to wrestle is here altogether transcended, and God is known simply as love, which does not demand the satisfaction of its claim for penalty by the execution of the curse of the law, before it can manifest itself as grace. Here, then, there can be no question of vicarious propitiation by the death of the Messiah to satisfy the curse; salvation, atonement is not a thing that has to be wrought out by the merits and sufferings of a mediator; it is already present in the person of the Saviour who possesses, in his consciousness of sonship to God, redeeming grace and truth, and offers them by all his acts and words, by his life and death, to the acceptance of the world. Here the redeeming principle is not found in any particular event, but in the illuminating and life-giving powers which go forth from the divine spirit of Jesus. This spirit—modern language would describe it

most simply by the term "religious genius," which is familiar to us moderns—the fourth Evangelist designated by the notion "Logos," which was current in the Jewish-Hellenist speculation of his day. In this notion the hypostatised "Word of Revelation" (Memra) of the Jewish theology of the period, melted into one with the similarly hypostatised world-forming and -governing "Reason" of Greek philosophy. The combination of the two ideas was accomplished by *Philo* (vol. iii. p. 172) a full century before the fourth Evangelist, and the term had been ever since a usual and current expression of what lay in the mind of the age. The question therefore is perfectly idle, whether the Logos-notion of the fourth Gospel is to be traced to the philosophy of Philo, or to Jewish theology. The truth is simply that it belongs to the general religious consciousness of the second century, which could not feel that there was any occasion to distinguish with any exactness between the various sources and nuances of this convenient expression, this formula in fact of the union and connection of the wisdoms of the East and of the West. Instead of carrying on useless discussions on this question, it would be well to aim at greater clearness than has hitherto prevailed as to the intention and the result of the application of the Logos-notion to the person of Jesus, which the fourth Evangelist was the first to resort to. At the very outset so much is clear; if in the founder of Christianity there is seen the "Incarnation," *i.e.* the personal, corporeal appearance of that same divine Logos who had been from the first the mediating principle of the divine activity both in creation and in the history of salvation, then Christianity is thereby asserted to be the consummation of all previous revelations of God in the world, and so the perfect religion, equally above Judaism and heathenism. That relation of the Johannine Christ to the Father-God, unity of essence along with dependence in point of existence, manifested in the form of the most confident intimacy combined with the freest obedience of filial love,—what is it but the perfected ideal of the Christian religion and indeed of all religion? And if the Evangelist makes the Logos arrive first in Jesus at his full manifestation in history, while he yet existed before, a pre-existent

active principle of revelation, what does this really mean, but that the Christian religion, in spite of all its novelty, was not entirely unprepared for, that it did not break into the world without cause or without connection with what went before, but was the realisation of the religious endowment of our race, the highest stage of development of that divine reasonable impulse which was always and everywhere present in humanity? Thus we are fully justified in finding in the Logos-doctrine of Johannine theology a genuine speculative strain of thought, the rational idealism of which belongs to a distinctly higher level than the national and limited positivism of Jewish Christianity, or again than the positivism of the present day which has its root in a universal Logophobia (distrust of reason). The reverse however must certainly not be overlooked. The Logos being conceived not only as a divine principle but as a particular divine person, and the latter immediately identified with the historical person of Jesus, the historical features of the latter are obliterated, and instead of the man who, in spite of the exaggerated miraculous nature attributed to him in the earlier Gospels, was yet clearly enough discernible in them, we here look upon a God clothed in human form, whose allegorical symbolism, its exalted ideality notwithstanding, can never quite make up to us for the loss of living historical reality.

The early church was unable to conceive of redemption otherwise than as a mythological process, a struggle or a litigation between God, Christ, and the devil, mankind being only the passive object of the contest. With this it very naturally connected itself that the church desired to see the two parties who were to be brought together by redemption, namely God and man, represented in the person of the mediator in an external mechanical manner, a complete divine nature and a complete human nature being united in him. This motive appears with special clearness in *Anselm*, who demonstrated the necessity of the incarnation of God by the following argumentation. Human sin, thus he sets out, being an insult to God and a disturbance of his world-order, involved an infinite penalty, which God for the sake of his own honour could not leave unpunished; hence God demands, for the reparation of his injured

honour, an infinite satisfaction, failing which he must deliver guilty mankind to the merited punishment of death. This satisfaction, however, guilty mankind was not able itself to render, since whatever man could offer to God is of finite value only, and since, besides, he already owes God all that it is in his power to do, and hence cannot draw from it any superfluous merit to make good his guilt. There was only one way out of the difficulty; the satisfaction which mankind owed, but was not able to render, must be rendered for them by one who was both man and more than man, that is a God-man. But this satisfaction did not consist in the obedient life of the God-man Christ; that was no more than his duty, and was not therefore meritorious; it was the surrender to death of the sacred life of Christ, which furnished, according to Anselm, a meritorious work to which he would not have been obliged, and which God therefore accepted as an infinitely valuable satisfaction, and reckoned to the credit of sinful men as the kindred of the God-man. This theory is obviously a true reflection of the secular and ecclesiastical consciousness of the Middle Ages, the ages of chivalry and of Catholicism; it simply transfers the idea of wounded honour which demands satisfaction or vengeance, an idea which belongs to the moral code of chivalry, to the relation of God to man, never inquiring whether an idea which has some meaning in human relations between equals, can reasonably be transferred to the altogether different relationship between the creator and the creature, or if this transference does not itself involve a lowering of God to man, which is most unworthy of his true honour. And again, the theory of Anselm transfers to the atoning work of Christ the Catholic view of supererogatory, meritorious works, which go beyond the measure of duty, and lay the foundation of a merit which is transferable from one man to another, and so may serve to cover up a deficit incurred elsewhere. From the ground of the Catholic doctrine of salvation, to which it was a fixed assumption that supererogatory meritorious works were possible, and that the merit of them was transferable, the Anselmic doctrine of satisfaction is perfectly consistent: all that it does is to treat the atoning work of Christ according to the pattern of the work-service of the church, which

latter was thus justified by being represented as the copy and the continuation of the work of Christ.

It was therefore very intelligible that other mediators should be placed by the side of the first and typical mediator, Christ—the *saints*, who again were summed up in the church herself as the universal mediator between God and man. Nor is it to be wondered at that these special mediators should at last have supplanted and thrust into the background the original mediator, Christ, if not in the dogmatic of the school, yet in the practice of the church. This was a natural reaction against the exaggeration of the divine in the person of Christ; the more the human side was absorbed by the divine, and removed to a mysterious and incomprehensible beyond, the more did the need make itself felt to fill up the ever widening gap with new mediators, and so to gain some compensation for a distant and unapproachable deity by human copies which were near, familiar, and intelligible. Thus the Catholic belief in saints was but a sapling from the same root from which the whole religious belief in mediators springs, and must either fall with the latter, or maintain itself with it in a higher, ethically idealised form. The last result to which the belief in mediators led was practically the most important and also the most mischievous; namely, the mediatorship of the church as the community of the saints, in which, according to the scholastic theory, all the treasures of the merits of Christ and of the saints are held in store; which disposes of them as a mistress, and in her ritual imparts to individuals a share of the enjoyment of these treasures, or of the saving benefit of salvation, of the favour of God,—and so wields an unconditioned sway over men's consciences.

It is at this point that the Catholic doctrine of redemption and mediation is weakest and most open to attack, and here accordingly *Protestantism* applied the lever of its criticism. To get rid of the mediatorship of the church, which rests on the merits of the saints, it went back to the sole merit of Christ as the one mediator, but in its dogmatic statement of this truth it adhered in the main to the ideas of Anselm, though these have their root just in that mediæval Catholic view of the world which was now to be superseded. Hence

the peculiar phenomenon, that Protestant dogmatic rejects the principle that there can be works possessing merit over and above duty, and yet keeps up Anselm's doctrine of the substitutionary merit of the death of Christ. Protestant doctrine indeed goes even beyond Anselm in ascribing to Christ's active obedience, as well as to his passive, a meritorious character, and representing these merits as transferred to us by imputation, while yet it lays stress on the demands of conscience which throw every man's responsibility on himself alone. In this inconsistency of Protestant doctrine the same conflict between idea and form, means and end, repeats itself, which we remarked in the Pauline doctrine of redemption. With Paul the legal theory of vicarious atonement was merely the means to get past and rid of the religion of the law; and in the same way the Anselmic theory of the satisfying merit of Christ is merely the means to get rid of the satisfying merits of other ecclesiastical mediators, and generally of the notion of merit as applied to human conduct, and so clear the ground for divine grace, which justifies through faith alone. There is undoubtedly an inconsistency when redemption by meritorious works is denied within the church, but asserted at the beginning of the church; yet we must admit both that this inconsistency was a necessary outcome of historical conditions, and that it is far less felt in practical religious life, where the echoes of various feelings go to form a harmony, than in theory. From the logical point of view Socinians and rationalists may be ever so much in the right in their criticism of the church's dogma of atonement; but the church was at least as much in the right in not letting all these logical objections keep her from singing Paul Gerhard's Passion hymn,

"O Lamb of God once wounded!"—¹

a hymn which moves entirely within the dogmatic circle of ideas, but only uses them to stir up the true evangelical sentiment of thankful surrender to the Saviour's love, which was faithful to death. Where the dogma remained without the inner resonance, a mere

¹ "O Haupt voll Blut und Wunden."

stiff proposition, the object of cold knowledge and assent, it might well be open to objections not of a logical kind only, but of a moral kind as well ; we need only remember the well-known fact of the moral decivilisation of the people in many respects at the flourishing period of stiff doctrinal orthodoxy. Hence it was a circumstance of extraordinary importance, never to be too highly valued, that Pietism and the community of the Brothers of the Common Life laid stress not on the dogmatic idea as such, but rather on the experience of the heart, the tone of feeling, the movement of will which doctrine was to set up ; in this it was implied, without any change being made on the dogma, that redemption must be an inward thing, in the sense of the Pauline mysticism of faith in which the Christ-for-us is changed into the Christ-in-us, his vicarious death into our ethical dying and living again with him in the spirit of sonship—a process within the spirit to which the saviour is related as the awakening and sealing pattern and sign. This appears with special distinctness in the literature of edification, especially the spiritual songs from the works of the mystics, the Pietists and the Herrnhutists. In the hymns of a Gottfried Arnold, Tersteegen, Fr. Richter, Rambach, Hiller, Bogatzky, Zinzendorf, Novalis, etc., there is such warmth, such strength, such depth, such purity and freedom of religious feeling, as to stamp them as an admirable expression of evangelical Christianity, and a true echo of the best voices of the Reformation.

Here, however, it appears in the clearest manner how closely the deepest and most living piety is allied to the profoundest thinking. What those pious poets expressed in the language of inspired feeling and vision, comes in substance just to the thought in which theosophists and philosophers, both old and new, have clothed the central kernel of the idea of redemption. I will here present only a small garland of these utterances ; the reader may supplement them, if he desires to do so, from the first volume of this work. According to *Meister Eckhart* redemption consists in this, that we cease from our own will and opinions, and in pure devotion of the soul to God let him work in us, and so in self-forgetting love grow one with him, that he henceforward may become man in us, as in Christ. Accord-

ing to the "*German Theology*," no work of God can save me, in so far as it is outside me and comes to pass outside me ; it can only save me in so far as it is and comes to pass inside me, is known and loved, felt and tasted, in me. But God's work in us is that we, set on fire by the divine love, go out from self-love, and let ourselves be taught and impelled to all good by God's spirit and God's will. In turning away from self-will, which is our condemnation, lies redemption and the forgiveness of sins, blessedness and freedom ; other way there is none to these ends. The Protestant theosophists unanimously taught the same doctrine, upholding it polemically against the dogma of the church, *e.g.* *Weigel* ; Christ's death and merit is imputed to no one, except he have in himself Christ's death, and rise with Christ in a new life. It is the Christ who dwells in us who must do this, not he who dwells outside us ; and *Frank* says : Adam and Christ are in every man, inasmuch as he is both flesh and spirit ; the Christ according to the flesh (the historical Jesus) is given to us by God for a sacrament and an example, that we should lay hold of God in him ; but his history must also be accomplished in all his members ; only when the Word becomes flesh in us, suffers, dies, and rises again in us, and drives out the old Adam, is Christ's office and career entirely completed. According to *Böhme*, too, redemption consists in the will's going out from its self-ness, out of which arise strife and anguish, and plunging itself again entirely and utterly in the one will of God, from which it sprang ; faith is not a mere acceptance of the history that Christ died for our sins ; it is this, that one has no other love than God's, that one throws one's will into God's will, and lives in God, that one lets God's spirit live and act in one ; then one is free of all sins, for they no longer touch him who in God's quiet eternity has found freedom. In this the Lutheran theosophist is closely echoed by that philosopher of the Renaissance, *Giordano Bruno* ; according to him the way of salvation consists in an ethical and æsthetic elevation of the heart from the lower passions to the higher or heroic passions of the true and good, and it reaches its consummation when divine love becomes the ruling passion of the soul, which rises thereby above the world of sense and the iron law of necessity,

and enters on wider efforts after her own perfection. *Spinoza* follows *Giordano Bruno* ; he sees the blessedness of man in the intellectual love of God, which is engendered in us by the knowledge of the divine perfection, and gives us strength to overcome our passions, detaches us thereby from all unfreedom, and in the perfect rest and inner freedom of the heart, not only expects, but immediately is, the highest blessedness. Nothing, therefore, according to *Spinoza*, is essentially necessary for salvation but the knowledge of the eternal Son of God, *i.e.* of divine wisdom : the knowledge of the historical Christ is not absolutely necessary, though it is helpful because divine wisdom, though revealed in the human mind in general, has revealed itself in Christ Jesus more than in any other. According to *Kant* the only essential object of saving faith is the ideal Christ, *i.e.* the ideal of God-pleasing humanity. The origin and the authentication of this idea lie in human reason itself ; but a visible form has been given to it in a historical personality like Jesus, whose moral power so victoriously asserted itself against all opposition, that we may regard him as an example of the idea of moral perfection ; it matters little whether he corresponds accurately with that ideal or not, and nothing certain can ever be said on this point. A sharper line is drawn between the religious ideal and the historical reality by *Jacobi*. "We quite understand," he writes to *Claudius*, "how everything that man can see of the divine, everything that can awaken him as he beholds it, to a divine life, represents itself to you under the image and with the name of Christ. In so far as what you reverence in him is that which is essentially good and divine, your soul keeps itself upright, you do not humble by the worship of an idol the reason and morality that are in you. What Christ may have been outside you, for himself, whether the reality of him corresponded to your notion or not, or whether he ever really existed at all, all this can make no difference to the essential truth of your idea, nor to the value of the dispositions which spring from it. What he is in you is the only important matter ; and in you he is a truly divine being ; through him you see the Deity, so far as you are capable of seeing the Deity at all, and when you rise *with* him to

the highest ideas, you fancy, and it is an innocent error, that you can only rise to them *in him*." *Fichte* draws a distinction in the theology of the church between two propositions of very different value; the metaphysical one, which contains the perception of the unity of human existence with the divine life, and the historical one which amounts to the statement that this unity first came to man's consciousness in Jesus of Nazareth. "It is only the metaphysical element, by no means the historical one, that saves; the latter only informs. If a man is really united with God and entered into him, it makes little difference by what road he reached that point, and it would be a very useless and perverse proceeding to be always going back upon the idea of the way, instead of living in the thing." "The one means of blessedness is the death of self-ness, death *with* Jesus, regeneration; but to know the history of the instruction to this point, contributes nothing whatever to salvation." To *Hegel's* more objective thinking the historical element is not quite so un-essential as it appears to the subjective idealist. In his view, also, it is true the atonement is based on the nature of the human spirit, or more precisely on the consciousness of the essential unity of the finite and the infinite spirit, in which all the contradiction of the finite has disappeared; but this truth, *Hegel* remarks, can only enter into the mind of religious mankind in the form of a historically given view, in which that which spirit essentially is is set forth as a definite external reality, as one particular fact and personality. Thus the atoning truth of the Christian church only came to view in the person of its founder, and hence the church's own consciousness of the removal of the discord between God and man is concretely set forth for the church in the idea of the one God-man and his atoning death. The main error of these two last theories, viz., that redemption, an experience of the feeling and willing Ego, appears to be turned into an intellectual process of consciousness, was avoided by *Schleiermacher*, who described redemption and atonement as the communication of the powerful and blessed God-consciousness, which is present in the church of Christ as the higher life imparted to her by her founder, and continuing to work to an infinite extent; in this

communication we have to recognise both the operation of an external divine act and a development of the energy of the religious endowment which is peculiar to human nature. This communication of the higher God-consciousness, which in general he traced to the influence on individuals of the common Christian spirit, he also represents as the act of Christ, but this naturally is not to be understood literally, but in the remoter sense in which we may describe all the blessings which proceeded from a religious genius, and still go on working centuries after him, as his acts, *i.e.* as the effects produced indirectly by his historical life. The last cause of these effects Schleiermacher found in the work of God which is accomplished through the endowment of the human race, and consequently he thought it necessary to infer the supernatural character of the historical person of the founder, and to prove the identity of that person with the absolute ideal, and gave an elaborate argument to this effect ; but here there can be no doubt that he sacrificed what should in strictness have followed from his premisses to the practical requirements of dogmatic, which he yet failed altogether to satisfy by such a procedure (vol. i. p. 339).

The philosophy of religion must not here any more than elsewhere take for granted any particular dogmatic or philosophical theories and formulas, but must start from the facts of the religious experience of mankind, as presented by the widest historical review. The less prejudice we bring with us, and the more simply we seek to explain these facts, not scorning the aid of psychological good sense, the more shall we be likely to do justice to the real kernel of the motive which started the dogma, the less likely to fall into any kind of dogmatism. A glance at history shows at once that the two religions which turn on the idea of redemption, however different in their ways of putting that idea, yet exhibit in some points a striking similarity. The Indian and the Christian religion of redemption insist alike that redemption is not to be obtained in the way of works, either ritual or moral, but by the emergence of a new ideal of life or religious and moral consciousness, which again does not proceed directly from instruction or reflection, but is the result of an

illumination in which the supra-mundane truth itself breaks through the darkness of the natural mind, and frees the heart from the fetters of natural desire. Both alike see in theoretical knowledge and practical discipline, whether that of personal self-government or the activity of beneficence, valuable and indispensable means to bring about and complete the consciousness, or the state, of salvation. In both the consciousness of salvation becomes the common spirit of a community which disregards the barriers of people, rank, and sex, seeks to win man as man, and takes him under its educative care. And in both, the ideal of life of the community connects itself in such a way with the person of its founder that the latter appears to be the ideal or the highest good in bodily form, and thus becomes the object not of grateful piety only, but of adoration and worship.

These parallels are not invented by me ; they are historical facts. My intention, in placing the facts side by side, was not of course to depreciate Christianity, and to place it on a level with Buddhism. I have always done the opposite, and that in such clear language that I can only regard it as a foolish calumny when an opponent imputes to me any such view. Surely we should have advanced so far by this time, as to allow a theologian to practise the science of comparative religion without exposing himself thereby to injurious imputations. It is such parallels as this that are peculiarly instructive for the scientific examination of religious phenomena. Where the parallels bear on details of the legend, they suggest inquiry into the historical connection between the two religions. Such an inquiry has lately been attempted by Seydel in a most interesting way, though perhaps somewhat too boldly ; the attempt is always meritorious, whatever we may think of the tenableness of the hypotheses set up. The more general resemblances, however, which we set forth above, can in no case be explained from historical dependence, but only from common analogous motives of the religious consciousness, and this is what makes them so particularly instructive in connection with the historical aim we have in view.

At lower stages of religion redemption is no doubt sought for, but redemption from the external evils of the world only ; and

these being connected with the anger of the Deity on account of particular transgressions of their worshippers, redemption is sought by methods having to do with worship, and directed to bringing about the atonement of the angry God ; hence the great systems of propitiation in worship. As the moral consciousness becomes more highly developed it is found that the divine will demands goodness from us, and that all evil includes a transgression against God, which cannot be made good by mere ceremonies of a ritual nature ; and now the demand is put forward, in addition to that of ritual works, nay sometimes before that demand, that morally good works be done, as a means of putting away transgressions. Thus it is in the religions of law ; in Mazdaism, exoteric Brahmanism, Judaism, and in the legal Christianity of Catholicism. But this cannot permanently content the religious consciousness, which cannot conceal from itself that the hurt lies too deep to admit of being healed by any mere outward actions. It lies not only in the individual shortcomings which those acts prescribed by the law are intended to atone for, it lies in the fundamental error of the inner disposition of the heart, in that selfishly wilful direction of the will which everywhere seeks nothing but its own, which is always at variance both with duty and with outward circumstances, which, even when it unwillingly obeys, never ceases to feel the goad of inner reluctancy, and is thus made to feel its impurity, its unfreedom, its unblessedness. How can this fundamental evil ever be healed by any kind of action, which being the outcome of the heart must always wear the nature of its source ? Does not every work betray its impure origin in self-love, if by nothing else, yet by claiming to be counted meritorious and to obtain a reward in happy circumstances, in this or in the future world ? That self-righteous marketing and counting up of performances and of enjoyments, merits, and happiness, must we not trace it to the root, in which its effects too are to be seen, of the clinging of desire to a man's own God-severed self, and to the world of empty desire ; does it not show a soul imprisoned in the false love of the transitory, in the illusion of self-deification and deification of the world ?

It was thoughts like these, which, impressing themselves alike

on the sages of India and on the apostle Paul, on the mystics of Islam as on those of Catholicism, and last and most of all on the Protestant Reformers and dogmatists, led ultimately to the conclusion : *Not works bring salvation, but faith*—i.e. *being penetrated by a higher truth, which sets the soul free from the false love which is at once her guilt and her misery.* To this extent all those whom we have named are in fact agreed. Only at the question what truth it is which when believed sets free, and in what way freedom is realised, do the paths begin to diverge. If the original evil lies in a perverted fundamental tendency of will, then there are only two ways in which a cure is possible; either the will is found to be utterly perverted, condemned to total negation, and the ideal of life found in ceasing to will; or the perverted tendency of the will is changed into a right tendency, and the false love conquered by the true. The former is the principle of redemption of India, the latter that of Christianity. In both cases alike redemption is accomplished by faith in the saving truth of an ideal; but the contents of that truth differ entirely in the two cases. In the former case it is the conviction of the vanity of all exercise of will, which leads to nothing but constant illusion, guilt, and pain, in an endless sequence; a conviction the practical result of which is the mortification of the will, renunciation of the world, the quiet of death. In the latter case it is the conviction that the mischief only lies in the false love of the self which is contrary to God, and of the world which is without him, but that in that good to which the will of God is directed there lies the highest good for our will too, and that in the complete surrender of our heart to that good we find both the perfect fulfilment of the positive end of our life and perfect satisfaction, or the highest salvation. Of this conviction also the practical result is self-denial, a dying of the natural will, but only as a means, as a way to the true assertion of self, to life in the peaceful and happy communion of God. It is evident that this principle of redemption alone is the right one, for it alone imparts vigour to life and causes life to be fruitful; and it is only of it that we now proceed to speak.

Proceeding to ask how the consciousness of redemption is arrived at, we are struck at the outset by a remarkable statement which recurs regularly in the history of religion in connection with such tendencies—viz., that instruction and theoretical reflection do not of themselves suffice to produce religious faith, but that it rests on processes of feeling which reach down to the depths of the soul, and point to its mysterious nature and origin. Such practical truths as have power to determine the life and the ideals of life are of this nature—can never be known theoretically only; there may be a knowledge about them, even a notional apprehension of their meaning, but they are not known in the full sense of knowledge, so long as they are not experienced as a living power in the heart. This experience may not be always equally profound or clear; but the full decisive experience comes about only when the *will* lays hold itself of the truth by the power of which it feels itself laid hold of, appropriates it, recognises it, takes it up into the heart as the ruling power and dearest possession of life—in short, where the saving truth is appropriated in living *faith*. But how can the will come to appropriate a truth which requires of it the abnegation of its own natural and personal desire? The will is not able to take upon itself this pain so long as the activity of its natural desire is productive entirely or predominantly of pleasure. But this is not permanently the case; for this the divine wisdom and justice in the natural and moral world-order has sufficiently provided. The experience of the natural evils on which the pursuit of happiness suffers shipwreck in a hundred ways, the experience still more of the moral evil of guilt, in which selfish will and act turn their sting against the ego itself, and cause it to feel the discord of its selfish life with the divine law of life in inner self-condemnation and torturing disorder of mind, the experience finally of wretched impotence, of the wearing struggle of a broken and divided mind, to which, in the slavery of legal obedience, the soul is condemned just by the division of its will between selfishness and obedience, these are the negative motives which more and more fill the will with disgust for its natural life-tendency, and make it inclined to adopt a higher principle of life. To this

dissatisfaction, which compels the man to turn away from his old state, there is to be added at the same time the attractive presentiment of the blessed and liberating effect which union of the will with goodness, the full surrender of the heart to it, would have on the painfully distracted soul. The attractive power of goodness could not influence the soul if it had not in itself a pole turned towards goodness—the God-given impulse of reason, which keeps the individual will always bound to its origin in the one sole will of God. As this impulse asserts itself negatively in the condemning voice of conscience, in the painful sense of guilt, and in mourning over the vanity of the service of sin and of the love of self and of the world, so it manifests itself positively too in the yearning for redemption from this unblessed state, which passes into hopeful anticipation, into a presentiment which is a promise, of the higher life. The more the former repellent dissatisfaction, the latter attractive presentiment of happiness, increase and stretch out to meet each other, the more does there ripen in the soul the capacity to accept the truth which redeems through the act of faith, the act of the whole knowing, feeling, and willing ego. It makes little difference in the essence of this process whether the new ideal of life emerges mainly from within, from the hidden depths of productive genius, or whether it is presented from without by instruction and vivid image. In the latter case, too, it is not recognised as the truth till it is felt with immediate clearness to be the word which solves the riddle, the fulfilment of longing hopes, the cure of all disorder. The truth flashes like lightning, at once enlightening and kindling, on the soul; before its beam the hard crust of selfish obstinacy melts away, the proud heart surrenders itself as a meek captive, the doubting heart lifts itself up with confidence and courage; in the surrender which is accomplished to the truth which lifts him from the ground, the man's doubts, distrust, and pride all disappear, the struggle sinks to rest, the soul which in her distraction had parted with all her strength now finds, in the peace she has attained, new power of life both to will and to do that which is good. "Old things are passed away; behold, all things are made

new !” Gone is the painful sense of sin, for the cause of it, the disunion of self-will with the divine will, has been removed ; and gone with it all other fear, the unnerving and torturing pressure of the evils of the world ; for

“ Who the sure treasure bears within his heart,
He feels no terror, looking at life’s game ; ”

or, to use the words of the apostle, “ If God be for us, who can be against us ? ” Along with peace joy comes back to the soul, and with joy liberty and strength of will and deed ; these lift her up above her own narrowness and weakness, and cause her to see the world too in a new light ; and thus along with the inner life the outer life also is made new on every side.

This wonderful change is not arbitrarily brought about by man himself, but experienced as a thing that has happened to him ; it appears to him as the operation of a higher power, as the gift of undeserved divine favour or *grace*. And is not this in truth the case ? Careful thought in fact can do nothing but confirm what the believer holds as a truth requiring no proof. If in the judging voice of conscience we saw above the reaction of divine righteousness against the abnormal direction of self-will, then here too we must see in the atonement of the previous division the effect of the atoning love of God which does not leave men, even if they are guilty towards him, to suffer helplessly and hopelessly the torment that follows upon all transgression, but holds him with indissoluble bonds within the scope of its saving omnipotence ; it gives the impulse in his heart, which, as even Plato saw, reminds him of his true home in the realm of the spirit, acts like home-sickness to point him homewards when he wanders, and leads back the lost one to the arms of his father. As in the material world the force of gravity which draws all individual things towards the common centre, can only be conceived as a power of attraction working from this centre, so the root impulse of the finite reasonable being, which draws him out past everything finite, past even his own self to the unity of the whole, can only be understood as a work of the one sole ground of all spirits, of creative,

primitive reason or of God. His good and loving will, which aims at a living fellowship with us (vol. iii. p. 303 *sq.*), revealed itself to mankind from the very beginning of their moral career, as promising grace, in the yearning anticipation of a redemption to come; manifested itself then in the course of the ages at sundry times and in divers manners as preparatory grace, namely, in all the groping attempts after ritual atonements to propitiate the deity, in all the comfortable voices of the prophetic promises of a coming era of salvation, in all the legends and poems of popular song about a golden age which had once been and was to return again; and it manifests itself finally as fulfilling, redeeming, and atoning grace in the Christian experience of life, expressed by the apostle in the classic sentence: "The spirit of God beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God" (Rom. viii. 16). In fact no simpler and no truer expression could be found for the whole substance of the truth of redemption than these words, *that we are the children of God*, of like essence with him, dependent on him for our existence, objects of his loving care, destined to communion with him in an intimate and Godlike life of love. And no less true, no less apt is the other member of the statement, that the rise in our consciousness of this redeeming truth, our being apprehended by it and apprehending it in living faith, is the result of a revelation of the divine spirit in our spirit, the witness of that unerring voice which speaks to us in our heart, which is ours, a part of our being, and yet not of us, not a thing that proceeds from the particular finite ego, and which accordingly can only be conceived of as a divine revelation in us and through us, as the *witness of the holy Spirit*. In this witness of the Spirit the Reformers and the Protestant dogmatists always saw, with Paul, the solid inner ground of all religious certainty; the "Neo-Kantian" theology certainly cannot appeal to them when it treats the witness of the Holy Spirit as a mediæval superstition, a pagan nature-mysticism, a hallucination or anything else of the kind, and proposes to replace it by the historical witness of the church.

As the need of redemption must be felt in the heart of the individual before the process of redemption becomes possible, so the

certainly of the attainment of redemption is an immediate fact of consciousness within each individual. Where this certainty is present the whole Christian church may condemn and contradict; its fulminations glance harmlessly off the evangelical conscience. But where the inner certainty is absent it cannot be replaced by any testimony of the church, of what kind soever, because manifestly no attestation by the experiences of others can ever replace that personal experience on which all assurance of salvation must rest. The historical witness of the experiences of others can only serve the individual as a means to arrive at experience of his own, it can never take the place of the latter, and bring about of itself the assurance of salvation. *Historical faith does not save*—that is a cardinal doctrine of the Reformation and of sound Protestantism, which we cannot give up for any positivism, with whatever “scientific” hangings. Only when this cardinal truth is firmly established can we rightly understand the high importance of historical means for the belief in redemption. It is no doubt perfectly true that we must not think of the individual, either in his religious life generally or in his consciousness of redemption as standing in abstract isolation, or severed from the historical soil in which his whole religious consciousness has its roots. The educative and awakening, confirming, and strengthening impressions put forth by the community which is already there, or is coming into existence, are the indispensable means without which the above described occurrences could never take place in the individual, nor the consciousness of redemption ever be consolidated in a regular moral and religious life.

In this point the difference between the original religious genius and the ordinary man, however great it be, is not an absolute, but only a relative one. In whatever way the consciousness of redemption first appeared in the former, it always had its presuppositions and its types in the antecedent development; Luther founded on and appealed to Paul, Paul to Jesus; Jesus to the prophets of the Old Testament. Similarly, the original bearers of the revelation of redemption are in many ways conditioned by the world surrounding them. Their processes of feeling, the struggles and pains out of

which redemption issues forth in their case, are not their individual experiences merely, they are but typical of the consciousness of the age; it is the need of the time, the universal longing for a way of salvation and escape, that finds its echo in the soul of the chosen genius, and in him is formed into a profound personal experience. That anxiety about salvation through which Luther passed in his cell, shook the whole German people of his time; all felt the inadequacy of the means of salvation till then provided by the church, and the question of a new way to "get a gracious God" lay on unnumbered lips; and hence the solution which Luther found for himself in the struggles of his soul was the word which solved the question of others too, and at once found a mighty echo in the hearts of all; and this echo, again, was a sign and confirmation to him that it was not his own word and work, but that of God, that he was engaged in. In the same way Paul appealed for the truth of his Gospel to the effects it produced in the consciences of men, and it was undoubtedly this proof by experience that confirmed and perfected his own self-assurance. We have every reason to suppose that it was the same with Jesus, that the consciousness of his call to be a Saviour arose out of his pity for the hungry people, and from his observation of the actual healing power of his word (Matt. ix. 36). Everywhere then we see that in the original bearers of the consciousness of redemption, the development of that consciousness is stirred and quickened by the present needs and claims of the community in the midst of which they stand; and conversely, their own faith is confirmed and established by the echo of it which they hear in the mighty impression their revelation produces on their environment, which causes a new community of sympathisers to gather around them. It stands to reason that this dependence in various ways on others takes place in a much higher degree in the case of those who find the consciousness of redemption already present as a fact in their environment, and have it brought home to them by instruction and example, so that they have nothing to do but to reproduce it. Though the external communication of others can never take the place of the personal experience of the heart, yet the latter cannot

dispense with the confirmation afforded by the analogous experience of others ; the less independent and vigorous any one's religious individuality is, the less can he do without such confirmation.

Here then is the origin of the belief in *mediation*, a belief of such importance for the religion of redemption. Belief in redemption comes to pass in most men not as an original product, but by reproduction in them of the ideal which is communicated to them by others. Where the ideal in question is a merely legal one, concerned with nothing but some particular ways of action, customs, and usages of a ritual or moral nature, this may quite well be communicated by theoretical doctrines and practical statutes, laws and rules of living which owe comparatively little to the person who communicates them, since they are intelligible in themselves, and trace nothing but their authority to the person, or in fact to the position or mission only, of the teacher or prophet. In the religion of redemption this is otherwise ; here the ideal has to do not immediately with outward works but with faith, with inner processes of the heart, in which the man experiences a change of his whole way of thinking, his whole tone of feeling, the whole direction of his will. Such inner experiences, every one knows, can with difficulty be presented in the way of notional communication of doctrines ; they can never be exhaustively set forth in that way ; and in any case such a mode of presenting them would entirely lack power to lay hold of and to move the heart. Here certain elementary psychological truths present themselves for consideration, the importance of which was recognised even by Spinoza ; that an affection can only be overcome by an affection, and that to excite the proper affection the idea is more effective than the notion. Now if redemption consists essentially, as we saw, in the false love of self-will, which is contrary to God, being overcome by the true love for what is divinely good, then the most effective means to bring about redemption will be that which is most suited to awaken this love. But for this, experience teaches us that no notional statement can suffice, whether theoretical description or practical precept : for affections cannot be called forth by

definitions, and love cannot be compelled by laws. This, too, we may remark by the way, is the reason why in religion all moralising is so entirely unfruitful, wearisome, and ineffective. But as Plato saw, when goodness is seen in an ideal picture of personal goodness, whether in external perception, conveyed by the senses, or in the inner seeing of imagination, then it involuntarily puts forth a power to attract every soul that is not completely hardened. Now, abstractly, it is quite true that the highest ideal is the goodness of God himself, and hence he both can be and ought to be the object of our highest love. But practically this is difficult of attainment for men, such as they are on the average; the whole history of religion shows this, and it is intelligible enough. For in the first place, it is only in the profounder religious natures that the idea of God is so living and so clear as to work powerfully on feeling, and produce any permanent reaction on temper and disposition; and then in most men the idea of the goodness of God meets with an obstacle it can scarcely overcome, both in their experience of outward evils, and in their inner sense of guilt. Under this double pressure the human heart can scarcely find courage to believe in the love of God; it thinks it must first of all fear his wrath. How is this obstacle in the way of love to God and of belief in redemption to be overcome?

The answer to this question is to be found in the history of Christianity, which shows us in the *ideal picture of the love of a human Saviour* an agency which produces so powerful an impression on men's hearts as to overcome their fear and the obstinacy of their self-will, and change these into confidence and joyful self-surrender. The best way of bringing home to the human understanding a historical phenomenon of a particular nature is to place it side by side with analogous general facts of experience. Now such a general fact, proclaimed by the poets and sages of all times, and confirmed on a small scale by common daily experience, is the saving, redeeming, and elevating influence which issues forth from noble men to the world around them and after them. This influence does not depend by any means merely on what they do, on the works they directly

aimed at doing, or the actual success they attained, or even on the views they put forth in their teaching; it far transcends the works and services which are connected with the person of the good man, far transcends the sphere of their immediate activity, and the results which followed their acts; for these are always individual, and limited to the particular time; it rests in its essence on *what the personality itself is in its whole life and manifestation*. "Common natures pay with what they *do*, noble ones with what they *are*." This word of the poet contains a deep truth which bears powerfully on the question before us. It is the noble personality taken by itself, this living manifestation of goodness, this incarnate visible, comprehensible ideal of true Godlike humanity, that, with irresistible, superhuman power, lays hold of all hearts which are not completely hardened; which awakens in every breast the quivering spark of the better self, which, setting forth goodness not merely as a law which commands, but as a living reality and a life-quickening force, causes another also to feel how amiable goodness is, how much to be desired, so that willing surrender to it is no longer a burden but a joy: this is what extends a saving hand to the guilt-laden conscience, to him all whose courage has departed from him, who despairs of himself; which by the unselfish greatness and mildness of its forgiveness, its help, its healing, encourages the penitent to take heart to believe in the infiniteness of the divine love which conquers all, forgives all, makes all good again, and which finally, by the example it affords of persistent faithfulness in goodness, gives courage to the weak, and inspires him with confidence to arise and to walk in a new life. Do I require to add that all this, true as the experience of all ages shows it to be of the noble personality generally, applies in a unique degree to the ideal figure of the Saviour, which has nothing to match it in all history? That from the heart of the Son of Man of Nazareth, from his love to God and man, so childlike and pure, so manly and strong, a stream of new life issued into humanity which can never again run dry, which gathers to itself in its course whatever else of divinely good and true has appeared elsewhere in mankind or may at any time appear, and so grows mightier and mightier,

ever richer in fertilising and vivifying forces for all sides of the life of the human mind?

That such a personality as this, which overtops all others, which by its unique ideal traits has served, and must always serve more than any other as a life-engendering and strengthening example and demonstration of the belief in redemption, of the highest religious consciousness of mankind,—that such a personality should become the object of a variety of statements which exceed the limits of the historical and human, this we readily understand—it is a very natural, and moreover a useful and salutary phenomenon of consciousness, which religious psychology can readily explain. In Jesus' intimate consciousness of God, his childlike confidence and loving communion with the heavenly Father, the knowledge of God as our Father, and of our call to be the children of God, rose for all Christians, and this new consciousness announced itself to their immediate and unerring sentiment as a truth coming from above, and God-revealed. How natural then that this higher consciousness of God which had issued forth from Jesus should clothe itself in the representation of a higher, immediately divine or heavenly, origin of Jesus himself as the one specific "Son of God"! In this Christians only expressed in a graphic symbolical form the indisputable truth that as every higher ideal of life, so most of all the highest, the ideal of Sonship of God, had not arisen in the human consciousness by chance, and not from man's own invention or reflection, but from divine revelation. It would puzzle me to say in what other way this deep truth could be made level to the common understanding, and even more how it could be symbolised more beautifully and more attractively than in the Christmas story, so childlike, yet so deep, of the wondrous child who came down from heaven. Again, there lies in the consciousness of the Sonship of God, which implies the certainty of the love of God, also the confidence of overcoming the world, of emancipation from its terrors, of comfort in its evils, of victory, begun in the present, to be completed in the future, over all its obstacles and temptations. Now, if this experience of inner redemption and relief from the pressure of the world was the out-

come for the Christians of Jesus' consciousness of God, what could be more natural than that their prophetic eye should elevate the Saviour himself to the heavenly exaltation of Lord of the world, sharer of the throne of the divine world-government? And how could the lofty truth, that the poor and weak child of mankind can lift himself upon the eagle's wings of faith to the heavenly heights of eternal life in the communion of God, how could this truth be more grandly or more beautifully symbolised than in the splendid Easter story of the victorious resurrection of the Conqueror of death and Prince of life? Between Christmas and Easter, however, lies Good Friday: the Son of God, come down from heaven, must first drain the cup of earth's affliction before he is exalted to the Lord of Heaven. Is there not here too a suggestive symbol of the general truth that the image of God which is implanted in us by God, this divine in us, which forms our better self, must first pass through the struggle and pain of the earth, be purged from the dross of impure humanity, and learn to use and to approve its divine force in active and passive obedience, before the peace and joy of blessed communion with God can open before it?

Till this truth thou knowest,
 "Die to live again"—
 Stranger-like thou goest
 In a world of pain.

There is also another central religious experience which connects itself with the view faith takes of the death of the Saviour. The blessedness of the reconciled consciousness of the children of God was preceded by the unblessedness of the sense of estrangement from God, by the fear of an angry God which answers to the sense of sin. The change of the latter state of feeling into the former is, as we showed above, in the first instance nothing more than the immediate consequence or the reflex action of the change of mind which takes place in faith from natural self-will to the new life-tendency which is devoted to God, or from the false love to the true. Further, however, we have seen, that doctrine and law are little suited to call forth this true love, that this is best done by the sight of a personal ideal of good-

ness such as is prominently set before the eyes of Christendom in the image of the Saviour, whose love is most vividly set forth in the sacrifice love led him to make when he surrendered himself to the death which lay unavoidably on the path of his career as a Saviour. Thus we reach the following argumentation: The love of Christ awakens in Christians love to him as the personal ideal of goodness; this true love overcomes the selfish love of natural self-will, which separates us from God, and so terminates our estrangement from God: but the termination of our estrangement from God is the atonement of the sense of sin, or the forgiveness of sins; it follows, therefore, when we omit the intermediate steps of the argument, that the death of Christ brings about the forgiveness of sins. From this we see that this dogmatic proposition is based on an actual and well-founded religious experience. Now we must not forget that the religious consciousness here as elsewhere overleaps the natural (psychological) intermediate steps, and traces the effect of which it is aware to the immediate agency of God. In the case before us there is a change of the God-consciousness from fear of the angry God to assurance of the love of God, and though this change is really, as we saw, one within man and psychologically led up to, yet it is a very natural and simple step to carry it over to God, and so to attribute to the death of Christ the import of a means for atoning the divine wrath, and therefore of a "propitiation." It cannot be denied that this mode of view implies the impossible assumption that God, who is atoning love itself, needed on his side to be atoned; yet it would be wrong to explain its prevalence in the church from the mere fortuitous historical assumptions of the Pauline doctrine; on the contrary, we must recognise that this view is the easiest way to take wherever there is a question of transforming a legal standpoint which still subsists into the higher consciousness of Sonship or of redemption. So long as man still stands at the position of the law, he feels his separation from God to be the result of the punitive righteousness or of the wrath of God, the pressure of which no action on his part can remove; and as at this point he still sets out from the assumption that the righteous claims of God must be met by

some doing or some suffering, in order to obtain his favour—a view which is only transcended in the consciousness of redemption—there seems to be no other way to escape from the fetters of the law, but the belief that the supposed necessary condition which the man cannot himself fulfil, has been satisfied vicariously by the Mediator. Regarding the death of the Saviour then from this point of view as a vicarious propitiation presented to God, man is the more impelled by it to thankful love and to the surrender of his heart, and then atonement with God and redemption from the sense of guilt and fear are actually attained. Thus by a roundabout road, by a view which is not inherently correct but is in the circumstances psychologically natural, the right result is gained, the consciousness of redemption with all its salutary consequences for heart and life. Whoever has once understood the position of the case—it is one of the most interesting and important parts of the phenomenology of religion—will allow the church dogma of redemption to be relatively justified as well as the theories of rationalism, idealism, etc. To understand the psychological genesis of the doctrine both of its kernel and its form, leads here, as in the case of other doctrines, to the most wide-hearted toleration.

Our argument has now led us to the perception that “the belief in a Mediator” may have and has had two widely different meanings. It may stand for a *transcendental, juridical treaty of peace between an angry God and sinful man*, or for the *ethical introduction, in history, of the consciousness of redemption through the communication and revelation of its original bearer*, whose image then remains in perpetuity the most powerful means to awaken and uphold this consciousness in the church. In the former sense the belief in a mediator must certainly be held to belong to the semi-legal point of view, which appears when looked at from the higher pure consciousness of redemption to be a lower stage of religious development, but for all that has a certain inner necessity and justification in the education of mankind. In the second sense the belief in a mediator is a permanent and indispensable truth, and that for the highest stage of the religion of redemption, because that religion knows no more effective and no purer means to communicate, awaken, vivify, strengthen, and

deepen the religious consciousness, than the image of an ideal religious personality, in which it sees the living embodiment of its own religious ideal, in which all its members see the standard they all have in common, the head in whom they are one, and at the same time the complement, the filling up of whatever is lacking in their own actual experience. The ideal always contains more than the reality, the latter has always to look to it to fill up its gaps, to make good its one-sidedness, to solve its contradictions, and so in this ideal belief in a mediator too there is always a certain substitution of the ideal which faith apprehends for the imperfect reality. The substitute is not here, it is true, the departed earthly personality from which the higher consciousness proceeded in history ; strictly speaking, it is the ideal which goes on living in the consciousness of the church and developing itself with the times. In this ideal the church's own higher self-consciousness, connecting it with that historical memory, confers on itself a symbolical expression, personifies and hypostatises its own common religious spirit. This, at the root of the matter, is what religious language aims at expressing in the notions, "the glorified Christ," "the ascended Christ," "Christ in heaven," "the Lord who is the spirit," phrases to which a mystical turn of the doctrine of redemption is commonly attached. Now if we consider that this more ideal view was from the first bound up in many ways with the ruder view of a juridical and vicarious mediatorship, and that with Paul himself the latter always passes over into mystical union with Christ, we cannot but conclude that in religious practice the boundary lines between the one form of the belief in the mediator and the other, are so imperceptible, the difference between the two views so slight, as to make all dogmatising zeal in such matters appear entirely out of place.

A further circumstance connected with this dialectic of fact bearing on the belief in the Mediator, is that the ideal image of the mediator does not remain unchanged in the consciousness of the church, but undergoes manifold changes in the advance of the forms in which religious and social life are clothed. Too little attention is paid, even now, to this important point ; it seems to be regarded as

a matter of course that the Christ of the faith of the church is always exactly the same, always Jesus as he once lived on the earth: it is quite forgotten that from the very first a subjective element was mingled with the idea of Christ in the consciousness of the church, which from many reasons grew always stronger with the course of time, and asserted itself in many a changing form. It is obviously one of the most elementary truths of criticism that the idea-picture of a personality in the minds of others is not identical with the thing-in-itself of that personality; even where the idea-picture is called up by sense-perception, as in those who immediately surround a man, every one knows that the picture is not given ready-made by the senses, but that it arises in consciousness consequently to the sense-perceptions, as a product of subjective synthetic mental activity, which is modified from the first by a multitude of subjective elements. Hence the well-known fact that even in his lifetime a man is judged in the most various ways by those about him, and that judgments regarding him vary in proportion as his personality is characteristic and extraordinary; the reason being that the reproductive formation of a unique personality in the idea-pictures of others is the more difficult, the more its distinctive character transcends the measure of ordinary analogy. Then again it is quite a matter of course that as the distance, both in space and time, increases, which separates us from the actual existence of such a personality, the subjective element in the idea-picture of that personality should increase likewise, in fact should increase in geometrical progression, because every new feature which is added by a narrator or a worshipper must, since it cannot be brought to the test of any direct vision, give occasion to a new set of free combinations in the mind of a third person, of a fourth, and so on. If this is the case in secular history, with regard to persons who stood on the open stage of public life to such an extent that hardly ever will two historians agree in the view they take of a man's personality, it must be much more the case in religious history, where two additional causes come into play to reinforce the subjective element. Firstly there is the circumstance, that personalities of striking importance to religion have generally

been but little seen on the public stage of history, their life being lived mostly in retirement, the dim light of which affords posterity more scope for the free production of legends. To this we have to add that requirement of feeling which always exercises a dominating influence in religious tradition, namely that the tradition must be first of all, not accurate, but subjectively edifying. But what is edifying to any man is what contains effective motives for his peculiar religious consciousness; and thus it is self-evident, that as the stage of the development of the religious consciousness varies, the edifying matter that is wanted must also differ in its nature. Now as the stock of the religious traditions of a church, and more particularly its central idea, the object of its faith in the mediator, is worked up according to the kind of edification wanted at the time, it must necessarily come to pass that as the religious life of the church is changed and developed, the idea picture of the mediator must at the same time be changed, which lives in the church's consciousness.

What all these considerations lead us to expect is quite put beyond doubt by a glance into the history of the religious of redemption. It is very noticeable that the picture of Christ is infinitely more changeable and multiform in the history of Christianity than that of Buddha in Buddhism. This follows from that which constitutes the specific superiority of Christianity. Its contents are much richer in valuable motives, and therefore its impulse to development is stronger, and it is much more capable of accommodating itself to a variety of circumstances. Every stage and every side of its development is reflected in a corresponding image of Christ. In support of this statement I may point out the principal forms merely of this rich theme; details might be given in endless variety. Even in the literature of the New Testament what variety do we find in the views taken of Christ! The primitive church saw in Jesus simply the prophet or man of God, mighty in deed and word, the departed teacher and martyr, and the Messianic ruler of the future. According to Paul, Christ is the prototypal Son of God descended from heaven, whose incarnation, obedience, death on the cross, resurrection, and heavenly glory form the drama of redemption

which we are to pass through and repeat in ourselves. To the apocalyptic seer Christ appears clothed in the glory of the heavenly King who is on the point of coming again to judge the world and to set up His kingdom of glory. To the Alexandrian Epistle to the Hebrews Christ is the Beginner and the Finisher of the faith, the perfect high-priest in the heavenly sanctuary. To the Evangelist John he is the incarnate word (Logos), the manifestation of the only begotten Son of God who was from the beginning, who came into the world to bear witness to the truth, and to be king in the supra-mundane kingdom of the truth. With the apologists among the early Fathers Christ is the embodiment and the full manifestation of that divine Logos, that principle of all reason and revelation who shed all the germs of truth which have entered into humanity. When the war-like Germanic peoples accepted Christianity they represented the Saviour to themselves as the heavenly king and army-leader to whom his retinue of vassals owe knightly allegiance. When under Constantine the church had mounted the first step towards rule over the world, it also elevated Christ from a Son of God who was like God to the Son of God who was of the same essence with God: and when the church of the Middle Ages had absorbed the world in herself, her Christ became simply the "Lord God"¹ before whose divine nature human nature shrunk to nothing. But as the church maintained relations with the world through clergy and monks, so the Lord God Christ was at the same time the head of the saints and the founder of the treasure of grace made up of the merits at the disposal of the church. When the Reformation brought back Christianity out of the darkness of the church to the hearts and lives of men it brought back Christ too from his incomprehensible other-worldliness into human comprehension. To the profound mysticism of Luther he was the divine bridegroom who betroths himself in the bond of love to the poor human soul, condescends to take part in her weakness, and lifts her up instead to his divine dignity; while to the practical piety of Zwingli he was the victorious commander under whose banner we have enlisted as

¹ "Herrgott."

warriors for God. In the Reformed church, the church of Protestant heroism, Christ is mostly thought of as the active type and the royal head of the elect who are anointed with the Spirit, while the Lutheran church, the church of Protestant inwardness, looks up to the "Head with pain and wounds bowed down," and in faith presses to her heart the image of suffering love. When Pietism released Christianity from the scholasticism in which it was frozen, Christ became the "Gracious Friend of souls," the "Mild Prince of Peace who sweetens by the power of his love the knighthood of our faith." The cooler sense of rationalism revered in Jesus the

"Teacher far above all teachers,
Rich in wisdom, love, and goodness,"

who by his word and example leads us on to virtue. The Kantian moralism sees in Christ the moral ideal of that humanity with which God is pleased, Romanticism the ideal of the beautiful soul, the earlier individualistic liberalism the champion of the freedom of conscience against hierarchy and tradition. And the latest (German) theology, since the foundation of the German Empire, loves to see in Christ the founder of the kingdom of God.

Should any one ask which of all those images of Christ is the true one, he cannot have understood either the foregoing historical sketch or the psychological analysis given in this chapter of the belief in a Mediator. Both of these, I imagine, teach with perfect agreement that every image of Christ is right in proportion as it is *the right expression of the peculiar religious and moral ideal of an age*. The more purely, the more aptly, the more intelligibly the ideal cherished by the church at the time is expressed in the dogmatic view of Christ, the more that image answers the purpose of communicating the Christian spirit in worship and education, the more correctly is it framed, be the form of the expression what it may. The error of dogmatic begins when it claims for its statement, however relatively justified that statement be, that it is the only right one, and declares other statements which answer to other practical needs, to be inadmissible, thus narrowly exaggerating truth

that is relative and suited for a practical purpose, into truth absolute. The surest preventive of this error is scientific insight into the psychological genesis of the belief in a Mediator, such as I have here endeavoured to delineate. For as all life is development, a true ideal of life cannot be a thing finished and ready-made, but must be a thing becoming, developing itself through life and in life. The only thing that is persistent in all this change and movement is the law of development, and that again is ultimately nothing but the religious endowment of our race, this eternal revelation of God in mankind, to which everything historical is related as the phenomenon under the conditions of time, as the relative type and means to the absolute ultimate end, viz.—the fulfilment of the divine destiny of mankind.

CHAPTER VII.

THE DESTINY OF MANKIND.

MANKIND has always had, in virtue of its endowment of reason, an anticipation of a higher, supersensuous destiny, and this has been expressed by form-giving fancy, in the representation of a perfect and happy state, placed sometimes at the beginning of mankind—as the “golden age” of the past—sometimes at the end; and this, again, sometimes at the end of history on earth, sometimes in a supra-mundane continuation of life in the other world, as immortality and eternal life.

Of the *golden age in the past*, found in the legends of the Greeks and Romans, the Persians and the Hebrews, and, borrowed from the latter, in Christian dogmatics from Augustine onwards, we have more than once had occasion to speak. We saw that these legends of the primitive state do not belong immediately to the domain of history, but to that of religious legend, but that they yet contain truths which in many respects are of great importance. First of all, they contain (especially the Bible and the Church doctrine of the primitive state) the symbolical expression of what man is according to the *idea* of him; *i.e.* of what he neither was nor could be actually when his life on the earth began, but was from the beginning fitted and intended to *become*. Then again these legends contain a dim reminiscence of the fact that the present state of civilisation was preceded by a state of nature, an age of childhood, which was better than the present human lot of struggle and pain, in that it enjoyed the relative happiness of childlike innocence, simplicity, and the absence of wants, was nearer to the deity because not separated from it by any conscious selfishness or guilt, and did not know sickness, the

worst of natural evils, because it lived quite naturally, borne along and protected by sound natural instinct. Further, these legends tell us that when man emerged from the state of childlike innocence, and entered on the toilsome labour of civilisation, he had to purchase his progress in knowledge and power at a great price, losing, to his sorrow, his happy natural simplicity and his childlike peace with God, so that he looks back with longing eyes to what he has lost, while he pursues a problematical happiness in the distant future. This we saw to be the significance of the legends of the origin of evil among the Greeks, the Persians, and the Hebrews (p. 12). And who would deny the weighty truth of these legends, which do nothing but attribute to man at the outset of his history an experience which repeats itself in every individual life, that he who stands in the midst of the battle of life cannot look back without painful yearning to the golden days of childhood?

No reasonable man, however, wishes that he had stood still at the undeveloped standpoint of the child; does he not know that his nature could only be developed, his destiny fulfilled, through the manifold experiences, labours, and battles of life? and hence the wise man says with the apostle: "Forgetting the things that are behind, I reach forward to those things which are before, for the prize of my high calling!" Though the happiness of childhood has vanished, he seeks to find it again at a higher stage, in a better peace which lies beyond the struggle, in an inner harmony which is much richer than that of childhood, because in it the antitheses, which there slumbered and were not known, have been fully developed, but harmonised and overcome. Similarly, mankind as a whole must not mourn and lament in the idle and fruitless pain of looking back at the lost paradise of the state of nature; not in the undeveloped beginning must it seek the ideal of its destiny; it must reach forward incessantly after that which is before, and strive to gain the prize of its high calling. What it is *essentially* and *unconsciously* from the first, by *God's* creative act, it must *seek actually to become by its own conscious act*. Its destiny, the development, to a perfect God-like whole, of all the powers deposited in its nature, can be attained

in no other way than by the free exercise of these very powers, and thus can only form the goal, not the beginning, of its historical career. It is the fore-sense of this that has found expression in all religions in the manifold hopes of a *future perfect state*, whether in this world or the world beyond. We shall in the first place glance at the principal forms of this hope as they occur in the history of religion. There are, broadly speaking, three forms of it: Metempsychosis, the belief in resurrection, and the belief simply in immortality.

The doctrine of the *transmigration of souls* is a special modification and corollary of the general view of the nature-peoples, that souls (even during the life of the individual) can take up their residence for a time in other bodies. This is the basis of the theory of possession and of other magical and spiritist ghost-doctrine. Starting from this assumption, it is not far to the thought that a soul which has been, as it were, without a shelter after the death of its former body, may choose for its new habitation a body which is only in process of becoming. Thus the Indians of North America believe that the souls of children who have died enter into mothers who are passing at the time, to be born again by their means. By this theory of transmigration these savages reach a very simple explanation of the problem of "Atavism." This migration becomes, according to the nature of the new body, a progress and a gain, or a retrogression and an evil: the former, for example, in the belief of many of the negroes, as well as of the Australians, who hope that their souls will occupy bodies of the white race, and accordingly regard white men as the souls of their ancestors come back again in an improved edition. Equally common, however, is the belief in migration into the bodies of animals, into those of beneficent or hurtful, beautiful or ugly animals, according to the personal worth or the social position of the departed, not, so far as we know, according to any other principle.

In *India* the doctrine of metempsychosis was an integral part of the Brahmanic system; it was connected partly with the doctrine of

creation, partly with that of retribution. The whole world being a graduated system of emanations of the primal and all-embracing life of Brahma, which passes through all beings as forms of his manifestation and returns from them all to unity again, the particular soul shares with the one world-soul of which it is only one specialisation the same circling course through the successive stages of its manifestation. Into what form it may pass on each occasion, whether into higher or into lower stages of life, depends on its past actions; it is the nexus of retribution that determines the future form of existence. Redemption from this cycle of new truths is only to be attained, as we saw above (p. 101 *sq.*), by means of the higher knowledge of the unity of the self with Brahma, and of the unreality of the self which desires and acts. With this the practical renunciation of self or of the world is accomplished, the emancipation, even now, from the world of appearances; and with the death of the body this leads to the entire cessation of separate existence or passing into Brahma. Buddhism taught the same thing as this esoteric Brahmanic doctrine of redemption; the only difference is that in the Buddhistic *Nirvana* (vol. iii. p. 70), there is no background of Pantheistic metaphysics, and the main stress falls on the practical side of the mortification of the will, while the question as to the non-existence of the soul after death was left open, as unessential. In Buddhism, however, as well as in Brahmanism, the doctrine of metempsychosis forms the fixed assumption of the doctrine of redemption.

The *Egyptians* also taught a partial transmigration of souls, but only, it would appear, as a punishment of special severity for such souls as had sinned so heavily as not to deserve rest. From Egypt, if we may believe Herodotus (ii. 123), the doctrine came to the *Greeks*, where it seems to make its first appearance in the Orphic mysteries; from this source the philosophers Empedocles and Pythagoras probably derived it, and from these again it was taken by Plato, in whose hands it received a somewhat more ideal significance. It is not, however, by any means impossible that the derivation of the belief from Egypt by Herodotus is one of the unhistorical suppositions of that writer, and that it belonged to the Orphic mysteries from

the very first. In that case it might be simply enough explained; the idea of the circle of life, on which the Orphic and Dionysian mysteries are founded, though no doubt connected at first with the change, the death and revival of the life of nature, may have come to be applied to the life of man. As Dionysus-Zagreus is killed and torn to pieces in autumn when vegetation dies, and rises anew in spring, or as Demeter's daughter, Core, snatched away from Hades comes back year by year to the earth, so by an analogy which lay very near the child-like consciousness, the individual souls of men might be thought to return from death in the vestments of new bodies. From the same premisses the same conclusions might be independently drawn in Greece, as well as in India and in Egypt.

Halfway between the doctrine of metempsychosis and that of the continuance of the soul without the body, is the doctrine of a *resurrection*, to take place at some definite future time, of souls with their renewed bodies. In metempsychosis only the soul possesses personal identity; the new body, whether that of an animal or of a man, is a different one; but according to the doctrine of resurrection the old body is restored in the self-same form, and recognisable, though with improved powers and composed of nobler and finer material, so that the man who rises again is entirely the same as the former man, both in soul and body. This doctrine came into existence in the *Persian* religion, from which it passed into post-exilic Judaism, and thence into Christianity, where it was combined in a peculiar manner with the more spiritual Greek doctrine of immortality. According to the Persian hope of the future the struggle between the two world-kingdoms of Ahura and Ahriman is to be finally adjusted by the appearance of the victorious Saviour Saoshyas (vol. iii. p. 84). Simultaneously with the appearance of this Saviour the resurrection of the dead is to begin, the completion of which will be followed by the general world-judgment. All men will be gathered together by the son of Zarathustra, and then every one will see his own good and evil works; the ungodly will at once be seen, like a white animal among a herd of black ones. Wailing, he will then seek to cast the blame of his misdeeds on the neglect of the pious, who did not

sufficiently instruct him, but no answer will be given him, and shame will be his portion. The pious and the wicked will then be separated from each other; the former will go to heaven, the latter to hell. But after the short interval of three days and three nights the great renewing of the world will commence, which makes everything good again and unites in harmony what was formerly divided. A comet falls from the moon upon the trembling earth, the metal of the mountains begins to burn and pours out over the earth in a glowing stream. All men plunge into this stream, but the good only feel it like a bath in warm milk, while the ungodly will feel as if they had been cast into a fiery oven. All men come forth out of this fire purified, only the devils will be entirely destroyed. Now the great joy dawns; father and son, brother and friend are united, never to be separated any more. All raise up their voices in harmony, to praise Ahura and the immortal saints, whose creation is now consummated. Of the Soma-juice, the Persian nectar, the draught of immortality is prepared for men, which ensures eternal life to every one who drinks it. It is the former life, only raised to a higher level and made new; he who died at a mature age will rise again at the age of forty years, and remain at that age; he who died before he was grown up, will be a youth of fifteen. The family will also continue; each man will receive a wife and children, but no new children will be born. Every one will reap as he has sowed. Saoshyas will distribute rewards with strict justice, according to Ahura's command. Those who brought no offerings and gave no alms will have to go naked; but those who observed these duties will be clothed by the angels. Such are the principal features of Persian eschatology: retribution there is, and separation in the general judgment, no eternal punishment however, but redemption, atonement, and peace, at the end. "That he should continue living for ever in a purified body, on a new earth, cleansed from everything that now defiles it, an earth which Ahura himself has sanctified by his presence, and from which the passage to the dwellings of light stands perpetually open: this was the cherished dream of the Persian saints" (Tiele).

Persian influences also helped to form the belief in the resurrec-

tion in post-exilic *Judaism*. At an earlier period the religious hope of the Jews was directed only to the continuance of the people as a whole, and of individual families and races within it, not to an actual living-on of individuals after death. The life of the individual seemed to the Hebrews to be inseparably bound up with his body, and though there was a certain continuance of the existence of souls in Sheol (Hades, the underworld), yet it was no more than a melancholy vegetating existence, without any force or feeling, by no means the object of joyful hope, but a state where the help of God appeared to have come to an end. "Wilt thou show wonders to the dead? Shall the dead arise and praise thee? Shall thy loving kindness be declared in the grave? or thy faithfulness in destruction? Shall thy wonders be known in the dark, and thy righteousness in the land of forgetfulness?" Those questions of the Psalmist (Ps. lxxxviii. 11) show distinctly the old Hebrew view of the other world or Sheol; it is the land of hopelessness, of darkness and forgetfulness, where joy and grief are at an end. But this mode of view could no longer satisfy, when once the religious consciousness of the Jews had begun to assume a more individual form. When stress began to be laid on the relation of the individual to God and not merely on that of the people as a whole, and when reflection turned to the contradiction between the sufferings of the good in this earthly life and the religious postulates involved in the doctrine of retribution, as was first done in the book of Job (p. 13), it was felt necessary to extend the hope of a miraculous divine restoration of the people as a whole, to individual pious men, who having died in the time of trial of their people could not be witnesses of its restoration. Thus from its inner religious development from the time of the exile Judaism began at first to put the yearning and hoping question, which under the influence of the Persian doctrine of resurrection first came to be the conviction of individuals,¹ while at a later time, and especially amid the universal religious excitement of the

¹ *E.g.* the unknown author of Isaiah xxiv.-xxvii. probably a contemporary of the Great Unknown (chap. xl.-lxvi.) Passages like Isa. xxvi. 19, liii. 10 *sqq.* contain the first traces of the belief in a resurrection in Israel, though here the belief hovers between picture and actual opinion.

Maccabean age of trial and heroism this conviction more and more gained ground in the religious consciousness of the people. It is remarkable that the belief in a resurrection as a fixed element in the Jewish popular stock of ideas is first met with in two works of the period of the Maccabees; in the second book of the Maccabees (vii. 9 *sqq.*) and in the apocalypse of Daniel, where we read (xii. 2 *sq.*): "Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever." At the time of Jesus the resurrection was a fixed article of the popular belief, though some, like the illuminated Sadducees, might cast doubt on it; it was specially laid hold of by the Pharisaic tendency, and interpreted in a grossly sensuous way in the spirit of the carnal Messianic hope fostered by that party. The belief naturally passed into *Christianity* as the Christian belief of the Messiahship of Jesus was mainly based on his resurrection. Yet under the influence of the Christian spirit this idea underwent from the first a certain purification; according to Paul it is not the gross sense-body, made of earthly flesh, that is to rise again, but a spiritual body, of the supersensuous-sensuous light-stuff of the heavenly world, which Paul with his whole age considered to be the most suitable and the purest form in which the divine and the Godlike spirit could appear. We shall afterwards revert to the detail of the Christian resurrection as bearing on immortality and on the blessedness of heaven.

One of the commonest subjects of belief among mankind is the continuance of bodiless souls after death, which we might call *immortality* in the stricter sense, did not the term imply more than that belief can be said to contain, especially among the nature-peoples. In many instances the continuance is assumed not of all human souls as such, but only of the souls of men in some way remarkable, whether distinguished by social position or by their virtues and merits; and even then the soul which continues after the death of the body is not held to be absolutely immortal; savages

consider that it may very well be destroyed, fall in battle or be crushed by the club of the judge of the dead, or fall off the bridge of death into the abyss, or meet with a mishap in some other way. The fact however of immediate continuance after death is established for the savage with the certainty of ocular testimony; he sees the breath depart from the dying man, which was his life, his soul; whither, he asks, has it gone? Then he sees in a dream or in some vivid imagination or vision even by day-light, the dead man living before him with the same objectivity that the perceptions of actual things commonly have. How then should he (who knows nothing of the psychological explanation of such phenomena) cherish any doubt of the reality of this phenomenon, *i.e.* of the continued existence of the soul which appeared to him in his dream?

As for the place of abode of souls which continue living, the most naïve idea is undoubtedly that which represents the soul as staying near the place where the body was buried, or in the scene of its former life. With the latter view is connected the worship of Manes and Penates, which were thought of as present in and presiding beneficently over the house. Where evil rather than beneficent results are expected to accompany the presence of the spirits of the departed, or where shrinking or repulsion is felt at their too close neighbourhood, the attempt is made to keep them at a distance from the abode of the living; for this end many savages will forsake the hut where any one has died, in order that his spirit may occupy it undisturbed; or where this plan appears too luxurious and cannot be carried out, they take means to keep the spirit from coming back to the old house; they will carry the body out, for example, not by the door, but by the window, they will throw a firebrand after it, pour a gallon of water after it, and so on. Many survivals of these old usages may be seen in the superstitious practices still observed among civilised peoples. The departed soul, moreover, is thought of in a certain sympathetic relation with the body; its rest is conceived to depend on the peaceable and orderly observance of the funeral rites; and hence the souls of those whose bodies remain unburied are compelled to go about without rest. This is one of the most

widely-diffused ideas of all peoples, civilised peoples by no means excepted. How intimate the connection is often supposed to be between the soul and its interred body, we see distinctly from the very general custom of placing food at the grave for the dead, putting it in the grave along with the corpse, and here and there also renewing it periodically. Among the Chinese and the Hindus this custom is still kept up as a regular sacrificial worship paid to the souls of ancestors. Perhaps the Christian love-feasts at the graves of martyrs, as well as the observance of All-souls' day may be regarded as survivals of similar old customs and ideas.

Though souls love to visit certain earthly localities, yet the general belief places their real abode not here but in a "beyond." The place of this beyond, the way to it, the perils of the journey and the conditions to be met with there, form one of the most fruitful themes of the mythology of all religions. Man's knowledge about all these things is generally traced either simply to divine revelation, or, with more epic detail, to the descriptions of such gods and heroes as have made temporary visits to the under-world. The stories of this kind in Greek mythology are well known; the descents to Hades of Dionysus, Orpheus, Herakles, and Odysseus; an interesting parallel has recently been found to these in the Descent of (the Assyrian) Istar,¹ with which may also be compared the interesting epos "Kalewala" of the visit of Wainamoinen to Mana, the land of the dead. The origin of all such legendary descents into hell has been properly traced to the solar myth;² the sun himself is the heavenly hero, who daily descends into the land of darkness, and daily returns victorious to the land of the living. It agrees with this that the place of the beyond is almost always either an earthly place in the west, generally a distant island or mountain height, or the deep place under the earth. The "islands of the blessed," well known from Greek mythology, have many counterparts in other mythologies, for example in the legends of the Polynesians. More frequently, however, than the west upon the earth, the region under

¹ Translated (into German) and explained by Eberhard Schrader: Giessen, 1874.

² Tylor: *Primitive Culture*, ii. p. 48.

the earth is the place of the beyond. To this the optical appearance of the sun's sinking under the earth may have contributed, and no doubt also the interment of dead bodies helped to bring about the idea. The Greek Hades, the Roman Orcus, the Hebrew Sheol, the Germanic Niflhel, the Finnic Mana, and other such representations are all extensions of the depth of the grave into a place, situated in the depths, where all the dead assemble. If the idea of the under-world arose in this natural way, then we readily understand that the idea was at first morally indifferent, without any distinction of the lot of the good and of the wicked; the under-world was the receptacle of all souls without distinction. It was only gradually, as the idea of the beyond came to be connected with that of moral recompence, that the original indifferent and colourless uniformity of the under-world was broken up into a bright abode of the blessed and a dark prison of the lost. Thus the Greek, for example, distinguished from the general Hades, which was neutral, a special place of punishment, Tartarus, and a special place of reward, Elysium; the Jew distinguished from the general Sheol Gehenna (hell), and Paradise or Abraham's bosom; and in other quarters too the beyond was divided into a better land and a land of woe, which are separated by a chasm, spanned by the fateful bridge. The place of the blessed is often fixed in *regions of light above the earth, in heaven*, the special abode of the blessed gods and spirits. This way of thinking was characteristic of the religion of light of the early Aryans, as may be seen from a fine hymn of the Vedas :—

Where the eternal light arises, where the sun shines eternally,
 In the land where all endures, there, O gods, grant that I may be !
 Where King Waiwasvata rules, in the sanctuary of heaven,
 Where the mighty waters are, there let me be immortal !
 Where the third heaven is, where life is for ever free,
 In the central point of the worlds, there let me be immortal !
 Where the end and goal of all wishes is, where the sun shines gloriously,
 Where there is nothing but pleasure and freedom, there let me be immortal !
 Where pleasure and blessedness are, where joy and bliss abide,
 Where every wish is silent, there let me be immortal !

With the Persians too heaven is the place of the good, which they

enter by passing over the bridge of judgment, while the wicked, who cannot get over the bridge, fall into the abyss of hell. The Germans thought of Walhalla, the hall of the gods, which noble men enter, as being in heaven, while the common people go, as a matter of course, to the under-world. Paradise, or the Abraham's bosom of later Jewish eschatology, is no doubt to be thought of as in heaven, where the reward for the just is laid up, and from which the "kingdom of heaven" comes down into the earth. In Jewish eschatology, certainly, this heavenly other world or world above often gives place to the temporal other world of the future Messianic kingdom. In Hellenism, on the contrary, the upper heavenly world, the place of non-material souls, was regarded as the scene of consummation; it could not but be so where no sympathy was felt for the notions of resurrection and of the earthly Messianic kingdom. Similarly in Christian eschatology, the more chiliasm retreated into the background, the more was heaven regarded as the place of blessedness and of the final consummation, as we shall afterwards see more in detail.

And this brings us to the principal remaining question, *the state of souls in the other world*. It is conceived sometimes as a simple continuation of the present existence, sometimes as a compensation, an equalising, a retribution for this life. The continuation sometimes appears as the melancholy and dismal echo of a reality which was better, because richer and fuller of life, as a *shadow of the earthly life*. This we saw above to be the early Hebrew way of thinking on the subject, and we find it again in the Homeric Greeks; an Achilles would rather earn day-wages on earth than be king among the shades. But we soon meet with a different notion of the other world, in which it is the *ideal of the life on earth*, the fulfilment of all wishes, the removal of all want and need, the perpetuation of all happiness. This has probably always been the more usual mode of view both in nature-peoples and in civilised races of the most various zones and religions; though the concrete features in which the ideal is set forth naturally differ very widely in accordance with varying taste and culture. Thus, for example, the shivering Greenlander hopes to find in the other world perpetual summer and constant sun-

shine, good water, abundance of fish and birds, seals and reindeer, which will allow themselves to be easily caught, or to be found cooked alive in the kettle. The North Germans hope that in Walhalla they will rejoice anew in battle every morning; there will no doubt be wounds and death as on earth, but the fallen will come alive every evening, and they will all, victors and vanquished, eat boar's-flesh and drink beer and mead together at Odin's table; and, though consumed every evening, these viands will be there afresh next day. The believing Moslem hopes that in the other world he will rest on couches of gold and ivory, served by maidens beautiful and ever young, refreshing himself with drinks which, while full of spirit, will produce neither intoxication nor headache, and feeding on fruits which grow on trees without thorns, and on the flesh of the rarest birds. The ascetic Buddhist, on the contrary, cannot conceive of heaven as a paradise of exquisite sensuous joys, but only as an ascending series of ever more mystical ecstasy, which at last passes into Nirvana, as the earthly ecstasy into trance. The disputatious Rabbi, like the dialectical Christian philosopher Origen, imagines heavenly joy to consist in an academic debating room or society, where learning and philosophising never cease. The contemplative mysticism of Christianity, from John's Gospel onwards and throughout the whole of scholasticism, places blessedness in the constant vision of God.

In all these views the world beyond is simply this world idealised. If this be so, it could not fail to appear that the virtue which even in this world commands recognition and distinction will not be less valued in the other, nor fail to be rewarded there by suitable distinction. By means of this obvious association of ideas, the theory of simple continuance passes into the theory of *compensation in the other world*. It must of course be remembered that the standard by which a man's lot in the other world was supposed to be regulated was not at first one of purely inward morality, but that of outward ability, specially, therefore, that of meritorious contributions to the good of the community. In manly nature-peoples, especially such as the ancient Germans, the Indians, the Aztecs, the Arabians, the

suggestive thought is often met with that a man's heroic death on the field of battle and the death of a woman in childbed gave a good claim for happiness in the other world. But when in the sequel the moral estimate of human worth grew deeper, and a man was judged less by the particular good services he had rendered, and more in accordance with his general personal virtue or badness, then this moral value of the individual was thought to determine his fate in the other world. On earth good and bad men are mixed together, and share alike in the good things and in the evils of the world, without any special regard to their inner worth; but in the other world there is to be a separation of the two classes, and the outward experience of all is to correspond accurately to their true deservings. This thought has often clothed itself in the legend of the dangerous bridge of death, which is said to lead across the river of death or the abyss of hell, and over which the good pass safely while the bad fall in. This legend recurs with closely analogous features in the most diverse peoples, even peoples of the modern world. The natural origin of it is no doubt to be seen in the rainbow, which to the eye of childhood appears to form a miraculous bridge from this world to the heavenly other-world; and it is one of the most telling examples of the process of the naïve consciousness which leads it to attach to simple nature-myths higher ideas belonging to a moral and religious view of the world; the former being the form in which this ideal content frames itself in the childlike picture of the world. The doctrine of retribution in the other world reached its earliest development among the *Egyptians*, where it came to be of great importance for the customs and morals of the people. Souls, according to the Egyptian view, must, as soon as they leave the body, appear before Osiris and the forty-two judges of the dead, and are examined according to the priestly law-book, which is called from this circumstance the "Book of the Dead." They must be able to profess that they have not wittingly done evil to any man, that they have said nothing false before the judgment-seat of truth, have done nothing impious, have not slandered the servant to his master, have not committed murder, have deceived no one, have not

altered the measures of the country, have not spoken ill of the images of the gods, have not taken away any piece of the wrappings of the dead, have not committed adultery, have not turned milk away from the mouth of sucklings, have not driven any wild beasts upon the pasture, have caught none of the sacred birds : "I am pure, am pure, am pure !" If this is found to be correct, the souls enter into the beaming light of heaven ; if otherwise, they go to the dark Hades which lies in the west. In the *Greek* popular faith the general view of Hades was also gradually modified by a few traits of moral retribution, but these only applied to eminent exceptions in good or in evil. The happy fields of Elysium are reserved for the heroes whom the gods love ; and heroic criminals have to appear before the judgment-seat of Rhadamanthus and Minos, where they are condemned to the punishments of Tartarus : the ordinary run of people is not subject to any judgment or retribution, but is left to the dream-life of Hades. So at least according to the general popular belief. In the cultus of the *mysteries* the analogy of the life of nature led to the adoption of a higher view of the fate of souls in the other world, and to the expression of that view under symbolical forms. The doctrine of the transmigration of souls was peculiar to the Orphic mysteries, while the Eleusinian entertained the hope of a blessed life in the communion of the gods, designed for those who were purified by the sacred initiations. "Blessed is he who does not go under the earth without having seen it (the Eleusinian mysteries) ; he knows the goal of life and the beginning given to it by Zeus"—so sings Pindar. These initiated ones will, according to him, lead an untroubled and blessed life in Hades with the high gods (of the under-world), while an inexorable judgment awaits the others. In the same way Plato says in the *Phædo* : He who comes to Hades uninitiated and unpurified will lie in the mud ; but he who comes thither initiated and purified will dwell with gods." And *Sophocles*, in a fragment preserved in Plutarch, praises as "thrice happy the mortals who, after they have witnessed these rites, go to Hades ; for them alone is life prepared there ; for the others evil !"

The doctrine of the mysteries was the source from which Greek philosophy also derived its theory of the other world. It was remarked above that the *Pythagorean* doctrine of transmigration was derived from the Orphic rites ; it can scarcely be said to have any inner connection with the Pythagorean philosophy. Such a connection, however, does undoubtedly exist in *Heraclitus* ; the migration downwards and upwards, which his world-soul has to pass through in its development into the world and its return to unity, has to be made by individual souls too along with the world-soul. In its connection with a material body, into which it enters from a higher existence, the soul is estranged from the true divine life which is its origin ; only when it lays off this wrapping, which is ill-suited to its divine nature, does it return to the purer life of the gods (demons). Hence Heraclitus calls men mortal gods, the gods immortal men, and our life the death of the gods, our death their life. These ideas are worked out in the *Platonic* philosophy in a way which determined the subsequent course of thought ; Plato weaves them into his idealistic system and so provides them with a philosophic basis. Plato was the first to endeavour to prove the immortality of the soul scientifically, without teaching that the soul had any beginning or pre-existence. The arguments stated in the "Phaedo" are partly drawn from experience and analogy, partly of an *a priori* metaphysical character. To the former belongs the comparison of life and death to waking and sleeping and other changing states, which presuppose a persistent subject as their substance ; also the remark that our becoming conscious of universal truths appears to be a remembering of ideas possessed formerly and thus involves a former existence ; but specially, too, the reference to the experiences in which the thinking and willing mind actually proves its liberty from sense, from which we have to infer the probability that the soul which is so different from the body will not have to share the fate of the latter in death, but will survive it. His metaphysical argument Plato based upon his doctrine of ideas : as each idea remains simply equal to itself, and excludes from itself all negation and change, so the soul too is in its nature one with life itself, and is thus inaccessible to its contrary,

death ; it is the very notion of the soul to be incorruptible life. It has recently been asserted that this argument of Plato is not so much in the line of individual immortality, but rather an exoteric dressing up of the thought of the eternity of the general or the world-soul, since it must regard the individual soul as a mixed thing having in it both being and not-being, having part in the principle of becoming, and hence subject to decay ; this, it is said, is what his doctrine of ideas in consistency implies.¹ This latter may very probably be the case ; the force of the contention may be allowed, that the Platonic doctrine of ideas leads in strict consistency to idealistic pantheism, which has no room for individual substances and personal immortality. But must it follow from this, that Plato himself consciously drew such an inference ? Is it such an unheard-of thing in the history of philosophy, that the consequences which objectively seem to be the necessary result of a system were not drawn, not recognised, by its originator ? or even that propositions which he had a practical interest in maintaining may have been upheld by him in contradiction to the theoretical premises of his system ? This seems to me a much simpler and more natural assumption in the case before us, than that other assumption that in those arguments in which he speaks so clearly and unambiguously of the immortality of individual souls, Plato was only speaking in the way of accommodation for the unphilosophical multitude standing in the position of exoteric opinion. One thing in particular seems to me to disagree with this assumption, namely the practical importance which Plato himself manifestly attributed to this doctrine of immortality ; in fact he makes it the basis of his idealistic ethics, the principal motive of his doctrine of virtue, as we read at the close of the *Phaedo* : “ Hence it becomes us to do everything we can in order to become partakers of virtue and wisdom in our life, for the prize is fair, and the hope great ! ” This is not the place to enter further into this controversy ; but however it may be decided, it is certain that throughout the whole history of thought and belief Plato was always regarded as the champion of the doctrine of individual immortality

¹ Compare notably Teichmüller : *Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe*, p. 105 sqq.

and that his influence has always been on this side. His immense importance in Christian theology was essentially due to this.

What led from the one to the other was Alexandrian Hellenism. Plato's theory of pre-existence and immortality meets us in the Alexandrian Book of *Wisdom* and in *Philo*; and not less in the *Essenes* who stood under Hellenic influence. In all these quarters the ordinary Jewish doctrine of resurrection is replaced by that of immortality without the body in a beyond which is divided into a heavenly place for the blessed and a hell for the ungodly. Of the transmigration of souls which Plato said (at least in the *Phaedo* for the ordinary run of people) was to be expected after the elapse of the millennial intermediate state of retribution in the other world, we find only a weak trace in *Philo*. The essential eschatological hope of Hellenism is commonly directed to the liberation of the soul from the prison of the body, its rise into the aether and its permanent communion with the pure and blessed spirits.¹ This Hellenistic eschatology had probably influenced the general popular belief of the Jews in the time of Jesus, through the channel of Essenism. For, not to speak of the general Messianic final judgment which was connected with the resurrection, it was a fixed thing in the popular eschatology that immediately after death there was to be a retribution in the other world in hell (*Gehenna*) and in "Abraham's bosom"; as we see very clearly from the Biblical parable of Dives and Lazarus (*Luke* xvi.) as well as from the promise of Jesus (also in the *Luke* tradition, xxiii. 43) to the thief crucified at his side: "To-day thou shalt be with me in Paradise." In Judaism proper, however, which found its most distinct expression in Pharisaism, the main hope continued to be directed to the coming earthly consummation of the Messianic kingdom, and the retribution in the beyond pointed to in such passages could be no more than a preliminary intermediate state, before the general resurrection and the general judgment which was to fix men's fate.

These same two tendencies, which we may shortly call the *Jewish*

¹ Compare *Philo*: *de Somniis*, i. 22. *Book of Wisdom*, chap. iii. 8, 20. On the *Essenes*; *Josephus*, *B. J.* II. viii. 11.

and the *Hellenistic*, are combined in Christian eschatology, which, according as one or the other factor predominates in it, bears a more realistic or a more idealistic character. In the eschatology of primitive Christianity, which was in the main also that of Paul, the chief point was the expectation of the speedy and visible *second coming of Christ* on earth to set up his Messianic kingdom, which was thought of at one time more sensuously, at another less, but in its main features, of course, according to the Old Testament theocratic ideal. But just because this Messianic kingdom was hindered by its Jewish origin and form from becoming quite identical with the idea of the eternal consummation of the future, it was distinguished from the latter, and made to precede it as a merely preliminary interimistic state, a foretaste of eternal blessedness in the glory of earthly victory. Thus arose the idea, common to Christian and to Jewish apocalyptic, of an earthly Messianic kingdom of limited duration preceding the consummation of the world. The Johannine Apocalypse fixed the duration of this state at 1000 years, whence the name of the Millennium, and the word *Chiliasm*. With this it came to pass that the resurrection and the judgment, which even in the Jewish view were to form the opening acts of the Messianic kingdom, were separated into two different scenes, one at the beginning, the other at the end, of Christ's millennial reign on earth. Only with the second or general resurrection, which is followed by the general world-judgment, does the Apocalypse arrive at the *consummation of the world* (chap. xxi.): the first heaven and the first earth pass away, a new heaven and a new earth take their place, and a new world, the "new Jerusalem" comes down to the earth out of heaven adorned like a bride for her husband; God himself then dwells in the midst of the saints, lights them as their sun, and governs them from eternity to eternity; but the saints themselves, with Christ at their head, will share in the glory of God, and in his government of the world. But even in Jewish eschatology which that of Christianity always followed very closely, the "days of the Messiah," *i.e.* the earthly Messianic rule, and the "world to come," *i.e.* the state of eternal consummation, often run into each

other, the boundaries between them are never rigid ; and so in the New Testament hope of the future also, the two epochs of the consummation, the limited earthly rule of Christ which belongs to Chiliasm, and the eternity of heaven, are never so clearly distinguished from each other as in the Apocalypse. In the discourses on the future in the Synoptic Gospels we always hear of a single final catastrophe only ; while in the description of the final state there are so many purely earthly traits as to suggest that the state spoken of is rather a provisional one on earth than the definitive one of eternity. It might also be hard to make out with regard to Paul, whether he regards the second coming of Christ, which he too expected to come immediately, as the definitive end of the world, or as the beginning of an intermediate kingdom after the nature of the millennium of the Apocalypse. It is certain, on the other hand, that the deutero-Johannine theology dropped the earthly Messianic kingdom altogether, and put in its place on the one hand the constant presence of Christ, who has come back in his Spirit, on the other the eternal blessedness of the perfected community of Christians.

On the state of souls after death, too, the New Testament contains a variety of statements, some of them perhaps scarcely to be reconciled together. The common description of the dead is "they that sleep," which points to the sleep of souls in Hades, from which they will only arise at the general resurrection. Other passages, however, do not agree with this, where the departed soul passes at once into Paradise, or is at home with Christ, and receives a new habitation of a heavenly nature. This certainly excludes the state of sleep ; and it is hard to understand how the soul's being at home with Christ can be a mere provisional state, still to be followed by the resurrection, the judgment, and the final entrance into blessedness. These realistic elements of Jewish eschatology refuse to combine with the more ideal view of the state of the soul which is united with Christ. With Paul the latter view was the outcome of the peculiar mysticism of his faith ; the inner communion of the believer with Christ, which has begun even here, could not, he thought, be interrupted, could only be completed, by the death of the body. Still more decidedly

does this appear in the Gospel of John, which expressly makes "eternal life" and eternal blessedness begin in faith in this life, since they consist in nothing but that complete communion with God and with Christ without which faith cannot exist. True, we also read in this Gospel of a resurrection and of the dead going forth out of their graves on the day of judgment. As to the fate of the wicked, it is difficult to gather a consistent view from the New Testament. According to many passages their punishment seems to be simply that they remain in death without any hope of resurrection: according to others, they rise, and are condemned in the general judgment to eternal torments, which they endure in a place of darkness, or else of unquenchable fire. There are some indications which point to the hope that they may yet be saved; we hear of a rising again of all men in Christ, and of the destruction of death, and the ultimate goal is described as God's being all in all, which it would be difficult to reconcile with the continuance of hell and of the damned. This play of heterogeneous views belongs to the very nature of such transcendental hopes, and is also due more particularly to the variety of the sources and presuppositions which the history of early Christianity brought to meet and play upon each other in this field.

The expectation of the immediate coming of Christ to set up his earthly kingdom of glory was vividly present to the mind of Christendom during the first two centuries; but in the altered circumstances of the third century it began more and more to fade away. The more Christendom departed from its original avoidance of the world, the more it aimed at setting up house for continuance in the world, and the more confidently it began to rule the world by the force of its ecclesiastical spirit, the less interest or belief remained in a supernatural chiliastic kingdom of Christ as distinguished from the kingdom of God already realised in the church. Thus it soon came to pass, that that view which had been the very air the primitive Christians breathed was directly condemned as a Jewish heresy by the Catholic Church, and never after this period found its way into the church's dogmatic; one of the most instructive instances of a community changing its religious consciousness. The church,

however, held fast to the last act of the primitive Christian drama of world-consummation, that namely which is accomplished in the general resurrection of all men, the general judgment of the world, the damnation of the ungodly, including all not-Christians, the entrance into blessedness of the good, or more particularly of true Christians ; and which forms the definitive close of time and entrance on eternity. The place of the damned will be hell, the punishments of which were conceived by most of the Fathers (certain idealists excepted, such as Origen, who was counted a heretic on this point) as sensible tortures of eternal duration. This view, deeply impressed on the popular mind both by word and picture, was no doubt an effective pedagogic instrument in the discipline and civilisation of the rude nature-peoples, but on the other hand was undoubtedly the cause at least in part of that rudeness and hardness of feeling which manifested itself for half a millennium in the prosecutions of heretics and witches. The place of the blessed was seen in that earthly-heavenly beyond, which is to arise out of the renewal and at the same time the fusion of the present heaven and the present earth. Whether the heavenly or the earthly side is the more prominent in this new scene of consummation, whether the supersensuous or the sensuous traits predominate, always depends on the idea formed of the detail of the life of the blessed. On this point the views held in the church have been from the first very much divided. On the one side we have an idealistic spiritualising of the beyond ; this is met first and foremost in the Gnostics of the second century, and the view of the Alexandrian theology of the fourth Gospel and of Origen is essentially the same, though here the other side makes itself perceptible also ; and we find it too at a later period in certain mystical speculative theologians. Here salvation is really nothing but being one with God and Christ in love and knowledge, which is just the ideal of the Christian life in the present. The resurrection of the body is either ignored entirely or it is accepted from the traditional way of speaking as an unessential and unimportant appendix to the true doctrine, and the sensuous element as far as possible eliminated from it. On the other side we have the gross sensuous idea of a

resurrection of the body of flesh, its very skin and hair, bones and bowels—an idea which is compelled to disregard the expressions of Paul in an opposite sense, and goes back to the Jewish and Pharisaic doctrine of the resurrection. And this came to be the prevailing doctrine of the church. The manifold difficulties and contradictions in which this view was inevitably entangled at every attempt to go into details were simply borne down by a reference to the divine omnipotence and to the limited range of human knowledge. It was only rationalism that gave up the resurrection altogether, since, as Kant says, man can have no desire to drag about a body through all eternity which he was never really fond of even when alive. The early church had parted with the first and the most important article of primitive Christian eschatology, and had regarded the millennial kingdom of Christ as a Jewish error; now Rationalism dropped this last remainder of Jewish eschatology, and restricted itself to the pure incorporeal immortality of Hellenism, thus making what the church had hitherto regarded merely as an intermediate state of individual souls between death and the resurrection, the permanent and only state of the other world.

The result of this was that interest was now concentrated on the “that” of the continuance of the soul, or on finding a secure foundation for the belief in immortality. *Spinoza* in his *Treatise on God*, etc., had asserted the imperishableness of the pious souls which in love to God came to have part in his unchangeable being, and had also spoken in his *Ethics* of the eternity of the spiritual and active part of the human soul, which he said was greater than the perishable part in proportion as our love to God was greater; but he counted memory, on which the continuity of self-consciousness depends, to be a part of the “*imaginatio*,” which depends on corporeity and passes away in death. This amounted to a denial of personal immortality; at least it cannot be denied that the premises of this conclusion are to be found in the *Ethics* of *Spinoza*, even should it be uncertain how far he himself wished it to be drawn (vol. i. p. 61). Against the so-called moral argument for immortality from the necessity of compensation in the other world, *Spinoza* set up the proposition that blessedness is not the reward of virtue but virtue itself, namely the

love of God, which includes in itself power to overcome the lusts. For these same reasons the idealistic moralist *Shaftesbury* protested against the eudaemonistic demand of compensation in the other world; and the sceptic *Hume* pointed out the weakness of the argument which concludes from the absence of compensating justice in this world, of which alone we know anything, to its presence in the future in another and a problematical world (vol. i. p. 129). In the Leibniz-Wolffian Illumination, on the contrary, immortality was a fixed and a cardinal article of faith, which admitted of being proved from grounds of reason. For *Leibniz* himself it followed from the very nature of the soul as an uncreated and imperishable monad of infinite capacity of development. *Wolff* added to this the argument from analogy, that as the uncreated soul did not lose its power of forming ideas when it entered this life from a former state, the same will be the case at its exit from this life. *Mendelssohn* was the spokesman of the Illumination on this question; in his *Phaedon* he on the one hand proved the immortality of the soul from its nature, since being a simple substance it could not be destroyed, but only annihilated by a miracle, which, however, was inconceivable; while, on the other hand, he proved it teleologically from man's natural striving after ever greater perfection, a striving implanted in him by his Creator as his calling, which even death cannot hinder him from fulfilling; and if this striving is to go on, the soul's essential properties of thought and will must also continue. The metaphysical argument from the substantiality of the soul *Kant* attacked as a paralogism proceeding out of a confusion of the synthetic unity of the function of the ego or of self-consciousness with the simple nature of a soul-being. In its place Kant put the moral argument or rather (for it cannot be properly called an "argument") the postulate of practical reason, that for the realisation of the moral law, which from the recalcitrant sensuousness of our nature is unattainable to us at any point of time, an eternal duration of personal existence must be at our command, and that in that case a happiness may be expected in the other world answering to our virtue or our desert of happiness. In *Fichte's* later philosophy Kant's moral postulate took a meta-

physical turn, Fichte seeing in the moral personality an imperishable form of the manifestation of God; yet his opinion seems to have varied on the question whether every individual had the prospect of continuing to act in a future order of things, or only those who had developed out of themselves here below something universal and of general value. The latter was also the view of *Goethe*; from considerations connected with the economy of nature he draws the conviction that the monad which is incessantly active will not want occupation in eternity, but that in order to manifest one's self in the future as a great entelechy, one must be it now. The same theory of a particular or hypothetical immortality has also been favoured by *Weisse*, *Rothe*, and *J. H. Fichte*, junr. (at least formerly). But that it is a small step from the immortality only of good men, to the immortality only of that which is good and true, or of the spirit generally, may be seen even in Spinoza on comparing his earlier and his later treatment of this question. The same thing was repeated in modern philosophy when ethical idealism took its metaphysical and logical turn. To *Schleiermacher* the interest ordinarily felt in immortality appears to be simply a sign of a selfish and therefore an irreligious disposition, for not immortality outside of time and behind time, he considers, is the aim and the character of religion, but that immortality which we may have even in this life in time, and which is a task in the solution of which we are actually engaged. "In the midst of the finite to be one with the infinite, to be eternal every moment, that is the immortality of religion." According to *Hegel* too the one essential point is the eternity of spirit, which cannot be merely future but must appertain to spirit in its thinking and willing what is universal even now. As to the continuance of the individual soul Hegel did not distinctly pronounce, so that this question proved an apple of discord and ground of separation in his school between those on the right (*Göschel* and *Conradi*) and those on the left (*Richter*, *Feuerbach*, and *Strauss*). To be consistent, logical idealism, which holds that the idea, the universal, is the only true existence, should lead to the denial of individual immortality; and accordingly *Biedermann* takes his place on the Hegelian left on this question—

on the other hand, it is equally natural that a pluralistic metaphysic, such as that of *Herbart*, which holds the particular to be the real, should maintain the immortality of the individual soul. In *Herbart's* own system it is an awkward circumstance, that the consciousness of the soul only proceeds from its being together with the reals which form its body, which seems to raise serious doubts as to the continuance of self-consciousness beyond death. Those real-idealistic systems are in a more fortunate position, which, following *Leibniz*, consider the soul to be an independent monad capable of infinite development, to which death imports no more than the transition to a new stage of growth. This theory has been ably worked out by *Krause*, and is now generally maintained by the adherents of speculative theism: in addition to *Weisse* and *Fichte*, junr., of whom mention has already been made, we may here name the philosophers *Wirth*, *Ulrici*, *Carrière*, *Fechner*, *Lotze*, and *Teichmüller*.

It is conceded by these thinkers that no apodeictic demonstration of the imperishableness of our self-conscious ego, or of "personal immortality," is possible. Such a "demonstration" could only be given if it could be shown on the ground of experience that it was impossible, because repugnant to the facts of our consciousness, to think a future non-existence of our individual ego. But this can never be shown; not only does our ego sink episodically into unconsciousness, during sleep or fainting, but we also know nothing of a previous existence of our ego before our present life; but of that which we cannot assert to have existed in the past we cannot apodeictically prove that it will exist in the future. Hence personal immortality cannot, once for all, be an object of knowledge, with regard to which any statements of a positive and scientific nature can be advanced. It is an object of *hope*, which is not dependent on grounds of knowledge. All that philosophical reflection can do here is, it appears to me, only to lend an indirect support to that hope by refuting the arguments brought forward against it, and then demonstrating the positive value of the hope, or imparting to it a more elevated character by purifying it from all comparatively unworthy motives.

If no strict proof can be given for immortality, still less is it possible to disprove it. The impossibility of immortality could only be maintained on one assumption, an assumption which would leave us no choice, viz., that the soul was not a substance but a mere function. But in that case, as a function cannot be without a subject of which it is a function, we should at once have to ask of what our soul is said to be a function. To this question the materialists have a ready answer: that the soul is a function of the body. Idealists, however, regard it as a function, helped by the body and conditioned by it, of an ideal principle, whether God or spirit or world-soul or idea, or the unconscious, or entelechy, or whatever other name be given to it. With all their differences in other directions, all these conflicting views of the world come to the same result on our question, because they all have one fundamental assertion in common, viz., the non-materiality of individual souls. But if we test the view before us by the facts of experience, we can prove it to be untenable.

The body is a whole set together out of many parts; now if the soul were one of its functions, then the fundamental fact of our experience, the unity of consciousness, would be unintelligible. Even though we confine the subject of which it is a function to a part of the body, say the brain, that does not help us; for the brain too is a plurality of parts outside each other in space; now if we conceived, as the materialists do, that our ideas were functions or products of the molecules of the brain, the synthetic unity of the act of thought, in which various ideas are combined together, would still be incomprehensible, in the absence of a central subject of this act. Then again, the body is notoriously an aggregate of parts which are constantly being added to it or taken away from it; it renews itself entirely in the course of a few years. If the soul be its function, whence comes the stability of consciousness? whence memory, which is scarcely touched by the change of the materials of the body and yet preserves in itself almost the whole sum of the experiences of life? But when the materialists point to the manifest dependence of the soul on the body, most obvious in its sense-perceptions and its lower states of feeling, we must first of all remind them that no one

denies that the life of the soul is in many ways *conditioned* by the body, but that this proves nothing for the *identity* of the two; and secondly we must maintain that such an identity is positively disproved by the converse of the former fact (of the conditionedness of the soul by the body). Materialists very commonly overlook this, but it is a fact that in the higher relations of life our soul has an existence of its own quite different from the functions of the body and independent of it. Its thoughts, feelings, and efforts of an ideal nature are its own exclusive property, incomparable with any functions of the body, and in no causal connection with the latter; and our soul finally possesses in this, its inner life, the power of governing the body, resisting its impulses, forgetting its pains, overcoming its weakness. This is quite incomprehensible on the assumption that the soul is nothing but a function of this very body which it so directly and decidedly opposes; it is quite comprehensible if we assume that it is different from the body and has a being in and for itself, that it itself therefore is a substance and the independent subject of its functions, which at the same time are no doubt conditioned in many ways by the functions of the body through which, in our present condition, it is compelled to act.

Scarcely more tenable, though somewhat more complicated, is the idealistic theory that the soul is a function, brought about by means of the body, of a universal ideal principle. According to this hypothesis too the peculiarity which makes the universal function of that principle this individual soul, rests exclusively on the body, because in the universal taken by itself there could be no principle of individuation; and so the individual soul appears here again primarily and immediately as the function of its individual body, and only mediately as a result of the universal ideal principle. As against the former conclusion we have to insist here also on what was remarked against the materialistic hypothesis, while the latter conclusion makes the difficulty double; for if the soul were immediately a function of the body, it could not enter into opposition to it, and if it were mediately at the same time a function of the ideal, it could not be at discord with the ideal: and yet experi-

ence shows it to be constantly at variance with either one or the other. A further modification of this theory is the Spinozistic hypothesis that body and soul are the parallel forms of manifestation or modes of function of one common substance, which regarded from one side presents itself as matter, regarded from the other, as spirit. But though this recognises the difference between the functions of the body and those of the soul, the fact of their action and reaction on each other, the mutual activity and passivity of each in its connection with the other, is made the more incomprehensible. According to the Spinozistic theory of the parallelism of the corporeal and the psychical, every phenomenon on either of the two sides can only be caused by a phenomenon in the same kind in the same series ; it is only accompanied by the phenomenon, in a different kind, of the other series. ("Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum.") But experience shows with a distinctness which does not admit of doubt numberless cases in which psychical movements are occasioned by bodily processes, which were in no way prepared for in the soul, as well as cases in which bodily movements have been occasioned by impulses in the soul, which had nothing whatever to do with the antecedent states of the body. Thus we see that the theory of functions, whatever turn it assume, encounters insuperable difficulties, being unable to explain now the difference and now the dependence on each other of psychical and corporeal phenomena. And finally we must appeal as against the whole principle of this theory to the fundamental fact of our consciousness that we are immediately aware of our independent reality and of the active causality present in our will, and that whatever reality or activity beyond this we may come to know we can only assert as a consequence deduced from that immediate fact of our ego. What right can we have to ignore the immediate fundamental fact, or to deny to ourselves and ascribe to something else that notion of substance which we deduce originally only from our own ego ?

We may therefore hold fast to this, that our ego is *an independent subject or substance other than the body*, and this obviously secures at least the *possibility* of an independent continuance of this subject

after the death of the body. Many thinkers go further than this, and find that the notion of substance involves the metaphysical necessity both that it can never perish and that it was never produced. Uncreatedness would certainly be the necessary consequence of the assertion of the metaphysical necessity that the substance of the soul is as such imperishable. But not to insist on the point that such a consequence might entangle us in difficulties with the notion of God and that of creation, nothing further seems to be gained by it for the question we have in hand. For even he who considers our human soul-substance to be essentially uncreated and imperishable must yet admit that it did not formerly exist as this self-conscious ego; though he may give it pre-existence as that of another ego (according to the theory of transmigration) or as the dim germ-state of a psychical power with a latent capacity for consciousness. In either of these cases the logical necessity is not excluded, that as the soul was before—in the one state or the other—so it may be again; *i.e.* that our present ego, as it did not formerly exist in the form of this personality, may cease to be in that form in the future, that it may be replaced by other states of the indestructible soul substance, and this would be to give up personal immortality. Hence I am of opinion that we must give up the attempt to get beyond the possibility of immortality or to reach apodeictic certainty by means of metaphysical argumentation. But it is also quite unnecessary that we should do so: for practical purposes it is quite enough if the metaphysical possibility is admitted. This is enough to give practical motives room to assert themselves and to engender a conviction which, though it is, as cannot be denied, of a subjective nature, yet need not on that account be any less warm or salutary than any objective conviction, any positive knowledge on the subject, would be.

In the practical motives of the hope of immortality, both pure and somewhat impure elements may be seen at work: the more the latter are sifted out of it, the more valuable and the more healthy does the hope become. The idea of *compensation* in the other world, it has been often and justly remarked, belongs, if it be admitted as a motive of moral action, to a lower stage of moral development. He who

should do right merely for the hope of future reward, or desist from wrong-doing merely from the fear of future punishment, would of course be no more morally good than the clever Epicurean and Egoist who arranges his acts by considerations of utility measured by earthly consequences. Yet here too there are two things which should not be overlooked. First, the pedagogic value of such an idea to restrain and overcome rude natures, and to prepare the way for a legal discipline which may in time lead to a purer morality. In the general development of mankind the religion of law, of a servile and fearful spirit, had to precede the religion of redemption, the religion of Sonship and love; and so too in the moral education of a particular generation, such as is the task of religion as organised in the Church, the motives, borrowed though they be from the legal standpoint, of retribution both in this world and in the world beyond, can never be altogether dispensed with. Where they operate they must still be pedagogically necessary; and where they are no longer necessary, they will of themselves cease to operate. And even if the notion of compensation in the other world is kept up at a higher standpoint, we are not entitled to conclude that impure moral motives are at work. This mistake is very commonly committed by doctrinaire criticism, when wanting in practical understanding of religious psychology. Such criticism confounds the accompanying idea with the determining motive, and fails to see that at a higher stage of moral perfection, where pure love to God and goodness is the sole acting motive, the idea of heavenly blessedness still possesses practical importance, though not so much as at the lower stage. The idea does not, when entertained at the higher stage, import an external compensation or reward, but the ideal fulfilment of one's religious and moral destiny, the ideal therefore of true inner perfection, which includes in itself, it is true, perfect self-satisfaction as its natural accompaniment, because the eternal order of the world has linked the feeling of satisfaction to the fulfilment of one's end. The feeling of satisfaction is everywhere the accompanying secondary result and the sign of the fulfilment of an end, but it ought not of itself to be the end; and so, to a pure moral consciousness, blessedness will not

be the personal end to be aimed at, but it will certainly be an accompanying secondary result and sign of the fulfilment of the highest end of the personality, of the perfection of the self in communion with and likeness to God. By this distinction the ground is cut away both from naturalistic eudaemonism and from anti-natural pessimism; but important as it is, every one who is familiar with living human nature knows that in real life the theoretical distinction cannot be so clearly maintained, that in the complicated web of the motives of human hearts the lines between pure ways of thinking and such as are less pure are apt to run into each other imperceptibly, so that only He who knows the hearts of men could decide with certainty what degree of moral rightness there is in any individual case. Hence all doctrinaire repudiating and insisting in such matters is utterly useless and foolish. And hence the right of the educator and of the guardian of souls must not be disputed to strike, according to the need of the hearts they have to deal with, on this string or on that. With infants he must be at liberty to threaten or to comfort, by pointing to the retributive justice and faithfulness of God, but he must also be at liberty to speak wisdom among them that are perfect (1 Cor. ii. 6); that is, to speak of the love of God, which is higher than all reason, which even now we experience in our hearts, and from which no death can separate us (Rom. v. 5; viii. 39).

This naturally brings us to the higher motive of the hope of immortality: *the idea of the progressive development and perfection of the human personality*. "Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect!" That is a brief, and it is the aptest, expression of the destiny of man. Now perfection, generally speaking, is the full realisation of one's nature; and so the perfection man is bidden to strive after will consist in this, that man's godlike natural disposition is developed in each individual, fully and harmoniously, in the particular way specially prescribed from the outset for him. Now, the specific human element in which the God-likeness of our nature is to be sought is the faculty of reason, which acts in personal knowing, feeling, and willing, towards God and man and nature. Human destiny accordingly may be expressed in this way: reason is to realise

itself as it does in God, in the knowing, the feeling, and the will of the personality ; or as the reason of knowledge is truth, and the reason of the heart is love, we may shortly say that man's destiny is his personal cultivation in truth and love in relation to God and to the world. These two, truth and love, are inseparably bound up with one another ; we can only love what we know to be true, and we can only truly know where we lovingly seek and find communion. Now the object of this knowledge and this love is God, inasmuch as he is in himself truth and goodness, and the source of all that is good and true in the world. To know therefore and to love, not only God by himself nor the world by itself, but God along with all that is of him in the world, or along with all that is divinely good and true in man and in nature—to know all this, to love it, and knowing and loving it, to appropriate it or enter into fellowship with it : this is the perfect life, life in God and like God, for which man is intended ; this is the realisation of the final end of divine wisdom and love, which created beings like himself, just that he might enter into living communion with Him (vol. iii. pp. 299, 304).

The ideal of human destiny thus described is certainly a high one ; we cannot fail to see what a wide interval separates it from real human life as experience shows it to be. How limited is the circle of the knowledge even of the wisest of men ! How narrow the sphere of the loving activity even of the best ! How many a useful force is called away before it has grown to maturity ; how many too in the midst of the most fruitful activity ! And the great majority even, at what a distance does it remain during the whole of life, from that goal ! How many generations of mankind have passed away, how many will yet pass away, without even being acquainted with this ideal ! It certainly cannot be denied that these facts of experience, seeming as they do to be so directly opposed to the universal authority of the ideal, produce a depressing and confusing effect on human feeling, and are capable of leading only too easily either to sorrowful resignation and despair of the attainableness of the ideal, or to a lowering of the ideal to the level of ordinary reality ; while in either case strenuous endeavour after the ideal is exchanged with

indolent and spiritless acquiescence in life as it is. This danger of spiritual incapacity and paralysis is most effectively met by the hope of immortality, which finds in the other world the complement of this fragmentary earthly existence. For the development of human faculties in individuals and in peoples in this world, which must always remain imperfect, it substitutes the perspective of an advance in the world beyond, with indefinitely great possibilities of further development and perfection; thus lifting up the downcast by the comfortable promise that their pains and strivings are not aimless nor resultless, stirring up and inciting the indolent and the contented, not to count themselves to have already attained, but to strive with all their powers towards the mark (Phil. i. 6; iii. 12-15). Acting in both these ways, as an ideal which elevates, comforts, and encourages, and as an authority which rebukes and incites, the hope of immortality is a motive so incomparably rich in blessings, that mankind certainly would not give it up even if theoretical grounds existed for doubting its possibility. This, as we showed above, is not the case, and this hope will remain an inalienable treasure of mankind for all times. Its value will not be lessened by the fact that we cannot know anything about the manner of that future in the beyond, any more than we can know anything about the remote future of mankind on this earth.

Indeed, this absence of knowledge as to the manner of the future appears not only to be no evil, but in many respects to be a very salutary circumstance. The indefiniteness of the picture we form of the future tends to check the inclination which easily becomes so dangerous, to revel to such an extent in pictures of the future as to forget the claims and the value of the present. The serious error of denying to our earthly life its own peculiar value and its moral justification considered by itself alone, and of degrading it to a mere means for the life to come, is one into which the defenders of the belief in immortality are very apt to fall; and occasion is thus given to the opponents of that belief for saying that it lends itself to a false and exaggerated habit of overlooking the present with its real blessings and its pressing duties. This reproach *Krause* was able happily to

avoid when he remarked in his suggestive way that as each period of our earthly life has its own dignity, its own beauty, and is by no means a mere preparation for the age succeeding it, so our earthly course as a whole has, when compared to that future state, its own peculiar value; the fact that it is not the whole, but only a fragment, is no reason for regarding it as vain and trifling; and the law of development is certainly the same now in the case of every individual as it will be in the future, however the outward form of the state may change. This agrees perfectly with the Apostolic doctrine, according to which "eternal life" is begun in faith even now, and will only be continued and completed in the future in a richer and purer form.

Again, the indefiniteness of our idea of the future state is good for us, because it leaves the possibility open to every one of framing his own special representation of the future to suit his own practical needs; and the variety of the biblical representations of the last things makes this easy and natural. Nowhere could narrow dogmatic insistence on any particular proposition or speculation be more to be condemned than here. There are two main forms, however, of the ideal of life, which being equally based on human nature, and both alike essentially legitimate, and having found expression in a variety of historical types (*e.g.* in the Lutheran and the Reformed piety and morals—see vol. iii. p. 235), have also determined, each in its own way, the form of the eschatological picture of the future; for the sake of brevity we may call them the contemplative holiday mood and the work-day tendency to action. The former mood rejoices, amid the toil and care, the struggles and afflictions of this present time, in the comforting thought of the *rest* which is prepared above for the people of God, where the quiet retirement of the holy day which here below only sheds its fleeting ray for a moment on the darkness of earth's days, will have passed into the permanent holiday peace and the blessed service of God enjoyed in the vision and communion of God and of his saints. This is a lofty thought which no one ought to carp at because his individual mood turns to something different; it is in this thought that those natures find repose

and comfort, which are given to turning inwards. They are not on that account less noble : in the bewildering worldliness they now see around them, the horrid dance around the golden calf, and the wild struggle for existence, all of which are euphemistically called "modern culture," they feel themselves ill at ease ; strangers here, they yearn after a better home, after their heavenly country (Heb. xi. 13 *seqq.*). Yet the others, too, are entitled to consideration, the natures which are turned more outwards, to working and making, forming, organising, things and men ; they hope that in the other world too, their restlessly active power will be able to manifest itself in new forms and spheres, and be permitted to rise in an unwearying *progress*, from one stage to another, through the countless departments of labour in God's great economy. This is a powerful thought, and is well fitted to inspire the impulse towards action, that impulse which takes joy in life and is happy in activity, to ever new ascents, as we see in the attractive and classical example of Goethe (vol. i. p. 245).

It scarcely needs to be remarked, that the difference between these two hopes of the future is not to be imagined to amount to an antithesis, only one member of which can be adopted, as if only the one or only the other could claim to be the whole truth of the matter. If there are many mansions in our Father's house, care will no doubt be taken that each individual shall get that for which his God-given idiosyncrasy has predestined him, this one quiet Sabbath rest, that one active labour. Even in this life the religious consciousness manifests itself in this double form, in the contemplative enjoyment and rest of worship, and in the active work of moral conduct and scientific pursuit of knowledge, and what thus takes place here as day succeeds day and week follows week, cannot that take place in the other world too in a succession of longer periods ? We know nothing about it ; we only believe that "what eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath entered into the heart of man to conceive, God hath laid up for them that love him." But here we stand before the mystery, the veil of which no mortal eye has ever penetrated, or will ever penetrate ; and we now turn to the

description of the earthly manifestation of the religious consciousness, imperfect, it is true, but not valueless nor trivial, its manifestation in the double form of the service of God in its narrower and in its wider sense, in the form of worship, and in that of moral, practical, and theoretical life.

SECTION III.

THE MANIFESTATION OF THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS.



CHAPTER I.

WORSHIP AND CHURCH.

IF the saying is correct, that in its hope of the future religion betrays its innermost nature, then the last chapter has confirmed the statement with which we set out as to the nature of religion, that it is such a reference of life to the world-ruling divine power, as seeks to grow into a living communion with it. Now the immediate manifestation of this consciousness and the fulfilment of this striving is *worship*. Worship may be called, not unjustly, a *representing action*, inasmuch as it does not aim at realising outward ends in the world, nor seek to call forth the religious consciousness for the first time : it assumes the latter to be the common state of a number of men, and seeks to give to that which inwardly moves them all alike a common outward expression in words and acts, in which every individual finds the movement of his own feelings symbolised, in which accordingly the ideas, feelings, and will-movements of all flow together in one common stream, and thus mutually support and strengthen one another. But while worship is no doubt a representing action, and undoubtedly has a certain affinity with artistic representation, this is far from an exhaustive account of it ; besides the æsthetic it has an ethico-teleological side which must not be overlooked. Worship aims at attaining an *object* ; not an object in

the outer world of phenomena, and not really an object in God, as a naïve religious consciousness may imagine, as if a certain impression were to be produced on his disposition or his mode of action ; the effect aimed at in worship lies in the inner part of those who celebrate it ; it is, namely, to make them receptive for the divine influence, or so to awaken and attune their emotions, that the religious relation of reference to and connection with the divine may be really accomplished in their actual experience. Thus we may further define worship as that manifestation of the religious consciousness in the representing action of a community, in which its efforts after living communion with the divine come to real and actual accomplishment.

Here two sides must at once be distinguished ; the distinction and at the same time the close connection of the two are of the greatest importance for an understanding of worship. On the one side is the striving of man after living communion with the divine, a *spontaneous activity* (in the first instance inward), which culminates in *self-surrender* to the divine ; on the other side the experience by man of this living communion, which is *received* and *enjoyed* by man as a *divine gift and operation*. The Old Testament expresses the former very profoundly as a seeking of God's face, the latter as a rejoicing before God's face. In Christianity the two sides are the foundation, each of a different view of worship, and particularly of the Lord's Supper, two views which have always been connected with each other, and have very unnecessarily been regarded of late as mutually exclusive of each other. Firstly, worship is regarded as a religious act or "sacrifice" on man's part ; and secondly, as the means of a divine act or giving to men,—as a "means of grace," which man on his part receives as a divine gift. It is unnecessary I say to represent these two views as mutually exclusive, or to make them matters of controversy between different confessions ; if we look at the principle of the matter, it is clear and obvious that the two views neither can nor ought to be severed from each other. If worship were a mere human act without any corresponding "receiving," it would be an objectless and empty ceremony, an æsthetic amusement without any religious value. If, on the other hand, worship were

a pure channel for men to receive by without any corresponding religious and moral action, this receiving would necessarily be a magical thing, because not brought about by any spiritual element in the personal religious life of the receiver. We must give the name of magic to every idea of a spiritual operation which takes place without any preparation, or with none but a physical preparation ; and an idea like this does not belong to the sphere of spiritual or ethical religion, but to that of nature-religion. For the religion of the " worship of God in spirit and in truth " it is unconditionally true that no experience of the divine salvation can enter the mind in any other way than by the acts of the mind itself, the man must be there with his whole knowing, feeling, and willing ego, he must himself take part, be active, in what takes place. No revelation is breathed into a man who is entirely passive, no operation of grace is poured into him ; it is when the soul is seeking and striving that there reveals itself from within, under the awakening and encouraging impression of communion, the light of the higher life which enlightens it, the power of the life hid in God, which sets it free. This, it is true, is an operation within the spirit which is not produced by the individual ego and his arbitrary or calculated action, but experienced by him as the operation of a higher power to which the human subject stands in an attitude of receptiveness, but this receiving is only possible by means of that inner activity, directed back on the self, which we saw above to be saving " faith," or the free act of the self-surrender of the whole heart to divine grace. In so far then as in worship the heart opens itself up to the impression of the divine, surrenders itself, takes the divine to itself and appropriates it as part of its own life, it experiences thereby a divinely operated furtherance or a communication of living divine power, it becomes aware of its own life raised to a higher level, as a life that proceeds from God and is connected with God, an experience to which dogmatic gives the very fitting expression of *unio mystica*. In this mystic coming together of man with God to a conscious living communion which is personally free,—and this is the kernel and the end of the act of worship,—lies precisely the proper mean between

the empty symbolism of a mere human act (a ceremony) and the unspiritual magic of a mere divine act (a miracle).

From the fact that worship has these two sides (and each of them allows of being dissected into a number of processes, inward and outward), it results that worship is never a simple act merely, but always a transaction moving through a series of connected acts, *i.e.* a drama. This notion, borrowed from art, ought not to give offence when thus employed; all that it is meant to indicate as applied to worship is that the *form* in which the religious consciousness here manifests itself is that of representative action. The contents of the dramatic representation may be of the most varied nature; from the epic nature-mythology of the earliest heathenism, which turned on the course of the sun and of nature, to the most ideal processes of man's emotional life as they are set forth in Christian worship. There is no intention to under-estimate the immense difference between these two, or to deny in any way whatever the specific superiority and uniqueness of Christian worship; yet it is right and proper to recognise that in point of form the common element of all worship consists in its dramatic character, the various moments in which the religious consciousness acts and the religious relation is realised being set forth in a plurality of acts, which for that very reason can only be properly judged when taken together, as being, in conjunction with each other, the exponents of the dialectic of fact of the religious process. This is an important point for the understanding of religious phenomena, and demands more attention than is usually given to it. We find on the most cursory glance into the history of religion abundant illustrations of it.

The earliest action in the way of worship, in the primitive history of mankind, was nothing but a dramatic repetition of the divine life seen in the processes of nature, with a view to taking part in it in a mutual intercourse of gods and men. The usages connected with the spring and autumn festivals in nature-religions everywhere show very plainly an effort to represent the coming and the departure of the deity of life and light, in such a manner that the changing fortunes of the deity may be repeated and experienced afresh in the

imitative acts and emotions of their worshippers. Thus in Egypt was celebrated the complaint of Isis for Osiris, in Syria the marriage and the death of the sun-god Melcarth or Adonis, in Eleusis the search and the lament of Demeter for her daughter Core, snatched away into the under-world, and then her return and reunion with her happy mother, in Athens the death and the resurrection of Dionysus; all in a manner essentially dramatic and full of movement and change, and therefore quite fitted to become the root of the drama proper, which, it is well known, was developed out of the Dionysiac festival-games. And as at the yearly festivals at the turning-points of the life of nature, man took part in the life of the deity by imitating it and sharing in the experience of it, so at the turning-points of his own life also he sought to assure himself of the sympathy and the blessing of the deity for himself and for his household; hence the manifold religious customs connected with birth, with the entrance on puberty, with marriage and death. These usages are found in all religions alike, the scantiest and most primitive religions of savages not excepted; there is no doubt that we must see in them the most elementary forms of worship, and if this is so, then the aim of worship was from the very beginning just what it is still in the highest forms of religion, namely, to realise the religious relation of living communion with the power which rules the world, or with God. Even sacrifice and prayer are only particular incidents and means, probably not even the oldest incidents and means of this dramatic action in which worship aimed at communion with the divine.

The origin of *sacrifice* is simply this, that at festive occasions man invited the divine powers to share in his meals. He brought their share near to them by burning the food of the offering, and pouring out the drink on the ground (fire and earth are the intermediaries, themselves divine, of the gifts). The common participation of the meal by men and gods was afterwards lost sight of as sacrifice became priestly, sacramental, and narrower in its idea; but this was originally the main point of it; the aim was primarily to make the gods man's guest-friends, and so to assure oneself of their friendship and alliance, and it may also have had the intention to strengthen and inspirit the

gods for vigorous deeds on behalf of their worshippers, as, for example, the old Indians considered this to be the meaning of their Soma-offering. What was originally a sign and means of the league of friendship between men and their divine guests gradually received, as the idea of the divine dignity grew more exalted, the significance of an act of homage, or of the offering of a tribute which was due, such as the subject or the vassal has to pay to his king or patron. According as this act of homage is concerned with the giving of thanks for favours already received, or with petition for further blessings, it is a thank-offering, or an offering of supplication. The propitiatory sacrifice, too, finds its explanation in the analogy of primitive legal relationships; it is originally nothing but the offering of a penitent in compensation of some wrong, or the "were"-money which the offender or some of his people offers to the offended person to buy off his vengeance. If the liability arise out of an offence committed by a community which could be regarded as a corporate unit, against a powerful lord, the latter might demand that one or several members of the community should be given up to him for death or slavery, by way of ransom for the whole; but an equivalent might be offered and accepted for the human ransom, some valuable piece of property, *e.g.* cattle or herds. The whole of antiquity considered that any interruption of the relation with God was to be dealt with in this way: to soothe the wrath of the deity and buy off the disfavour which threatened evil to the community, some valuable gift was offered by way of ransom. In graver cases this offering no doubt consisted generally in earlier times of the life of a man, whose vicarious death was thought to propitiate the deity for the others. Only at a later time, when manners and ways of thinking became more humane, was the deity credited with a gentler disposition, and believed to be willing to accept the life of an animal as propitiatory sacrifice, instead of the life of a man. The memory of this advance in the humanising of worship is preserved in such legends as that of the sacrifice of Isaac or Iphigenia. The moral value of these sacrifices depends on the degree in which the offerer really felt the pain of penitence, and the desire to have peaceful intercourse with the

deity, restored to him; these motives were from the first symbolised in sacrifice, in so far as it was a propitiation, along with the desire to avert the punishment of the deity. The many no doubt laid most stress on the outward action as such, ascribed to it an immediate and, as it were, a compelling influence in procuring the divine favour, and so exempted themselves from all deeper moral stirrings in connection with the occurrence; this belongs to human nature. Hence the active polemic which profounder minds, such as the Hebrew prophets and the Greek philosophers, waged at all times against the superstition of an empty ceremonial service, and against carnal reliance on the healing efficacy of sacrifice; instead of sacrifice they called for the moral worship of heart- and life-surrender to God and to his holy will. But the religion of a community cannot be without symbols of worship, and mere polemic is fruitless so long as it is not possible to put in place of the coarse worship of ceremonies a purer and more spiritual symbolism, which being an immediate and vivid expression of the moral and religious ideas, is fitted to call forth in the worshipping community the corresponding views and movements of feeling.

This is the case in *Christian* worship as in no other; here the means of representation in word and act, and in the act its simplicity of form, the vividness of the historical motives from which it is derived, and the depth of its religious ideas have always, or to speak more accurately, from the days of Paul, combined to form a mysticism of the most effective kind. Paul found baptism and the love-feasts in use as the fixed customs of the primitive church, but it was his theology that connected both these acts with the cardinal Christian idea of redemption in so immediate a way as to make them sacramental expressions and forms of communication of the Christian spirit.

Baptism occurs first in the practice of John the Baptist: with him it is an act of penitence and of dedication to the coming Messianic kingdom. The Christian church took it up, with essentially the same significance; but here the confession of belief in Jesus as the Christ was thought to be accompanied with the

forgiveness of a man's sins and with his receiving certain miraculous gifts of the Spirit (*e.g.* ecstatic speaking with tongues, and the miraculous power of healing). Paul's deeper notion of "faith" caused baptism, which is the act of confessing that faith, to receive the mystic significance of a union with Christ as the spiritual head of the church, in which the believer grows into one person with Christ, experiences afresh in his immersion in water Christ's death and resurrection, and then, as a "new man" has part in Christ's life of holiness and glory which is removed above earth's sin and death. According to Paul baptism is a symbolic and dramatic repetition of Christ's death and resurrection, and is thus the appropriation and inner accomplishment of the central Christian idea of redemption by ethical dying and becoming new. In baptism the new man, the spiritual man, comes to the birth, who no longer stands under the slavery of sin and of the law, but in whom the spirit of life and love, the spirit of the children of God has sway. Thus baptism is two things: it is the foundation of a new religious position in life (those who are baptized into Christ have put on Christ, Gal. iii. 27); and it is the obligation to a new moral life and conversation (the promise of a good conscience towards God, 1 Peter iii. 21, Rom. vi. 3 *sqq.*). Here we may remember that admission to the Eleusinian mysteries was also regarded as a sort of new birth, and that specially the hierophant who was intended for the temple service had to take a sacramental bath out of which he emerged a new man with a new name, the "former things were passed away," the old man was put off with the old name. The church fathers saw very well how like the rite of baptism was to the solemnities of the mysteries, and they even allowed themselves to be led away by the similarity at an early period into ideas regarding the efficacy of baptism which were not far removed from magic; while baptism not only was near this danger, but actually fell into it when the baptism of infants took the place of the adult act of faith (this was more and more the case from the fourth century onwards). It is evident that when baptism is administered to infants it cannot have the same meaning as when it is the expression of a personal faith. Yet it cannot be denied that this

custom was bound to come up in history when Christianity entered into the form of a national church ; nor can it be denied that for the national church it is right, permanently right. It contains the true and profound thought, that inside the Christian church the divine spirit of goodness and truth is the objective power, under whose educative, purifying, and strengthening influence all individuals stand from the very beginning of their spiritual development, so that they have merely to grow into this spirit of the community in which they live, to open themselves to that spirit and give themselves up to it, in order to become partakers of its saving and sanctifying powers. Thus infant baptism is a very fitting expression, an expression level to the comprehension of all, of that specific Christian consciousness of redemption according to which the religious salvation of the community of God is not an ideal devoid of actuality, the realisation of which is to be the aim sought with endless pain and labour by the individual with his finite powers, but never attained by him ; but that it is already present in the historical community, an active and educative living power, the redeeming energy of which each may experience who willingly surrenders himself to its educative influence. This last element of personal free self-surrender does not take place in infant baptism at the same time with the outward act, but is added afterwards by means of the education the church imparts. The latter is not the necessary consequence merely, it is a necessary complement of infant baptism, the unfolding in fact of the "educating grace" of the religion of redemption which in that symbolic act was only ideally guaranteed. Thus it is a very fitting arrangement that in the "Confirmation"¹ which takes place at the close of the religious education of youth the personal belief of the young Christian is set forth in a solemn confession, so that what is wanting in infant baptism, the free personal appropriation of divine grace, is afterwards explicitly supplied. The grace offered to the child, unconscious of the offer, is now consciously laid hold of, and this brings about the final ratification of the covenant of communion with God, the

¹ Einsegnung.

initiative of which was taken on God's side in the act of the church at the beginning, but which could only be ratified by a free act on the part of man.

The primitive Christian church was accustomed to hold regular *love-feasts* at its meetings, such as were customary in other religious communities also, for example among the Essenes. During this meal, and especially at the solemn act of the "breaking of bread," the Christian thought of the last meal Jesus ate with his disciples, when he himself made the broken bread a symbol of his own body, soon to be broken in death. Thus the love-feast of the disciples also became to them a commemoration of the last occasion when their Master had been present with them, and of his death which followed immediately after. Even the fact that this meal was regularly connected with the meetings of the church for religious exercises, conferred on it a certain religious consecration as if it were a part of worship, yet no sacramental meaning seems to have been even distantly attached to it, to judge from the indications in the first Epistle to the Corinthians as to the order or rather disorder of the observance. It was Pauline theology once more which provided a basis for the sacramental character of this observance. Paul compares the "Lord's Supper" as he suggestively names it, with the Jewish and heathen sacrificial feasts; as in these the sacrifices enter into a mystic relation with the God to whom the altar belongs, so does the Christian with Christ at the Lord's Supper. Participation in the consecrated cup and bread, these symbols of the shed blood and the broken body of Christ, not only represents, but in some mysterious fashion brings to pass a personal union with the crucified head of the church, and thus in a sense establishes a fellowship in death, a covenant of blood between Christ and all those who are his. By this union those who share it are removed from the demonic life of the world and admitted into a spiritual living connection with Christ, or become "members of his body," inspired by his spirit of Sonship to God, and stand towards God in the peaceful relation of the "new covenant" of atonement. Hence with Paul the consecrated cup

which brings about this union is itself called the "new covenant," and "the communion of the blood of Christ" (1 Cor. xi. 25 ; x. 16), and the reason given for the constant repetition of the rite is that "Christ's death is showed forth" in it again and again, *i.e.* proved as a fact to be what to Paul it essentially is—the foundation of the new covenant in which old things are passed away and all things are made new. Thus the Lord's Supper is taken by Paul, as well as baptism, to be a mystic and symbolic act, in which the death of Christ is repeated in the experience of his followers, translated from an outward experience of an individual into an inner experience of all, into that ethical process of feeling in which the idea of redemption is realised. Thus, according to Paul, the sacramental act is not a mere symbol ; a mystic union takes place in it between the participants and the spirit of Christ ; only this union is not bound to the elements of the Supper, as if these were anything more than symbols merely ; it is rather the act of piously partaking, a symbolical social exercise of faith, that brings the participators into a covenant for life and death with the head to whom they all look, and with each other. In the church, however, this ideal Pauline view of the Lord's Supper was soon turned into something more realistic, more material ; the bread of the Lord's Supper was taken to be a continued incarnation, as it were, of the divine Logos, and hence a supersensuous yet sensuous medicine and elixir of life. This belongs to the nature of all such modes of representation in worship, and comes from the simple psychological circumstance that the inner experience of the elevating and reviving influence of the rite is traced to an outward cause, and this cause supposed to reside in the matter of the rite.

The celebration of the Lord's Supper occupied from the first a central place in Christian worship ; and that worship consequently was developed in a way for which I can find no more fitting term than the *dramatisation of redemption*, the celebration being regarded both as a work of revelation on God's part, and as a manifestation of faith on the part of man. The action runs through a number of acts, in which the mutual relation of God and man, which constitutes the essence of the religion of redemption, unfolds itself as a repetition in

a sort of dialogue of the dialectic which obtains in fact between the acts of divine revelation and the answer of human faith. At first the parts were divided between priest and people; but at a later time the people, especially in the Greek Church, were reduced to mere spectators of the priest, who does everything. The action extends from the mischief wrought by Adam, which made redemption necessary, to the hoped-for consummation of redemption in the blessedness of the church triumphant, and thus forms an abbreviated edition of the history of the world and of salvation, and at the same time a symbolical prefiguration of the processes of feeling in which redemption should be ever afresh experienced and appropriated by the church. As a representation of the redeeming work of God it is a means of the grace which is offered to man in revelation, while as a thanksgiving on the part of the redeemed community it is the spontaneous act of self-surrender by the church to God, and in this aspect the idea of sacrifice is expressed in it in a purely ethical way. In the thankful celebration of the sacrifice of the love of Christ the church presents itself, the "mystic body of Christ" ever afresh, to God, as a divinely dedicated sacrifice; that was the original meaning of the "Mass," or the Eucharist, as plainly appears even in Augustine. But as the congregation came to take less of an active part in the celebration, and the action became more predominantly clerical, and as at the same time an immediate theurgic saving power was attributed to this action of the clergy, and as mediæval Christendom, with its more material mode of view, asked to see the divine actually present in the consecrated host, the originally purer meaning of the Eucharist became more external and coarser, till the magical idea was reached of the miracle of the sacrifice of the mass, in which the priest daily repeated the sacrifice of Christ for the benefit of the living and the dead. Here a true and profound idea, namely, that redemption is an experience which repeats itself ever afresh in the church, was most fatally distorted; instead of the ethical process in the hearts of the faithful there was now a priestly miracle, by his command of which the priest came to be the author of salvation, and so the lord of the conscience, the distributor of all the treasures of

grace, the indispensable mediator between God and the church. As this cardinal error of Catholicism was inseparably bound up in the priestly sacrifice of the mass, the Reformers unanimously and with perfect justice, directed their protests against this seat of the evil, and insisted on the immediateness of the relation between Christ and the individual at the Lord's Supper. In the positive view then formed of this relation the two Protestant churches took different lines. The Lutheran church laid stress on the faithful receiving, on the resting enjoyment of God on the part of the communicant; the Reformed church on the faithful doing, on the common putting forth of the Christian spirit which fills the church in solemn thanks and self-dedication to God and Christ. This difference in the attitude of the communicant's mind is closely connected with the difference in the tone of piety cultivated in the two churches respectively; the piety of the former is mystic and contemplative, that of the latter ethical and productive; and this difference in mental attitude is the real point of difference between the two churches: the question as to the presence of the body of Christ is only important as a symptom. The fact is that the two churches have each taken one of the two sides, as sisters might, which, as we said above, are equally essential to worship, and which were in fact combined in the early Christian view of the Eucharist. Worship is a means of grace; it is also an act of sacrifice; and each of the churches lays stress on one of these two sides, without really wishing to deny the other. On the Lutheran side, too, a living act of faith is required in order to a worthy partaking and spiritual enjoyment of the Lord's Supper: and on the Reformed side too it is not denied that the saving efficacy of the rite is added to the act of faith to confirm the assurance of salvation. From this it follows that here, as in all the points with regard to which they have a controversy with each other, the two Protestant churches are both right, and that they only begin to be wrong when they claim to exclude each other instead of learning from each other. Could they learn from each other in this matter, the Old Catholic ideal view of the Eucharist would be called up once more; and no unprejudiced judge can therefore fail to admit that a reunion of the

two churches is at this, the most hotly controverted point, perfectly possible, and would lead to a position more truly catholic than either of them now occupies.

Another particular in which Protestantism has reverted to the early Christian mode of worship is that it has given the *word* the prominent place which is its due in the worship of the religion of the spirit, that word too being that which all can understand, which is spoken in the language of the people. The action regarded by itself may contain the profoundest symbolism, but without the word which interprets it, it is a dumb and uncomprehended sign, which too easily becomes for the multitude an *opus operatum*, and though it may awaken some dull sentiment of devotion, cannot be helpful to a piety which is aware of itself, whose understanding is clear, whose will is vigorous. Only the word in which the spirit frames itself into a definite thought, can make any impression on the thought or the will of the congregation. At the very first the word was the creative power which brought light and order into the chaos of seething energies of life; and in religion too, the word alone has power to introduce any clearness into the chaos of the tumultuous feelings, moods, and strivings of men's souls, and to give them shape in a permanent and living social order, in the ideal world of a community's convictions and dispositions. And the word has to be considered in worship in a twofold aspect; firstly, it is the congregation's liturgical word of prayer, which is either directly uttered by the congregation in church music, or recited for it by the minister, who here is simply the mouth of the congregation; and secondly, it is the contemplative, instructive, hortatory, word of preaching, which starts from the word of Scripture, and expounds and brings out the sense of Scripture in which the teacher is well versed, with a view to the edification of the worshippers. The teacher here exercises the function of the productive "prophet" of the early church.

Prayer is the transporting of ourselves into intercourse with God, to find with him that salvation which the world of the finite cannot give. When it seeks salvation from God it is supplication; when it

celebrates and rejoices in salvation already possessed it is thanksgiving, or more generally adoration, absorption in the view of the divine perfection and in the feeling of having a part in it. According as an advanced idea of God, and an advanced state of personal feeling has been attained or the reverse, the contents and the form of prayer will vary. Generally speaking everything may form the subject of supplication that man cares about, from the lower wishes connected with his outward welfare to the loftiest desires after moral strength and religious peace, after the fulfilment of the divine will both in the individual and in the kingdom of God as a whole. In low religions the former of course predominates, while the moral element only appears gradually and sporadically, *e.g.* in the petition for the forgiveness of sins; while in Christian prayer the care for earthly things may still be an element, may be the point from which we set out, but cannot be the point at which we aim. Here prayer is itself the means used in order to put off all low and selfish cares, and to raise our minds to the one thing needful, to the absolute fulfilment of our aim in participation in the holy and blessed life of God, to peace and joy in the Holy Ghost. When we lift up our minds to this supreme good, all special and conditional ends arrange themselves under this chief end, in such a way as to be no longer objects of desire when taken by themselves, but only in so far as they are destined to serve the all-good and all-wise government of the world as means to the highest good. All particular ends are ultimately summed up in the one petition: "thy will be done." The true spirit of prayer accordingly embraces on one side childlike confidence in the divine love and wisdom, which knows and determines what is best for us, and on the other childlike resignation to the divine will, a temper which cannot wish selfishly to demand anything, cannot dream that it is able to extort anything, but always remembers its absolute dependence on the all-determining will of God. The mere feeling of dependence on the divine power, without confidence in its love and wisdom, leads to a dull resignation, which saps all courage to hope and strive, and ends in joyless, actionless quietism, or in despair. The mere feeling of confidence, again, without the humble

and resigned sense of dependence, leads to childish wilfulness which bids God defiance, and imagines it possible to force his power into the service of selfish private ends. This is the mode of thought and view which lies at the root of all magic ; for magic is nothing but the attempt to force the supersensuous power of the deity, or of the spirit-world, into the service of self-will by means of certain forms of worship. The limits between this superstition and the too much belief of selfish and defiant prayer are not fixed, but quite fluid. Equally removed, therefore, both from spiritless resignation and from arrogant defiance, the true piety of prayer consists in that childlike disposition, that faithful resignation which Jesus taught us in that pattern of all prayer : " Not my will, but thine, be done ! " To bring our mind into this the true spirit of prayer, no means is so well adapted as common prayer in the midst of the worshipping congregation. Here private interests of themselves retire before the general aims of the moral and religious life of the community ; the ideal goods to which the common will of the congregation is directed in prayer, at once present themselves to the sentiment of the individual too, as the superior, the supreme goods ; and while his interest is thus engaged for them, his taste for them awakened, his capacity for them revealed, the heart rises above the mists of selfish cares and ties to the pure ether of the divinely good and true, the glow of common devotion warms and softens even the unwilling heart, purifies it from the dross of selfishness and worldliness, and fills it with noble enthusiasm.

A specially effective instrument for creating this elevated pitch of feeling in a number of people at once is *church song*, or the chorale. Here the common prayer, for every church song is this, is actually sung by all together, and this intensifies the effect of it ; and to this is added the use of a solemn, sustained, and powerful piece of music, to make the impression of elevation and enthusiasm complete. Though the chorale, as sung by the congregation, should fall always short, more or less, of the æsthetic demands of a musical ear, yet the great majority of the congregation is not aware of it, and even those few who feel it to some extent will not let it disturb them too much,

if their heart is really in what is going on. The chorale "*Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott*" is seldom sung quite correctly, yet at every festival celebration it produces an incomparable effect. It is not meant to deny that much could, and should be done for the improvement of church music: a little more variety might, for example, be introduced into the airs, the rhythm might be made, as a rule, a little more cheerful, the pitch of voice might be lowered, so as to make it easier for men to join in the singing, and, most of all, the singing might be supported and led by a choir of the best voices. Again, "liturgical services" might be arranged for the evenings of holy days, in which a suitable selection of Scripture passages might be read, varied with the singing, not only of chorales, but also of solo airs; something, in fact, analogous to the oratorio, though, of course, much simpler, and with less pretence of art. Such a service would be little inferior to oratorio in point of edifying effect, and it would be a change which all would welcome, from the ordinary service with preaching. By its lively dramatic movement, such a liturgical service would afford a suitable mean between worship and the popular religious drama, which, as it formerly grew out of Catholic worship, might in time come back to the Protestant Church, not as a substitute for worship proper (as Rothe proposed), but as a complement of it, and as a link between religious and secular art. Such a bond of union would benefit both sides; religious art would be enriched, and the forms it uses beautified, while secular art would be ennobled, and taught to use deeper themes. "Verily our stage, which has no mind but for æstheticism, might well employ the sanctifying power of morality and religion, while sober Protestant worship might seek more than it does, the adornment of art" (Thoma). These ideas belong, in the meantime, to the future, and many may shake their heads over them; I will not here follow them up further, but will only call to mind the Luther festival plays of Devrient and Herrig, which the Jubilee of the Reformer gave us. To me these seemed to promise much, and to be a beginning, which may be carried further, of a popular Protestant drama, a germ which needs nothing but the proper soil

and the loving care of competent persons, to grow up into a fair tree.¹

To the liturgical word of prayer, said or sung, in which the common religious spirit of the assembled worshippers finds direct expression, there is to be added the word of the address belonging to worship, or the *sermon*, in which religious truth finds expression through the individual knowledge and statement of the preacher. As liturge, the minister is only the mouth of the congregation; he has to express the consciousness of the congregation in the fixed current form which the church has sanctioned. As preacher, on the contrary, he announces Christian truth in the form which it has assumed in his own personal conviction; he develops its contents by freely discussing them, he expounds the traditional forms according to the measure and character of the insight he has attained, and applies general truths to the special circumstances and needs of his hearers. In point of form, preaching is like ordinary discourse, but it differs from the latter in that it neither seeks to communicate knowledge, like lecturing, in special departments of learning, nor yet like political or forensic speaking to produce a definite conviction and resolution to act in special departments of life. On the contrary, it seeks to lay hold of the whole man at the centre of his personality, to conquer his heart, to influence his moral and religious disposition, to determine the formation of his character, with one word to "edify" him. This edifying effect preaching produces by setting forth concretely and definitely, with the persuasive force of personal conviction, the Christian ideal, which is the fixed basis and assumption of the consciousness the members of the congregation all share with one another. It is this combination of objective truth with subjectivity of statement that constitutes the peculiar power of preaching to awaken personal conviction and to engender religious life; for here too, it is true that life can only come from life. At this point, it is true, we touch the peculiar difficulty and danger of preaching; it seeks to

¹ Compare my Lecture on "The Religious Drama," printed separately from the *Prot. Kirch. Zeitung*, 1881, Nos. 19 and 21; also the reports on the Luther festival plays of Devrient and Herrig, *Prot. Kirch. Zeit.*, 1883, Nos. 44 and 46.

declare the truth as it is apprehended in the mind of the preacher, and at the same time as it is taken for granted in the minds of his hearers. But will the one without further question coincide with the other? It can never be expected that it will altogether do so. Not to speak of the special circumstances of our time, it must be stated as a general fact that the richer the truth is, and the more weighty for personal life, the more must it, when reproduced by one person, bear the stamp of an individual apprehension, and therefore appear peculiar and new. The abler the preacher the more will the peculiarity of the truth, as he knows it, be stamped upon his manner of preaching, and indeed lend to his preaching its greatest charm and value. The preacher's right cannot be disputed on general grounds to state the truth as he individually has apprehended it, and the question can only be as to the limits of this right, or how far the preacher is bound to agree with the assumptions present in the minds of the people?

This question is readily answered by considering what is the object of preaching. Preaching is not meant to convey information about any object of knowledge, and should not therefore contain statements of dogma or of history; it is meant to edify, *i.e.* to produce personal religious life; and it should therefore set forth the truth of Christianity not in theoretical notions and formulas for the intellect, but as a *practical living ideal for the heart*; it should paint the picture of Christian piety and morality as clearly, as vividly, and as attractively as possible; now developing it outwards from the central principle to every side of the periphery, now starting from one particular side of its manifestation and tracing it back to the general principle of the Christian disposition of the heart. If this is the essential object of preaching, then two things follow with reference to the question asked above. First it is clear that there must be agreement between the preacher and his church as to the nature of the Christian ideal, or as to what is essential to the living piety and morality of a Christian personality, and how the Christian principle directs that the disposition be formed in relation to God and to the world. Agreement as to this real and practical relation

of life is the community of faith which is absolutely indispensable for the preacher's usefulness. But as to the proper way of formulating this ideal theoretically, as to the doctrinal statements which must accompany it as its dogmatic or historical assumptions or consequences, this is not immediately connected with the end of preaching ; it is less a question of church practice than a question of the school, and the preacher as such can and should be left free to form his own judgment respecting it. He may consider the dogmatic definitions of the church symbols to be technically correct formulas of the Christian religion, and may yet refrain from employing them, judging them to be unsuited for the practical ends of preaching. And conversely he may regard the dogmas as defective expressions of the faith which were only justified at a particular time, and may yet make use of their ideas and their phraseology in his preaching, considering this to be the readiest road to the comprehension of those to whom the faith is only familiar in this form. What is important for preaching and for worship generally is not that doctrines should be theoretically correct and capable of standing the test of logical examination, but that they should be practically right, that they should appeal to the heart and have the power of motives, that they should be psychologically serviceable. This, however, is not only true of different doctrines in very different degrees, it is a thing that depends very much on the stage of cultivation reached by a particular congregation both religiously and generally. Where the religious consciousness of a church is so estranged from the dogmatic mode of view of the church symbols as only to adapt itself to them with difficulty and by laborious and roundabout reflection, there it would be a very purposeless proceeding if the preacher insisted on these dogmatic formulæ, and sought to force them on the congregation as if they were the very kernel of the matter, when in any case they are no more than the human, scholastically formed vessel of the religious spirit, the communication and quickening of which alone is the end of worship. Where, on the contrary, a congregation lives so unquestioningly in the traditional dogmatic ideas, that they are as

it were the mother tongue of its religion, than which it knows no other, there the preacher will make use of these ideas, as the readiest means of making himself understood in his efforts after edification, whatever he may think of their theoretical correctness, whether he regards them as a fit expression of the living truth of religion, or as an unfit expression, as tenable or as calling for improvement. In the former case he will only have to give heed to it that he do not make the dogmatic form which in any case can only be a means towards a practical end, itself the end, that he do not confound the starting-point with the end, of the address in worship, and thereby miss the real end of worship, the edification of the congregation. In the second case he must no less take heed that he do not by rash and loveless criticism of the forms of the church tradition confuse and wound the consciousness of the congregation which is still attached to these forms, in which case he will forfeit the confidence of his people, and by discarding the means of reaching their understanding lose the means of influencing them practically. Eagerness against dogmas is as out of place in the pulpit as eagerness for them; the one is as well as the other a symptom of short-sighted and narrow-hearted dogmatism and doctrinaire-ism, which exalts the form above the substance, confounds the church with the school, puts theology in place of religion, and so in zeal for theory forgets and injures life. "Grey, friend, is all theory; green the golden tree of life." If this saying were always remembered by preachers, ecclesiastical difficulties would often prove less formidable. But it is a fortunate circumstance that in this matter life itself is generally wiser than men's school-wisdom. Antitheses which men regard as insuperable (and to logic they may really be so) practice with its unconscious reason adjusts quite simply till they are scarcely noticed; theologians who confront each other irreconcilably in the dogmatic strife, and mutually accuse each other of the most "subversive errors," are led by their natural good sense to resemble each other so closely in their practical work in congregations similarly placed that the ear which is not theologically trained can scarcely detect any difference between their styles of preaching. Hence the

people comes to care less and less about the dogmatic disputes of theologians: it regards the man and not his professional opinion; when once it feels confidence in the religious and moral personality of a preacher, it no longer asks what school of theology he belongs to. And we conceive the people are quite right in the matter, and could only wish that as time goes on the good sense of the people might make its way among the ruling bodies of all the churches!

Preaching as a regular part of public worship aims at the edification of the Christian life generally, but the minister of religion is called to deliver addresses on other occasions (German "*Kasual-rede*," address at functions) when he has to place in the light of moral and religious truth special experiences of individuals or of the church as a whole, and to sanctify these by his words of exhortation or of comfort. The events of family life in particular; the birth of children, their coming of age and entrance into society, marriage and death, are consecrated by special acts of worship, which afford the most natural opportunity for tending the moral and spiritual life of individuals and of families, or for the "cure of souls." In this regular cure of souls, connected with the events which naturally occur in life, even more than in public worship, lies the bond which connects the individual with the religious community. As the latter in the person of its regular organ accompanies with its blessing and with religious observances the life of each of its members from the cradle to the grave, it attests the loving sympathy and participation of the body in the joy and sorrow of the individual, and makes every one, even the poorest and the most deserted, feel that he does not stand alone in the world, that his life, his weal and woe, matter something to the community, and is the object of their sympathy, their care, their intercession. In this feeling of the linked union of the body lies the strongest motive of the individual's feeling of responsibility to the community, by the sympathy of which he knows himself encompassed and upheld. While the sympathy shown by the community to the individual increases his sense of the value of his life, it at the same time educates and deepens his feeling of responsibility for his conduct, and in his sense of honour and of shame reinforces

in the most powerful way his sense of duty. Thus the cure of souls is the most natural and the most effective means of the *moral education of the people*; as the organ of the religious community, the minister represents the ideal of the community or of the public conscience; his word of exhortation or rebuke is something more than the word of an individual, it is the voice of the ideal moral common spirit, the judgment of the acknowledged conscience of the people, of the community's sense of honour and of duty, and so it possesses an authority, an educative power such as is not possessed to a similar degree by any other institution, neither by the civil magistrate nor by the school.

These two must certainly co-operate with the religious community or the church for the purpose of the normal moral education of the people, but they will never be able to take the place of the church, because they cannot take hold of the individual so directly as she does, at the inmost centre of his personality, his heart and conscience; they also, it is true, represent what is true and good, but only on one particular side; they do not offer an all-comprehensive ideal of life, they cannot bring to bear on every individual as the church does an influence which penetrates the whole of his life. The religious community consecrates the very beginning of life with the solemn declaration that the infant citizen of the world is called to the highest ideal, and must be conducted towards it by means of education; then it cares for this education both directly by the religious instruction of youth, and indirectly by its influence on family and school; and even when these two are relieved of their educational charge by the pupil's arriving at years of discretion, the church still continues, by means of her worship and her cure of souls, to educate, to exhort, to direct, to encourage, to strengthen. To family life, too; religion gives the most ideal consecration by representing the marriage-bond, not as a mere legal contract, though it no doubt is this in the first instance in civil society, but as a community of hearts knit in God, which conscience is charged to keep sacred and inviolate. Then in civil life, where the harsh rights of man look to nothing but the letter of the law, which so frequently involves cruel injustice to those

more slenderly equipped for the struggle for existence, there the religious and moral community steps in, whether directly as the church, or indirectly in the associations and institutions it has called into existence by appeals to the sentiments of compassion and charity ; the religious community redresses the inequality, supports those who are sinking, and represents those eternal unwritten laws of humanity which are not codified in the laws of any state. And finally, where the law can no longer put forward any claim, where all knowledge and all power are at an end, and only the voice of sorrowing and yearning love is heard ; at the border of the grave it sets up a standard of hope.

It is this indissolubly close connection between the institution of religious worship and the institution of the moral education of the people that constitutes the distinctive characteristic of the Christian church as compared with other religious communities. The popular religions of antiquity never produced a "church" in the proper sense of the word, and that because the civil and the religious community were still one, worship was a matter pertaining to the state, and those who officiated at it were state officials, and formed no special union distinguished from the civil community. Worship had no doubt a very close relation to the objects of the state, and it would be wrong to deny that the popular religion had a great deal to do with the manners of the people generally ; yet scarcely anywhere in antiquity do we see such a thing as a regular moral education of the people by the representatives of worship. Some faint beginnings of such a thing may be seen here and there, as, for example, in the flourishing period of the Delphic worship of Apollo, the priesthood of which exercised a moral educative authority as promulgators of the Pythian oracles ; but this influence was limited to the occasional emergencies of public life, and never amounted to a moral leadership of all the classes of the people. The popular worship was in general far too external and ritualistic, and was based too much on naturalistic assumptions to allow it to exercise an ennobling and formative moral authority. Hence the sages of Greece, like the prophets of Israel, were generally in opposition to the priesthood, and expressed very depreciatory judgments on the value of the ritual of worship. In his

ideal state *Plato* did not intrust the education of the people to the priests, but to the statesmen and philosophers. In Israel it was not the priests but the *prophets* of the monarchy, and after the exile, the scribes and teachers of the synagogue who worked, quite apart from the priests, and often in opposition to the priestly ritualism (vol. iii. pp. 140, 144), at the moral and religious education of the people. The *synagogue*, with its spiritual worship, which was limited to the consideration of the scriptures and to prayer, was, it is true, the precursor of the church, and partook to some extent of the same character; but in the first place it was not the whole religion of Judaism, it stood outside the powerful organisation of the priesthood and its sensuous worship in the central sanctuary, and in the second place it was always tied to the Jewish law, which, by its national peculiarities and by its ritualistic elements, opposed an insuperable obstacle to any purely moral and widely human education on the part of the synagogue. The same is the case with *Islam*; though it has been much more fortunate than the synagogue in its propaganda, and deserves great credit for the way in which it has tamed and disciplined rude tribes, yet it is not suited for the moral education and spiritualisation of mankind, held back, as it must always be, by its legal positivism, originally devised for a single people only. The first religious community to overstep the barriers of race, and to become a world-religion, was, as is well known, the *Buddhist*; and this it was able to do by overlooking the Brahmanic ritualism and dogmatism, and addressing itself to men as such, meeting the desire of their hearts for peace and freedom by its helpful preaching of redemption. Nor can it be denied that in this idea of redemption, which forms the centre of the worship also of Buddhism, there lay a morally educative, purifying, and restraining power: history itself proves how admirably Buddhism was adapted to tame rude tribes of barbarians. Yet the Buddhist church too suffers from a tremendous one-sidedness: it cannot conceal its origin from a world-avoiding community of ascetics. Originally it was nothing but an order of monks, which was then joined by a great company of lay brothers and sisters, and the educative influence this community was able to

exercise on the people was always impaired by the limitations of monasticism ; its ideal was only the negative ascetic one of self- and world- renunciation, not the positive one of the sanctification of individual and social life ; hence its influence on the historical life of the people went less to enliven and to form, than to impede and to unnerve.

The *Christian Church*, on the contrary, possesses in a peculiar degree a positive power to educate and to make history. From the first she was conscious of her calling to be the "salt of the earth," the "light of the world," and she has always been guided by the consciousness of this, both in the attitude she has taken up towards secular life and in her inner organisation. Though at first holding zealously aloof from the "present world," and eagerly looking for the kingdom of Christ spoken of in the Apocalypse, which comes down from heaven, she was yet intent on conquering the world for this kingdom and on preparing the way for the future condition of the world by the conversion and sanctification of men. But what appeared at first more as a means for an end situated in the other world, became in the progress of time, as the hopes of the future paled and retreated to the background, an end in itself. Thus, out of the church of those contemners of the world who hoped for the second coming of Christ, there grew the world-governing church, which saw in the education of the nations her historical calling and her immediate task. However strongly the action of the Catholic world-church was marked at every period with human weakness and passion, we cannot fail to acknowledge that the leading motive of her politics, both external and internal, sprang from this well-grounded consciousness of her call to be the educator of mankind. To gain the world she accommodated herself to the world ; to lead the nations she not only tolerated in many respects, and on a large scale, their customs and ideas, but even adopted them in her own worship and belief. To educate the world of the heathen nations by degrees to Christian thinking and living she had need of those dogmas so wonderfully adorned with mythology and philosophy, she had need of the elaborate apparatus of worship which hovers between the darkness of

mysteries and the splendour of the world's pomp, and captivates the heart with the magic of fancy. She had need also of her clergy, organised as a unity, holding an independent position as regards the secular power, equipped with superior dignity and authority in the eyes of the people, the clergy which found so powerful an ally in the monastic orders. Both the inner struggles of the church against heretics and separatists, and her outward struggles against emperor, king, people, and city, admit of being regarded and understood as the natural consequences of the great idea of a universal institution for the education of the peoples, in which the mediæval church saw her mission, both her right and her duty, a mission which, to a certain degree, she actually fulfilled.

All this we Protestants need not scruple to admit, especially with regard to the earlier centuries of the Middle Ages ; yet, at the same time, we cannot help seeing the mischievous consequences which sprang out of the church's efforts to rule the world, and which, though at first outweighed by the benefits of her wholesome education, yet afterwards led to abuses which grew ever more intolerable and pernicious. It was, of course, very natural that amid the struggles of the early church with enemies without and within, the bishops should rise above the modest position they originally occupied of men freely chosen by the church on account of the confidence felt in them, and assume the dignity of dominating persons of authority, representatives of Christ and successors of the apostles ; so much we find even in the Pastoral Epistles, and still more in the so-called Ignatian Epistles, about the middle of the second century. It was equally natural that as Christ was removed to the mysterious darkness of the Trinity, and as the miraculous element in worship increased, a reflection of the supernatural should fall on the office of the bishop as the representative of Christ and the performer in worship, so that he should appear as the specific vessel of the Holy Ghost, as the sole depository of infallible truth and of saving grace, as the keeper of the keys of heaven and the mediator between God and the church. But it is not less clear that when this took place Christianity had fallen from the moral and religious elevation it possessed at first, to a lower

position. In place of the universal priesthood of the immediate intercourse with God of all believers, there was now separation of the church from God ; it was bound to the mediatorship of the priest. Instead of the pious heart's immediate certainty of saving truth, the conscience was now dependent on human authorities and external means of grace. A new state of servitude had been brought in, destructive in point of religion of the satisfying confidence felt by the child of God in divine grace, and in point of morals of the satisfying freedom and dignity accompanying the personal self-determination of the Christian man.

When the *Reformation* rediscovered in faith, in the immediate surrender of the heart to God, the sole source of salvation, then the freedom of the Christian man from priestly mediation and ecclesiastical tyranny, the immediate access of every individual to divine grace, the individual conviction of each man concerning divine truth, or, in a word, the universal priesthood of Protestant Christianity was won back, as primitive Christendom had possessed it in the Apostolic age. This, of course, made the relation of the clergy to the congregation an entirely new one. Far from having become superfluous, from the universal priesthood of the community (as some fanatics supposed), the clerical office now came to its true place, the place demanded for it by the spiritual and moral nature of Christianity ; no longer in an unnatural position of superiority to the church, it was now fitted into the body of the community as its natural organ. The Protestant minister is no longer the priest with supernatural official character and power to rule over the faith and life of the church ; he is the "minister of the word," or of the Christian spirit by means of the word which, as speaker in public worship and in the cure of souls, he declares and applies "in the name and by the authority" of all—for the word belongs to the whole church. He is distinguished from the other members of the congregation by his social calling as the organ of the moral and religious community, precisely as the civil magistrate is distinguished from the ordinary citizen. The difference is one of social calling merely ; it involves no religious superiority, no specific relation to God different from the

universal priesthood of the faithful, no specific worldly authority as distinguished from the royal freedom of all the children of God : in fact, no mysterious sacramental or hierarchical official character. Hence, too, in his relations to civil order and to the magistrate as representing it, he claims no exceptional position, no exemption from those obligations of the subject which are incumbent on all ; he does not claim that his order is on a level with the civil magistrate, or even superior to him ; he does not seek to encroach upon the magistrate in the civil government, to prescribe or to forbid laws, or to subject state policy to the church's ends. He does not seek to found a state within a state or above the state. All claims of a worldly church policy, such as characterise the Romish church are, according to the Protestant view, entirely foreign to the clerical office, because it does not seek to rule but to serve in the community.

Should this renunciation of worldly power and rule make the Protestant church less able to fulfil her task in the moral education of the people, than the Catholic church of the Middle Ages ? Or does the church no longer need to attend to that task, may she leave it to the state and restrict herself to her functions in worship only ? Neither of these opinions is true, or could ever be held except by one who drew no adequate distinction between moral and religious education and the compulsion of police and law. The fact is that the Reformation for the first time put the church in a position to fulfil its educative task in the moral and spiritual way in which alone justice can be done to it. The Reformation drew a clear distinction between the sphere in which the Gospel operates, or the sphere in which the moral and religious disposition rules ("the Kingdom of Christ" Luther called it), and the sphere of the world's law, or the sphere of civil right ; these two spheres the Reformation taught us to regard as two modes of the appearance of the kingdom of God, different from each other in quality and yet never to be abstractly divided and torn asunder. That distinction was demanded by the Protestant principle of freedom of belief and of conscience ; but on the other side the Reformers had so deep a conviction of the divine appointment of the civil magistrate, and of the moral import-

ance of the law and order in which the life of a people is framed, that they thought it necessary that the church should lean on the state and should form one of the civilly regulated institutions of the nation. It was this distinction of the church from the state, and, at the same time, this making the church a member of the civic order of the nation, that provided the proper sphere for the evangelical church; a sphere in which she can and will fulfil her call to the moral education of the people with far greater purity and with a richer blessing than ever could the Catholic world-theocracy.

The cry for the "separation of Church and State" is now heard in many quarters, but this may be very easily accounted for when we remember the endless controversies between church and state, which are generally equally embarrassing and injurious to both parties. But while it is natural and legitimate that disgust should be expressed at these controversies, it would be going far beyond what the case requires if such a radical cure were resorted to for such evils as the separation of church and state would undoubtedly be. Before we make up our minds to such a step, the consequences of which no one can calculate, and which must at least violently convulse the whole life of the people, we ought earnestly to consider the question whether such disagreeable conflicts are not rather temporary and fortuitous phenomena than symptoms of any permanent or essential hostility, and whether, by the exercise of a little prudence and moderation on both sides, they might not be avoided, or at least kept within bounds? And here it is very necessary to observe that the church should not be spoken of in the slump. The relations of the different churches to the state vary very much, and it would be a great injustice to the Protestant church to judge her in this respect as on the same line with the Church of Rome.

The Church of Rome, indeed, is prevented both by her theocratic principle and by a history of a thousand years, from entering into a genuinely peaceful relation with the autonomous state, which is the expression and the promoter of modern civilisation: she would have to renounce her claim to rule the world, *i.e.* she would have to renounce herself, before she could desist altogether from the attempt to

guide the external and internal policy of states, or to bring the order of society, marriage, the education of children, school and science into subjection to her maxims and interests, which are at least as much secular as spiritual in their nature. But the modern State can never yield to such an attempt without giving up her sovereign self-determination, *i.e.* herself; and so there can never be genuine peace between the modern state and the Romish church, but, at the best, merely a tolerable *modus vivendi*, in which both parties are incessantly on the alert, the one watching for an opportunity to invade the state's sphere of rule, the other concerned to maintain its household law and to keep back the church in her own limits. In the very interests of self-preservation, the state never can and never must maintain an attitude of indifference towards the Catholic church. To leave alone a church of such immense resources, of such indefatigable ambition, so unscrupulous, so unhesitating, and so wary in the choice of her means, as experience proves the Church of Rome to be, to pay such regard to abstract theories of freedom as to leave such a church alone, whatever she may do, would manifestly be a great folly, for which the state which committed it could not fail to suffer grievously. Once let the priestly church, protected by a regime of *laissez faire*, have the field prepared for aggression, and the state which has been thus deluded will soon find that freedom means nothing in the mouth of that Church but unlimited rule over every one and every thing. With respect to the Catholic church, therefore, the interest of the state in its own preservation forbids an abstract separation of church and state.

With respect to the evangelical church the case is somewhat different; it can scarcely happen that the state should feel its independence seriously threatened from this quarter. It may happen here from time to time that attempts are made on the part of ecclesiastical zealots to encroach on the sphere of the state, but even these are mere chance excesses of individuals: they have no foundation in the principles of the Protestant church; nay, these principles quite cut away the ground from them. For in principle the evangelical church makes no pretence to worldly rule;

in principle it recognises the divine right of the civil magistrate to regulate and direct civil life in all its parts, and the plain duty of all citizens to obey the magistrates in all things not contrary to conscience ; in principle it adapts its own church order to the existing circumstances of the country where it may happen to be, and as an institution willingly takes its fitting place in the organism of the life of the people. Nay, the Protestant church has always, from its birth, been so full of confidence towards the civil power, where that power was not directly hostile to her, that in many instances she has placed in the hands of the government of the state the drawing up of her own constitution and the direction of her corporate business. By a church which concedes to the state such extensive rights, the state can never have to fear that its interests will be endangered.

And this adds force to the consideration that the state has not only rights with regard to the church, but also duties, which it cannot refuse to discharge without inflicting serious injury on the commonwealth, not even if it does so on the specious pretext of the "freedom of the church," whether demanded by zealots for the purity of the church or by the doctrinaires of liberalism. The duties of the state towards the church are, like duties in all social relations, of a twofold nature, both negative and positive: the former demand a respectful consideration of all that belongs to the peculiar inner life of the church, of its faith and worship ; the latter requires the helpful furtherance of the church in all that belongs to her outward social station and activity, which we comprehend in the notion of the "institution for the moral education of the people." We can now see how important and how charged with practical consequences in the matter of the relation of the church to the state is the distinction drawn above between the two sides of the church as an institution for religious worship and an institution for moral education. The more the state respects the freedom of the church on the former side, and protects it from all attempted oppression whether from without or from within, the more the state takes the action of the church on the latter side under its own regulative, guiding and furthering charge, the more certainly will all conflicts

be avoided, and the more will the two institutions fill up each other's wants and promote each other's welfare.

The blessing will not be on one side only. A little consideration is enough to show that the state can no more do without the church than the church can do without the state. The power of the laws of the state goes no further than its power to enforce them, no further, that is, than the outward doing or leaving undone. But the dispositions of men, on which the permanence of all social order ultimately rests, are not to be commanded by laws or forced by police regulations. Nor must we forget that the idea of the state, which no doubt supplies of itself a lofty and elevating moral motive, lies as a fact quite out of the reach of the great majority of men. It is an abstraction to them which excites no emotion in their breast. Most people only come into close contact with the state through the taxgatherer, a contact not conducive to enthusiasm, as no one can fail to admit. Some point to the school as an omnipotent instrument in the hands of the state for the formation of well-disposed citizens. There is no doubt that the school is an admirable instrument of education; but in the first place its influence is much too brief in its duration to be sufficient by itself, and in the second place even while it lasts it depends much more than is generally supposed on the co-operation of the family and the church. Without this co-operation or in opposition to it, it may be doubted if the school could do much to form the moral disposition of its pupils. It certainly cannot do much in that direction at present when it is so much under the influence of the positivist and utilitarian spirit of the age, a spirit which attaches so much importance to cramming the memory with the greatest possible quantity of knowledge, as necessarily to neglect the harmonious formation of the whole man, which embraces other things besides knowledge, namely soundness of feeling, of fancy, and of the bodily frame. An improved technique in the method of teaching, the increasing demands of practical life, the many-sidedness of the cultivation of the present day, and other similar considerations, may be put forward to excuse the tendency complained of; but

none of them is able to remove the serious apprehension that as young heads are increasingly burdened with chaotic and ill-arranged rote-work put into them undigested by a mechanical system of cram, the result must be the opposite of nobility of disposition or of thorough formation of character; viz., that unblessed half cultivation, both *blasé* and lost in self-conceit, which knows a little of everything but nothing right, and hence has no heart left for anything, no respect or piety for anything, in its self-sufficient conceit of knowledge regards everything ideal as so much ancient rubbish, and in this sceptical, nihilistic mood becomes the prey of every charlatan and false guide!

If ever an age required an ideal counterpoise to the rude and coarsening supremacy of matter, of physical and intellectual materialism and positivism, it is certainly our own. And such a counterpoise is found first in the Christian moral education of the people, such as is afforded by an ecclesiastical cure of souls, in the widest sense of the word, and wisely conducted. This education has first of all the incomparable advantage that it does not build morality in the air, but on the foundation of a religious view of the world, which, founded in the education of the young, is ever anew confirmed in the church's regular acts of worship, in which, as we saw above in our discussion of worship, edification and the formation of the disposition depend less on definite dogmatic formulas than on a true and clear ideal of life. Then again the education of the cure of souls has the great advantage that it goes through the whole of life, and that it is connected with the important experiences of the life of each individual, with the seasons when his mind is moved by joy or sorrow and most receptive and open to the words of sympathising love, of comforting faith, of serious admonition. And as it represents amid the changes of time that truth which ever remains the same, it also dispenses the common word of truth with impartial equality to all. No castle is too grand for the minister of the word, no poor man's hut too mean for him to bring his spiritual gift there, and proclaim there too the sacred and sanctifying word of the Gospel. Where in this age of ours, which boasts so much of universal equality

and humanity, but in practice is making the gulf between the different classes wider than it ever was before,—where is there another institution that is in the noblest sense of the word so popular, which not only, like the state, demands the same from all, and promulgates the same criminal laws for all, but which brings to all alike the same sympathising love, treats the souls of all with the same care and tendance? And not only their souls; for the needs of the body too, for the care of the poor and of the sick the cure of souls as organised in the church is the most natural centre and point of departure. However useful the civil care of the poor may be, it is bound by its form as law, it is too awkward, too stiff, too slow, everywhere to bring the needed help at the right time. Much more readily will the distressed confide in the pastor, and the pastor's eye is much better able, with its practised insight into human circumstances, to understand the complicated situations in which sin and misfortune are often so inextricably linked together; and while he provides the means to relieve the immediate necessity, he adds to his outward gift the spiritual one of the word of comfort and encouragement or of exhortation and rebuke. The pastor who goes both to the rich and to the poor, softening the hearts of the former to mercy and beneficence, and filling the hearts of the latter with courage, confidence and contentment, is just in virtue of this work the most effective reconciler of social antitheses, and can exorcise the dangers of class hatred better than any civil power. Moreover, the educative influence of the minister is not confined to his directly official activity; his very existence in the parish is a constant reminder to the parishioners of the higher world of the kingdom of God, whose representative, advocate, witness and pattern they see in him. His peculiar position, between that of an official to be regarded with awe and that of a fatherly friend and confidant, adds a weight both to his person and to his counsel and opinion, which no one else enjoys in a similar degree. Especially in the simpler circumstances of rural parishes the respected minister is usually the incorporate conscience of his flock, the representative and the pillar of public morality and authority: to the common man the respect and piety

which is felt towards the personal worth and official dignity of the minister represents in a concentrated form all and every feeling of piety towards the authorities both of the visible and the invisible world. Thus it may be said that the evangelical minister too is a mediator of the higher world to his congregation, only not in the dogmatic and hierarchical sense in which the Catholic priest is so, but in the ethical sense of a witness and a teacher, a personal representative of the Christian ideal, who does not separate them from God by standing between God and them, but points them and leads them to God. The same difference in the notion of the mediator, which we noted in our chapter on that subject, meets us here too as the distinctive difference between the Catholic priesthood and the evangelical pastorate.

It appears very clearly from the above how valuable, indeed how indispensable, to the state is the moral education of the people by means of the pastorate of the church; and if this is so, it follows that the state should do all it can to aid the church in this work. It must recognise the clergy as one of the regular institutions of the organised life of the people, must extend to it legal protection, assure its permanence, sanction its public authority, arrange its functions outside of worship, and regulate its relations with the other organs of social life. Further, it must see to it that the minister is freed from worldly cares, and placed in a position of dignity by the receipt of an adequate stipend, without which his moral authority can scarcely be maintained, since penury entails dependence on all hands, and makes a man less regarded of his neighbours. Then again, it cannot possibly be a matter of indifference to the state whether the servants of the church, who are not merely the organs of her worship, but as educators of the people are the state's own organs and servants, are properly equipped or not for this high function by means of proper training. A minister who is quite apart from, quite closed to, the cultivation of his age and of his people, may be ever so respectable in point of personal character; but his influence as a pastor will necessarily be both limited in its range—for he must be a stranger to the circles of cultivated society

—and one-sided in its nature ; for he cannot understand many of the interests and questions by which the thoughts and feelings of his contemporaries are agitated. Hence the state justly demands from all the servants of the religious communities which it recognises such a measure of general cultivation as the university affords. Nor is there anything excessive in the demand that the university studies of those future servants of the church and of the state—for pastors are both of these at once—should not consist of an exclusively professional course of theology, but should embrace a wider field, and deal with the history of man's whole mental life. This demand is far from being met by a small appendix of two or three extra-theological courses of lectures being tacked on to a theological course, which is conducted mainly from the points of view of the church. It might be the simplest way to solve this difficulty as well as others connected with it, if the university course for the service of the church and that for the higher part of the scholastic profession were brought into close connection with each other, as was formerly everywhere the case ; if both proceeded together for a considerable distance, so that it should be easy to pass from the one to the other. It would certainly be a good thing for both parties, for the church and for the school, if the training of the servants of both were thus combined ; it might help to cure the one-sidedness both of philological formalism and of theological dogmatism. Could this be brought about, the evil rivalry which now subsists between church and school would at once be removed, and instead of it we should see an ultimate co-operation of the two throughout all the stages of school education. The valuable capital of higher cultivation possessed by the minister, which at present often lies quite unproductive, especially in simple country parishes, would then be utilised, as even now it ought to be, in co-operation in the work of the school, and would become fruitful of a sound Christian and human education of the people.

At present the tendency of the age seems to be in the contrary direction, not towards a more intimate union, but towards a sharper separation between the church on the one side, and the school and

society on the other ; on the side of the world the church is represented as an antiquated institution which is hindbersome to progress, and is jealously repelled from all participation in public life ; while on the side of the church there prevails partly a forced self-repression and partly an attitude of sulking. This is an unhealthy state of matters, and extremely prejudicial to the common weal, and as there are faults on both sides, a sensible understanding is not perhaps to be despaired of. Society should see that it simply cannot dispense with the education of the people by the church, and that nothing whatever can take the place of that. And the church on the other hand should see that the educative work she has to do for society, and which is so necessary for society, is not bound up with definite dogmas, however valuable these may be for worship, for the simple reasons that, if that were so, the different confessions could not all be carrying on that work, as we yet see that they do. So long as the church insists on accompanying the blessings of her moral education with fixed dogmatic convictions and formulated confessions as her *conditio sine qua non*, she will not cease to encounter a growing resistance, and she will be placing her light under a bushel, to the world's loss. If, according to the word of her founder, she seeks to become the light of the world and the salt of the earth, she must learn to distinguish between the Christian ideal, a universal thing which as teacher of the people she must bring home to the people and impress on the heart of the people by means of the current language of the day ; and those ecclesiastical dogmas and usages, which, framed by the fathers for the purpose of worship, have their legitimate place, their only legitimate place, in worship, which cannot well do without some degree of stability in its forms. Even here, indeed, these dogmas and usages are not an end in themselves ; they are only the means, the point of departure, which it must be left to the tact of the preacher to interpret and to deal with as he finds it advisable.

The *constitution* of the church, finally, cannot be a matter of indifference to the state, simply because the manner in which the various organs of the church discharge their office depends on it.

As regards the Catholic church, the state can exercise no influence on her constitution, as it rests on the historical tradition of a thousand years, which the church herself—by an immense historical fiction—traces back to Christ's own institution. But the more is the state entitled to reserve for itself a voice in the filling up of the higher ecclesiastical dignities, such as bishoprics and archbishoprics, within its own territory, and to claim the right to object to persons whose influence it has reason to expect will be prejudicial to the peace and order of the commonwealth, and ultimately to interdict them from the further exercise of their office. This right, which the Catholic state has always claimed and exercised, the Protestant state ought also to assert, as an indispensable means of self-defence with a view to its own self-preservation.

It belongs to the principles of Protestantism that it regards questions as to the constitution of the church from quite a different point of view from that of Catholicism. To the latter the church is an organised society in the form of a state, a hierarchical power or theocracy, and as such an absolute end in itself, to which end all the functions of worship are only the means. To Protestantism, on the contrary, the church service of the congregation or the "ministry of the word" in worship and in the cure of souls is the highest end of the church, and all the arrangements of church government are merely the means in order to the regulation of that function in the most suitable manner possible. Here, accordingly, the form of church government or the constitution of the church is not a question of religious importance, and can never become an article of faith, as the authority of the Pope is to Catholics. It is a question of utility merely, and may admit of different answers in different places and times. Hence, too, the Protestant churches of the Reformation assumed different forms of constitution.

The Reformed church built up its constitution on the basis of the congregation, in the elective and representative bodies of Presbyteries and provincial and national Synods. This form, it must be admitted, answers most closely to the Protestant notion of the universal priesthood of Christians, and wherever it was introduced

originally in favourable conditions, it has shown a great facility of self-preservation and self-extension, and great efficiency of church organisation. Without this democratic constitution, which brings the whole church to take part in church government, the tough endurance of the Calvinistic churches in bearing persecutions would not have been possible; they could not have shown so keen a spirit of enterprise, such power to found or to revolutionise states, so strict a discipline; they could not have attained such an eminent position in the world's history. The Lutheran churches, on the contrary, which are governed by provincial consistories composed of theologians and lawyers, have been from the first rather theologians' than people's churches. This is not the same thing as the Catholic hierarchy, but somewhat nearer it; what we have here is not a priesthood equipped with supernatural powers of salvation, and with the jurisdiction of the father confessor; but a class of theologians, with privileged knowledge of scripture and authority to expound it, stands above the laity of the congregation, which is thus once more depressed to a certain position of minority and made the object of spiritual pedagogy. There was a time, no doubt, when this pedagogy was legitimate and useful, even within Protestantism; it is an incontestable historical fact that during and after the Thirty Years' War it was principally the Lutheran clergy who preserved for the down-trodden German people its religion and morals, and thereby its power of self-preservation. But the other side of this bureaucratic, police-like church government did not fail to appear. As the state is the business of the magistrate, so the church appeared to be the business of theologians, not a concern of the laity; and the less the congregations took part in it, the slighter became the influence of the church on the religious and moral life of the people. To pietism belongs the merit of having made the gulf between the clergy and the congregation somewhat less wide, of having made the church more popular, the people more ecclesiastical. Rationalism, too, had a good influence in this direction; with its straightforward *bon sens* it drew the clergy away from dogma to ethics, and from the study to the practical life of the congregation. The anti-rationalist reaction

of the present century was no doubt justified in many ways, but in this it was not happy, that in recalling the clergy to a strict orthodoxy, formed on the standards of the church, it also awakened in them the consciousness of their official and class position, and so widened the gulf between the clerical profession and the people in a way which both sides have reason to deplore.

It was natural that an attempt should be made to remedy this evil state of things by bringing the laity to take part in the government of the church. Thus, during the last few decennia, synods have made their appearance in nearly all the state churches of Germany, bodies which share the government of the church with the consistories, which still continue to exist—a union of the Lutheran and the Reformed system of Church government. The result of this innovation, it must be confessed, has only very partially answered to the high hopes amid which it was made. The fear which those not directly implicated in the matter felt, that a time like the present, in which men's minds are moved with such force and in such opposite directions in matters of religion, might not be happily chosen for the introduction of a democratic church constitution, appears so far to be justified by experience. The first result of the synods was, that antithetical tendencies in religion and theology which formerly were rather latent and undefined, took shape in definite parties in church politics, so that all the evils of party in parliamentary life were imported into the sphere of the church. Violent party spirit, and in consequence disregard of the common cause; the domination of party leaders, men distinguished only by their familiarity with the forms of business and by unscrupulous determination, the darkening of calm judgment of the matter in hand by the introduction of the most heterogeneous motives and party interests both of church and of general politics, the oppression of minorities, and inroads upon the rights of the civil government—these are the shadows which have thrust themselves into notice even more quickly and more fatally in the parliamentarism of the church than in its political prototype.

It will not be possible to get rid of the synods, however, any

more than of the parliaments. But there will be the greater need, on account of these abuses, to hold fast the supremacy of the state over the church, and rather to strengthen than relax its guiding hand. The state is everywhere the representative of the whole as against the centrifugal motion of its parts, it represents steady development as against violent leaps, quiet reason and justice as against the changing parties and opinions of the day. It is the high office of the state in unquiet times of church party struggles to keep its hand on the rudder of the church, and with wise foresight to prevent her from running upon rocks or sandbanks. Not that the state should take a side in questions within the church, respecting worship and dogma; that would be entirely to forget both the office of the state and the peculiar nature of the worshipping people whose belief and union with each other must be free. But the state must act as an impartial umpire, as in social, economical, and other similar provinces of life, so also in the province of the church, and see to it that all get fair play, that no party be allowed anywhere to suppress its antagonists, that minorities too be protected in the enjoyment of their fundamental Protestant right to freedom of conscience and of belief. The state is the guardian of equal rights for all, and as it keeps the peace among the different confessions, it is also intrusted with the noble task of setting to the conflicts of church parties a measure and a limit, and of reminding ever and anon those who are at variance with each other, that they are citizens of one Fatherland and of one Kingdom of God.

CHAPTER II.

RELIGION AND MORALITY.

IT is an incontestable fact that in the higher states of civilisation religion and morality act and re-act very intimately on each other; and it is natural to suppose that this was the case from the beginnings of human life on the globe. It may indeed be unhesitatingly asserted that it was so, if only we do not forget two things: first, that a relation of action and re-action is not identity, and then that neither the religion nor the morality of primitive times corresponds exactly to what we now understand by these terms. Both of these points have been very much overlooked; some students have maintained that a pure morality, being an element of a pure religion, sprang from the primitive revelation; others on the contrary have held that religion arose out of a highly-developed moral consciousness, out of the recognition of our duties as divine commands, or the need of the conscience for divine support of our moral strength, or something else of the kind. It was a natural and justifiable reaction from such aberrations when the new and more exact study of religion pointed with emphasis to the wide interval which exists between the views and usages of primitive religions and our moral ideals. When we see that in rude states of civilisation petty usages devoid of any rational meaning are invested with the greatest religious importance and sanctity, while moral vices and abominable acts are practised not only without scruple on the part of religion, but in many cases even in her name, the assertion may appear to be justified "that the relation of morality to religion is one that belongs only in its rudi-

ments, or not at all, to rudimentary civilisation," and that it is only during the course of history that the two spheres, originally independent of each other, have been joined in one.¹

This assertion, however, is one which we are compelled to characterise as a precipitate conclusion from an inadequate apprehension of the phenomena in question. If religion and morality alike spring from that same reasonable nature of man which on the practical side manifests itself in his earliest impulses and feelings, then if we believe the human being to be an organic unity, we must expect to find that the two are from the first in a close relation to each other. And such a relation may in fact be shown in various ways to have existed. The beginnings of all morality lie in social *custom* which arises in that fundamental form of human society, the family. In the natural sympathy felt by the members of the family for each other, and in the feeling of "piety," the sentiment of mingled awe, respect, and confidence to the head of the family, lie the roots of the moral consciousness, of social obligation and duty. This is early reinforced by the sense of order, or the need of doing regularly recurring acts in a form that is fixed for all alike (and this is dictated partly by reasons of utility, and partly by the unconscious symbolism of the ideas accompanying the acts); and finally there is the retributive impulse, which forms the foundation of the claims and rules of primitive law. From these feelings and impulses, innate in human nature, in which man's reasonable disposition manifests itself from the very first in a perfectly spontaneous and instinctive way, arise the elements of social customs, which the individual finds there as given limits and norms of what he has to do or to refrain from doing, and from which the moral idea of the subjection of action to rules of universal validity, of obligation by the binding relations of super- and subordination, in fact what we call "conscience" arises by means of the abstracting and generalising work of reflection. To regard conscience as an inborn codex of moral laws was, and in fact is still, the error of unpractised psychological thought, which carries

¹ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, ii. 360. To the same effect Waitz, Lubbock, Hellwald, Lippert, and others. But compare Roskoff: *das Religionswesen der rohesten Völkerstämme*, pp. 155, *sqq.*

back to the very beginning the results which have been arrived at in many different ways by a developed civilisation. Nothing in fact that is present in our consciousness as its content is innate in us ; but only the disposition and the faculty of producing such a content for ourselves under the stimulation of the external world. It is through the social dwelling together of families, tribes, and peoples that the social feelings and impulses of our nature are brought to development, *i.e.* are incited to seek manifestation and satisfaction in definite forms, rules, orders, and customs, all produced at first instinctively ; and it is from these concrete arrangements, which like language are the product of reason which has not yet given an account to itself of its own doings, that there arises the abstract idea of the rule, of duty generally. As social relations grow wider and more delicate, and this idea is applied in an ever-increasing variety of ways, the moral consciousness results, with definite contents developed on many sides, which again, of course, is susceptible of infinite degrees both in the width of its sphere of action and in point of inner cultivation and purity ; which latter accounts for the great manifoldness of moral views in different peoples and ages. It was the great error of the supernaturalist explanation of morality which formerly prevailed, that it overlooked this development, and the natural conditions under which it took place. Modern positivism, on the contrary, falls into the still more fatal error of fixing its attention so exclusively on the natural conditions of the development as to fail to see that the impulse of reason which occasions the whole process is not limited to these conditions. Thus morality is lowered to mere empirical utility, which in no way excels the attainments of the society in which it operates either in the form in which it shows itself or even in its essence, having for its root nothing but the collective egoism of that same society. Positivism moreover, traces religion to the unreason of animistic superstition and egoistic magic, and thus religion and morality would seem to have nothing in common but what is negative, namely, the want of any foundation in reason ; and as they arise from totally different springs, the matter for wonder is, not that they diverged at the outset, but

that they should ever have come together at a later time and acted on each other in a reasonable manner.

To us the subject presents itself in a very different light, since we conceive both religion and morality, whatever the natural conditions under which they must be allowed to have developed, to be founded in principle in the nature of man as a reasonable being. By the impressions made on him by nature, his reason was incited, we conceive, towards religion,—by social life towards morality; and however different the forms it assumed, it yet betrays its essential unity in the active connection which subsists between these two sides. In spite, therefore, of all the talk we hear to the effect that selfishness is the spring and the essence of primitive religion, we shall continue to maintain that religion arises from the rationality of man, from that in him which is akin to God, not from his animal irrationality and badness. From the very first it was *the same reasonable sentiments of piety and sympathetic obligation* which as a social bond were the spring of manners and morality, and as a link with the world-governing power or the deity were the foundation of religion and worship. In both respects these sentiments were the original *means of saving and educating man, so that he should overcome the selfish inclinations of his heart*, not the means by which he ministered to that selfishness. Where they became the latter, we are no longer in contact with the pure original state, but with a degeneration of religion; we have before us not naïve faith (glaube) but false faith, superstition (aberglaube), the distinctive mark of which it is that instead of letting the idea of the divine lift him up above selfishness, he drags it down into his own service and employs it as a means of that selfish rule of the world he aims at establishing for himself. Superstition does not by any means consist in the representation of the divine in unsuitable forms, in the image of the nature-phenomenon—that may be the imperfection of a childlike form of belief; but the imperfection of the child is something quite different from abnormality, or perversion, or sickness, in which the process of life has fallen into disharmony and decay. This is the case in superstition; it is not the imperfection merely, it is the

disease of faith, the ruin of its normal life-process, the perversion of the ordained relation between man and God, man setting himself in the first place, and making his natural tendency to self-assertion his absolute end and God the means and minister of his own selfish purpose. This is taking for granted that man has the idea of a higher divine power, and also of the possibility of entering into a relation with that power which will be for his advantage, and finally the idea of certain actions and words (ceremonies and formulæ) which are fitted to bring about such a relation. All these ideas, however, are elements of faith and of its manifestation in worship, which therefore must be assumed to exist before the superstitious abuse of magic can make its appearance, just as there must be life before there can be disease. All the means the magician uses for his superstitious purposes are nothing but the stale and withered forms of an earlier *cultus*; forms in which now, indeed, no rational meaning can be found, because the life which originally produced them has departed out of them, but in which there must certainly have been a religious meaning originally, since it would be impossible to explain the fact of their existence except from the requirements of primitive worship. Those stiff and unmeaning magic usages therefore were preceded by rites of worship which were full of meaning; selfish and unreligious superstition was preceded by a pious faith which was childlike and naïve. The contention of Positivism is entirely erroneous when it draws the inference from the fetichistic religions that religion and morality had originally nothing to do with each other, that the action of the one had no reference to that of the other. I am prepared to defend the opposite thesis, that the underlying feeling in both was always essentially the same, and that therefore the manifestation and development of both, in the customs of worship and of society, was for a long way inseparably connected and interwoven.

If we designate the fundamental sentiment of religion as that of "*piety*," we mean just that mixture of fear, reverence, confidence, and sympathy which is exemplified in the fundamental social relation, that of the family. The foundation of piety consists, it is true, in that shrinking fear which is everywhere connected with the sense

of entire dependence on a superior, an irresistible power. This is by no means denied ; on the contrary, there is more need than ever at present to insist on the fundamental importance of this point. For it remains true that "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom !" All education to reasonableness in the life of mankind as well as that of the individual, begins with this, that a firm barrier is set up against the unreason of self-will against the natural impulses of individuals, by their becoming aware of their dependence on a superior power, which being irremovably founded in itself cannot be bent nor broken, which exists and works by no means for our sake merely, with which it is impossible to take any liberties, which cannot be used as a means, but energetically asserts and causes to be felt its independence of us and lordship over us, whose procedure follows its own purpose, its own firmly established rule, and to which therefore impotent man must first of all bend and submit himself. Only when the arrogance of human selfishness has received its death-blow from this salutary fear of the divine power, is the field opened for the development of rational feelings of a positive nature. With the fear of the superior power there is then combined the feeling of consideration, of respect, produced even in primitive man not by the greatness of the divine power merely, but also by the perception of its ordered regularity, and of the many useful results which flow from the exercise of it for the maintenance of the life of the world and of man. Man's fear of the deity is thus turned into reverence, which is combined with confidence : he sees in the ruling powers of the world beings related to himself, which maintain the world of life and light for his benefit, and protect him from the powers of death and of darkness. Thus he feels a sentiment of solidarity and sympathy with the ruling powers, he seeks their intercourse, their alliance, their patronage ; he manifests the interest he takes in their life by imitating it in his worship, and in return he seeks to assure himself, and in his social customs bears witness to his conviction, that the gods take an interest in his social life and aims, especially at the regularly-occurring and important events and turning-points of it, on the occurrence of birth and death,

at puberty and marriage, war and peace, seed-time and harvest. In the usages which men have been accustomed from the earliest times to observe on such occasions lie the beginnings of all social customs, and therefore of all morality. It is, however, an incontestable fact, and one established by a growing body of evidence in recent investigations,¹ that all those usages were originally of a religious character, and were nothing more nor less than primitive acts of worship, in which man sought to bring his own weak life and the lives of those belonging to him into connection with the powerful life of the deity, to celebrate his living intercourse with the power which governs the world. If we add that the elements of law and security as they appear from the most venerable antiquity in the form of oath and ordeal rest on a basis of religion, that the beginnings of all civil government, of the foundation of all towns and states, of all ruling families, are traced to the same origin, and finally, that civil duties generally, no less than the duties of worship, were placed under the sanction and protection of the deity; in the face of all these facts, recurring as they do with perfect regularity in all instances, it cannot well be denied that *the historical beginning of all morality is to be found in religion.*

There was always, however, a reaction of morality on religion too. The sentiments being similar in the religious and in the social relations of piety, it naturally happened that the divine beings were more and more represented after the analogy of social lordships, which led to their being detached from the natural phenomenon and made independent rulers of nature and disposers of human fortunes after the likeness of men. This anthropomorphising of the nature-powers led, as we saw, to two results: on the one hand, the gods made men were brought into close relation to the general interests of society, and acquired more of a moral character; they became human ideals, and representatives of the true ethical ends of society. On the other side, however, they were lowered to the weakness and

¹ Of marriage and burial customs this has long been well known: with respect to the tattooing connected with the entrance on puberty, and with respect to festival dances it has lately been clearly demonstrated by several writers, *e.g.* by Reville in his work on the religion of savages.

moral impurity of human nature, as if they had been individual men; human passions and vices were attributed to them, and their wishes and claims on men were conceived after the analogy of capricious and greedy lords, not inaccessible to flattery and bribes. A discord thus found its way into the idea of the deity, such as the primitive myth had not known, and not into the idea of the deity only but also into worship. If worship had formerly consisted of those simple usages sprung as it were out of the soil, in which the earliest men celebrated their patriarchal community with each other, and at the same time with the nature-deity which ruled the world, there were now added to these observances, which were of a social nature, special duties towards the gods, who now demanded their sacrifices, feasts, temples, priesthood, and so on. To act in conformity with custom had formerly been both religious and moral, but a distinction now appeared between social and religious duties, the latter now forming a class by themselves, and claiming to be of higher importance than the former. The religious and the moral being thus separated it became possible that the two might be in conflict with each other, and it further became possible that one or the other might be developed abnormally. We also saw above that this abnormality actually took place, and could not fail to take place in the highest degree where the state of nature was left behind without passing into the state of civilisation, where families and tribes failed to be regularly and legally organised in a civilised nation and state, the civilisation of which might have presented common interests of high value such as might form the ideal subject-matter of religious ideas and usages. Where this did not take place, where the multitude, instead of gathering itself together in civic discipline, and in the work of civilisation, followed instead the centrifugal impulse of separate selfish wills, there social disorganisation tended to disorganise and ruin religion too: the high gods of the powers of nature retreated before the swarm of lower spirits, in which there was nothing of the divine but the power to benefit or injure. These gods being no longer bound to any visible phenomenon of the course of nature, and having equally little any constant reference to a social

order, their action was subject to no rule, and sank to the level of pure caprice of the most meaningless and useless kind; they were the true reflection and instrument of the selfish caprice of degenerate "savages." The corruption of the primitive religion in animistic superstition and magical worship was therefore the consequence of the disintegration and dissolution of primitive society; and it was natural that the religion which had thus been ruined should react in a still greater degree in the direction of ruining social conditions and moral ideas; and thus there sprang from this mutual corrupting influence all the abominations of the magical religion of savages, which have led modern positivism to the precipitate conclusion that from the first religion has had no relation to morality, or only a negative hostile relation to it.

Of the process of corruption in religion and morals we can have no history, but the ultimate result of it appears in a fixed form in the religions of savages, *e.g.* of the negro tribes of Africa. An extremely instructive contrast to it is to be found in the *Egyptian* religion, the oldest religion of a civilised people of which we have immediate information. In the Egyptian view of God the nature-character of God is combined with a striking tendency in the direction of the unity of the divine being, and in this, as well as in its interest in departed souls and its fetichistic animal worship, this religion distinctly betrays a near affinity to the nature-religion of the African tribes. The more striking is its difference from the latter by the way in which the moral bearings of mythological ideas are made to apply to social life. Two points are characteristic in this respect; the idea of the orderly and lawful character of the divine government both in nature and in the moral life of society, and the idea of retribution in the other world. The Egyptian word "*Maat*" denotes law, not in the legal sense of an ordinance which proceeds either from a human governing power, or from the divine legislator, but in the sense of "that unfailing order which rules the universe whether we regard it from the physical or from the moral point of view;" and this thought, "a great and noble idea" Le Page Renouf justly calls it,¹

¹ *Lectures on the Religion of Ancient Egypt*, Hibbert Lectures, 1879, p. 119-22.

plays so important a part in the Egyptian religion, that Maat is hypostatized to a divine person, and called Lady of Heaven, Regent of the World, and President of the world below. She knows, strictly speaking, no lord and governor, and yet again she is connected with all the great gods, especially with the sun-god Ra, and with the god of measure and mediator of revelation Thoth, as Erinnys and Dike are with Zeus. Now the Egyptian king is counted the son of the heaven-king Ra, whose daughter is the regulating law or Maat, and thus the profound view is evidently shown to have been held by the Egyptian that the civil order of his land was an outcome of the same divine procedure which is to be observed in the regularity of the phenomena of heaven as well as of earth (the Nile). As guardians of civil order, however, the gods are also the retributive judges of human conduct. According to the "Book of the Dead" the departed soul stands in the other world before the judgment-seat of Osiris and the forty-two gods, each of whom is the guardian of a separate law, and judges the soul's conduct with reference to it. Most significant is the picture in which the "Book of the Dead" describes the scene of the judgment. The soul of the departed stands before the goddess Maat, who, in one hand holds the sceptre, and in the other the symbol of life. The heart, the symbol of his moral personality, is weighed before Osiris, who sits upon the throne as judge of the dead; in the one scale lies the heart, and in the other the image of Maat; Horus observes the tongue of the balance, and Tehuti, the god of writing, notes the result. The sins of which account is taken in the examination, are those of a moral and legal nature, and those connected with worship, but are not specified in any definite order: the gravest appear to be violations of piety towards the gods, parents, and the magistrates, and of justice towards fellow-citizens. "He who blasphemes the king, his father, or his god, he who lends his ear to evil and remains deaf to the words of truth and righteousness, he who hurts his neighbour or despises the gods in his heart, he cannot enter into the dwellings of the blessed dead." It at once appears what a penetrating influence these ideas of the judgment of the dead, and the insistence on the moral law connected with it in "The Book

of the Dead," the oldest law-book of which tradition tells us, must have had on the formation of the morals of the people of early Egypt. To such fruitful moral motives could the elementary ideas and sentiments of primitive religion give rise on the soil of a favouring civilisation.

The notion of a "divine world-order," which was personified in Egypt in the goddess Maat, was not unknown, even from the earliest times, to Indo-Germanic thought. In his *Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion* Max Müller shows (pp. 245, *sqq.*) that the Vedic word *Rita* was originally the settled movement of the world, the sun, and the times of day; then that it meant the right path which men should follow, whether in regard to worship, or in their general moral conduct. The corresponding word in Zend is *Asha*, which also denotes both the ruling law of the world, the order of nature, and the correct walk and conversation of men. On this M. Müller makes the noteworthy remark: "This will suffice to show that a belief in a cosmic order existed before the Indians and the Iranians separated, that it formed part of their ancient, common religion, and was older therefore than the oldest Gâtha of the Avesta and the oldest hymn of the Veda. It was not the result of later speculation, it did not come in only after the belief in the different gods and their more or less despotic government of the world had been used up. No, it was an intuition which underlay and pervaded the most ancient religion of the Southern Aryans, and for a true appreciation of their religion it is far more important than all the stories of the dawn, of Agni, Indra, and Rudra." . . . "It was all the difference between a chaos and a kosmos, between the blind play of chance and an intelligible and therefore intelligent providence" (pp. 257, *sq.*). Thus we see that this idea of the regular world-order was of primitive date with the Indians and Iranians, as well as the Egyptians, and that it was derived from the simplest daily observations of the senses, particularly from the regular movement of the sun, and of the periods of the day and of the year; and this gives us an incontestable right to regard this idea as one of the oldest elements of the religious consciousness, and one of the main sources

of the moral ideas of social order, and of right and law. That this idea, moreover, of the divine world-order was by no means an empty theory, but operated from the beginning as a powerful motive in dealing with deep moral stirrings of conscience, we see distinctly from the well-known penitential hymn of the Vedic singer, in which he supplicates Varuna for the forgiveness of his fault, and seeks to move the god to pity by reminding him of the weakness of human nature (as the poet of *Psa. ciii.* comforts himself with thinking that God knows our frame, and remembers that we are dust). When we consider how naïve, how thoroughly of the soil this old Vedic hymn and others like it are, and when we compare them with the immense ritualism of Brahman theology, we are led, in direct contradiction to the positivist axiom, to the conviction that these ritualistic practices in which there is so little that is moral, are not the beginning, but the late product of such a legal formalism as has everywhere been developed from the traditions and the pedantic reflections of a professional priesthood and guild of scribes.

The ideal of life of the Brahmanic legal religion is found expressed in the law of Manu ; and this law contains precepts for the ritual, legal and moral life of the higher castes in India, in such detail as to place the whole of life from birth to death under the discipline of fixed rules. This law does not, it is true, present us with a picture of sombre asceticism, but with one of sober and solid practical morality ; it attaches the greatest weight to the foundation of a household, and to the performance of the duties of the father of a household. But it labours under two great mistakes. One it has in common with all religions of law : by the minute formalism it sets up for the ceremonial of worship and of society it crushes personal freedom, takes away motives for personal energy, obstructs all change in customs and in the order of society, and in all these ways renders all sound historical development impossible. The other error is specifically Indian. In addition to the exoteric ideal of life, which is valid for all, and which consists in the fulfilment of ritual and civic duties, it recognises another and a higher ideal, which it does not bind on any one as a duty, but recommends to all those who

are seeking for eternal blessedness as the true way of perfection : namely, withdrawal from the world and from domestic life to the quiet of a silvan solitude, there in contemplation without any works to find true insight and the freedom which makes blessed, from all the fetters of the world. Examples may be found elsewhere of a similar double morality ; what is peculiar to Brahmanism is that it does not leave every one free to choose between the practical and the ascetic ideal, but in the first place makes the former the duty of every one, and allows only then the man who has fulfilled this common duty to strive, and that only in later years, after the attainment of the esoteric ideal. By this provision the Brahmanic law seeks to do away in practice with the inner contradiction between the two forms of life : for the mass of men the exoteric law of works is to remain in inviolable force, but for those spirits which aim higher an escape is to be provided in mature years from legal unfreedom to personal freedom, the freedom at least of thought and of cessation from activity. In this we must certainly recognise a broad and tolerant trait such as is foreign to most positive religions ; but it cannot be denied that the bifurcation of morality into two opposite forms of life, one of them active and unfree, the other free and inactive, was bound to have consequences fatal to any sound and harmonious formation of the people. What profits it to know the worthlessness of outward works and services, if that knowledge is to be the privilege of weak old hermits merely, and the multitude are to go on just as before ? And what positive value is there in a world-avoiding sanctity which regards not only the fetters of external work-service but the moral duties of social life too, as a thing it has transcended and left behind, and on its cold and lonely height of sterile contemplation puts away all the bonds of the world, even those of love to wife and child, house and calling, as burdensome entanglements ? In this discord, which arose out of its peculiar religious development, between an abstract, morally unfruitful idealism, and an idea-less, morally unfree ritualism, the rich vigour of the Indian race was wasted away.

Buddhism is the logical result, the universalising of esoteric Brahmanism, the doctrine of redemption of which it made the

common property of the people, and at the same time the principle of a universalistic religious community. It has the advantage of Brahmanism, first of all in its compassionate love to the people, its unlimited missionary impulse, which is not obstructed by the barriers of race ; then in its freedom from the narrow bonds of Brahmanic ritualism and scholasticism, in the popular character of its preaching and the simplicity of its worship ; and finally in the edifying power of the personal type of its founder and its numerous saints, in whom the pious craving for reverence found a welcome object and a pattern of ideal morality. By making a principle of the religious nothingness of all worldly things, even of the limits of race and of the ordinary rules of society, by going back from everything outward to the inner disposition, and making the salvation of man depend entirely on the moral virtues of the heart, on self-conquest, patience, mildness, and good-will, Buddhism for the first time in history detached religion from its earlier entanglement in civic interests and in the sphere of civil law, and made it the personal affair of the individual heart, and of the voluntary union it established—a union of which the sole link was that of living moral fellowship. But great as the advance undoubtedly was, which was made in this universalist religion of redemption upon the national religion of law previously prevailing in India, Buddhism still laboured under the fundamental error of esoteric Brahmanism, its one-sided ascetic, world-avoiding, monastic tendency of life. Indeed it even surpassed Brahmanism in this ; for what Brahmanism had recommended only for the latter part of a life that had been actively engaged in the world before, Buddhism raised to an exclusive ideal which filled the whole of life, and provided it with rule and system ; it became the founder of monasticism and of the rule of the cloister. But in this way a double ideal of life was set up once more : the perfect life for the narrower monastic community, the imperfect for the wider community of the laity ; and thus religious perfection was once more made to depend on definite outward forms and customs. The spiritual and moral principle of inwardness and freedom, which had been asserted against traditional ritualism as a principle of reformation and progress, was

not after all consistently carried through, but had again to yield to the monastic and ritualistic formalism of the Buddhist church, which was not a whit more favourable to the purity and vigour of the moral life of the people than the formalism of Brahmanism. Buddhistic morality therefore everywhere operated only as a narcotic quietive to curb rude natural force, or to alleviate the natural griefs of individuals; it proved incapable of acting as a reforming power to renew society, of carrying on any persistent influence in the direction of moral enrichment, or guiding the spirit of the peoples into the path of humane development in history. The reason of this impotence is to be found in the want of any positive practical moral principle, and this again is the natural consequence of the want of any positive religious principle of the world.

In *Greece* too religion was at first in immediate unity with law and custom; then the two sides developed themselves for a time in a fruitful interaction on each other, while at last the moral unfolded itself independently in a world of beautiful humanity, which yet was not able to compensate for the decay of religion, nor to satisfy the craving of the peoples for a firm basis of life. The positivist view that at first religion and morality had nothing to do with each other finds as little confirmation in the earliest Greek testimonies as in the yet older ones of the Egyptians and the Indians. A look into the Homeric songs or into the "Works and Days" of Hesiod shows us at once that at a time when priestly ritual and the ideas of liturgical obligations and transgressions were but little formed, the whole life of the Greeks was yet governed by religious motives. Among the *Greeks* too¹ custom and morality rested from the first on the fixed belief in a strict righteousness which rules in the fortunes of men, which rewards goodness and punishes evil, in a *moral world-order*, which in part the gods and specially Zeus were supposed to uphold, but which, like the Egyptian Maat, was also personified as a special goddess, now called Dike and now Erinnys, and placed by the side of Zeus as the executive organ of his just government. And as in

¹ Cf. the very instructive work of Leop. Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, Berlin, 1882; specially vol. i. cap. 1 and 2; vol. ii. cap. 1.

Maat and Rita we saw the law of the natural and of the social or moral world-order combined in one single notion, so here too there is something of the same nature ; the Erinnys, generally the fulfiller of the divine punitive judgments, is at the same time the guardian of the order of nature. Thus, for example, in the *Iliad* she prevents the horse of Achilles from speaking with a human voice, and, according to an expression of Heraclitus, she would lead back the sun into his course if he should leave it. Thus it is a primitive Greek conviction, as well as an Indian, Iranian, and Egyptian one, that the moral is radically connected with the natural order, and that the basis of both is divine. In the post-Homeric age the belief in the ruling righteousness of providence (Opis) was worked out with growing definiteness. The good man is the beloved of the gods ; it goes well with him, and even though he has to endure many a calamity and humiliation, like Odysseus or Heracles, yet these work ultimately for good to him, for "Zeus makes mortals advance to wisdom, and has fixed it that in pain there is teaching," as Aeschylus makes the chorus say in the *Agamemnon* (176). The ungodly, on the contrary, the despiser of divine and human ordinances, punishment finds out surely, even though late, for,

"Though the mills of God grind slowly,
Yet they grind exceeding small,"

as a Greek proverb says. Where retribution does not come in view before death, it descends on children and grandchildren, and in them also on the soul of the guilty father which suffers trouble in Hades from the ill fortune of those belonging to him. As time went on the belief cherished by the mysteries in a direct retribution in the other world became more and more general, as many indications combine to show. Nor did the Eleusinian priests neglect to enforce the moral significance of this belief ; Plato bears them witness that they teach that the soul is immortal, and that it is necessary, on that account, "to make one's life as holy as possible."

What a profoundly pious and what a pure moral feeling this belief in a divine world-order awakened in the better minds among

the Greeks, the poems of a Pindar, Aeschylus, and Sophocles show in the clearest way. What a power of beauty is there in the chorus in Sophocles' "King Oedipus" (846 *sqq.*)—

"Oh, may I live
Sinless and pure in every word and deed,
Ordained by those firm laws that hold their realm on high !
Begotten of heaven, of brightest ether born,
Created not of man's ephemeral mould,
They ne'er shall sink to slumber in oblivion ;
A power of God is there, untouched by Time."

The "shame" or "reverence" (*Aidos*) which expresses the fundamental sentiment of the Greek towards the divine government, is exactly what I showed above to be the common source of religion and morality ; the feeling of piety, of reverence to what is venerable and challenges regard. An element of fear is not wanting in it, but *Aidos* is something more than mere fear ; in fact it is often expressly distinguished from fear and put side by side with the sentiment of humility and reverence, righteousness and insight, veneration and love. The objects of *Aidos* are the gods and magistrates, moral orders and duties, parents and old men, the unfortunate and those in need of help ; indeed, the young man when alone is to feel *Aidos* even for himself, and to represent to himself the image of *Aidos*, as is often required of him ;¹ in the last two cases *Aidos* is the moral feeling of respect for human dignity, the shrinking from injuring in any way the moral personality. But as reverence for superiors and respect to law and custom are based in pious awe at the holy rule of the deity, it involves not merely obligation, but also an element of liberation, a power of lifting up the personal conscience above the mere social statutes of human rulers to the eternal truth and goodness of the divine world-order, which, as it is not perfectly represented in any civil law, forms everywhere the court of higher appeal to which the oppressed can turn to seek justice. Sophocles describes a piety of exalted moral elevation and freedom, when he makes Antigone justify herself against the angry King (451 *seqq.*)—

¹ Schmidt, *op. cit.* i. 173.

“ I could not find such force in thy decree
As that a mortal should have power to outrun
The sure unwritten institutes of heaven.
Not of to-day or yesterday they live,
But everlastingly, and none can tell
The hour that saw them leap to light. I would not
Be so o’erwhelmèd by a man’s resolve,
To be arraigned before the Bar Supreme
Doing them violence.”

The moral and religious temper of the Greeks finds its most characteristic expression in the notion of *Aidos*; but it embraces, in addition to reverence, the other fundamental religious sentiment, the sympathetic desire after communion, after intimate intercourse, with the deity, out of which there naturally developed itself at a later time the moral desire to be made like to the divine ideal. The well-known word of the *Odyssey* (iii. 48), “All men need (long after) the Gods,” finds manifold echo in the whole course of Greek history, and indicates indeed the general mood on which the Greek view of worship was essentially based. Nowhere is worship a mere empty ceremonial or a slavish and selfish service for reward; it is the “intercourse of Gods and men with each other,” which affords to the human spirit its highest happiness. Plato speaks from the soul of his people when he calls it (*Laws*, iv. 716) “the noblest and truest of all sayings, that for the good man to offer sacrifice to the Gods, and hold converse with them by prayers, and offerings, and every kind of service, is the noblest and best of all things, and also the most conducive to a happy life, and very fit and meet.” And what he adds to this corresponds, if not to the consciousness of all his contemporaries, yet to that of the best men of his time, that the bad man is not profited by his worship, “for the bad man has an impious soul, and from one who is polluted neither a good man nor God is right in receiving gifts. And therefore the unholy waste their much service on the Gods.” That this conviction was not confined to the philosophers, but widespread, and held in priestly circles too, is proved by the inscription on the temple of *Epidauros*: “He only who is pure must tread the threshold of this temple: and none is pure but he who thinks holy thoughts.”

This perception that purity from sin is the indispensable condition for intercourse with the deity was of uncommon importance for the moral effect of religion on the life of the people. It does not, it is true, appear from the first as plainly as it does here ; yet it seems to have appeared at an early period in connection with the far-reaching influence of the Delphic cult of Apollo, to have been diffused by pious singers, and to have been sanctioned by the legal regulations as to propitiation, and as to the withdrawal of unworthy persons from public worship. It is, as Schmidt remarks in the work above cited, one of the results of the immense change which took place in the religious feelings of the Greeks in the period between the beginning of the Olympiads and the Persian wars, that the thought was conceived of a purifying approach to the Gods : and to this change the peculiar ideas of purity and exaltation connected with the cult of Apollo, and nourished mainly by the influence of the oracle at Delphi, very materially contributed. With the religion of Apollo Pythagoreanism was very closely connected, and those of its views with which we are concerned here were derived from that religion. The ethical reflections of Pythagoreanism afford the first well-known example of the new mode of view. "Follow the God" is the characteristic utterance of the founder of the Pythagorean league ; and the similar expression is also attributed to him, that men are most perfect when they go to the Gods. These sayings indicate in the clearest way that the deity is not only the guardian of the world-order, but may also be the object to which man may draw near, and his pattern. Pindar, who came from the priesthood of Delphi, and who drank in at an early age the religious and moral ideas of these men, gives in one of his odes an animated description of Apollo, who pours peaceful harmony into the souls of his worshippers. The same Pythagorean position was occupied by Socrates too ; he felt himself to stand under the immediate guidance of a divine spirit, and he counted faithfulness to his life-task, which the order of the God had imposed on him, to be better to him than life. Plato packs this whole tendency, which aims at the deepening of the religious consciousness, into the profound thought that

man is called to resemble as far as possible the God whose property he is.

This effort after purity, which proceeded from the Delphic cult of the pure light-God Apollo, exercised, as we have seen, a great morally formative influence on the best of the people : in the national and popular religion it first appeared in the form of a pretty elaborate system of propitiatory and purificatory rites. The rules to be observed in conducting the purificatory rites were fixed by the priesthood of Delphi, and by tradition and public law received public sanction over the whole of Greece, without interfering, however, with many peculiarities of local worship and laws. Here, as in all priestly legislations, we find that what was held to defile, what called for atonement, and excluded from public worship, was partly liturgical impurity, partly moral guilt, without much discrimination. On the whole, however, we are able to say that the tendency of the Delphic priesthood was, not indeed to separate the liturgical and the moral from each other, or to make either independent of the other, but to frame the requirements of religion in such a way as not in any marked degree to conflict with the requirements of morality. Moral guilt was made to appear as the worst form of impurity, as we see from two remarkable Delphic oracles, one of which declares him to be impure who neglected to defend his friend in battle, although no blood cleaves to his hands, while the other frees him from all impurity who, in defending his friend, accidentally killed him. The elaboration of the liturgical notion of purity belongs only to the Greek middle ages, *i.e.* to the flourishing period of the Delphic oracle in the centuries from the Doric immigration to the Persian wars ; this we infer from the absence of that notion in Homer and Hesiod. It is as the priesthood and the ceremonial of worship acquire strength that the idea of ceremonial purity and purification begins to appear. Once there, that idea may, on the one hand, be turned to good account as a very effective means for the moral education of the people, and for protecting public morals, as was to a very large degree the case with the Greeks (those who neglected good manners were excluded from all public acts of worship, processions, festival

plays and games, as impure persons); but, on the other hand, the fear of contracting impurity easily passes with the multitude, in whose minds the distinction between liturgical stain and moral guilt may not always be maintained, into superstitious awe, and anxious seeking for ever more effective means of propitiation, a state of mind on the part of the people which the priestly class has everywhere known how to use for its own ends. This point once reached, the ideas and influences which formerly had a wholesome influence as means of moral discipline, become means of corruption of the worst kind, leading as they do to a Pharisaic perversion of the moral judgment, to depreciation of moral conduct, and exaggeration of the value of ritual acts. In Greece too, this ordinary morbid symptom of priestly and legal religions appears to have occurred not infrequently; Plato draws in his Republic (ii. 364) a glaring picture of the juggling arts of the priests of Orpheus, who charged a high price for their methods of atoning for every sin a man had committed himself, and even for those committed by his ancestors.

But as the ideas of liturgical purity degenerated into superstitious practices, they also provoked a trenchant opposition to their whole principle on the part of men of deep thought or of pure feeling; an opposition which concerned not the rites only, but even the myths of the traditional religion. The philosophers Xenophanes and Heraclitus criticised the popular worship and belief in the gods with the greatest acuteness. According to Heraclitus, to undertake rites of purification is just to try to wash off mud with mud; the Gods have no need of the sacrifices, they in no way resemble the images in which they are worshipped, and it is most indecent to accuse them, as Homer and Hesiod did, of human vices. As for the last charge, it would be wrong to think that the mythical anthropomorphism of the Greeks had too much influence on the spirit of their religion or on their moral judgment; but some influence of the kind it undeniably did have. On this Schmidt remarks very aptly, that "the nation was competent to keep the two spheres of ideas apart from each other; that those light plays of fancy did not on the whole interfere with their devotions may surprise us and may dis-

pose us to a certain extent to wonder ; but it would be erroneous to say that those fancies involved no injury to religious feeling and even to the moral disposition of the Greeks ; poetry entered too much into all the spheres of life, and had too much influence on worship also, not to produce some such effect." The more reflection extended its flight, the more did that simple innocence disappear, which could readily find entertainment in the human conduct of those same gods who at the same time were revered as the supporters of the moral order and the dispensers of blessings. And if awakening reflection thus led the more earnest spirits to the rejection of the myths of the gods and to the purification of the religious consciousness, to others, such as the Sophists, the Illumination provided a justification of their moral lightness, leading them to excuse their immorality by pointing to the lâches of the gods in the myths. Such views could not fail to have a dangerous influence on the popular consciousness, as they soon came to be proclaimed from the stage, which with the Greeks occupied the place of our pulpit. However zealous Aristophanes was for the old orthodoxy, he contributed not a little to its subversion, by making the gods ridiculous on the stage. And though Euripides took occasion to announce his own purified view of the gods in the most pointed sentences ("When the gods do vilely, No gods they at all") this could scarcely counteract the sceptical impression which his bold treatment of the gods on the stage could not fail to make on the Athenian public.

Thus the Illumination of the age of Pericles undermined not only mythical and liturgical superstition, but at the same time the pious beliefs and the good morals of the fathers, and loosed the bond which till this time had connected religion with morality in Greece. The popular religion was indissolubly interwoven with its natural basis in the myths, and it was not to be expected that that religion could be renewed and cured ; renewal and cure were only to be looked for in the way of independent philosophical reflection on the foundations of morality which lie in human nature itself. This path was opened up by the *Socratic school*. The moral thinking of Socrates and Plato was penetrated by a deeply religious spirit, but even in Socrates this

religious spirit was only loosely connected with the popular religion, and Plato got rid of the latter altogether, and attached his moral ideals to the idea-world of his speculation. The speculation of Aristotle dropped the religious basis of ethics altogether, and reduced the latter to a descriptive analysis of the various modes of human conduct and thought. The same road was followed by his successors till the Stoics, who began again to connect ethics with metaphysics, and so gave that science once more a close relation to religion. They regarded that reason which ought to be the principle of our action as an efflux of the divine reason, and thus made the exercise of virtuous wisdom appear as the fulfilment of our divine calling, and in the light of pious obedience to the divine government of the world. And inasmuch as all men alike have a share in the same divine wisdom, it forms a bond of universal moral obligation, which, because it is based on the affinity to God of human nature generally, transcends the limit of people and race. Thus this philosophy arrived at the thought, big with promise of the future, of a kingdom of God which embraced the whole of mankind, in which all should be fraternally joined together as subjects of the same divine law, namely, the reason which is both divine and human. We must not undervalue this Stoic idea of humanity, which for the first time broke through the exclusiveness of the sense of nationality in the ancient world, and especially exercised a moderating and humanising influence on the brutal egoism of the Roman deification of the state and contempt of man. But, that it failed to achieve any thorough reform of society was due not only to the fact that philosophical ideas never possess that universal and energetic motive power which belongs to religious ideas, but more particularly to the inner defect of Stoicism. In its abstract idealism and rationalism it set its pride in the indifference of the thinking mind to the heart which feels, and thus necessarily weakened and impaired the sympathetic instincts of our nature, on which alone all positive social ethics are based. Thus it was perfectly natural that the Stoic ideal of humanity, however theoretically true, yet remained practically unfruitful, or rather that its real value lay only in the fact that it helped to prepare the way

in the heathen world for that religious idea of humanity with which Christianity was charged ; it was also helpful to Christianity at a later time, serving in various ways to set in a clear light the truth of the new doctrine.

The state religions of the *Romans* and *Persians* need not long detain us ; no such development of the relation between religion and morality took place in them as we saw in India and in Greece. In Rome and in Persia religion referred mainly to civic life, and this had the advantage that religion and the state mutually supported each other, and that the state derived from religious ideas an uncommonly effective motive to help its own vigorous development ; it was in honour of their God, whose kingdom coincided with their state, that both Romans and Persians founded their empires. The great defect, however, of these and of all state-religions was that religion was externalised into a legal police institution, made mechanical in priestly ceremonies, perverted to an instrument of political selfishness, and deprived of its moralising influence in proportion as ideal motives gave way to those of a more worldly nature in the life of the state. Whatever falls outside the object of the state and the legislation of the state, is left here without any reference to religion ; anything like an elevation of the personal consciousness to behold and imitate the divine ideal in noble humanity, such as took place in the Apollo-religion, is hardly to be traced among the Persians, and among the Romans not at all. Here accordingly, as soon as the end of the state was in the main secured, the rude superstition of religious ceremonial was accompanied by a frivolous unbelief, and by the barbarous inhumanity of a legalised and refined selfishness. No state-religion can produce humane culture out of itself ; the utmost a people in such a position can do is, to a certain extent, to take on foreign culture ; but that culture it at the same time spoils, detaching it from its original ideal soil, and using it as an instrument for its own worldly and carnal ends. Had the Persians conquered the Greeks, ancient civilisation would never have come about at all : when the Romans conquered the Greeks, the decay of ancient civilisation began. State-religion, however provocative of civic virtue,

is injurious to humane culture and to the growth of the finer feelings.

Judaism also was a state-religion, a national theocracy, up to the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans; but an impulse was present in Judaism from the first, which led the religion, as it developed, beyond this limitation. This was the moral spirit, which the prophets of Israel had introduced into the national henotheism, taking the "Holy One of Israel" to be the God who showed himself holy in justice and judgment on all human sin, both in Israel and outside it, and who uses the fortunes of the world of the nations too as the means of his work of moral education. The primitive Semitic idea of the divine "holiness," *i.e.* incomparable exaltation and terrible majesty, was thus made a vessel to contain the moral thought of perfection, and there was thus infused into the Hebrew God-consciousness an element of unique moral energy and strictness. For it was known that the holy God desired to have a holy people also as his property, and that to everything that was done inconsistently with this character of the people, to every violation of the religious and moral ordinances of his people, he manifested himself in judgments as a terrible and jealous God, as a consuming fire. This vivid consciousness of sin as guilt against the deity, and as calling for punishment, is characteristic of Semitism generally, and is connected with its profound feeling of dependence; but by the multitude, in Israel as well as outside it, this feeling of guilt was generally connected with mistakes in worship, and made good by performances in the way of worship. The prophets, on the contrary, when they rose to a higher notion of the holy God, also conceived a higher idea of the holy people of God, and opposed to the popular service of God by ritual usages, the moral service of God by a pure life, as the one true means by which man could assure himself of the divine approval, and become partaker of divine blessings (vol. iii. p. 139). The changing relation of these two tendencies, so radically opposed to each other, now one and now the other occupying the field, now both of them proceeding side by side, of the free, spiritual, moral idealism of the

prophetic religion on the one hand, the mechanical sensuous ritualistic positivism of the religion of the priests and the people on the other, this is the central interest of the history of the Jewish religion from the eighth century to the beginning of Christianity. We saw in a former chapter how the prophetic idealism, in order to establish a footing among the people, was obliged to enter into that compromise with priestly positivism of which the Deuteronomic law-book was the first product, a book in which the prophetic spirit of an inward religion and a humane morality still predominates. Here the motive given for obeying the law is not only fear of a jealous God who avenges the transgression of his commandments with fearful penalties upon the transgressors, and on their posterity to the third and fourth generation, but also hearty love to that God who of free grace chose Israel for his own, and who, as a faithful and merciful God, keeps his covenant to the thousandth generation to those who love him and keep his commandments. This law is filled up with ceremonial, civic, and moral injunctions promiscuously: but ritual is only insisted on so far as is necessary for the suppression of image-worship. Some of the ritual and ascetic laws merely confirm usages already prevailing; there is no trace of the hierarchical element; the civic and moral injunctions sketch the ideal of a healthy popular life, with very simple customs which often show a surprising degree of humanity.

Very different was the aspect of affairs two centuries later, in the priestly law of *Ezra* and his school. Here the ritual laws about priests and festivals, sacrifices and propitiations, are of the first importance; the most petty outward forms are treated as of greater moment than moral purity of heart and life, the taking away of sin is made mechanical and represented as the effect of sacramental priestly acts, the priesthood is raised to a hierarchical mediatorship between God and the people, national feeling is intensified to a high pitch of fanaticism (vol. iii. p. 154). This spirit of Levitical legalism was now stronger, now weaker, in Judaism, but on the whole always maintained itself, and in Pharisaism it found its most naked manifestation. The theology of this school is the classical pattern of a religion of

law, the national and legal positivism of which makes the moral consciousness narrow, petty, external, self-righteous, intolerant, inhuman, and in which, on the other hand, as its moral consciousness aims at nothing more than a literal and pedantic legalism, humility, the fundamental sentiment of religion, is altogether taken away, and the whole of religion lowered to a transcendental matter of business.¹ The exclusive relation of God to the Jews now appears no longer as a temporary means adopted in the divine plan of the education of mankind, as the old prophets had believed, but as an eternal privilege of the people, which, for the sake of its fathers and its law, is and remains the people alone loved by God. The heathens, *i.e.* all who are not Jews, have no value nor importance in God's sight, he allows them still to do their pleasure in this world for a while, but he does not will their salvation, he has appointed them for judgment and for the damnation of hell. The Jew, accordingly, has no positive duty to fulfil towards them, he must not enter into any fellowship with them, must not care for their culture and wisdom, must neither receive benefits at their hands nor do them benefits. Marriage with heathens is like fornication, and commercial intercourse with the heathen is only allowed as it damages him. As for the moral value (the righteousness) of the Jew, it rests, according to the Pharisaic theology, not on the purity of his disposition, a thing which he would know about at once, but on the state, which he can never know accurately, of a somewhat complicated reckoning, which is kept in heaven by the subordinate officers of the divine tribunal. The sum of a man's fulfilling of the law, and of the alms which he has given, forms the treasure of his own merits, which is increased by the inherited capital of the merits of his fathers; on this, on his own merits, and those of others, rests his claim to a divine reward. Over-against this credit side, however, stands the account of what he owes on account of his transgressions of the law, reckoned one by one; these involve a certain measure of punishments, but the debts thus contracted admit of being wiped off

¹ Evidence for this verdict on Pharisaism may be found in immeasurable quantity in the description, from the sources, of the theology of the Old Synagogue, by Weber; *cf.* especially par. 15, 18, 59-72.

by the voluntary or involuntary suffering of pains, both in the man's own person, and in that of persons closely connected with him ; and in this way the state of the account may be materially improved against the final reckoning in the other world. He who has reason for anxiety, when death approaches, as to the state of his account in heaven, acts wisely if he seeks to cover the deficit by leaving legacies for benevolent purposes, and so on.

Christianity arose out of the reaction of the inward spirit of the religion of the prophets, against the external character of Pharisaic Judaism. It took over from the religion of Israel the religious basis of morals, viz., the belief in the unconditional obligation and authority of the holy will of God as the Governor and Judge of the world ; it also shared with later Judaism the belief in the divine inspiration and authority of the Scriptures of the Old Testament, as well as the belief in a retribution in the other world at the general judgment. It differed from legal positive Judaism in appealing from the letter to the spirit, and found, with old prophecy, the most immediate revelation of God in the inner impulses of his Holy Spirit. Jesus declared war from the first against the external righteousness of the Pharisees and Scribes ; instead of the cleanness of dishes and of the skin he demanded, with the prophets, purity of heart : instead of a heart divided between the service of God and of Mammon, he required the undivided surrender of the heart to the love of God in active and patient fulfilment of his will ; instead of the loveless self-righteousness which looked with scorn on the sinful multitude, he called for unaffected humility, meekness, mildness, and compassion towards all men, as towards brothers and children of the merciful God who makes his sun to shine on the evil and on the good. What we have here in a still undeveloped form, popularly and simply stated, is essentially the same antithesis which meets us again in Paul, theologically developed and carried to its logical issue, the antithesis, namely, of inwardness and outwardness, spirit and letter, childlike love and slavish law. " Love is the fulfilling of the law " : so Paul taught with Jesus. But love cannot

be commanded ; it only awakens in the heart which is touched by the beam of the love of God, whether directly as with Jesus, or indirectly as with Paul, who saw in the crucified Christ the manifestation of the love of God which moved him to the trustful and thankful surrender of his heart and life to God, who was reconciling the world to himself in Christ. Thus Paul found the highest moral motive in a feeling of the heart which is one of the most natural, one of the noblest, feelings of our race, in adoring love to the divinely good as manifested in human form.

And this was in fact a new moral principle which transcended Jewish legalism as far as it did the Greek virtue of the sages. It shares with the latter, and here it has the advantage over the former, the *inwardness* and *freedom* of the moral life-principle. He who is impelled by love does not stand under the compulsion of a law which is foreign to him, but carries in himself the norm of his willing and acting ; it springs from his own impulse, from the feeling of his own heart, not however from a selfish affection, but from an affection which lifts him above his sinful self, and which therefore he feels in himself as an operation of divine power, as an impulse of the Holy Spirit. He who loves God feels himself to be inspired by God ; and he also knows himself to be authorised by God to find in this holy spirit which inspires him the only unconditional norm of what he must do or leave undone, and by which too he may judge everything outside himself, even religious traditions and usages, in respect to their serviceableness to the ends of holy love (1 Cor. ii. 15, iii. 22). Thus he knows himself to be released from the authority of religious statute, which now appears to him not as the eternally valid revelation of the will of God but only as a temporary means of education for the elementary stage of mankind (Gal. iv. 1-10). At the same time the limitation of the religion of law to a single people is removed ; the law of the letter might be given for the Jewish race alone, but the gospel of the spirit is a power of God to salvation for every one who believes, Gentile as well as Jew. In faith in the Gospel of the Sonship of God every one has part in the love of God with its promises and obligations, its gifts and tasks ; thus this faith becomes a bond of

religious as of moral union, which binds men of all peoples and classes into one new people of God. Here Pauline universalism coincides in the result attained by the cosmopolitan humanism of the Stoics; but what with the Stoics was a theory based on rational reflection and without any far-reaching practical consequences, was with Paul a living principle born of the emotional impulse of faith and love and endowed with energy to conquer the world. And this is connected with a further point of difference. The Stoics certainly traced universal human obligation to the affinity of our nature to God and to the universal divine law implanted in our reason, and so spoke of a kingdom of God whose citizens we all are or are called to be; but this ideal was quite in the air, was not exemplified by anything in the real world; how it could ever be realised in the actual world was quite problematical, as the Stoics, the later Stoics at least, held pessimist views of the weakness and sinful corruption of human nature, its affinity to God notwithstanding,—views scarcely less pronounced than those of the Apostle Paul on this subject. With Paul, on the contrary, the ideal of the universal community of all the children of God in the kingdom of heaven was based on a belief in that definite revelation of the saving divine purpose, which he saw in the person and the work of Jesus. This revelation was in his eyes the end and goal of the whole series of prior revelations of God, and thus easily took its place within that positive belief in a historical and teleological revelation which he shared with his compatriots. Thus the Pauline ethic, for all its ideal autonomy, was founded on the positive basis of a sacred history possessing undeniable authority as a revelation; its moral ideal was not an empty one, moving in the air, which had still to look for an attachment to reality, but the ripe fruit of the tree the roots of which stretched back to the early period of the patriarchs, the fruit of the historical religion of Israel. In this doublesidedness, its continuity with the history of the religion of the Old Testament, and its transcendence of the Jewish religion of law, the Pauline ethic became the link, of world-historical importance, between the pious narrowness of the Jewish conscience and the free and wide humanism of Greek thought. And these two sides, the

historical limitation and the personal rational freedom are always equally indispensable for a sound ethic; the great matter is always to settle their relations to each other. And here too Paul pointed out the right way, founding his philosophy of religion on the thought which in modern thinking must always be the principal point of view: the thought, namely, of a *development* of the moral spirit under the guiding education of God. Each stage of the development has its corresponding moral ideal; none of them is fortuitous or arbitrary, each rests on a divine ordinance and is good and necessary for its own time, but for its own time only; what was suitable for the boy no longer suits the man, and in the stream of history there is no point for standing still, there is no last, nothing fixed unchangeably; only the law of development is ever the same, for it is founded in the decree of divine wisdom and deposited in the organisation of human nature.

Christian ethics too required a development of eighteen centuries to arrive at a pure realisation of its principle on all its sides. The power, so positively fruitful and so able to transform the world, which lay in the principle of brotherly love, manifested itself at first only within the sphere of the community, in the exercise of compassion and beneficence to the suffering brethren in the faith. "See how they love one another!" the astonished heathens cried when they witnessed the beneficence of the Christians to the poor, the sick, the destitute, and prisoners. The impression must have been very great; the phenomenon was an unheard of thing, a unique thing in a society where murder was a public entertainment, and the most barefaced avarice and deceit was a matter of course with great and small. In the first centuries however the ascetic, world-opposing side of Christian morality predominated so much, and the positive, world-shaping force of it was so little made to appear, that primitive Christianity has seemed to many students to have been in the main a world-avoiding spiritualism. We must not forget that the world the Christians avoided, and from the interests and efforts of which,—its higher efforts too, we must confess,—they turned unsympathisingly away, was not the world generally, but the then subsisting world of

heathen society. This is naturally accounted for, partly by the corruption of the manners of the Gentile world and partly by the primitive Christian expectation of the end of the world. In the heathen world of the Roman empire the most dissolute sensuality and the coarsest contempt for men went hand in hand; and art, especially the degenerate drama, and in part even worship, were under the influence of these corrupt tendencies. What was more natural than that Christianity, compelled to enter on a struggle with this corrupt sensuality, should have exaggerated to the utmost the antithesis between the spirit and the flesh, a position which it shared with Essenism, Alexandrianism, Platonism, the younger Stoicism and Neo-Pythagoreanism,—that is to say, with nearly all the serious mental tendencies of the age, and should rather have inclined to a rigorous spiritualistic asceticism than by a premature treaty between the spirit and nature have sacrificed the purity of its moral principles? Then again Christianity encountered in the Roman Empire a public life which in a hundred ways was interlaced with heathen worship and belief, that is, in the Christian view, with the service of demons; a political system built upon the ruins of the freedom of the nations, which no longer offered any satisfaction to the ideal needs of higher minds, and which set up in place of the faded ideals of the religions of the nations its worship of the Caesars. Was it to be wondered at that the Christian community had little sympathy for such a state and desired to have as little as possible to do with its affairs, without at the same time violating the obligation of passive obedience to it? And when the Roman Empire, not content with this passive obedience, persecuted the Christians with merciless severity as dangerous to the state, was it to be wondered at if to the eyes of the persecuted this hostile state appeared to be an embodiment of the satanic world-power, the kingdom of the devil, who was now conducting his last desperate struggle with the children of God, but was soon to fall into destruction at Christ's final judgment of the world?

The expectation of the closely impending return of Christ to set up his visible kingdom of glory, and the assumption that till this not distant term the present world stood under the rule of the devil

and his demons,—these essential elements of the primitive Christian belief had a most powerful influence on the moral thought of the early Christians; and it cannot be denied that this influence was two-sided. On the one side it is true that the belief that they were surrounded at every step by the snares of the demons stimulated them to stricter watchfulness and self-discipline, and to joyful renunciation of the world; and that the hope of soon witnessing the triumph of Christ over the world and taking part in it incited them to the most wonderfully heroic endurance; but when the world was lighted with this dull apocalyptic glare, it was scarcely possible that their eye should be clear or their hand active for the moral tasks of life. What did it profit to labour for the amelioration of social conditions which were soon to be swallowed up in destruction? With such prospects, the most that could be looked for was that compassionate brotherly love should feel itself compelled to do something to alleviate the immediate evils of the neighbourhood; there was too little positive interest in the things of this world to lead to any active effort for the general aims of society. Even the most natural moral community, the family, could not, from this point of view, be regarded as an institution of positive moral value in itself; it was regarded, like the state, as at the most a necessary evil, which the Christian was free to use, but which it was safer to despise. This point of view was set up by Paul (1 Cor. vii.); it remained dominant with the fathers of the Church, and it led afterwards to the doctrine of a double morality, a lower and a higher, and to the promotion of celibacy for those who represented the Church's ideal of life, namely the order of the clergy. Only the Alexandrian father, Clement, formed a notable exception; he was preserved from ascetic extravagances by his familiarity with Greek and especially Stoic philosophy. He is convinced that the Christian can guard his moral perfectness in every situation in life, in riches as well as in poverty, in marriage as well as in celibacy; in fact, that so far was marriage from being a hindrance to Christian perfection that on the contrary by the special demands it makes for moral effort it promotes a fuller and more rounded development of Christian virtue than the

celibate who thinks of nothing but the salvation of his soul, can ever attain. But such reasonable views remained an isolated exception. The ascetic tendency was too much interwoven with the beginnings of Christianity, as even the New Testament shows, and was too much in accordance with the general current of the age, to be overcome by the dissenting voices of isolated teachers of greater enlightenment.

In such circumstances the only thing the church could do was, while allowing the legitimacy of the ascetic ideal, to set such bounds to it as regard for the constitution of human nature and for the requirements of life in the world demanded. The doctrine of a *double morality*, which had such grave consequences for after ages, was just such a compromise; the lower morality being that which might be required of every Christian, and the higher that which might be recommended as a counsel of perfection to him who aimed at a higher attainment; by the latter, celibacy and voluntary poverty were meant, and the stricter style of fasting too is counted by the Roman Hermas to be a work of greater merit than the law demands. The organisation of this higher morality in an order of spiritual perfection, or in monasticism, did not proceed directly from the church, but arose out of Egyptian asceticism with the co-operation perhaps of influences proceeding from other than Christian sources; but the church, especially the Western Church, always knew how to incorporate the monastic order as a regular member of her hierarchical grades, and so to make it not what it might have been, a dangerous rival to the clergy of the church, but an obedient corps of picked men in her struggle for world-rule.

This distinction of lower and higher morality, of the morality of duty merely and that to which merit was attached, and this identification of Christian perfection with a definite external manner of action, implies a mode of judging moral value more by the outward acts than by the disposition—a legal standard therefore. The spirit of Jewish legalism, indeed, held its entry into the church more and more, only without the national Jewish forms it had before; and set up its permanent seat most markedly

in Rome, where it met with a temperament akin to that of Jerusalem, and with an old habit of rule. The Roman view of Christian morality appeared in a characteristic form and very early, in the treatment of the subject of penance. With the practical wisdom which always distinguished her, Rome first saw that rigoristic ascetic idealism which appeared in its most exaggerated form in Montanism, to be thoroughly impracticable, and set up instead a law of penance which allowed even the "fallen," those whose sin the church had hitherto regarded as unforgivable or as "mortal," to be received again into the communion of the church; care only being taken that their restoration should be proceeded by a solemn penance, the kind and degree of which the church was to fix in proportion to the sin to be wiped out. The distinction between "mortal" and "venial" sins now came to imply that the former required a special church penance if they were not to lead to eternal damnation, while the latter might be forgiven without such a process, simply by means of prayer, almsgiving, and observance of the regular fasts. Thus penance came to be a legal transaction, the conditions of which were settled by the church in ever greater detail in decrees of synods and "Penitentials," according to which the priest had to estimate various kinds of sins confessed to him, and to fix the measure of the penance or satisfaction demanded by each of them,—exactly as the secular judge has to adjust his sentences in accordance with the penal code. We certainly must not undervalue the educative influence the church thus exercised on the rude peoples of the Middle Ages; but it is also certain that the inwardness and freedom of evangelical morality entirely disappeared before an external legalism only distinguished from that of Judaism by not being limited to the theocracy of a single people but claiming universal rule over the nations. Along with this outward legalism and partly as its direct consequence, a heathen lawlessness and want of discipline invaded the church, which in the last centuries of the Middle Ages led to a general and frightful corruption of manners. The church's system of penance was no doubt much to blame for this; the way in which the forgiveness of sins was made to depend on services of any kind rendered to the church,

e.g., on money payments, tended to destroy the earnestness and the purity of the moral judgment. To this was added the demoralising influence of bad example, immorality prevailing among the clergy and the monks, just those orders which were supposed to be the specific representatives of the church's ideal of holiness. It was just the unnaturalness of this ideal, and specially of forced celibacy, that avenged itself in the shameful dissoluteness which prevailed among these orders. That a church thus represented lost more and more, towards the end of the Middle Ages, the influence it formerly possessed over the peoples, we can very well understand.

Scholasticism offered no remedy for this evil, because its average aim was, in the sphere of ethics as of dogmatics, merely to prove by formal dialectic that which was received and had authority. Only Abelard made a notable exception from this. Living in an age which made morality external, he insisted on inwardness of disposition, on the importance of a pure personal aim, on free self-determination, so decidedly as to fall into the error of depreciating the objective side, that of action and its consequences; so by exaggerating a true principle failing to influence men's practice: at the same time, however, his genuinely Protestant criticism of the system of penance was of great value. It shows a purity of moral feeling rare in the history of ecclesiastical morality, when Abelard declares the fear of the punishments of hell and all the penances which were prompted by it to be destitute of all moral value, and says that that alone is the true penitence which proceeds not from the fear of punishment but from the love of God; and that this love operates forgiveness of sins because it does away with the cause of sin, namely disregard of God. Confession is in Abelard's view a useful means for humiliation and moral education, but only when one confesses to good priests who do not from shameful avarice sell forgiveness of sins for money. The power of the keys is not given to the bishops as such, but only to such as are like to the apostles in personal worth, and who exercise that power not capriciously but according to the norm of the divine righteousness. The capricious judgments of priests are of no weight: everything depends on the divine judgment alone. Hold-

ing these principles Abelard was on the way to the emancipation of the conscience from the authority of the priesthood, which took place at the Reformation, but he did not work out the consequences of his principles.

Very opposite to the Protestant spirit of Abelard is that of *Thomas Aquinas*, the classical representative of the mediæval Catholic view of the world in ethics. The ethical system of Thomas is an ecclesiastical supernaturalism combined with Aristotelian and Platonic views, which are cleverly applied so as to give dialectical support to the dualism of the church. The dualism of the supernatural and the natural appears in all the notions on which his system is built. The highest good is twofold: unconditioned blessedness in the contemplative knowledge and love of God according to his perfection, and conditional happiness in the normal active life of human society: the former transcends the powers of the creature, and can only be acquired through divine grace. Virtue accordingly is also twofold; natural virtue corresponds with the reasonable nature of man generally, and may be acquired by education and exercise; this Thomas divides into the cardinal virtues of Plato, prudence, justice, moderation, and courage. To these are to be added the three supernatural virtues, faith, love, and hope, which have reference to God as the object of supernatural blessedness, and so can only be infused by God through the church's means of grace. Faith gives the intellect, whose faculty of apprehension is naturally limited, an increase of faculty for apprehending supernatural truth (adds, for example, to the natural knowledge of God's existence that of his threefold nature), and thus forms the firm basis of all Christian morality, which however it does not produce directly out of itself, but by means of the forming energy of love. It is only love, joined with hope, that communicates to the will its proper movement, by which it is brought into unity with its end, and, as it were, transformed to the likeness of it. Christian love is in the first place love to God, in the second place love to the creature for God's sake, especially to a man's neighbour and to himself; sins against the love of God are graver than those against the love of one's neighbour. Of

a twofold nature again is the law or the order of reason fixed by God as the governor of the world ; it is on the one hand the law of nature or the knowledge of general principles implanted in the human mind, from which all civil laws proceed ; while on the other hand, it is the supernatural law revealed in the word of God and in the church, which guides man on his way not only for his temporal life but to life eternal. But within this law again two grades may be distinguished ; the Christian virtue which is enjoined on all, and the perfection of the evangelical counsels which is only possible to some. To prove this doctrine Thomas starts from the Aristotelian dictum that the contemplative is to be preferred to the active life, and then argues as follows : He who will attain the highest, the contemplative love of God, must not only avoid what is directly opposed to it, as sin is, but even that which, though not directly opposed to the love of God, might yet impede the full and undisturbed enjoyment of that love ; of this nature are riches, the lust of the flesh and the pride of free determination of the will. For the perfection of the Christian life therefore it is necessary to renounce these three natural goods, it is necessary to accept voluntary poverty, chastity, and obedience—in short, monasticism. Only those who belong to an order, Thomas holds, surrender themselves and their all to God ; those who live in the world keep something for themselves and give something to God. “ Man is so placed between the things of this world and the spiritual goods in which eternal happiness consists, that the more he cleaves to the one the more he turns away from the other, and *vice versa*.” Thus Christian perfection falls into two ideals of life, which, as they do not admit of being inwardly combined, must be apportioned to two orders in the church. The spiritual order represents the ideal of contemplative piety or of the love of God, and this virtue is exclusive of that morality which is active in the world ; the secular order represents the latter, which it is true is not in itself without value, but which yet stands in such an antithesis to the perfect love of God as to be always hindbersome to it. This is the classical expression for that relation of twofoldness and externality to each other between piety and morality, which is characteristic of the ethics of the Catholic

Church, and the roots of which reach back to the rise of the Catholic world-church, and spring out of the compromise then made between the abstract world-avoiding idealism of primitive Christianity and the practical realism of Rome already aiming at world-rule.

Historical justice demands, however, the recognition of an element of great value in the ethics of Aquinas—an element which only needed to be disengaged from a supernaturalism which was quite heterogeneous to it, in order to become the fruitful germ of modern rational ethics. This is the thought that a “natural law” is innate in reasonable beings, which is the effluence and the form of manifestation of the divine world-ordering reason, therefore identical in its essence with the will of God, and which is the immanent basis of all positive legislation (all secular legislation at least, according to him). This idea had probably descended to Aquinas from the Stoical philosophy through the medium of Roman juridical science; and it formed the point of departure for those systems of an independent rational philosophy of law and morals, which began with the natural law of Hugo Grotius, and culminated in the practical philosophy of Kant and Hegel. To this rational element of Thomistic ethics the *Positivism* of the nominalists formed a most decided antithesis. Scotus and William of Occam derived the moral laws from determinations of an arbitrary divine will, which not being determined by reason in God, cannot be known by us by means of reason, cannot be based on a reasonable disposition of our nature, but can only be known positively from the tradition of the church and received on authority. Thus ethic was made, just like dogmatic, a matter of a purely external belief on authority, of a conventional acceptance. It may well be understood that such a theory contributed effectively to the growing scepticism of the end of the Middle Ages. In it, and not in Thomist rationalism, lie also the historical roots of *Jesuitism*.

Jesuitism is nothing but the consistent application of that ecclesiastical positivism which puts the arbitrary decision of the church in the place of the moral world-order. According to this system there is no essential good, there are no eternal laws and ends of unconditional and universal obligation; that is good which ecclesiastical authorities

declare to be good ; and as in every question different verdicts of authorities may be cited, duty can only be known with a certain amount of probability, never with perfect certainty ; positivism leads to "probabilism." Thus the door is opened for subjective likings and for the dialectic of an intellect corrupted by the sinful heart ; the earnestness of conscience, inner truthfulness, faithfulness to conviction, are sacrificed to the most unbridled subjectivity. The reverse, however, of this emancipation of the selfish subject from the eternal order, is its entire subjection under the ordinances of the church. The individual layman is not at liberty to form his probable opinions for himself, he must be guided by his father-confessor, the judgment of the latter must be to him instead of the voice of conscience and as a divine oracle, he must have his confessor to be responsible for all he does. Thus the church obtains an unconditional rule over men's thoughts, volitions, and acts, such as it never before possessed to such a degree. And it is notorious how, by means of the Jesuits, she worked this rule to her own profit, how she succeeded in making princes and peoples the instruments, without any will of their own, of ecclesiastical ends, how she thought every means permissible when there was any question of extending the sphere of the church's power, of suppressing heretics, of acquiring properties ; how no social bond is counted holy in the face of ecclesiastical absolutism, how the Jesuits have intruded with shameless hand into the sanctuary of the family, how they have set peoples and governments against each other, how they have allied themselves now with despotism and now with revolution. In every relation of life Jesuitism represents the perversion and corruption of morality by the stiff and degenerate religion of ecclesiastical positivism and hierarchism.

As Christianity was the reaction of the ethical spirit of prophetism against the inanition of that spirit in legalistic Judaism, so Protestantism again is the reaction of the ethical spirit of the Gospel against the very analogous inanition of it in the legal religion of Catholicism. In both cases, however, the reform is not merely a going back to an earlier stage, but a rise to an essentially new and

higher stage. In justifying faith, the confident laying hold of the love of God as it is offered in the Gospel, the Reformers found the spring of a morality in which freedom from human tradition and priestly tutelage is combined with obligation to the love of God and of one's neighbour.¹ In faith the Christian, as Luther says, is a free master over all things, and in love he is a willing servant of all things and of every man; "by faith he rises above himself in God, from God again he goes beneath himself through love, and yet he always abides in God and in divine love." Thus the old mediæval discord between pious love of God and active morality was overcome, the love of God being now seen to be the motive power, which does not allow man to remain in idle contemplation, but incites him to incessant doing good for God's glory and the good of his neighbour. This activity is no longer prompted by selfish motives, nor yet by self-righteous seeking for rewards or any such attempts to acquire merit; everything proceeds from the simple feeling of thankful obligation and hearty love to God; and hence moral activity is no longer here, as with Aquinas, a hindrance to the love of God; on the contrary, it is a manifestation of it and so a proof of it; it is a living service of God in which the heart is conscious, with ever growing certainty and joy, of its communion with God, its being filled and impelled by the divine spirit. And since that only is good which proceeds from love, there can no longer be any action in excess of duty, which should go beyond what God prescribes, and establish a special merit; on the contrary, even when we strive and labour most faithfully in the divine service, the humbling consciousness can never leave us, that we remain far short of the moral ideal, that all our work is defective, that we have no claim to deserve anything before God, and must be content with his grace. Thus the motive is rejected on which the Catholic distinction of a double morality, that of the commandments and that of the evangelical counsels was based; the ground is cut away from under the whole system of monastic morality, and in point of substance too, the so-called

¹ Compare my lecture on *Luther als Begründer der protestantischen Gesittung*. Prot. Kirchenzeitung, 1883, No. 46.

“higher perfection” of the clerical calling is deprived by sober Protestant criticism of all its value. Measured by the standard of love, which seeks to serve one’s neighbour for his good, ascetic exercises and abstinences appear to be a fruitless waste of time and strength, an unreasonable, because a useless, service of God, and one which therefore cannot really please him. The truly reasonable service of God, on the contrary, is seen to consist in the faithful discharge of all one’s moral duties, by which we co-operate with others to promote the common good, specially, therefore, of the duties of one’s worldly calling in family and in society. The moral order of society is thus relieved of its ecclesiastical tutelage and of the disparagement formerly cast on it, and is instituted afresh in its own peculiar dignity and autonomous right. Marriage and the civil power are recognised as veritable divine ordinances of equally exalted sacredness with the church; they recover their own free movement and their constitution according to the inner grounds of reasonable practical utility. The ban is broken in which morality was held by an ecclesiastical and positivist religion; it can now unfold itself independently on its own ground, according to the conditions and needs of human nature, being no longer torn asunder from the root of its power, for it is firmly based on the sense of obligation towards God, and on the impulse which love feels to resemble him in doing good.

Protestant theology has not been able any more than that of primitive Christianity to maintain itself at the high level of the purely moral religious principle. Even earlier than in the latter, a vehement conflict arose around dogmatic formulæ, which were regarded to such a degree as the principal part of religion, that morals were scarcely thought to deserve any consideration in comparison with them, or where they were treated, were treated as a part of positive religion, and dealt with in the restricted shape of an exposition of the decalogue of the Old Testament. In the causes which led to it, this Protestant positivism differed from the Catholic positivism of the Middle Ages, but the results were the same; it led to the enslavement of religious conviction under the teaching authority of the

church, and to the deadening of conscience to right and wrong. The acceptance of church doctrines was now regarded, just as in Catholicism, as a religious duty not equal merely, but even superior to moral duties, and the observance of which the civil authority, as guardian of both tables of the decalogue (*i.e.* of religious as of moral duties), was bound to enforce most vigilantly. Thus the savagery of religious persecution broke out afresh within Protestantism. In the Calvinistic churches, anti-Trinitarians and anabaptists were put to death, and transgressors of the rigorous Sabbath laws were heavily punished in goods and person. In Lutheran state churches, as there were constant changes of the religion approved by the prince, it was now the adherents of Philippism,¹ now those of Lutherism, who were hunted from their house and goods, one and another being also occasionally put to death as a crypto-Calvinist or an Osiandrist. Even in this treatment of questions of faith as criminal matters, a practice which the Protestant churches received and continued as an evil inheritance from Catholicism, there is a sad declension from the height of the Christian principle to the pre-Christian position of the religion of legalism; but a further mischievous element of moral deterioration lay in the fact that Protestant theology accepted the heathenish mediæval superstition of devil-bonds and witchcraft, and persecuted the unhappy victims of this delusion with an even intenser fanaticism; the delusion seems to have gathered new support from the biblical narratives of the "possessed."

In such circumstances, it was certainly a great gain to the cause of humanity, that without any direct connection with the movement in the church, there grew up from the impulses of the classical renaissance,² and of the new inquiries into nature, that spirit of free philosophical inquiry which, in spite of all its changes, and no doubt its errors in other directions, yet has certainly led, in the practical

¹ From Philip Melanchthon.—Tr.

² The renaissance exercised a profound influence on the Reformation too. Not only did Zwingli and Melanchthon derive their scientific view of the world from humanist studies, Luther's ethical programme of reformation, also, in his address to the Christian nobility of the German nation, is directly connected with the ideas of the humanists.

sphere, to increasing clearness of judgment and purity of feeling. It was the philosophers Spinoza, Locke, and Shaftesbury, who first contended openly and decidedly for the civil toleration of the various religious confessions, by showing how absurd it was to seek to coerce or to prevent by force religious convictions and dispositions. And the Cartesian Becker and the Wolffian Thomasius, to whom the humane and enlightened Jesuit Spee—a white raven—joined himself as a third, were the first to assail with scientific arguments the horrible madness of the processes of witchcraft. It appears to me to be a duty imposed on us by gratitude, to call to mind those services to truly humane and therefore to true Christian morality. The rationalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has been much spoken against, but if it is measured by the standard of its practical fruits, it must certainly obtain a much more favourable judgment than the dogmaticistic positivism of the nineteenth century which is as practised in creating discord as the former in producing concord and reconciliation.

This tendency towards setting up morality on an independent basis of its own, reached its highest point in the rationalism of *Kant*. The service he did in this field was that he made the moral independent of all externalities and accidents, whether dogmatic traditions or empirical motives of utility, and planted it on a firm basis in human nature, on that command of reason, whose behests are universally valid and unconditionally obligatory.¹ The weak side of his position was that he conceived this reason, which he justly regarded as the basis of morality, too abstractly, too much on the side of its form, as too empty, too little palpable a thing, as the mere logical universality of thinking, and therefore thought it necessary to place it in an exclusive antithesis to the emotional side of our nature. By doing this, not only did he deprive practical reason of all force as a motive, of that force which lies in the natural moral sentiments and impulses which are innate in us, but he also failed to attain to a substantial principle, out of which the concrete moral dicta might be deduced; for such a principle can never lie in a bare formula of

¹ Compare the historical statement on Kant, vol. i. p. 164 *sqq.*

thought ; it must be found if anywhere in human nature taken as a whole. Hence the rigid imperative form, hence the narrow subjective horizon, of his morality, hence its indifference to the historical life in which the reasonable moral endowment of our race finds its development ; hence finally the purely external relation in which it stands to religion. When the morality of the "categorical imperative" is related to religion by the moral duties being said to be the commandments of a divine legislator who is at the same time the retributive governor and judge of men, this relation is not one that belongs to the principle of morality, it is fortuitous, and has the appearance of an afterthought. We are told that this reference of the moral law to a divine legislation cannot add to its authority, which is based on itself alone ; and also that the idea of a retributive judge ought to have no influence with us in the fulfilment of duty, lest that should be tinged with eudaemonism by such a consideration. The whole relation of morality to religion thus becomes a useless appendix to morality, which is sufficient for itself, and the value and importance of the reference are more than problematical. That, it is true, was not what Kant intended ; his position here was no mere accommodation to accepted views, it was a matter of personal necessity for him that the bond between religion and morality should not be quite severed ; but he sought that bond in an external attachment merely, because he was not able to find the deeper, radical connection between the two. And the reason why he could not find that deeper bond was that his abstract notion of reason led him to overlook both the origin of dependent human reason out of the world-ordering divine reason, and the way in which the former is inwoven with the whole of our nature on its emotional side. The psychological connection of morality with religion is founded on the latter, the metaphysical on the former. Had Kant paid regard to the fact that reason can dwell and ought to dwell in the heart too, that long before it shows itself as the thought of law it stirs in us as impulse and feeling, his morality would have turned out far richer and truer to life, and not only so, but he would also have perceived the radical connection and the fertilising interaction which exist between the religious and the

moral feelings, would have seen that the moral reasonable disposition of our nature was not a thing that lay ready-made from the first in man, but a thing which had to be developed in history, and a thing which can only be developed, and can only remain fresh and living in conjunction with the religious disposition of man's nature. He would then have conceded to the positive religions their essential place as stations and forms in the history of the moral education of mankind, and would thus have gained a truer understanding of the permanent truth of the notion of revelation, which as it is, swings about in his system in the most curiously unconnected way.

The defect of the Kantian morality, which tended to disconnect it from religion, was very suitably corrected by that emotional and intuitive tendency which from the first accompanied the rational tendency in German thought. The origin of it lies in *Pietism*, which itself was a reaction, a noble and very living reaction of heartfelt evangelical piety against the freezing of Protestantism in a mindless and heartless orthodoxy. Pietism was afterwards invaded, it is true, by a small narrow dogmatic, a timid and ascetic spirit, and declined from the high level of Protestant morality to the standpoint of mediæval mysticism, *e.g.*, of a Thomas à Kempis; but this ought not to make us forget its earlier services in revivifying evangelical Christianity. Such figures as Spener and Franke, Gottfried Arnold and Tersteegen, Bengel and Zinzendorf, are undoubtedly some of the finest in church history; it was they, and those like-minded with them, who at a time of senseless letter-worship and cold rational illumination guarded the sacred fire of pious feeling, and reminded the Protestant world again that Christianity is something more than the acceptance of historical books, that it is not a doctrine, but a life in God, the surrender of the heart in sacred love, and the active exercise of love in a holy life, so that it is impossible for any one even to understand its doctrine aright who is not touched by the sacred living power of its spirit, and has not entered into the living process of inner renewal or regeneration, since feeling and willing can never be separated in religion from knowing and understanding.

It was they who, pressing back dogmatic intellectualism to make way for ethical emotionalism, showed how the conflict of the confessions might be atoned ; the union of the Herrnhut brothers was the first positive instance of such a union. And finally it lay in the nature of the case that the religious inwardness cultivated in these circles, the habit of constant attention to the experiences of the pious soul, and the constant labour bestowed on the moral formation and perfection of the individual life, should approach very closely to the æsthetic worship peculiar to that epoch of genius, of the "beautiful soul," and to the scientific endeavour after individual thinking, independent inquiry, personal conviction.

The combination of the former religious, with the latter worldly, individualism, as represented in such men as Hamann, Lavater, Claudius, Klopstock, Herder, Novalis, Schleiermacher, proved to be one of the most important elements in the process of the formation of the modern ideal of humanity ; the peculiar character of that ideal is just that in it clearness and freedom of rational thinking enter into the most intimate union and interaction with inwardness and depth of religious and æsthetic feeling. This was its origin ; in the circles in which it came into being rational morality became emotional, the categorical imperative became the "higher morality of the beautiful soul," of which Schiller, Jakobi, and Fichte were the noblest representatives, and of which Romanticism is the caricature. If virtue be not merely respect for duty, contrary to inclination, but just "inclination to duty," as Schiller defined it, if the will and action which are truly good proceed out of the undivided unity of reason and heart, if the cold "ought" is replaced by the living impulse of sacred enthusiasm, by the love of the God-descended genius to all that is true and good, as Jakobi and Fichte taught, then it is clear that the wall of partition is broken down which separated the reluctant morality of Kant from religion. The fundamental sentiment of that emotional morality is, the more purely it is apprehended, the more it is kept separate from the impure impulse of nature, the more certainly religious ; and then morality is nothing but the unfolding of the same divine motive power in the broad field of active life, as

religion is the movement of it into the depth and height of the absolute life-ground and end.

Much as there is that is true and valuable in this teaching, it also laboured under a defect, which, as Romanticism showed, was capable of proving somewhat formidable; the morality of genial inspiration and of the art of harmonious living is as little readily applicable to the historical life of society as the Kantian moralism, and lacks at the same time the earnest sense of duty which belongs to the latter. The danger is therefore great that individualism may turn to limitless subjectivism, and set itself with irony, like that of Schlegel, above all social order and custom. The correction of this one-sidedness came first of all from the great national catastrophes at the beginning of this century; but it also came from the objective turn of critical philosophy in the speculative successors of Kant. If reason is no longer mere subjective formal thought, but the divine spirit in mankind, which in the process of the world's history develops its essence always more purely and more perfectly, which not only thinks the good and prescribes it as law, but produces it as a real thing, and gives it the form of a living historical power in law, custom, and religion, in state and church and science, then it is clear that the morality of the individual too can no longer consist merely in the elaborating and living of a beautiful individuality and genial inspiration, but must consist in an unselfish and faithful surrender to the objective ends of historical society, and of its moral institutions especially of the family and the state, these forms of concrete morality, in which reason has assumed reality and the bitter imperative has become the sweet habit of existence.

"Unto thine own dear country do thou cleave,
There spring the roots of all thy strength and power!"

This was the text of the practical philosophy of Hegel, who, following in the footsteps of Herder, opened up to the modern mind the feeling for historical life. That this historico-social turn of moral thought could not fail to interest the modern mind in historical religion too, is quite obvious. It is well known (at least it ought to

be) how highly Hegel valued religion and the church, and how conservative an attitude he took up towards them. He never succeeded, however, in tracing the relation between religion and morality with clearness, and that for two reasons. He apprehended religion too much from the intellectual side, as a school of theology, and he estimated the state too much in the spirit of antiquity, as the all-embracing embodiment of all morality. The after effects of this error may be seen not only in the irreligious tendency of the Hegelian left, but also in the otherwise admirable theological ethics of Rothe, who is of opinion that there is no other substance in religion but morality, and that it is the destiny of the church and of worship gradually to disappear in the state and in civilisation. Krause and Schleiermacher, on the other hand, represent the relation between religion and morality and their respective organs in a way which is essentially correct, speaking of it as a relation of interaction of functions which, though differing from and independent of each other, are yet sprung from the same root, and ought mutually to help each other.

Morality is the realisation of our destiny as reasonable creatures in the world of social relations, religion the realisation of the same destiny in reference to God. Social relations being based, along with the rest of the world-order, in God, the ultimate ground of all moral obligation consists in the religious feeling of dependence, which is reinforced by the feeling of trust and by the striving after communion with and likeness to the Deity, which provide an encouraging and inspiring motive. As the moral value of these religious motives depends on the character of the God-consciousness, which in its turn depends on the nature of the moral ideal which is cherished, the religious and the moral consciousness act upon each other in manifold ways, and are developed in history in constant interaction on each other. The Christian love of God, united with the love of one's fellow-man, is the motive which most favours a pure, free, and energetic morality. It is so all the more, the less it is hemmed in by dogmatic or hierarchical limitations. For its normal development in a humane morality, however worldly culture and philosophical moral

doctrine are indispensable auxiliaries ; and they help its growth the more, the more it contemplates human nature whole and in its historical development. Based on a religious motive, and guided in its development by a rational understanding of the conditions and the needs of human nature, morality will realise itself in a universal human community in which nothing but good is done, a "kingdom of God."

CHAPTER III.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE.

WITH all peoples the beginnings of science may be discerned in their religious views; myths and legends are the original forms in which man's desire to understand the world seeks satisfaction. The myths of the gods and of creation then stimulate men of a thoughtful turn to strike out further statements, which however contain rather poetical intuitions than scientific thoughts. As time goes on, however, the theogonies and cosmogonies settle down into more sober cosmological theories, which form the beginnings of natural philosophy and so of science. Thus in Egypt, in India, and in Greece, the beginnings of philosophy were developed out of mythology, and the priests of Egypt and of Chaldæa were also led in the very earliest times to the study of astronomy, by the needs of worship. But while priestly wisdom was so inwoven with religious traditions that it never entirely freed itself, either in form or in contents, from the egg-shells of mythology, this separation took place with the Greek philosophers at an early age, and so completely as to enable science to enter on the path of independent and methodical investigation, and to take up an attitude of opposition to the traditional popular religion, or to treat it with indifference. From Heraclitus and Xenophanes onward, the relation between religion and science among the Greeks was a merely negative one, sometimes one of direct hostility, sometimes merely of indifference. Only the Stoics, and at the close the Neo-platonists, attempted to support the popular polytheistic belief, and to give it a new face by means of their pantheistic ideas; but both these attempts showed the problem to be an impos-

sible one. The mythological nature-religion possessed too scanty a stock of true ideas, too little power for living development, to receive the fertilising and renovating influences of philosophy. Socrates, the most pious of the philosophers, was condemned to the cup of hemlock, and the idealistic philosophy of his school remained without effect on the religion of the Greeks; only in Christianity, which had a deep affinity for it, did Greek philosophy prove a powerful leaven of development.

In the Christian world again science proceeded from religion, from theological doctrine, and here too the daughter broke away in time from the mother and asserted her independence. Here, however, the relation is essentially different from what it was among the Greeks. However much religion and science have been at variance, whatever feuds they have waged with each other, they never quite parted company, they always exercised a positive attraction on each other, influenced each other, vivified and fertilised each other. This peculiar relation is due to the circumstance, that Christianity early developed doctrines or "*dogmas*" in which it possessed an element both nearly related to philosophy and specifically different from it. These two sides are intimately connected with the origin of dogma. The ordinary view, that dogma proceeded out of theological speculation which was partly under the influence of philosophy, is true with respect to the definite scholastic form in which dogma was clothed; but we must not forget that formal theological reflection found the materials it worked on ready to its hand in the ideas of the religious consciousness of the community. These ideas did not proceed out of theological reflection, but out of that prophetic intuition which we learned above to regard as the form of consciousness in which higher truths of eternal importance have become manifest to the human mind—the word of God clothed in human form, under natural conditions; substance and form, essence and representation immediately in one, without the difference between the two being observed.

The religious ideas which underlie Christian dogma were in part given to the Christian church by the Old Testament prophets, while in part they grew up in the minds of the Christian Apostles and

Evangelists from their absorbed contemplation of the life and death of Christ. The ethical monotheism of the prophets, their belief in one great rule of the world according to a moral plan, in the destiny of man for likeness and communion with God, in the infinite value of every human soul, in the presence of the divine Spirit in the hearts of the good, in the possibility of overcoming the sin and evil of the world by the victorious power of faith and love, in the not-to-be-arrested coming of the kingdom of God on earth and its consummation in heaven—these fundamental traits of biblical religion are truths of the greatest importance and of permanent validity, and contain the most fruitful germs of the scientific view of the world, so that the Apostle can say with truth that in Christ (in the Christian faith) are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col. ii. 3). These truths, however, were clothed at first in childlike and poetic forms, which while to our eyes merely the perishing shell of that precious kernel, were to the minds of those through whom the revelation accomplished itself, and to the mind of their church, inseparable from the kernel. In spite of the exalted moral nature of God he was yet represented by the prophets quite after the fashion of a man, both in figure and in his modes of feeling and of action, and while the prophet himself experienced the revelation of God as an inner occurrence in his mind, the legend yet made of it an outward, visible and audible occurrence, a miraculous story of a past event not to be compared to any experience that the moral religion of the present has to show. While the eye of faith saw everywhere in history the traces of the divine government, the ways of God's wisdom, the decrees of his holy love, the hope of the seer yet looked for the appearance in the future of a miraculous kingdom descending from the skies with the Son of Man seated on the clouds of heaven. The Apostle was acquainted with sin and righteousness as the two contending powers, indwelling in us, of the flesh and the spirit, and yet he could speak of one of them as the curse inherited from Adam, and of the other as the fruit of redemption and the gift of grace derived from the atoning death of Christ. Thus even in an ethical religion which has left the standpoint of nature-mythology far

behind it, there is still connected with the spiritual kernel a sensuous form of view, in which we of the present day may be able to see merely a symbol, produced by fancy, of an ideal thought, but which was at first by no means a mere symbol, a mere poetic unliteral garb of thought. This oscillation between the spirit of the contents and the sense of the form is characteristic of the religious "idea," which though born of man's reason, yet primarily seeks to serve not the mind which knows but the heart which feels, and therefore receives its form at first from the free poetising of fancy. Judged from the point of view of theoretical knowledge this might seem to be a defect in the religious idea, and to detract from its value; but from the point of view of religious practice it is an advantage; hovering in the middle between spirit and sense the idea serves as the most fitting form for the religious act of elevation from sense to spirit. At the same time its peculiar character renders it sufficiently elastic and fluid to adapt itself to the changes of the religious need within the lifetime of individual men as well as in religious communities. As the religious consciousness advances, an ever deeper suggestion is imported into the traditional forms of the religious idea. What was understood at first mainly as a matter of sense is more and more spiritualised, the spiritual meaning first taking its place by the side of the grosser one, and then gradually, and at last altogether, supplanting it, so that what was at first intended quite literally is now taken in a non-literal sense, as the symbolical form for a purer thought. Examples of this may be found at every step of the history of religion; we have only to think of those anthropomorphic and anthropopathic representations of the deity which, with the advance of the religious consciousness, have lost their literal original meaning and become more and more a figurative form of speech: in the same way the biblical notions, Word of God, Son of God, Kingdom of God, have passed in the lapse of centuries through manifold changes of meaning. It is of the greatest importance for an understanding of historical religion that we do not forget that the religious idea is in this way elastic and capable of change.

Now as soon as the need arises within a religious community for

assuring itself of its common faith, and formulating it in an expression which shall be permanently valid, the idea which till now was fluid and changing is fixed in scholastic forms. This fixing and formulating the religious idea in dogma is no longer a matter of productive fancy, but belongs to the reflecting intellect. It assumes religious truth as in general given, but seeks to define it more precisely, to develop it, to prove it; between the different sides of the idea, which often do not agree with each other, it draws lines explaining their connection and showing their agreement with each other; it seeks theoretical substructions for the postulates of the religious consciousness, draws from the premisses of the latter their logical consequences, and shows their connection with existing usages (the origin of which is frequently very remote and has no affinity whatever for the dogma) as well as with the view of the world which prevails at the time. In all these ways it seeks to introduce some tolerable connection, something like a system into the contents of the religious consciousness, so that the various moments which when isolated from each other appeared in the light of arbitrary assumptions, and were therefore liable to doubt, mutually support and strengthen each other and so produce the impression of a complete view of the world which can scarcely fail to command conviction. When definitions are thus made precise, and consequences logically drawn, the difficulties and intellectual stumbling-blocks which were more latent in the original simple poetry of the idea appear in a harshness till now unknown, and the claim of dogma to be acknowledged and confessed as the literal and accurate expression of the truth becomes a cross to the intellect which is thus required to think the unthinkable. To this it has to be added that the process of dogmatic formulating and systematising brings religious ideas, though they grew from quite a different root, into an intimate connection with the ideas pertaining to the general cultivation of the time, and this foreign garb often renders their original meaning hard to recognise. Every one knows what a wide interval there is between the theology of the fifth century and that of the New Testament; and yet it would be unjust to suppose that the labours of the Fathers

by which this result was brought about were a work of mere caprice, or to refuse to recognise the law of development which was at work in this field too. The philosophical notion-language of the age, for one thing, appeared to afford the most convenient means for setting forth the faith as scholastically formulated ; and for another thing we must not forget that Christian thought was powerfully attracted from the very first by the closely related Platonic and Stoic philosophy, and that this attraction produced consequences which ultimately led (think only of the Logos-doctrine !) by irresistible necessity to bold dogmatic constructions. Should it be counted a crime on the part of the Fathers, that they continued to spin out processes of thought which are undeniably suggested in the New Testament ? To deny the presence of such suggestions in the New Testament in order to load the Fathers the more at our ease with the whole responsibility for the dogmatic ballast of the church, this is not to judge the matter in a historical way.

When dogma thus arose, the intellect defining the religious idea with the help of philosophy, the truth of the idea thus operated on was assumed as a settled certainty. And this it continues to be during the whole period of the purely formal elaboration of the dogmas to a system of belief arranged down to the smallest detail, in other words the period of *scholastic dogmatic*, the peculiar character of which consists just in this work of purely formal thought which restricts itself to a given and inviolable matter of faith. Now the more thought gathers strength in this formal exercise, and the more it at the same time visits the school of philosophy which is independent of dogma, the more certainly must the period arrive when it awakens to the consciousness of its own autonomy, and ventures to assert that autonomy even against the contents of dogma. Slowly and unperceived does this change in general creep on in the life of religious communities. At first it is on the territory of extra-dogmatic, worldly science, considered to be neutral and free from danger, that reflective reason tries to walk alone without the leading-strings of doctrinal authority. But when it has once tasted of the tree of knowledge, of free inquiry, on any field, it has irrecoverably

lost the paradise of simple and unbroken faith, the innocence of childhood as it were, in matters of faith. Its eyes inevitably open to perceive the chasm which yawns between the results of its secular inquiries and the traditional ideas of faith. Yet as long as the authority of the latter is firmly seated in feeling and in acquired habits of thought, or even in the power of public opinion and of the existing social fabric, refuge is taken in the doctrine of the "*double truth*," the philosophical (secular) and the theological (revealed), which though they flatly contradict each other, yet are both equally true, and in no way encroach on each other, as they have nothing to do with each other. This is a very naïve way out of the difficulty, and whenever we encounter it in sensible people either in ancient or in modern times we are strongly tempted to doubt, whether it can be seriously meant. Who can read the sentences of a William Occam or a Peter Bayle without seeing that he is writing with his tongue in his cheek? And the historical origin of this extraordinary doctrine is such as to strengthen us in this suspicion; it served the Averroist school of the later Middle Ages to conceal the heresies it had drawn from the Aristotelian philosophy as compared with the doctrine of the church; and it was much favoured by that indifferentism towards all positive religions which was the natural result of the manifold intercourse of enlightened minds of all confessions with each other under the sceptre of the great Hohenstaufen, Frederick II. Thus even history teaches us to regard this doctrine as the fig-leaf of a shamefaced or only half-conscious scepticism. It can never be a tenable position; it can never be more than the *symptom of a period of transition*, where an old view of the world is crumbling away and yet retains some power of resistance, while a new one is coming on which is not yet clear enough or strong enough to settle its relations accurately with the old one.

Following the development of the religious spirit a step further we find that the position of the "double truth" is followed by one which is closely related to it, and which likewise seeks to maintain the truth of dogma as well as the rights of reason. The relation between the two is now said to be that dogma can never be *contrary*

to reason, but is *above* reason. This is supernaturalism ; it attempts to mark off the two spheres accurately from each other, and to prevent any conflict from taking place between the two by not allowing them to touch each other at any point. It was notably the Leibniz-Wolffian school which hoped to keep the peace with the belief of the church by means of this treaty of boundaries. Such a pacification is no doubt well meant, but whenever it is relied on the same doom repeats itself which drastically enough descended on Wolff himself : the compromise is one which carries war in its bosom. Even this is an untenable fiction, that the two spheres admit of being marked off from each other so definitely as to make a collision impossible between them. Will reason consent to be debarred from free inquiry into the universe, the position of the earth in it, the development of life on the earth, the nature and the primitive history of mankind ? These questions reason justly claims for its domain, but in all of them it is encroaching on the sphere of ecclesiastical traditions. And then the history of the holy Scriptures, as well as of the dogmatic controversies which led to the settlement of the dogmas, does not this as well as the whole subsequent history of the church, and the whole of secular history, belong to the province of free and reasonable inquiry ? But where are the limits to be drawn to the consequences of these historical inquiries, which may prove so immediately dangerous to the fundamental dogma of the supernatural authority of Scripture as well as to the dogmas of the old church councils ? Let reason once have seen in the study of history by what process the Canon of the Bible was formed as well as all those mysterious dogmas, and will she not soon take the further step, and summon to the forum of her free inquiry the assumed higher divinely revealed truth of these matters, for the sake of which it is claimed for them that they are "above reason" ? How reason has actually taken this step, we see from the history of Protestant theology from Semler downwards, the father of German rationalism. And that this step had to be taken is clear from the very nature of thinking reason. For when once human reason has awakened to the consciousness of her autonomy, when once she has perceived that the logical laws

which are inherent in her are the sole norm of her knowing activity, and that she is able and is called to know objective truth, to find reason in the actual world, according to those laws, she will seek to extend this business of thinking knowledge over everything that comes within the sphere of her experience outward or inward, and will never allow any limit to be set at which she should stop short with her thinking. She must at least be able to see some intelligible reason why reasonable thought is not to be allowed beyond such a limit. And this supernaturalism has as a fact conceded, having undertaken to prove by reasonable arguments the possibility, the necessity, and the actual existence of a revelation which transcends reason, though not observing, it may be said, of what a fatal inconsistency it was guilty in doing so; for how can reason regard anything as revealed truth which is not revealed to her, but closed, dark, and enigmatical? Is not this to pronounce a judgment and to deny to ourselves in the same breath the capacity of judging? If reason be able to prove the fact of the occurrence of a revelation—and so much supernaturalism certainly is bound to do for its opponents—then it follows of necessity that reason must be able to understand the revelation; and, therefore, that there are no supra-rational truths of revelation such as simply withdraw themselves from all knowledge. And thus the supernaturalist position destroys itself.

Rationalism accordingly drew a logical inference from supernaturalism when it declared that what is *above* reason must be *contrary* to reason, and thus altogether rejected it and proposed to extend the right of reason to autonomous judgment and knowledge over the whole domain of faith. The demand that anything not understood and absolutely incomprehensible should be held true on authority alone, rationalism rejects and regards as illegitimate; and it is right in doing so, as this is only putting forward the demand that the mind should be with itself in religion too, that it should not possess religion as a matter foreign to itself, but should actually appropriate it as a living property, should penetrate it as thinking spirit. That rationalism, taking up this point of view, applied a thorough intellectual criticism to the body of traditional beliefs, and

so at least prepared the way for a knowledge which should penetrate deeper into their religious meaning, this is the valuable service which history can never refuse to allow that rationalism rendered to religion. The limit of rationalism, on the other side, is that it never got beyond this mere intellectual criticism, never penetrated to a positive understanding of the religious truth present in dogma. In this it shares the erroneous assumption which supernaturalism also made; the opinion that is, that religion itself is identical with the form of the representation of religion which is fixed in dogma; the failure to distinguish between the symbol and the substance. From this false premiss, which is common to both, the two parties then proceed to draw opposite conclusions, both alike right, both alike wrong, according as they lay weight on the one or the other of the two sides which they have failed properly to distinguish. The truth of religious experience; the fact of a higher God-connected life really experienced in the act of faith, this is the truth in the position of supernaturalism; its error is that from this position it ascribes truth to the presentation in which faith comes, though this is no more than the theoretical form for the living practical religious substance of it; to this form it ascribes objective literal truth for knowledge, though it is a thing that refuses to be so known. It is the mistake of rationalism, on the other hand, that it ignores the kernel of profound and living religious truth which is concealed under the symbolical husk of dogmatic ideas; it is clear and intellectual, and has no understanding for the dark depths of emotional and intuitive life, for the reason of the heart and of fancy, which finds its peculiar expression in the language of religion; it is subjective and has little power of understanding various modes of thought, and has no feeling for the historical development of human capacities or for the dependence of every individual consciousness on the general consciousness of the age (*cf.* p. 68). Supernaturalism seeks to hold fast the perishable form for the sake of the precious contents, and in so doing condemns religion itself to stiffen in formalism and mechanical rites. Rationalism shatters the vessel which is no longer sufficient, but in doing so lets the religious contents themselves be lost to a greater or less

extent, replacing them with a moral kind of religion by which the religious sentiment is but little satisfied, and which is capable of passing on occasion into an entirely irreligious eudæmonism and naturalism. But though its positive result is so scanty and unsatisfying, rationalism can never be deprived of the credit history assigns it of having carried the labour thought had to do on dogma to a final issue on the negative side. Thought which, at the standpoint of scholasticism, had confidently believed itself to possess in dogma the pure and unadulterated truth, had now reached such a pass as to despair of finding in dogma any truth at all.

In this shipwreck of the form of faith religious *mysticism* proved to be the lifeboat which saves faith itself and its inalienable right, and brings it safe to land through the storm of destroying criticism. Mysticism is the immediate feeling of the unity of self with God; it is nothing therefore but the fundamental feeling of religion, the religious life at its very heart and centre. But what makes the mystical a special tendency inside religion, what makes it "mysticism," is the endeavour to fix the immediateness of the life in God as such, as abstracted from all intervening helps and channels whatever, and find a permanent abode in the abstract inwardness of the life of pious feeling. In this God-intoxication in which self and the world are alike forgotten, the subject knows himself to be in possession of the highest and fullest truth, but this truth is only possessed in the quite undeveloped, simple, and bare form of monotonous feeling; what truth the subject possesses is not filled up by any determinations in which the simple unity might unfold itself, and it lacks therefore the clearness of knowledge, which is only attained when thought harmonises differences with unity. The mystic consciousness is related to developed religious knowledge as the blossom still closed and retiring to the rich odour and colour of the unfolded flower. Clement of Alexandria was right so far, when he characterised *πίστις* as *σύντομος γνώσις* and *γνώσις* as *πίστις ἐπιστημονική*. And on this peculiarity of the mystical position are based alike its strength and its weakness.

The strength of mysticism lies first of all in the warmth and

inwardness of feeling it concentrates on the inner life; then in the boldness, originality and depth of the pictures of imagination in which that feeling seeks, as it were stammering, to body forth that which it possesses, and which, unformed as they are, yet often furnish the rough sketches for the building of speculative thought (*cf.* Jakob Böhme); and lastly and principally in the freedom of the subject which has God within itself from the fetters and means of objective religion. All those historical appliances of sacred doctrines, legends, and customs, in which, to the ordinary believer, religion itself seems to consist, the true mystic regards as external matters which pale before the "inner light" of the revelations of God in his own breast as the stars before the rising sun. Not that he is minded to directly attack these forms as the rationalistic freethinker does; he could not do so without dwelling upon them, and that he will not do, neither to approve them nor to condemn them. But while the mystic knows himself to be raised so high in the essential certainty of his own inner religious life, above all those external things, so that he can scarcely expect any increase of his spiritual goods from any such quarter, and still less requires to feel himself, his whole religious personality, bound to them, as the ordinary believer does; yet in such sovereign disregard there lies as decided a denial of the claims of the outward ecclesiastical institute of salvation and of its historical traditions as in the direct criticism and polemic of rationalism. All the difference between the two is that mystical criticism flows out of the fulness and energy of the religious life, that of rationalism out of the religious emptiness and impotence of the bare intellect. And this explains perfectly why mystical heresy has always and everywhere been much more odious to the clergy than that of the rationalistic free-thinkers. From the latter the existing religious system has little or nothing to fear, since empty negation has soon said its say, and has to evacuate the field as soon as the claims of the heart begin to be heard again; while mystical criticism again is like the plough which tears up the hardened soil and prepares it to receive the noble seed of new and permanent life. It was not the worldly smile of free-thinking scholars and men of

the world that a Cajetan once feared, but the "deep eyes" of the German monk, out of which the fervour of mysticism and the electric thoughts of speculation lightened like heralds of the approaching storm. How mediæval mysticism helped to prepare the downfall of scholasticism, and how through Luther it directly influenced the Reformation, is well known. But in the late Stoic and Platonic mysticism also of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, of Proclus and Plotinus, etc., we may recognise one of the most important factors which co-operated to bring about the fall of the old gods and temples, and the victory of the new and deeper religion. Nor was it otherwise in India, where mysticism opposed the ceremonial and caste-system of Brahmanism, and prepared the way for the Reformation of Buddha. Very marked was the opposition of the mysticism of Persian Sufism to the stiff traditional legal religion of Islam. With this free attitude towards the external forms of positive religion there is further connected the tendency to religious syncretism, which is often found in connection with mysticism ; and this is also a feature of rationalistic indifferentism, only with the difference that the latter does not care for religion itself, for the essential contents of it, while, on the contrary, it is the mystic's exclusive attention to the innermost kernel of religion that makes him indifferent to the peculiarities which separate different religions from each other.

This indifference, however, is closely bound up with that which forms the fundamental defect of mysticism, viz., that it scorns to bring forth the rich treasures of religious strength, freedom, and truth which dwell in it into clear consciousness, and to give them the higher value of thought-out convictions. That he may not become onesided, nor separate in abstract thinking what he possesses as a unity in the reality of his religious life, the mystic prefers not to leave the indefinite unity of the self-centred life of feeling for thought and reflection, which always set out with dissecting the universal into its determinations in order to know it in its definiteness. Hence, though mysticism always forms a leaven of religious development, it contributes very little directly to the increase of religious knowledge, much less than rationalism, which is so much poorer in religious

contents, but keeps its understanding clear. "Mysticism apprehends the problems of science correctly, because it gives expression to the immediate fact of the religious life; but to make mysticism itself a scientific principle would be the negation of science, which has to strive towards its mark, the understanding of life, through the exercise of the intellect" (Biedermann). And this intellectual defect exercises a paralysing and confusing influence on mysticism itself. That freedom which mysticism asserts in principle as against objective religious forms and traditions it is often enough led by its intellectual weakness to forget *in concreto*, and it scarcely ever asserts to the full extent. What drives the mystics, inwardly so free, back under the yoke of tradition, is not merely the shrinking felt by men of one-sided emotional nature from any open conflict with the authorities of the prevailing religious system; they actually feel the need of some form in which their transcendent feeling may find utterance, and the fulness of their visions an embodiment. The form that offers itself to them most readily for this purpose is the faith of the church, which has long taken form in dogma and in worship. Hence the mystic, his own religious life of feeling being undefined and formless, is naturally very easily led to seek in positive dogma a theoretical support and expression for his vague and fluid sentiment. But when he does so he cannot hide from himself that this form is ill-suited and inadequate for the richer contents of his feeling, and so dogma repels him again when he comes to feel that he cannot get rid of it. The most striking example of this irresolute attitude is that of the curious and powerful genius Hamann, in whom the blindest belief on authority is accompanied, without any attempt to reconcile the two, with the proudest appeals to his own inspiration; the Romanticists, too, often exhibit the same phenomenon. Yet this relapse into the servitude of belief on the authority of dogma is only one of the two dangers to which mysticism is exposed by reason of its intellectual weakness. When it seeks to insist upon its freedom, and yet to spare itself the pains of serious thinking, it falls with the greater certainty into the abyss of fantastic enthusiasm. Fancy, fired by transcendent feeling, and curbed by no discipline of thought, then frames out of the frag-

ments of religious traditions, of philosophical systems, and even of the study of nature, a picture of the world according to its own most private taste, in which the presentiments and suggestions of profound speculation cross and recross in the most fanciful confusion with the rudest conceptions of a childish mythology. The Gnostic and Theosophic systems of old and of modern times are such crosses of speculation and mythology at the bidding of fantastic mysticism. The value of these differs very greatly, according as the rational element preponderates in them (as, *e.g.*, in Jakob Böhme), or the sensuous mythical form (as with most of the countless enthusiasts of all times). And in this latter case the theoretical confusion of mysticism is too easily increased by practical confusion too; the sensuous fantastic view of the world becomes the basis of a sensuous libertine tendency of life. That this degeneration is never far away from mysticism with its intense and one-sided life of feeling and fancy, we see from countless instances in its history both in the Eastern and the Western world, from the Gnostics of old down to those extraordinary "Latter-day Saints" at the Salt Lake.

The combination mysticism offers of the inwardness of subjective feeling and the objectivity of tradition, being of so confused a nature, and so destitute of a true principle, we are obliged to inquire for some higher harmony of the two positions (rationalism and supernaturalism); mysticism starts us on this quest, but cannot give us what we seek. If we are to arrive at any actual synthesis of the discrete elements in question, it must be through an inquiry, setting forth from general points of view, as to the relation in point of principle between the subjective and the objective elements of our knowledge. For the antithesis between theological rationalism and supernaturalism (dogmatic positivism) is only one particular form of the general antithesis in questions as to the theory of knowledge, between philosophical rationalism (idealism), according to which all our ideas proceed out of our own mind, as *Leibniz* taught, and empiricism (philosophical positivism), according to which they are derived from outward experience, or from impressions of sense, as *Locke* believed.

Those tendencies led ultimately to a dogmatism (*Wolff*) and a scepticism (*Hume*) which were both equally barren, and were thus shown to be alike untenable; and so the necessity arose to go back to a higher point of view. This was done in the philosophy of *Kant*. In his criticism of the faculty of knowledge Kant set himself to reconcile the antithetical standpoints of empiricism and rationalism by showing that all our ideas are derived both from our own mind and from experience, the latter in point of the contents of the mind, given to us in the sensations of the outer and the inner sense, the former in point of the forms which are native to our own mind, the forms of view, space, and time, and the forms of thought, the categories. From this subjective character of our forms of view and of thought Kant inferred two things; in so far as they possess a basis in ourselves, before all experience, in so far as they are *a priori*, they are of universal validity and necessity, but in so far as they are of subjective origin only, they are only valid so far as our subjective ideas extend of which our experience is composed, but they do not extend beyond these to the "things in themselves" which lie beyond our consciousness, and these, therefore, cannot be to us objects of knowledge. Thus, according to Kant, the mind is the sole lawgiver for the world of our experience, but for that world alone.

This was a momentous turn; on one side too much was credited to the human mind, on the other side too little, and occasion was thus given for a twofold error. If our mind be the sole lawgiver of the world of our ideas, then, Fichte concluded, it is the sole creator of that world, and as no other world but the alone thinkable world of our consciousness can have any reality, the world is nothing but the product of the consciousness of our Ego. Though this subjective idealism soon underwent correction at the hands of *Schelling* and *Hegel*, who showed that not our thought but the absolute thought was the world-ground, yet even on this showing thought and being were still one, the world was nothing but the unfolding of the absolute idea, and hence our knowledge of the world too was to be reached by the *a priori* dialectic of pure thought; abstract idealism once more, which Kant had sought to harmonise with empiricism. The reaction to

empiricism followed soon. The modern cry, "Back to Kant!" was a proposal to revive the empiric and sceptical side of Kantian thought, his limitation of knowledge to the world of phenomena, while the thing-in-itself was in part left on one side as problematical, in part filled in with the postulates of practical reason—a renewal of that sceptical supernaturalism which was not rare among theologians at the beginning of the present century, who thought it an allowable thing to apply the results of the Kantian criticism *in usum Delphini*. But while this sceptical empiricism goes back beyond Kant to Locke and Hume, it does not coincide with the true tendency of the Kantian philosophy any more than speculative idealism does, in fact not nearly so well.

To escape from this vicious circle we must first of all try to see clearly the reason of Kant's mistake. It does not lie in the fundamental tendency of his criticism, in the distinction between the subjective and the objective element of our knowledge. On the contrary, the great and abiding truth of criticism is just this, that all our ideas are products of the activity of our own consciousness, hence always conditioned by the peculiar forms of that consciousness, and therefore neither the things themselves nor purely and immediately corresponding to them; that therefore nothing that is in any way given in our consciousness is to be held to be, just as it is, objective and universally-valid truth; that, on the contrary, all the phenomena of consciousness can only count as signs from which thought has to infer the things themselves. And here lies the questionable point in Kant. Regarding the forms of our view and of our thought as only subjectively valid because he sees them to have their basis in ourselves, he does away with the possibility of concluding from the contents of consciousness to the thing in itself; and thus his distinction between subject and object amounts to such a severance of the two as to make the nature of the object, nay its very existence, quite problematical. The subject is always on the point of doing away with the object, and yet never actually does so; hence the changing, oscillating character of the Kantian philosophy, which leads to a constant succession of expositions and demonstra-

tions now on one side and now on the other. But though Kant asserted with great emphasis that the validity of our forms of knowledge was limited to the phenomena of our consciousness, he never proved this, and he did not even keep firm hold of his own statement on this point (vol. i. p. 150 *sqq.*). On the contrary, he himself concludes by means of the category of causality to the things-in-themselves which lie at the basis of phenomena, and ascribes to them the categories of substantiality, multiplicity, and persistence; he declares our mind to be the sole ruler of nature, but lets nature be arranged by the causality of God with a view to the ends of the highest good; he accounts for the connected order of our ideas partly from their common reference to the Ego, partly by their reference to something that is independent of our thought, and thus assumes not only the existence of such a thing but also the possibility of our thoughts and ideas having reference to it.

And this is in fact quite necessary. As little as the weaving of ideas into knowledge would be possible without the unity of the idea-forming Ego, as little is it possible without a reference of the various ideas to trans-subjective, independently existing things, as their cause. Without this reference, any one may convince himself by a little attention to what goes on in his own mind, the inside of our mind would be at each moment a disorganised chaos of fragments of ideas, which would stand beside each other, come, go, return—who can tell why or whence or to what end—without any inner connection with each other—a giddy dance of idea-pictures, the succession of which as immediately given in the mind would tell us for the most part nothing of any causal nexus, and for which we should be absolutely unable to discover any sufficient cause in ourselves. To this chaos of ideas there is only added a rational order when we regard our ideas as signs which point to a being; when, that is to say, we infer the cause from the effect, and think things to the phenomena of consciousness, things which are in themselves, which have an actual existence apart from ours and outside of us, and stand in a connection with each other which is independent of our forth-

setting, and founded in the things themselves. When this is done the ideas in our consciousness arrange themselves for our thinking simply by being referred to that connection of things which we have assumed; they represent to us the fragmentary appearances of that connection, and are thought as dependent on it. What distinguishes the ideas of waking consciousness from those of dreams is just that in the former that regular reference to a connection behind them is possible, while it is quite absent in the latter. That our ideas are manifestations of something really existing and not an empty show, that they are signs of things and not mere fictions of our imagination we prove by this, that we—quite involuntarily of course, and without being aware of it as an additional operation of the mind—draw out further in our thoughts the lines of the phenomena of our consciousness, which so thickly cross and recross each other, and every here and there break off altogether, and seek for the points of connection between them in the existence, which lies beyond our perceptions, but which thought adds, of the things-in-themselves. Thus all our rational knowledge from beginning to end is based on the fact that we do not stand still at the phenomenal world of our consciousness, but go out beyond it in thought to the trans-subjective existence of the things in themselves, an existence which does not appear, but which we assume. But if thought is to be allowed, indeed must be allowed to take the step from the subjective to the objective world, then there is no reason whatever for drawing a fixed limit anywhere to its knowledge of the latter. If in our idea-pictures which we derive from experience both outward and inward we do possess signs of that which exists, then it is open to thought to work them up (comparison, combination, induction, analogy), and so to gain a knowledge of the manifold properties and modes of operation of things and of the laws of their connection with each other. The thought of “law,” however, around which all science turns, carries us, when we follow it out, straight into metaphysics; for the laws which science labours to know are by no means mere subjective rules of the process of our ideas, but denote a universal and necessary connection of that which exists, a connec-

tion which cannot be given in any perception of experience (for experience never contains what is universal or necessary), but is added to our perceptions by our thought. And thus we are driven to assume that there is in things themselves an objective causal nexus corresponding to the causal connection of our ideas.

That this is really the case can as little be seriously questioned as the reality of the external world, our certainty of which moreover is bound up with the assumption of such a causal bond. For if there were no correspondence between the world that exists in our thought and the world of things that exists independently of us, we could no longer find in the phenomena of consciousness any signs of real existence, it would be impossible for us to infer the latter from the former, the logical basis would be entirely taken away, on which we assume an existence which is independent of our consciousness, and yet we have positive need of this assumption if we are to introduce any order or connection into the chaos of the phenomena of our consciousness. And if this necessity of thought guarantees to us the truth of the world of things which we assume, to the extent that there is such a world, no less does it assure us what that world is, that it corresponds in its character with the world of our thought. And the fact of this correspondence is also corroborated by all these experiences where the phenomena we expected on account of the connections (laws) of being in our thought enter our consciousness accurately in the way we had foreseen. The every-day experiences without the certainty of which we could not arrange our acts with a view to any desired ends, are so many proofs from experience of the correctness of those laws of being which we have assumed, or of the agreement of the world outside us with the world of our thought. And how can we explain to ourselves the possibility of this agreement, the actuality of which we cannot doubt, but by the assumption that the laws of knowledge deposited in our nature, and the laws of being which are in things, have their common ground in one and the same creative reason, the thoughts of which are expressed in part objectively in the necessary relations of being in the world, in part subjectively in the innate functional norms of our knowledge which reflects that

world? The critical movement of thought seems to me necessarily to lead to this speculative conclusion.

Have we then arrived once more at absolute idealism, which held thought to be identical with being, and hence thought it possible to draw the whole of reality deductively out of pure thought? Not so: we are withheld by two considerations from this aberration. In the first place, we do not forget that the *a priori* possessions of which the critical position assures us, are not a content of consciousness, of what nature soever, not a definite thought from which further determinations and contents might be deduced; not even the definite notions, space, time, motion, number, cause, substance, etc., which we might make the basis of an *a priori* construction of the world. What is given to us *a priori* is nothing but the formal arrangement, which prescribes a definite rule of procedure to us when we weave sensations into ideas, and ideas into judgments; this must be done by us in a certain way, because of a sentiment of logical necessity we cannot escape from, in which the *a priori* constitution of our reason asserts itself as an instinct. This sentiment is analogous, it is true, to our moral æsthetic and religious sentiments, but cannot be traced to them, as it lies on a different and an independent side of our mind; it has no immediate connection with our emotional or practical life, but only contains the logical norm of our faculty of reason in respect of its general and formal correctness, with whatever matters it may deal. But a formal functional arrangement can only develop itself and become real by actually discharging its function, and our faculty of knowledge can only develop itself and become real by means of certain matters which it does not itself contribute, but which it receives from stimuli brought to bear on it from without or from within. Thus the development of our *a priori* forms of knowledge, and therefore also our becoming conscious of them in definite notions, depends on our being supplied with matters of knowledge which are not *a priori* or which are derived from experience. If by our forms of view and of thought we understand those definite notions of space, time, cause, etc., which we have acquired from reflecting on our own instinctive procedure, then it is quite correct to say, that

these are not innate in us *a priori*, but acquired from our actual knowledge of the world. But it is equally certain that they never could have been derived from experience unless certain definite norms of view and of thought had been inborn in us, and had possessed for us the force of instinctive necessity. Two things accordingly are equally true; without experience we could never come to any actual application of the *a priori* laws of knowledge, and could never come to be aware of them; and without certain forms of knowledge having been deposited in us *a priori*, we could never have come to have any correct experience. It is the error of abstract idealism that it fails to recognise the first of these two truths; the fault of positivism that it fails to recognise the latter.

Here we have to notice another point. The absolute idealism of Hegel bases its right to *a priori* construction on the assumption that thought and being are identical, that reality is nothing but the unfolded totality of the moments of the idea, of logical thought. This position lay directly in the path of the idealism of Fichte, according to which the world is the product of the consciousness of the Ego, but it is little in harmony with the original spirit of the critical movement, according to which, while it is the intellect with its *a priori* forms of thought that determines the form of experience, the connection of ideas, it has nothing to say as to their contents, as to the nature of what is before the mind, and so does not dissolve this essence into mere forms of thought. And this state of matters will not be changed, though as is certainly necessary, we extend the validity of our forms of knowledge to the things which exist outside us. True, these things outside us are beside each other in the form of space, and move in succession in the form of time, and are connected with each other in the causal form of dependence; but all this tells us nothing whatever about the essence of them; we have not the least reason to assume that it will be expressed exhaustively in these formal categories. But if we cannot let the essence of things disappear in thought as idealism does, are we to suppose with positivism that that essence is entirely withdrawn from our knowledge? That we could only do if we forgot that in our willing and

feeling Ego, a point is given us where we do not need to infer the essence from the idea picture of it, but are immediately aware of it. In will, with which we are acquainted in our immediate feeling of ourselves, whether active or passive, we come to the knowledge at first hand of a being which is something other than picture, form, relation, idea, or notion, which, on the contrary, is immediately actual and active in itself, which is substance and cause.

Thus *Schelling* and *Schopenhauer* are quite justified in applying the lever of criticism to the Panlogism of Hegel at this point, and in calling attention to the primary reality in the will, which, far from being lost in thought, is even fundamental to the categories of thought. When we act we know our will to be the cause of effects or changes which we see take place phenomenally, as sense-perceptions answering to our inward strivings; when we suffer, we know our will to be obstructed by a cause not lying in it, and which we therefore assume to be in an activity outside ourselves. Thus there arises for us out of our will and our active and passive states, in the first instance, the consciousness of causality, and then that of external reality. Here lies the practical "proof" (if we may call it so) of the reality of the external world, which we reached above from theoretical grounds as the necessary pre-supposition of the logical sequence of the phenomena of our consciousness. But from this point it becomes known to us not only that things are, but also what they are. When once we have recognised in our own willing and feeling ego that the essential or substantial being is a power or monad which exists independently, and is aware of its own identity amid the change of acting and being acted on, nothing can prevent us from applying this to the outward world, and conceiving it also to consist in the same way of just such substances, independent centres of force which also act and are acted on. And when we trace the appearances of bodies to such living forces or complexes of forces, the supposed absolute antithesis of body and soul disappears, the body itself becomes a system of soul-like forces, and the fact of its interaction with the soul is no longer an incomprehensible riddle. The question now is no longer how two things so absolutely opposed as spirit and

matter are supposed to be, can act upon each other, but only how a multiplicity of forces which are essentially immaterial can stand in a constant and regular interaction with each other, and can serve the ruling unity of the soul as its instrument? Whatever may be dark here, one thing at least is clear, that an orderly and serviceable interaction of forces among each other, such as thought compels us to assume, not only within the individual organism, but in the whole circle of existence, cannot be conceived without presupposing that it has one common ground, which, as the source of all particular forces, must be the primal force, as the source of the laws of their logical relations to each other must be the primal thought, and which we may therefore represent to ourselves most simply according to the analogy of our own ego which thinks and wills.

Thus, by simply carrying on the same procedure which seeks to explain the phenomena of our consciousness by adding to them in thought their self-existent ground, we have been led to the idea of God as the conclusion of our metaphysical explanation of the world. Here the idea of God is not added as a superfluous appendix, only called for by practical considerations, to an explanation of the world that is already complete without it, as appears to be the case with Kant, but as *Sigwart* admirably says at the end of his "Logik" (ii. 601), "It is the assumption without which no knowledge, in the true and strict sense, can be conceived; it does not travel beyond the experience that is given to us in any other direction than that in which every attempt to comprehend that which is given to us must do so; with the same justification with which we build up in particular substances and in their forces a kingdom of thought as the basis of the phenomenon, driven by the same impulse to gather up what is scattered into unity, we make the further step to the ultimate explanation of the world in accordance with the requirements of our thought. As little in the former case as in this is a strict logical demonstration possible, because reality outside ourselves can never be demonstrated. Here also we can only assure ourselves that the result we have attained is true from finding that our thoughts agree on the matter, and that the demands made by our

mind that what is given to us should be intelligible, are met. What distinguishes metaphysics from other science is not its method; the method of all knowledge is once for all and absolutely the same: it is the *universality of the problem*, and the problem of metaphysics is as imperative as that of knowledge generally. It stands at the beginning of all science, for it imparts clearness to the principles on which all scientific efforts proceed; it stands at the end of all science, since its presuppositions can only prove themselves true by the thorough agreement of all knowledge; it will remain a knowledge in part, as all knowledge is, so long as finite thought has not been widened and raised into Divine thought." To the same effect *Fechner* says (*Tages-und Nachtsansicht*, p. 16): "Those methods of inference from ourselves to that which is beyond ourselves, are in reality the same as those which we make use of everywhere in inferring from what is here to what is yonder, from to-day to to-morrow, with which, indeed, all experimental science concludes from what is given to what is not given. Who can deny that, taken separately, they become less and less secure the further and the higher they lead us past what is given to what is not given; but what they want in certainty when separate we seek to explain from the fact that they all agree, and from the agreement with them of practical considerations; thus where no strict knowledge is possible, we yet seek to approach to it as near as we can. We must allow that to be well founded which agrees, without any contradiction, with our fundamental points, and on which the points of view on every side agree."

The widely spread assertion that metaphysical objects, and God in particular, are unknowable, because "they are not given in our experience," can only impose upon us when we omit to give ourselves a clear account of the meaning of this proposition. What, strictly speaking, is given to me in experience? Nothing more, indeed, than the sensations and ideas which I find present in my consciousness at any particular time. What lies beyond these, is there anything beyond these? Of that I can never have any experience, or rather, I can only infer it from the phenomena of my

consciousness. That, for example, the pictures I have in my mind of other people have real beings corresponding to them, and that these have an inner life of their own like mine, is an assumption which altogether transcends my experience, in which I make an inference of cause, and of my own motion add to my representations the things in themselves. When these inferences have to do with the things which are nearest to us in the external world, we execute them so rapidly and involuntarily that we are not specially conscious of them at all. Only when our senses deceive us in some way or other are we led to remark the discrepancy between our ideas of things and the things themselves; or when we have occasion to look for the ulterior as well as the proximate causes of our ideas, then we begin consciously to reflect on our procedure in making such inferences. If we carry this procedure further in regular sequence, and extend our inferences in a constant advance from the near to the distant, from the familiar to the unknown, then we speak of scientific inquiry. And if then finally, continuing the same procedure, we seek to bring the individual causal connections into one general connection, and to see in this universal cause the justification of this whole procedure, the common basis of all causal connections, whether thought of or existing, this we call metaphysical thought. In this last effort it is natural that our steps should be a good deal less certain, and our hypotheses less definite and more exposed to doubt than they were upon the previous journey; but this difference is only one of degree, and one which is liable to variation; in principle the procedure and its justification are always quite the same; there is nowhere any limit where the world of the knowable might be supposed to be boarded up, so that we should have to stop there without any hope of ever advancing further.

That our metaphysical thought is far removed from "absolute knowledge," that it never rises above hypothetical probability, must no doubt be allowed; only we must add that it shares this character with all other knowledge which goes beyond our subjective ideas and occupies itself with reality. No absolute division can be established between an exact knowledge in the province of nature and a not-

knowing in the metaphysical sphere of religion. Where could the line be drawn between the two? Are not the fundamental notions of the knowledge of nature, force and motion, space and time, cause and law, atom, gravitation, development, life, stimulus, sensation, are not all of these metaphysical notions of the most problematical kind? "Strictly speaking," Fechner says, "everything is matter of faith that is not immediately experienced, or that is not logically certain; every knowing about that which is, extends into faith, must be carried into faith and conclude in faith, if there is to be any connection, any progress, any conclusion, of knowledge."

If accordingly we must give up the proud claim of idealism to absolute knowledge, not only in ultimate metaphysical questions, but in all sciences dealing with reality (pure mathematics and logic, perhaps, excepted), yet it has not come to such a point that sound reason should resign her post and leave the field to the wishes, pious or otherwise, of the heart. Even though man do not possess the all-knowing reason of God, he yet has some reason, and where there is reason there is not only the impulse towards unity of knowledge, but also the inner norm which in spite of endless aberrations yet always brings our search back to the right path, and so guides our groping steps that we can at least *approximate* to the one universal truth, as God possesses it. What, in the first instance, we set up tentatively, as a hypothesis which may explain the presentments we find in our minds, gains in probability in proportion as it is fitted to unite all our thoughts in a harmony which may claim to hold good in every direction. Now, the fundamental condition of any such harmony must always be, that it is suited to the *a priori* norms of knowledge in our minds. From the laws of logic the most pious wish cannot release us; ideas which cannot be thought without inner contradiction, or which violate in any way the logical connection of the world as known from other quarters, can make no claim to possess objective truth or universal validity. But while logical thinking is indispensable as a *sine qua non*, while it has invincible force as a negative criterion of falsity, it is quite unable to give us by itself any positive grasp of truth. The correctness of the form does not by any means

guarantee the correctness of the contents, the great point is that the form (*e.g.* the causal proposition) be rightly applied to the matter in hand in each case. And the matter of experience is so infinitely manifold and admits of so many possibilities of explanation that an approach to the truth can only be made by constant elimination of what appears unsuitable or improbable, and by constantly renewed attempts to advance further.

But while *theoretical* knowledge must thus be always relative and approximate, and must come short of absolute truth, it receives from the *practical* side a supplement which raises it to full conviction. This concurrence of these two sides takes place both in the most elementary and in the highest objects of knowledge. Every one is convinced of the reality of the outer world; why? The theoretic argument tells us that without this assumption we cannot reach any reasonable explanation of the phenomena of our consciousness, but should this argument want cogency, what it wants is supplied by the practical necessity every one experiences of making the reality of the outer world the basis of his purposes and acts. It is not otherwise with the conviction of the reality of God; it is *the joint result arrived at from the agreement of theoretic arguments and practical motives*. Theoretically, the idea of God is the hypothesis which is needed to explain the connection of the world. The case is not that of an explanation of the world, in other respects satisfactory, which requires this idea as an ornamental completion of its structure; on the contrary, our whole logical view of the world would have no foundation to support it, and would thus fail to satisfy that impulse of knowledge which strives after unity and necessity, did not that regular and purposeful connection which binds the changing and the manifold in the unity of an orderly and persistent whole, possess its ground of unity in a supreme governing power. Practically, however, the idea of God is the necessary postulate which gives our will and feelings their final end, their highest good; not as if a moral consciousness which is based upon itself and might be sufficient for itself should need the thought of a transcendental supplement to eke out its partial insufficiency; on the contrary, all our willing would

lack its highest and all-determining goal, our heart would lack rest and satisfaction, if the perfect ideal should be a mere subjective presentment of the mind without objective reality. This practical motive and that theoretical argument support each other mutually, like the two sides of an arch which only give security to the whole by each inclining towards the other ; only from their being as far as possible in harmony with each other can man obtain full conviction in the highest matters.

This brings us to the general question of the relation of religion and science. Both arise out of invincible needs of the human mind, and the two meet in their highest object, the idea of God. But they approach that point by different roads, and they therefore look upon it from different points of view. Science arises out of the impulse of our mind towards logical knowledge ; it starts from the phenomena which are given in consciousness, and seeks to place these in connection with each other and to explain them from their causes, and so at last it arrives at God as the cause which must be assumed for our explanation of the world. Religion, on the other hand, does not seek to explain the world theoretically, but seeks to establish a right relation between the feeling and willing Ego or the heart, and the world ; and this it does by referring man's own life with all that acts upon it from without, immediately to the world-ruling power. Of what nature this reference is and in what psychological states and processes it is accomplished, we have seen again and again, and our statement may in this place be brief. The basis is our feeling of dependence on a power which, if not always conceived as completely omnipotent, is yet regarded as an absolutely higher power, with regard to which there can be no resistance nor escape, and in whose hands are our weal and woe. It is very important that this basis of the religious consciousness should not be overlooked ; for it is just on the involuntariness of this sentiment that the necessity rests for entering into the religious relation. But it is equally certain that the feeling of dependence does not comprise the whole of the religious consciousness : in it alone there is nothing elevating or quickening or productive of happiness. But the human mind is so organised that

the feeling of the *dependence* of man's life on the world-ruling power naturally passes into the impulse to enter into a *living fellowship* with that power, in order so to preserve the freedom which threatened to be lost in that dependence, and not only to preserve it but to acquire it in reference to the finite powers. Thus the idea of the world-ruling power which accompanies the feeling of dependence is defined in a certain direction, and becomes fuller of meaning. For it is clear that we can only enter into such a communion with that power as shall further the ends of our own life, if it be the case that the nature and the will of that power are akin to our own and turned towards ours, so that we can find in it both a protection and a pattern of our human life and effort; *i.e.* that it is capable of becoming the object of our confidence and our veneration. The motive of the religious idea of God thus lies in the desire of the heart after living intercourse with God, or after such a connection with the world-ruling power as may raise our own life to his divine ideal and set us free from that dependence on the world by which we are oppressed; in short, in the desire for salvation with God.

If the motive of the idea of God is a different one in religion from that which it is in science, a further consequence follows. The formation of the idea must take place through different functions of our mental life in the two cases. In science logical thought advances step by step from one point to another, from what is given to the proximate and the ulterior causes of it. This process is guided by no feeling but that of logical compulsion or of the necessity of thought, which is not to be taken to be the same thing as practical motives, though the latter are added to and supplement the former where it does not of itself suffice. So far as scientific procedure is accompanied by a necessity of thought, to that full extent, but on the other hand no further, does its claim hold good that the knowledge to which it leads is objective and universally valid. But the sphere of that procedure is limited; in the highest regions it lacks that degree of definiteness and certainty which is requisite for practical interests. Religion, on the contrary, approaches its object not by the toilsome path of cautious and groping reflection and problematical hypothesis,

but with the bold confidence of the longing heart it *demand*s that object, *because* it has need of it, and as *it* needs to have it, matter and form immediately one, the demand of the heart clothed in the picture of plastic forming fancy. It is not with scientific reflection but with artistic intuition that religious productivity has most analogy. The producing organ is in both these cases freely working fancy, which is not bound by the laws of logic, and which deals with the representations given it by experience as it finds suitable to its own end, an end which does not consist in repetitive knowledge of that which exists, but in anticipatory formation of types of being. As the poet at one time embodies his inner life in living forms which he places in certain spots of space and time, as if they were historical persons, and at another time makes use of the men and the events of historical tradition as moulds into which he pours his own inmost life and effort and the life and effort of his time, thus causing the spirits of the past to rise again as witnesses for the ideals of the present and the future; just so does religious fancy set to work. The inner history of the pious heart, the common experience of enthusiasm in worship, the hopes of the church and the visions of seers, are dramatised as events of an ideal history, as miracles and revelations of higher beings, as the direct intercourse of God, conceived in the fashion of man, with certain favourites, as appearances of divine messengers and signs. And the real figures of historical tradition again are recast as types of the religious ideals of later ages, and that in a variety of forms which are then deposited one above the other like so many strata of the legendary tradition. This idealised history and those dramatised ideals are interwoven with each other and form that web of sacred legend and history, the clearing up of which is the problem of historical religious inquiry, a problem nowhere simple. But even the continuous government of God is figured forth by fancy with that free poetic intuition which everywhere overleaps the middle terms, apprehends each individual occurrence according to its ideal meaning for the heart, and hence refers it directly to a special divine activity and arrangement, so that the divine activity generally is invested with the character of the miraculous, of that which is raised

above the ordinary rules according to which things take place in the world.

In spite, however, of the close affinity between the action of religious fancy on the one side and poetical creation on the other, there is an essential difference between the two. In the case of the latter there is a clear consciousness all the time that the work is one of free creation, so that its products are not held to be objectively true, in the theoretical sense of the word ; in the former case, on the contrary, the creation is involuntary, and form and contents are so indissolubly blended in the process that the free creative activity is not felt to be producing the form at all ; the whole product, contents and form together, appears as a thing immediately given, and hence comes before consciousness claiming to be objectively true. Now it is clear that a picture of the world which has arisen in this way cannot possess objective truth, truth which all must recognise, in quite the same sense as the product of the effort after logical knowledge. And yet the claim it puts forward to be held true cannot be entirely unfounded, because it as well as scientific knowledge answers an invincible necessity of our mind. In what sense then is truth to be attributed to the religious picture of the world ? This question is by no means easy to answer, and requires to be handled very cautiously. Perhaps we may the more readily deal with it aright if we compare the "truth" of the religious view of the world not in the first instance with scientific but with æsthetic truth—only compare it, be it remarked, not identify it, and only in the first instance, not as if the comparison definitely concluded our inquiry !

When we speak of the truth of a work of art, *e.g.*, of a poem, we do not mean to say that it gives a logically accurate copy of reality, but that it really produces on our feeling that impression of the beautiful which art aims at, and thus really observes the laws of art or of beauty. Here too, accordingly, that is true which corresponds to the nature or the inner law of the matter in hand, that which is demanded by the *a priori* norms of the functions of our mind, the normal, therefore, the accurate as distinguished from the abnormal

or mistaken. But the function here called into play is a different one, not that of knowledge forming a copy of reality, but that of anticipatory (ideal) shaping or creating of form, and the norm of this function is naturally of a different kind, and the correctness or value of what is done here to be measured by quite a different standard from the former; what is æsthetically correct, or beautiful, is not the same as what is logically accurate or true (in the more restricted theoretical sense), nor yet with the ethically right, or good. Ultimately, however, all these three will be connected with each other, and must in some way agree together, since the norms of all the three functions have their roots ultimately in the same reasonable constitution of our mind, which cannot be at variance with itself. May it not be the case with regard to religious truth that it consists primarily in the rightness of the religious function, or in this, that the processes of feeling set up by religious ideas are such as answer to the norm of our religious constitution and correctly fulfil the end of religion? But the end of religion is not to bring our knowledge but our heart to reason, to make its feeling and its will harmonise with the reasonable will of God, with the dispensations and the tasks connected with his government of the world, and thereby to afford us full inner harmony and satisfaction. In that case we shall have to judge of religious ideas in the first instance according as they are serviceable to this practical end, and not according to their logical correctness; their "truth" will not consist for us in their value for theoretical knowledge but in their practical value for *edification*, i.e. in the degree in which they answer their purpose, in the normal character or the *piety* of the motives present in them; just as the æsthetic truth of a work of art consists in the *beauty* of the motives present in it, and the ethical truth of an ideal in the *goodness* of its motives. This is no mere comparison; the affinity between the religious and the ethical and æsthetic consciousness is so close and so essential that where one is normal the other will be so too; the practical truth of a religious idea or its value for edification is measured most directly by considering what good and beautiful motives it supplies to the heart. With respect to goodness every one will admit this, and after the discussions of the preceding.

chapter, we do not need to prove that goodness and religious truth are essentially one. But no excuse is needed for counting beauty also among the criteria of the value of religious ideas for edification. We have only to remember how close an affinity there is between the presentments of art and those of worship, and how closely the edifying and purifying impressions produced by a noble work of art verge on religious adoration. The more suited therefore an idea is to bring life into the heart, to attune it to harmony, to move it to joyous exaltation and devotion, in short, to "build it up" to genuine piety, the more reason have we to regard it as religiously correct and valuable, or practically true. This is in agreement with the famous proposition advanced by Spinoza¹ at the very threshold of modern philosophy of religion, that faith does not ask about the intellectual truth of dogmas but about the piety of them, *i.e.* their capacity for moving the soul to obedience.

But important as it is to have this cleared up, if we are to reach any proper adjustment of the relations of religion and science, we cannot fail to see that the question is by no means thereby settled. The case is not altogether the same in religion as in art. The æsthetic judgment attaches no importance to the theoretic truth of the matter, by means of which the impression of beauty is called forth, it is a mere means, without importance in itself, for this end. The religious man, on the contrary, assumes from the first and as a matter of course that all these ideas are theoretically true which he knows in his experience to be practically true or to possess the power of pious motive; the one kind of truth appears to him to be so indissolubly bound up with the other that he could not give up the theoretical truth of his ideas and doctrines without fearing to lose at the same time their practical saving power. Hence the zeal the churches exhibit for their dogmas, hence the unending conflict between religious tradition and science, whose search for knowledge necessarily causes her to traverse at every step the dogmatic view of the world which religion cherishes. With a view to the adjustment of this strife it has lately been proposed that the simplest plan would be to make a partition, science

¹ *Tract. theol.-polit.* xiv. (vol. i. p. 34 of this work).

taking charge of the province of the real, religion of the ideal. But experience shows that religion is not inclined to enter into any such arrangement, and at this we cannot wonder. If religion were to surrender the real meaning of her ideas, the idea of God first and foremost, she would be renouncing herself altogether. What sense could there be in the feeling of dependence or in that of trust in the divine government of the world, if God were nothing but a name for a subjective ideal, and there were no corresponding real power over the world? And the case is by no means so desperate as to oblige us to take refuge in such a radical proposal. If, as we have repeatedly seen, science herself, on her own path of logical knowledge, finds herself carried back to the idea of God, conceived in one way or another, because her thought of the world must be unfinished and unsupported otherwise, what right has she to assert that religion, which sets out just from this point, cherishes ideas devoid of all objective truth, which are a mere ideal creation of inventive fancy, a poetic fiction without any background of reality?

The fact that religion and science meet in the idea of God, suggests both the necessity and the possibility of a positive agreement between them. Only of course it must not be brought about too easily. The matter is not a simple one, as if when once we had vindicated the principle of the right of religion, all the ideas of the world cherished by faith might claim to be received just as they occur in the traditions of the positive religions, as objective theoretic truth and as the sole norm of the knowledge of the world. That would be to ask thought simply to accept, without examination, the intuitions of the religious fancy and the reflections of the theological intellect of past times; to renounce therefore thought's proper office. But while individuals can give up thinking, society cannot and must not do so, for thinking knowledge also is an essential part of our calling in this life, is a moral duty. And we have to add that the various religious doctrines which put forward such a claim are far from being agreed among themselves; to which of them then is the intellect to submit? To settle this point the intellect must at least examine by its own methods the various competing doctrines. But as soon as the attempt is made

to do so, it must appear that a distinction has everywhere to be drawn in these ideas between the real kernel of them and the symbolic form, that the truth of them is not to be sought in the letter but in the spirit.

In our age, however, there is no reason seriously to apprehend that secular science may feel herself obliged to submit to the dogmatic traditions of religion. A danger of another kind is much more to be feared. Religion having renounced the hope of controlling secular knowledge is seriously bethinking herself of guarding against the dangers which threaten her on the side of science by simply breaking off all connection with science and entrenching herself within the lines of positive tradition. The fight in the open is abandoned, the aggressive is exchanged for the defensive attitude, and all further difficulties are supposed to be at an end. Yet this supposed way of escape is found to be impracticable for two reasons. Though religion fenced herself off from science she would by no means get rid of the dangers which threaten her from that side, and she would expose herself at the same time to dangers of a yet more serious nature. She could not prevent irreligious theories from being disseminated in a hundred ways in the mind of the people and undermining the soil of religion. She would only increase this danger; by taking up a repellent attitude to the culture of the day she would make it impossible to come to terms with those elements of that culture which are legitimate and good, she would lose touch of the living present and weaken her educative influence on it. And finally, by shutting herself up against science she would ultimately sever the roots of her own knowledge too, would forfeit the ability to labour continuously at the tasks of self-knowledge and self-improvement, and would expose herself to the danger of being spiritually starved and frozen, and of a lingering death from the want of a fresh and living circulation.

If accordingly neither religion nor science can give up the claim to be in possession of truth, and if it is equally impossible that they should proceed side by side disconnected and indifferent to each other, there is nothing for it but that the relation between the two should be methodically regulated. This task belongs to the science

of religion, the only possible mediator between religion and science ; it must bring about a positive understanding between the two by showing how to distinguish in religion between form and content, between the symbol which possesses practical value and theoretical truth proper, between the changing and the permanent, means and end, letter and spirit. Our science treats religion after the same method which is applied to every other sphere of the mental life of man. It takes nothing for granted but that human nature throughout the whole race is what our own experience teaches us to consider it, an assumption certainly which cannot be proved, but which there is no authority for overruling, and which ranks as an axiom in every science, because no science of man would be possible without it. The field in which the science of religion has to seek its subject is at once the widest and the narrowest. It is the widest ; it must investigate religion in the whole course of human history, at least in all its characteristic and outstanding phenomena, and most specially in its primitive beginnings. As every living thing only unfolds its nature in the whole course of its development, and the law of development of the whole is more clearly apparent in its first beginnings, a scientific study of religious life cannot limit itself to a mere extract of that life, as it appears for example at its highest stage of development, without incurring the risk of uncritically taking the particular for the general, and regarding what is developed and complicated as if it were original and elementary. But if he is to find his way in this wide circle of external historical experience, in this chaos of manifold phenomena, and to understand the law in obedience to which religion has taken on such a variety of organic forms in faith and worship, the student of religion must also turn his eye on the narrowest field of observation, where alone he can have immediate experience of the religious life ; he must listen to it within his own breast ; he must have formed acquaintance in himself with the facts of the religious processes of feeling, he must have experienced in himself the action and reaction of inner needs and outer stimuli and motives, before he can gain an understanding of the powers which are at work in the history of religion. How superficial the study of

historical religion must be without this inner key may be seen from many of the works of positivist students, whose learned collections of materials sadly fail to compensate for that which they lack, viz., insight into the real essence of the matter in hand.

The science of religion accordingly has first of all to set forth its object in its becoming, in the history of religions. It must endeavour as far as possible with the help of the most ancient traditions, supplementing these by analogy, to penetrate to the beginnings of religion. It has then to trace the various paths of the development of religion in different peoples, and to describe and, if possible, explain the growth and elaboration of one religion, the stationariness or decadence of another, and specially the fact of the growth of the higher religions beyond their national beginnings, and the various factors which co-operated in their development. As it then compares the similar and the dissimilar phenomena of religions in detail, similarity, where it appears, gives occasion to infer inductively to general laws of development, while dissimilarity serves to determine generic differences, and individual characteristics. In both forms of procedure, however, there is need of the greatest caution, especially considering the state of modern inquiry in the detail of the subject, which does no more than tell us how little can be done in the history of religion with the classifications and types till now in use. Even in natural history notions of species which were hitherto regarded as fixed are now regarded as uncertain, and in the history of man's mental life we certainly must not attempt to force the stream of living development into a few bare types and categories.

The description of the rise and growth of religions necessarily comprises a judgment of them. And this judgment is the most objective of all, that namely of history itself, when it is pointed out with regard to different religions, whether their development showed them to possess a greater or a less power to live. When in the lower religions we see after a brief blossoming a retrogression and decay; if they were unable to renew themselves out of their own forces, and had to yield to higher forms of religion, their history contains the judgment that their value was but inferior, and all we have to do is

to point out the reasons of their limitation. And if the higher religions outside Christianity, Brahmanism and Buddhism, Judaism and Islam, show a certain tough vitality, and some of them a wide diffusion, but from certain points of time exhibit no further development, but are stationary for many centuries; if, unable to enter into the historical life of the peoples, and to renew their youth by taking up new ideas, they rather by their unchangeableness condemned the peoples which had adopted them to immobility, to incapacity for historical progress, to the death of all spontaneity, to a dull decline, in this we hear the voice of history itself pronouncing the judgment, that the truth which lay in these religions (for without some truth they could not even have continued to exist) is too one-sided, too limited to possess any real and permanent capacity for life. If, on the contrary, the Christian religion which proceeded from the prophets and apostles of the Bible, not only exhibited from the very first an unlimited impulse to spread, but also the capacity to enter into the life of the different peoples, in such a way as itself to grow in and with them, to take up into itself and to assimilate the best elements of their mental life, thus always growing richer itself in fruitful ideas and vigorous motives, and if in consequence of this inner fulness of life, it has always been able to surmount and to cure the defects, malformations, and sicknesses from which it too has suffered, and to issue with fresh youth and vigour out of every crisis; if history shows all this to be the case, then it manifestly furnishes us with the most brilliant and irrefutable apology for the unique superiority of Christianity to all the other religions. And if the past history of Christianity shows so unbounded a capacity of development, it would manifestly be very arbitrary to assume that that capacity is now extinct; on the contrary, everything tends to assure us, that the same law of development which in the past enabled Christianity to adapt itself to new needs as they arose, will not fail in the future to meet with and to satisfy the needs which may yet emerge.

For certainly the need of further development cannot be ignored, any more than the possibility of it can be denied. This too is a natural consequence of the development of Christianity up to the

present time. At its very inception Christianity took over from Judaism and worked out to a further stage a multitude of elements which, essentially belonging to a subordinate stage of the religious consciousness, had no inner connection with the new essence of Christianity, but were rather antagonistic to it. Then when it passed to the Gentile nations it took up into itself their culture and coined its own religious truth into scholastic propositions (dogmas) in the forms of the thought (philosophy) prevailing in the age. The picture of the world which came into existence in this way could not be expected to lay claim to absolute truth ; its theoretic truth stands or falls with its theoretic assumptions, *i.e.* with the philosophy and the knowledge of nature of the age of its origin. It is no doubt the case that at the renewal of Christianity in the sixteenth century its specific moral and religious truth in its simpler biblical outlines was once more placed in the foreground and made the central part of its teaching ; but not only did the pre-Copernican view of the world maintain its place with its far-reaching dogmatic consequences ; the traditional dogmatic apparatus was preserved almost unchanged, and was held fast by the church just as before, as her treasure of faith with which she must never part. Indeed, we see everywhere in the history of religion that the old is not laid aside as development progresses, but only placed somewhat in the background, so that though losing some of its practical authority it yet retains sufficient force to be brought forward again as an authority when occasion calls for it. Hence the strange mixture we find in all forms of religion which are somewhat developed ; the most various and heterogeneous elements lie side by side, true ideas and pure motives along with the most antique and superstitious ideas and usages ; a mixture which not only makes it very difficult to form a correct judgment as to the nature of a positive religion, but is also the cause of practical difficulties and collisions between the religion and the knowledge and sentiments of advanced civilisations.

Now, if it be the task of the science of religion to bring about an understanding between a historically given religion and the scientific knowledge of the day, it cannot possibly refuse to test religious

traditions in detail in order to find out how far they are in agreement with the laws of logical thinking and with the assured results of the scientific knowledge of the world, *i.e.* with natural and historical science. Whatever directly contradicts this knowledge, which possesses the character of objective truth, cannot be literally true, otherwise there would be two truths contradicting each other, which is unthinkable. Against this judgment there can be no appeal to religious feeling, since whatever the latter may declare applies to the practical value alone, or to the edifying nature, of religious ideas, which they may possess and often in fact do possess, although theoretically incorrect. Hence the task of the science of religion is by no means exhausted when it has merely tested the theoretical truth of religious tradition; it has not understood the real meaning of the ideas of faith at all if it has not understood the practical motives present in them, and brought to light those needs of feeling to which they correspond, the ethical effects which they produce, the states of the heart which they serve symbolically to express and to evoke. It is in virtue of this positive psychological understanding of religion that modern religious science is both much more thorough and far more open-hearted and tolerant than the Illumination of an earlier day, and these advances are mainly due to the genetic and comparative method. If it can be shown that similar ideas, *e.g.* of miracles and revelations, inspirations and incarnations, appear in the same way in different places and furnish expression to similar motives in religious psychology wherever they appear, then no one who has eyes can fail to see that these practical religious motives furnish a simple explanation of those ideas. Thus the *genetic* science of religion, by unsealing the psychological springs of religious ideas, renders the dogmatic explanations of older and of more modern scholasticism superfluous.

At the same time, this genetic (historico-psychological) explanation of religious ideas does not altogether complete the task of the science of religion. Other science, that which starts from the external world, is not complete till it has sought in the metaphysical idea of God the basis which may be believed to support the world it has

constructed, and for religious science the step from the phenomenological to the metaphysical inquiry is quite indispensable. Science seeks in every field not only to know how ideas arise in us subjectively, but also what is the objective background of them, the thing-in-itself which corresponds with them. Now, religious ideas have for their contents the relation between us and God, and the problem of religious science cannot be exhaustively solved without inquiring what is that fact which underlies this religious relation of which the idea exists in our minds, or how we are to conceive of God's relation to us, and since we are a part of the world, what is his relation to the world. Metaphysical *speculation*, therefore, must form not the beginning but the conclusion of religious science; just as the other sciences set out from the periphery of immediate experience, and the deeper they penetrate always approach more nearly to the central metaphysical questions, and at last to the one centre, the idea of God. Should it be objected to this speculative conclusion of religious science that no such conclusion is possible, because the subject of such speculation transcends experience, we have already shown that the objection, though it obtains credit for being inspired by sound criticism, is based on the uncritical assumptions of the popular consciousness as to what belongs and what does not belong to experience. It is correct to say, and it must be at once admitted, that in the inquiry after ultimate metaphysical grounds we must be more on our guard than in any other against the illusion of an "absolute knowledge." If religious speculation has frequently supposed that as God is given to us in immediate consciousness we can think of him, comprehend him, and describe him in immediate intuition, that was a mistake. What is immediately given to us in religious as well as in other experience is our own ideas and sensations merely; what underlies these in essence, metaphysically, can only be inferred, here as in every other province of experience, by thought, and the hypothesis which is reached in this way will only command a degree of theoretic probability in proportion to its fitness to explain the facts of consciousness, not only those of the religious but those of our whole consciousness, not only those of our individual, but those

of the universal human consciousness of all times. The latter point is frequently overlooked in religious speculation; it is disposed to believe that the religious experience of one's own person, or at least of the church, is quite sufficient to conduct us to a notion of God which shall be theoretically satisfactory and unconditionally true; it forgets that religious experience is only one particular extract out of the whole circle of the contents of our consciousness, which is to be explained by the idea of God in a manner satisfactory on all sides; and it forgets further that the content of our consciousness at this present time, even if we include our whole generation and the whole of its knowledge, yet forms a small extract merely of the contents of the consciousness of all mankind, a content which is constantly becoming and increasing. From the very fact, therefore, that the basis on which the supreme hypothesis must be established is so comprehensive and so little fixed, that it can never be given and surveyed in its entirety in our consciousness, it inevitably follows that the proof of the idea of God, at least in the theoretical way, can never get beyond a more or less high degree of probability, can never be advanced to absolute certainty.

But who bids us call a halt at the theoretical way? Did we not see above that what is lacking here is made up from the practical side? Will not an absolute certainty result after all, if the two sides agree? Yes and no, according as we think of certainty. Certainty in the objective sense of universally valid knowledge extends in every field just so far as our logical faculty of knowledge is accompanied by a necessity of thought. In this way we do certainly arrive at an idea of God, but in proportion as we seek to define the contents of that idea the difficulties increase, and the possibilities that it may be otherwise; and in the same proportion the necessity of thought grows less, and objective certainty along with it. That idea of God, on the contrary, which we postulate on practical grounds, carries always the greater conviction with it the more it satisfies the needs of our heart, the more definitely, that is, and with the more detail it is conceived; but on the other hand the conviction thus acquired is never any more than subjectively valid, *i.e.* it is a certitude of faith,

not of knowledge. This being the case, it follows at least that the two ways of knowledge seem to be intended to supplement each other. The more completely the theoretical and the practical idea of God, or in fact the scientific and the religious view of the world fit harmoniously into each other, the more will not only the subjective certainty of faith be strengthened because the doubt is disposed of which arises out of the gainsaying of thought, but that certainty will further acquire the weight of objective truth, at least to the extent that it is suited to be the common conviction of wider circles of men, and thus to be of the same practical service as absolute certainty. To establish such a harmony between the scientific and the religious view of the world is thus the indispensable task of the science of religion, which is called to act as a mediator between religion and science. But it must never be supposed, however satisfactorily the attempt to solve this problem may fall out in individual cases, that absolute truth has thereby been attained. On the contrary, it is part of the task of religious science to bring home to the scientific mind the fact that no absolute knowledge is possible. To us that impossibility follows from the simple fact that the natures of men are so different, and that development is going on so constantly not only in knowledge, but in the ideals men look up to, that the standards of judgment both of the theoretical and of the practical consciousness can never be the same for all nor long remain the same, so that no point of view can ever be found from which the two views of the world will coincide absolutely for all people and permanently. Hence the certainty which results from their hypothetical unity can always be an *approximate ideal* only, a *growing* and a *limited* one, never a *completed* and *absolute* one. It remains true, that we "know in part!"

This admission certainly has the advantage of preserving us from every kind of dogmatism, and from the exclusiveness connected with dogmatism. For this is the essence of dogmatism, that it takes conditional truths for absolute ones. Not without meaning are the names dogma, dogmatism, for the roots of the thing are not in

science, but in the practical interests which dogma, *i.e.* the mode of belief of a community attached to a positive religion, fixed by common consent, attempts to serve. It would, I consider, be of the greatest advantage to science as well as to the church that the difference between the interests and tasks on the one side and those on the other should be clearly understood, and the identification of the science of religion and of dogmatics, which has till now been usual, avoided in future. As dogma is not a matter of knowledge but a matter of faith, meant to serve the practical ends of a religious community, by affording the means for its religious consciousness to exercise and communicate itself in worship, dogmatic does not serve so much the purely theoretical ends of worship as the practical ends of the church; it is the technical doctrine of the proper treatment of the dogmas of a certain church at a certain time. Hence its extent is very much more restricted than that of the science of religion, it does not require to carry on a comparative study of religions nor to conclude inductively from the common elements in different religions to general laws of the development of the religious consciousness, nor to compare the peculiarities of different religions with each other, nor to appraise their value; it is called to confine itself to the church religion, including of course its biblical basis, and has first of all to set forth the doctrine of the church as historically given, and then to endeavour to exhibit it in a light suited to the times, *i.e.* in harmony with the present spirit of the church.

With a view to his discharging this service it will be of great advantage, if it is not absolutely necessary, that the dogmatist should also be a philosopher of religion, *i.e.* that he should have acquired the width and precision of view which the general science of religion is fitted to give, so that he may be able to distinguish those elements of the dogmatic statements of church creeds which form their permanent kernel, from those which are merely the vesture they assume at a particular period of history. From this critical task the teacher of dogmatic must not shrink, if for no other reason, yet because various interpretations of church dogmas have always appeared side by side in the church's history, the relative value of which he should

be able to appraise. To this it must be added, that scientific ideas are so universally diffused at the present day that even the body of the people in the church seldom feel quite at home in its dogmas, but frequently regard them with a distant and indifferent eye, if not even with aversion. If the student of dogma is to make the traditional doctrine of the church intelligible and practically useful to the mind of the present day, he must necessarily have an insight into the scientific consciousness of the time, he must possess the faculty of distinguishing the legitimate elements of it from such as are mistaken, and of seeing where it offers openings for the truths of religion. But this adjustment between religion and science we saw above is the specific task of the general or philosophical science of religion, and the latter accordingly is a part of the equipment of the student of dogma which he cannot safely neglect if he is to discharge his own task aright.

On the other side, however, it appears to me to be equally certain that he who deals with dogma must fail in the task properly belonging to him if he seek to translate dogmatic at once into pure philosophy or to trace dogmatic ideas to logical notions and convert them into philosophical formulas, which as they gain from the point of view of pure logic must necessarily become empty to the eye of religion and therefore dogmatically valueless. The practical motives and processes of feeling which we have everywhere seen to be the principal part of religious ideas, cannot be exhaustively or adequately set forth in logical categories, because they belong to another side of the mind than the theoretical, and all emotional life, the religious life not less than the æsthetic, withdraws itself from strict logical formula. This is most strikingly the case with the central Christian dogmas. The matter really in question in connection with the doctrine of redemption and of the mediator is as we saw above the experience of the elevating and emancipating impressions produced on the human heart by the contemplation of a personal ideal. When the christological formulas, which are nothing but symbolical forms for expressing and communicating these inner experiences, are converted into abstract philosophical formulas, the latter can neither

contribute in any degree to an understanding of the meaning of the dogma nor enhance its practical effects on the community in worship. And supposing it to be the case that the philosophical formula contained a fitting expression for the metaphysical truth underlying the dogma (as perhaps in the doctrines of God, creation, providence, and other dogmas which touch directly on the metaphysical sphere), it is yet in this scholastic form quite unintelligible and unprofitable for the community of the church, whose interests dogmatic has to study; and so in practice the philosophical formula must always be translated back again into the religious language of the people. But why this roundabout? Would it not be far simpler and more useful to put the religious meaning of the dogma at once into the form in which it will serve the practical purpose of the church, and in which it is intelligible to the mind of the church at the present day? This might be done in most cases by replacing the scholastic doctrinal formulas with the simpler statements of Scripture, which easily admit of being explained in the common language of modern cultivated people, and so made sufficiently clear, without the scholastic terminology of any system whatever, to the consciousness of the church at the present day.

But, it will be rejoined, what is to become, on these terms, of "scientific exactness"? for the phraseology of the Bible is elastic, and admits of various interpretations; biblical terms may be understood in a coarser or a finer way, more sensuously or more spiritually. Well, that is in my eyes an additional reason in favour of the religious expressions, against the philosophical expressions of dogmatic. Dogmatic, I said, ought to minister to the church life of the religious community. But that community comprises not only those who are adults in religion, but also those who are babes; and the language of worship and of religious instruction ought to be intelligible to the latter as well as to the former, ought to offer even to those who are far from standing on the pure heights of the religion of the spirit those effective and salutary motives of moral and religious education, by means of which they may be led forward step by step to purer dispositions and views. For this educational office,

which the church is called to discharge anew for each succeeding generation, she has need of various motives, both of finer ideas, and of those which are less fine, according to the varying character and stage of advancement in her pupils, but the more the former are blended with the latter, and both mingle immediately in one, the better will it be for the continuousness of the life of the community, the less danger will there be of disruptions of sentiment. Now these conditions are satisfied by the representations of the language of popular religion (which are essentially the same with those of the Bible), which admit of various interpretations, and are elastic and fluid; these answer the ends in view far better than the precise and accurately defined formulas of the language of philosophical notions.

And finally, the separation here proposed between the science of religion on the one hand, and dogmatic on the other, would be the simplest solution of that difficulty, which arises from the circumstance that while the church needs stability and permanence in her forms of worship generally, and particularly in the forms of belief which minister to worship, science is called to a perpetual advance. The former shrinks from being driven to and fro by restless doubt, and has a right to be saved from such a fate; she ought to rest, as she desires, in the possession and enjoyment of faith's certainty. Science, on the contrary, is neither inclined nor authorised to rest in anything that is given as if it were absolutely certain; she is driven by the spur of doubt to ever new inquiry, to labours always more comprehensive and more thorough. If the science of religion and dogmatic are immediately identified, the consequence can scarcely be avoided, that at one time the unrest of scientific doubt and inquiry, the strife of opinions, the change of systems will intrude into the church, disturbing and interrupting her religious life, while on the other hand the church's need of rest will threaten to arrest the advance of science, to interfere with her unbiassed investigation. If, on the contrary, the science of religion and dogmatic are distinguished from each other, the former can proceed unhindered on her advancing path, without entangling dogmatic and the church in all the doubts and crises of scientific work. Dogmatic will never

quite stand still ; her progress will only be the quieter and the more continuous because she is not driven by the spur of the pure impulse of knowledge, but carried forward by the stream of the common life which flows so quietly, so unceasingly, and in and with which the mind of the religious community too undergoes perpetual development. And thus dogmatic will agree with religious science in acknowledging the truth of the proposition that *in religion too all life is development, and all knowledge is in part.*

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